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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to analyze the necessities of Alevism as a belief and the 
limits of freedom that Alevis have had since the foundation of the Republic of 
Turkey to maintain and practice their cultural and religious components in between a 
laic state structure and traditionally Sunni Muslim society. It puts the debate on the 
limits of religious freedom of a certain group; this is to mention Alevis, in a laic 
state structure, which should aim to keep its distance to any religious identity with 
possession none of them on the center. This thesis focuses on the nonrecognition of 
Alevism and limitation of their religious freedom in a clash between traditional 
Ottoman-Islamic identity and laic republican one. Hence, the distinguishments aim 
to emphasize the place of Alevis in political history of the Republic of Turkey, 
which has been fulfilled with a concrete competition of two aforementioned 
identities, and to mention the difficulties that Alevis have faced with as a result of 
their officially unrecognized religious identity by none of the two identities and its 
consequent limitations. 
 
Keywords: Alevism, political history of Republic of Turkey, laicism, religion, 
political Islam 
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RESUMEN 
 
Este estudio tiene el objetivo de analizar las necesidades del alevismo como una 
creencia y los límites de la libertad que los alevís han tenido desde la fundación de la 
República de Turquía, al mantener y practicar sus componentes culturales y 
religiosos entre una estructura estatal laica y la sociedad tradicionalmente 
musulmana sunita. Pone el centro del debate en los límites de la libertad religiosa de 
un grupo determinado, es decir los alevís, en una estructura del Estado laico, que 
debe tratar de mantener su distancia hacia cualquier identidad religiosa, sin optar por 
ninguna de ellas. Esta tesis se centra en la falta de reconocimiento del alevismo y la 
limitación de la libertad religiosa en un enfrentamiento entre la identidad tradicional 
otomano-islámica y laica republicana. Por lo tanto, las determinaciones tienen el 
objetivo de destacar el lugar de los alevís en la historia política de la República de 
Turquía, que se ha cumplido con la competición concreta de dichas identitades, y 
hablar de las dificultades a las que se han enfrentado los alevís, como consecuencia 
de su identidad religiosa no reconocida oficialmente por ninguno de las dos 
identidades y sus consecuentes limitaciones. 
 
Palabras clave: alevismo, la historia política de la República de Turquía, el 
laicismo, la religión, el Islam político 
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NOTES ON TERMS AND TURKISH PRONUNCIATION 
 
As Turkey, both with its political history and being the recent homeland of 
Alevism, is the center of this study, official names have been used with 
abbreviations regarding their Turkish versions, with inclusion of their translation to 
the first usage of related names. Besides, private names of people have been kept as 
they are in Turkish in terms of special letters (ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş, and ü.), those do not exist 
in English language. Last of all, as translations cannot be sufficient for all the words 
of a language, some words are left with their Turkish versions, such as Imam-Hatip 
schools - a special version of religious vocational school. 
 
 
For the pronunciation of aforementioned additional letters, the information 
below will be beneficiary: 
 
Letter International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) Value Example 
   
c /ʤ/ As j in jump 
ç /ʧ/ As ch in church 
ğ N/A, although /ɣ/in some dialects Lengthens preceding 
vowel 
ı /ɯ/ As e in happen 
j /ʒ/ As s in pleasure 
ö /ɶ/ As oo in soot 
ş /ʃ/ As sh in ship 
u /u/ As oo in root 
ü /y/ As ü in über 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A.D. : Anno Domini (in the year of Lord) 
AKP : Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) 
ANAP : Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) 
AP : Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) 
B.C. : Before Christ 
BP : Unity Party (Birlik Partisi) 
CHP : Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) 
CKMP : Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü 
Millet Partisi) 
CMP : Republican Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi) 
DİB : Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) 
DP : Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) 
DSP : Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti) 
DYP : True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) 
EU : European Union 
FP : Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) 
HP : Liberty Party (Hürriyet Partisi) 
Ibid.  : Ibidem (the same place) 
MBK : National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) 
MDP : Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi) 
MGK : National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) 
MHP : Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) 
MNP : National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) 
MSP : National Salvation Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) 
MP : Member of Parliement 
MÜSİAD : Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) 
NGO : Non-Governmental Organizations 
PM : Prime Minister 
RP : Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) 
SHP : Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı 
Parti) 
SP : Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) 
TBMM : Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi) 
TBP : Turkish Unity Party (Türkiye Birlik Partisi) 
THK : Turkish Civil Aviation Foundation (Türk Hava Kurumu) 
TİP : Worker’s Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) 
TOBB : The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of 
Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği) 
TSK : Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Religion, or within a simplest approach, belief is an important component of 
individual life, as the need of believing in something is essential for human beings. 
Since the early ages of the history, belief has possessed significant importance, and 
within time, it has been evolved to systematically advance various belief systems 
such as monotheist and polytheist. Even, concrete belief systems have been divided 
into different sects. 
 
Religion as one of the basic components of individual life has affected social 
and political structure; hence, it has brought about new terms to literature. Among 
all, the idea of separation of church and state, in other words, laicism and/or 
secularism, has become one of the most discussed ideas when it comes to the 
relation between religion and politics. The occurrence of the idea of separation 
opened a new era in the history of the world regarding the way of dealing issues of 
individuals in terms of judicial, economic and political orders. 
 
 The idea of separation has been evaluated either positively or negatively; 
however, constitutionally or not secularism/laicism has been adopted into many 
Western states. Eventually, it caused a new understanding that argues 
Westernization, which was used synonymously with modernization in some certain 
cases as in example of the Republic of Turkey, is linked with secularism/laicism. 
 
The Age of Enlightenment carried Western civilizations a step forward of 
their time; consequently, the Ottoman Empire intended to adopt western style 
applications into its structure in order to maintain its existence. With the 19th century, 
modernization process based on western ideologies started to be carried out in the 
Ottoman Empire; however, it could not save its existence. Instead, it led to 
foundation of a new state, the Republic of Turkey. The newborn republic was aimed 
to be structured as a modern state at the level of Western civilizations, and in order 
! 2!
to achieve this level, laicism was put in the core of the reforms to draw an exact line 
between the Islamic Ottoman Heritage and the modern Republic of Turkey. In 
addition to free itself from Islamic identity with its certain superiority, the idea was 
to provide religious freedom for different groups of people with different religious 
identities; however, the limits of religious freedom could not include Alevis, who 
form a significant amount of whole population of the Republic of Turkey. Not only 
under the Ottoman rule that possessed the Caliphate, but also under the rule of laic 
Republic of Turkey, Alevism has not been recognized officially with its different 
characteristics from Sunni Islam, religion of majority of the population. Therefore, 
Alevis have not had a place to live their religion freely. 
 
 
Laicism of Turkey has been an issue that was favored by a significant 
amount of people; nevertheless, on the other hand, there has been always antagonist 
approaches regarding the way it applies to social structure of Turkish society. Under 
the Ottoman rule, due to its Islamic identity and the authority of Sultan-Caliph, 
patriotism was a concept that was evaluated with loyalty to Sultan and to Islam. 
With foundation of the republic, the importance of Islam was decreased by state 
authority; and instead of its usage for political power, it was taken under control of 
the state with adaptation of laicism into Turkish political structure. Hence, it cannot 
be considered as surprising to have antagonist approaches to laicism for one who 
was/is in favor of Islamic Ottoman identity.  
 
Turkish politics has been a scene that was shared by two groups possessing 
two different perspectives regarding real Turkish identity: on one side, the people 
supporting laic republican identity, and on the other hand the people yearning 
Islamic Ottoman identity. When the Turkish politics is considered within this frame, 
the conflict between these two perspectives gets clear with their different actors who 
have intended to take the power in order to apply their own perspectives not only to 
political but also to social structure of Turkish society. Three military interventions 
took place; various political parties closed; many politicians were banned from 
politics; and these have just been the most visible examples of unstable Turkish 
politics.  
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With shifted perspectives among political scenes, the politics has been re-
shaped each time and instability affected the social structure, as well. Within this 
complexity among political and social orders, Alevis have been the ones, who were 
not taken into account by any of the parts of aforementioned two different groups; 
although, Alevism possesses both laic republican identity and Islam in its distinctive 
character. In accordance with this, Alevis have had a lot of problems due to their 
different way of belief as a result of their official non-recognition and exclusion 
from the society. 
 
In Turkey, as a general perspective, problems of Alevis are considered that 
they have to be investigated by Alevi people, who have already faced with 
discriminative attitudes in their lives, in order to possess a realistic approach to the 
problems. However, as I see this argument unclear for an academic approach, I 
decided to work on this issue, not as an Alevi but as one whom grown up in a 
heterogeneous society in terms of religious diversity, in which both political 
ideologies and religious identities were hidden due to security issues. Apart from my 
neighborhood, with Alevi visibility among society and consequent press releases, 
Alevism with its differences from the majority succeeded to attract my attention as a 
topic that I was interested in. Alevism has been the topic that I have advanced my 
knowledge from scratch not only by witnessing personally, but also by reading and 
listening their way of understanding the world, the humanity, the politics and 
religion. With my increased interest, I wish to start my career about Alevism with 
respect to its distinctive character and historical evolution, and its place in a laic 
state structure with majorly Sunni Muslim society. The most interesting part of my 
curiosity has been that question: “How come they could not find a place in Turkish 
politics to secure themselves in the society, while being one of the most important 
supporters of laic republican part of the conflict regarding political power and its 
consequences among society? 
 
The idea of separation of church and state has been a topic that I have been 
interested, with different types of states and society. That interest of mine was 
concreted with my M.A. degree final project, in which I focused on the effects of 
religion on social and political structure. Hence, specialization with a concrete 
religious group in one of the most difficult examples, this is to mention the Turkish 
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laicism that has been the unique example with its majorly Muslim population and 
sometimes the inspiration point for many other Muslim societies, has become a 
further step of my academic career.  
  
Alevism has never found a concrete base for their distinctive identity in 
Turkey since foundation of the republic. Before I started this thesis, the main 
argument on my mind had been: “as a laic state structure should have responsibility 
to provide religious freedom, no matter how it applies laicism including taking it 
under its own control, the main question becomes how far it goes and can expand its 
limits for religious groups, with specific curiosity in Alevis of Turkey.” The title of 
this study has been composed as a result of this question and special interest: “How 
Far Religious Freedom Goes in a Laic State: Alevis of Turkey.” 
 
 
 This thesis examines many different questions of social sciences concerning 
religion, state-religion affairs, Turkish perspective of laicism and Alevism. These 
problems have been discussed for many years within various academic fields. As 
introductive basic information on different perspectives will be given to the lecturer, 
while every single of them has been analyzed with its details regarding 
interpretations of different scholars at the beginning of related chapter of the thesis 
in order to maintain continuity of the entire thesis. 
 
 The difficulty of defining religion has become the common point that many 
scholars have agreed. Most commonly it has been associated with individuals and 
their unanswered questions as stated Max Weber and associated with sacredness as 
Milton Yinger and Rudolf Otto argued. Besides, religion`s link with set practices has 
become another point that has been argued, as Emile Durkheim and Clifford Geertz 
analyzed. 
 
 With respect to effects of religion to different order, most salient and most 
relevant one with the purpose of this thesis has become its effects on politics. During 
the Age of Enlightenment, many contributions have been made with different 
perspectives. The separation of religion and state affairs have been argued by many 
different thinkers; however, the level that the religion should present on state has 
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possessed different interpretations. While, John Locke reduced the level of religion 
to individual base with arguing that it did serve for commonwealth, Montesquieu, 
contrarily, highlighted the necessity of a collaboration of religious institutes with 
state for the commonwealth. Voltaire claimed the necessity of religion; however, for 
the sake of stability of politics, he supported the idea of separation. As a different 
perspective; Rousseau separated religion into two different concepts, while one was 
concerning the individual, the other concerned the citizen with pointing out the link 
with individual and state. These ideas will be discussed with its details, in following 
chapters, under dedicated parts. 
 
 Turkish experience of laicism has become another problem that has been 
focused for the purpose of this thesis. Within this perspective, there are three 
different arguments regarding Turkish perception of religion-state affairs. While 
Niyazi Berkes argued that the concept of secularism would suit well with Turkey, 
Andrew Davison argued that, laicism is the exact description that would define the 
Turkish perception. On the other hand, Binnaz Toprak refered the Turkish 
experience as a semi-secular state as the state has its own interests in terms of 
controlling the religion. Control mechanism was pointed out by Hakan Yavuz and 
Bülent Daver, as well, for being a different characteristic of Turkish experience. 
Apart from different definitions, laiklik (laicism, in Turkish) has been referred as the 
base of democracy in Turkish experience, by Heinz Kramer, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı 
and Emre Kongar.  
 
 When Alevi discourses and demands are taken into account, it will be visible 
that the references have always pointed out the necessities and the right that Alevis 
should have possessed in terms of a laic state structure. There has been significant 
difficulties during the literature search regarding the sources about Alevism. It has 
been considerably difficult to find objective approaches among authors, most 
specifically among Turkish ones as they generally are Alevis, as the issue has 
always been analyzed within the basis of two-antagonist interpretation regarding 
Alevism. According to the one of these approaches, Alevism was the part of Islam; 
hence, they are all welcome to benefit from Turkish social and administrative 
structure based on Sunni superiority. On the other hand, distinguishments have been 
made with exaggeration due to sentimental approaches with respect to second group 
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interpretation. On this point, sources of foreign authors can be considered as more 
objective; however, on these sources, the history of Alevism, and its place in laic 
structure under the pressure of majorly Sunni society have been overlooked.  
 
 Alevism has been highlighted with its significant differences those should be 
taken into account for their official recognition, by Umut Azak, Heinz Kramer, 
David Shankland, David Zeidan, and Ali Balkız, as contrary to the Islamic scholars 
those inviting Alevis to follow Sunni Islamic practices as the differences were the 
outcomes of lack of religious information. Among all authors that have investigated 
the issue of Alevism in many different academic fields, the great contribution of 
Martin van Bruinessen and Irène Mélikoff to the literature should be emphasized. In 
the meantime, different perspectives of these two experts of Turkology should be 
mentioned as well. While Bruinessen constructs the identity of Alevism among the 
Kurdish ethnicity, Mélikoff based her studies with the center of Turkishness. 
 
 With this study, making considerable contribution to the literature within a 
historical perspective regarding the unrecognized Alevi identity and the limitations 
of their religious freedom in between a laic state structure and Sunni Muslim society 
is aimed with intention to fill the gap.  
 
 
This thesis touches different fields of social sciences within different 
perspectives on different chapters of entire thesis, including introduction to 
sociology of religion and politics, history and political science with the help of 
statistical information. The main subjects that will be discussed are the Turkish 
politics and the conflict between laicism and Islamic conservatism and the Alevis 
with their distinct character in between. Apart from the main subjects, this thesis 
also discusses the role of belief in individuals` life, its intervention into politics, 
French model of laïcité, and French political history in order to highlight and to 
form background of the aforementioned main arguments within different 
perspectives. 
 
This thesis analyzes its two main arguments within the perspectives of 
religious freedom. For the first subject, the laic state structure and the way it deals 
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with Islam among political scenes after the Islamic Ottoman heritage will be 
discussed in order to understand the limits of religious freedom within a wider 
perspective for the entire society. For the second subject, Alevism will be focused to 
see if its adherents have been granted with freedom with respect to aforementioned 
limits of a laic structure. In order to do so, the cultural components and detailed 
historical references will be given for Alevism.  
 
Due to limitation of religious freedom as a result of being an unrecognized 
belief system, Alevis have possessed two different courses of action with respect to 
their life conditions under the rule of the Republic of Turkey. Within this 
perspective, chronological approach is possessed in order to divide these two 
actions: remaining in secrecy as they did for centuries under Ottoman rule and 
becoming visible as an organized and mobilized society. As Alevis have become 
more and more public, Alevism became a topic of debates regarding its distinctive 
syncretic structure, and it started to be discussed stronger than before within two 
different perspectives that governments and Alevi communities possessed, which 
have always been antagonist. The question is whether Alevis will be able to find a 
base for their identity both in political and social structure of Turkey to expand the 
limits that have always been obstacles for their religious freedom under a laic state 
structure. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the status of Alevis in Turkish political 
and social orders with respect to historical references in order to highlight the 
problems of Alevis within an academic perspective with probable solution proposals. 
In order to do so, the Turkish political history will be analyzed with details 
regarding the conflict between laic republican identity and conservative one. With 
detailed analyzes of the Turkish politics within the frame of political struggle based 
on Islamic references and Alevism, this thesis is planned to serve to two different 
aspects regarding laicism in Turkey: a general critic for the way of application of 
laicism and its consequences among political and social orders; and with a specific 
point of view, the relation between Alevis and laic republic, problems that Alevis 
have faced and the way the state have dealt with these problems (if there has been 
any initiative). However, this thesis does not aim to discuss any theological aspects 
regarding Alevism to see or to decide whether it is a religion itself or not. Opponent 
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perspectives of different authorities will be given; nevertheless, the aim will not be 
further than to discuss the differences of Alevism from the majority religion of 
Turkey, this is to say Sunni Islam, and its place in a laic state structure with 
difficulties that Alevis have faced with. 
 
This thesis, with all its arguments, may lead to future studies regarding the 
future of Alevis, who left their secrecy behind and manage to mobilize within more 
organized groups day by day, and the future of Turkish politics with a more 
conservative society. At the writing time of this thesis, under the rule of Justice and 
Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Government, with a neutral 
working group a new constitution is being prepared and laicism and the official 
status of Alevis, unsurprisingly, have become two important issues that are being 
discussed. No matter how the negotiations end, it seems that these two subjects will 
be discussed a lot in near future. Hopefully, this thesis will lead any future academic 
studies concerning the Turkish laicism, its evolution within time and the place of 
Alevis.  
 
 
 Laicism in Turkey, and the place of Alevis in this laic state structure have 
been discussed for many decades in social sciences. This thesis has been composed 
for the purpose of analyzing three hypotheses connecting to each other with 
significant points. 
 
The common hypothesis about laicism is that the term laicism, which is 
derived from secularism, should provide religious freedom for all religious identities 
within state. However, in Turkish understanding, as well as in French experience, it 
has obstructed and limited the religious freedom by taking it under the control of the 
state. Hence, instead of concrete religious freedom, laic state intends to take it under 
its own control and intervenes into religious life of individuals. With respect to state 
control mechanism, within time, the Republic of Turkey became the power that 
assigns Sunni Islamic religious authorities as control mechanisms at social level. As 
the religion is one of the elements of one`s private life, this intervention to religious 
life does not suit with the ideal laicism, and Alevis could not find religious freedom 
to live their private life properly. The Turkish understanding of laicism could not 
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embrace Alevis due to its limits on religious freedom. What have Alevis 
encountered within this limitation of religious freedom? 
 
Secondly, Alevis, the case study of this thesis, have been facing problems 
based on their religious differences not only in the Republic of Turkey`s 
understanding of laicism, but also in the Caliphate of Ottoman Empire. The “new” 
and the “old” state structures created two dominant identities (laic republican 
identity and the traditional Islamic Ottoman) among the population, which have 
been in clash. Within this clash, Alevis have never found the base for their 
distinctive religious identity in Turkish society. The common belief about Alevism 
is that, it possesses Islamic elements with their distinctive interpretation; and in the 
meantime, Alevis have been supporters of modern-laic republic. This belief put 
Alevism in discussion of does Alevism a branch of Islam or a total different religion. 
As stated earlier, this thesis does not seek to answer this question. It accepts the 
reality of Alevis in Turkey and tries to reflect their position in the identity struggle. 
As the political system does not let Alevis to be a player in political arena with their 
own political parties, they have always been forced to choose a side in political clash 
of two aforementioned identities. What were the reasons behind Alevis` choices? 
Because of this situation, Alevis could not become a shaping political player and 
were seen just as electorates by political parties, which have been formed around 
two dominant identities. Consequently, this caused that the demands of Alevis have 
not heard enough. Within the perspective of demands, what do Alevis ask for: 
privilege or equality? What are the efforts of AKP Government? 
 
Lastly, the heavy control of religious affairs by state agencies and the 
undeclared promotion of Sunni Islam created prejudgments in the minds of Sunni 
majority of the diverse population regarding Alevism. As these prejudgments had 
been inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the supporters of traditional Islamic 
identity in Turkey considered Alevis as perverted Muslims, infidels, and even the 
enemies of Islam. The problems of daily life between Sunnis and Alevis forced 
Alevis to hide their religious identity in the Ottoman Empire, and in the Republic of 
Turkey. The prejudgments that Sunnis had, and still have caused discriminated 
actions at individual level and tragic events in the history of the region and 
continuous disappointments of Alevis.   
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Within these three main hypothesis and the questions that already asked, this 
research tries to answer the main question, which is also the title of this thesis: “How 
far religious freedom goes in a laic state?” Even with taking this question a step 
further, the part conclusion reflects how a laic state should position itself for diverse 
religious groups. 
 
 
This thesis has been structured to find the answers of aforementioned 
questions and to analyze aforementioned hypothesis. With respect to its structure, 
qualitative research methods, such as field study and observations, and in-depth 
literature search have been carried out.  
 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis has focused on two issues: the identity clash 
in Turkish political history and the place of Alevism in the said clash. Hence, there 
has been two parts differentiated with respect to their methodologies. For the first 
part regarding the Turkish political history around the clash between laic and 
conservative identity, the literature search has been the main method that has been 
used. In addition to that, I have taken advantage of personal observations as the 
representative of qualitative research methods. For the second part, as Alevism has 
been a hidden identity maintained in secrecy for centuries, written sources could not 
be sufficient to understand and to explain the identity with its distinctive 
characteristics. For that reason, qualitative methods including personal interviews 
and observations have been the main method that has been used in addition to the 
literature search. 
 
Regarding the literature search, several libraries have been investigated for 
the related sources in various languages, in multiple cities in three different 
countries, such as Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, Library of Bilkent 
University in Ankara, Library of University of Mersin, Library of Çukurova 
University in Adana, Library of Istanbul Kultur University, Biblioteca de la 
Universitat Rovira I Virgili in Tarragona, Biblioteca de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
in Barcelona and the CCUC (Catàleg Col·lectiu de les Universitats de Catalunya). 
Additionally, related sources can be classified as primary sources, such as European 
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Union Reports, State Constitutions and official reports of the Republic of Turkey 
regarding Alevi Initiative, and secondary sources, including books, M.A. and Ph.D. 
thesis, academic and newspaper articles. Among all, it is important to emphasize 
frequent usage of newspaper articles regarding the recent events. Besides, the usage 
of newspapers helped to understand instant reflections of certain events of the 
history within different interpretations of two dominant identities.  
 
For the field study, the representatives and the chairpersons of Alevi 
foundations were selected as the target group in order to have a general opinion of 
different Alevi groups with respect to their ritualistic components, explanation of 
difficulties faced with and the way that they make themselves heard by the 
authorities. In order to fulfill this part of the research, six representatives and 
chairpersons and authors were contacted in Ankara and Mersin (Turkey) between 12 
and 20 April 2011. The questions for interviews were composed in order to obtain 
information for different groups of Alevis with their self-definition and self-
placement in the clash of identities. In addition to the interviews, personal 
observations have been done regarding Alevi visibility among society, individuals’ 
opinions for Alevism including Sunni people, and last of all, I have attended one of 
the most important Alevi meeting during the period of 60th Turkish Government’s 
Alevi Initiative, in Ankara on 12 April 2011. The transcripts of the meeting and the 
interviews with the questions are included to this study as appendixes. In addition to 
the visit to Turkey for the interviews, an in-depth literature search was carried out 
regarding the French experience of laïcité for three months in Paris. 
 
 
 The place of Alevis in between of two antagonist dominant identities in the 
Republic of Turkey and the limits of religious freedom for their case have been 
analyzed within three main topics. The three topics have a strong connection among 
themselves, although they seem entirely at first glance. These three topics are 
religion and state affairs, Republic of Turkey and place of religion, and Alevism: 
unrecognized identity. 
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 After the introduction part as the first chapter, religion and state affairs have 
been focused as the second chapter, in which the term of religion is analyzed within 
a historical perspective and its effects on political structure in order to arrive at the 
idea of separation of church and state. After this point, the French Revolution and its 
aftermath have been analyzed to clarify the evolution of French laïcité, which has 
been the inspiration point for Turkish understanding of laiklik, with its history, and 
most specifically with clashes between traditional Catholic identity and the laic 
republican one.  
 
 For the third chapter, an in-depth analyze of Turkish political history has 
been made in order to clarify the clash between two identities. For this analyze, 
governmental implementations and discourses referring any of these two identities 
with significant limits for the other have been taken into account and chronological 
perspective is intended to given to the lecturer, for the purpose of a background of 
clashes affecting religious freedom of individuals. Within this clash, the political 
parties formed around two dominant identities have been discussed in details in 
order to clarify the groups that Alevis have taken side with, which is a part that is 
examined in fourth chapter. 
 
 In the fourth and the last chapter before conclusion, Alevism has gotten 
under the spotlight with its historical evolution including its components adopted 
from different belief systems in order to analyze their syncretic belief system. After 
detailed information regarding Alevism, the place of Alevis in the Republic of 
Turkey in between the clash of two dominant ideas and the religious freedom that 
they have been provided so far have been analyzed within chronological order and 
with respect to the information that had been given under the third chapter. In other 
words, within this chapter, the clashes those had been explained in the third chapter 
form a basis for the changed limits of Alevi freedom within the frame of 
governmental implementations and consequent social changes. As this chapter has 
been composed for the case study of this thesis, significant issues have been 
examined in order to clarify the position of Alevis up until the present time. 
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 This study have been concluded with the help of the information that had 
been analyzed under three chapters in order to analyze the hypothesis those were 
given above and to answer aforementioned questions. 
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2. RELIGION-STATE AFFAIRS 
 
 Throughout history, human beings have accumulated their knowledge as 
answers to their questions regarding to issues related with many different aspects of 
life. However, individuals could not be capable of finding answers for all their 
questions; hence, these questions have been conveyed to supernatural beings, which 
or who was more powerful and capable than human beings.  
 
 To believe in supernatural beings can be considered as a premature approach 
for the concept of religion, which has been shaped in many different ways within the 
history. While some religious systems have been composed by human beings in 
order to give a better world view to their adherents with the help of their founders’ 
teachings, such as Manichaeism and Buddhism, some religious systems have been 
believed as the teachings of God, the supernatural being himself, instead of human 
being founders, such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Although the forms have 
been varied, religion has played significant role in human beings’ life. For this 
reason, role of religion has been analyzed within many different perspectives by 
various academics, it was even discussed that religion was capable of forming the 
culture of a society, itself.  
 
 Religion, in fact, has been a set of rules providing order for societies 
involving different aspects of life such as social, economics, legislative and political 
ones. Even further, religion possessed politics, and accordingly, the relation between 
state and religious authorities could not be maintained reasonable. Eventually, the 
idea of separation started to be discussed in order to end conflicts between these two 
powers, and secularist/laic approaches were emerged for the purpose of protection of 
individuals from religious oppression, protection of religion from politics and 
protection of politics from religion.  
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 Today, the idea of separation is applied as laicism or secularism in various 
countries’ political systems, generally in Western world, as a component of modern 
politics. This is the exact point that suits with the purpose of this thesis. Within this 
chapter, role of religion and its effects on political structure will be analyzed in 
historical process as the basis of laicism and state’s approach to religious freedom 
for better understanding of the case study of this thesis, which is the place of Alevis 
under the rule of laic republic and in between two dominant antagonist identities and 
the limits of religious freedom that they have been provided. 
 
2.1. Religion 
 
 The term religion has been defined by Western scholars for many years in 
many different ways. For instance, religion has been intended to be examined within 
sociological, psychological, philosophical, anthropological and ethnological 
perspectives; however, every single perspective dealt with the term within 
necessities of its own field and with domination of any sacred concept such as 
unconditional obedience, belief, supernatural almighty beings and gods.1 In fact, due 
to existence of different belief systems and worship methods, defining religion is 
quite difficult. Furthermore, definitions often begin with an assumption of what a 
religion is and is not. Within this perspective, religion will be discussed with its 
different aspects and historical development under this part of this chapter. 
 
2.1.1. What is Religion? 
 
The word religion, etymologically, derived from “relegere” according to 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C.-43 B.C.), with the meaning of “go through again, 
read again” as the word “relegere” is divided as re- (again) and legere (read). 
However, as a different perspective, many modern scholars, for instance Tom 
Harbur and Joseph Campbell, connect it with “religare”, which means, “to bind fast” 
via notion of “place an obligation on” or “bond between human and gods”.2 On the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Baki Adam and Mehmet Katar, Dinler Tarihi (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Açık Öğretim 
Fakültesi Yayınları, 2005), 17. 
2 Tom Harpur, The Pagan Christ (Toronto: Walker & Company, 2005), 260. 
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other hand, another possibility is being discussed with reference to “religiens” which 
means “careful” as contrary of negligens.3 
 
Far from an academic approach, religion is defined as following in 
Encyclopedia Britannica: 
 
“Religion is human beings’ relation to that which they regard as holy, sacred, 
absolute, spiritual, divine, or worthy of especial reverence. It is also commonly 
regarded as consisting of the way people deal with ultimate concerns about their 
lives and their fate after death. In many traditions, this relation and these concerns 
are expressed in terms of one’s relationship with or attitude toward gods or spirits; 
in more humanistic or naturalistic forms of religion, they are expressed in terms of 
one’s relationship with or attitudes toward the broader human community or the 
natural world. In many religions, texts are deemed to have scriptural status, and 
people are esteemed to be invested with spiritual or moral authority. Believers and 
worshipers participate in and are often enjoined to perform devotional or 
contemplative practices such as prayer, meditation, or particular rituals. Worship, 
moral conduct, right belief, and participation in religious institutions are among the 
constituent elements of the religious life”4 
 
This is not only a very simple, but also a clear definition of religion. This 
definition points out the relation between human and the ones considered sacred and 
the components of a religion. However, as it was mentioned, it is far from an 
academic approach. Hence, it will be beneficial to examine the term within scholarly 
perspective. The term is being defined by many different scholars in many different 
approaches. The definition that will be intended to be given within this part of the 
thesis will be the substantive meaning of the religion. Due to that purpose, basic 
sociological approaches will be given; however, most specifically historical 
perspective will be discussed.  
 
 Although religion has a very long history, there has not been any universally 
agreed definition of religion or an adequate one, as it was mentioned by W. Cantwell !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “religion,” (1 May 2013)  
<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=religion>.  
4 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "religion," (5 May 2013) 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/497082/religion>. 
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Smith.5 Additionally, Max Weber mentioned that the examinations regarding what 
essential character of religion was would not be a correct approach for the definition 
of religion. 6  These handicaps lead examination of different perspectives with 
different reference points regarding religion. 
 
 Difficulty in defining religion led scholars to orientate to various reference 
points on their own definitions. For instance, Emile Durkheim focused on sacred-
unsacred issue in his studies regarding religion. He stated that a religion was a 
unified system of both beliefs and practices related with sacred things, and Church 
was the community united by beliefs and practices. He also added that the beliefs 
were related with well-defined practices.7 
 
Clifford Geertz defined religion as a system of symbols, which stands to 
compose a powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in human. 
He pointed out the way of this composition as a formulation of conceptions of a 
general order of existence and varnishing them with an aura of factuality to make 
them seem realistic.8  
 
Milton Yinger, as another example, mentioned that religion was a system of 
belief and practices. With this system, in other words with religion, groups of people 
intend to struggle with ultimate/unsolved problems of human life.9 Similarly, Talcott 
Parsons defined religion,  
 
"as a set of beliefs, practices, and institutions which men have evolved in 
various societies, as far as they can be understood, as responses to those aspects of 
their life and situation which are believed not in the empirical-instrumental sense to 
be rationally understandable and/or controllable, and to which they attach a 
significance which includes some kind of reference to the relevant actions and 
events to man's conception of the existence of the "supernatural " order which is 
conceived and felt to have a fundamental bearing on man's position in the universe !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (San Francisco: Harper, 1978), 11. 
6 Ünver Günay, Din Sosyolojisi (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2008), 211. 
7 Meredith McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987), 11; 
   W.S.F. Pickering, ed., Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1979), 93. 
8 McGuire, Religion, 11-12. 
9 Ibid., 12. 
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and the values which give meaning to his fate as an individual and his relations to 
his fellows."10 
 
As it is visible, Parsons also focused on a unity of belief and practices. The 
institutions that he mentioned should have been Churches, within a general 
perspective, as the evolvement of individuals was mentioned. 
 
Rudolf Otto based his definition on an “experience of sacred”, which was 
also accepted by Joachim Wach.11 While, Edward Burnett Tylor pointed out the 
basis of religion as “the belief in spiritual beings”, Weber distinguished the 
connection of religion with supernatural events, like a reference to unsolved 
problems of human beings.12 On the other hand, Peter Berger possessed a different 
approach on his studies regarding religion, which was the “humanistic behaviors 
combined with sacredness”.13 Similarly, two Turkish scholars focused on sacredness, 
supernatural beings and problems of human beings. Ali Fuad Başgil defined religion 
as a sacred law that was accepted mentally and sensed by spiritually by individuals 
within a simple approach.14 Hüseyin Akyüz pointed out the spiritual and mental 
approach with his definition of religion, as well. He defined it as a set of rules, 
which helps individuals to achieve happiness by gaining the consent of a 
supernatural power with mental and/or spiritual orientation.15 
 
With respect to mentioned definitions, religion can be based on belief within 
a very simple perspective, as it generally refers to supernatural beings, in other 
words, gods who are accepted without a concrete proof. As mentioned by Karl 
Jaspers, gods are accessible only through faith and obedience, as they do not possess 
reality for human beings.16 For various times, problems of human beings were 
pointed out as the reason of relation between individuals and supernatural powers.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Ibid.,11-12. 
11 Joachim Wach, Din Sosyolojisine Giriş, trans. Battal İnandı, (Ankara: AÜİFY, 1987), 17. 
12 Yümni Sezen, Sosyoloji Açısından Din: Dinin Temel Sosyal Müesseseler Üzerindeki Tesirleri 
(İstanbul: MÜİFY, 1988), 30. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ali Fuad Başgil, Din ve Laiklik (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınevi, 1962), 63. 
15 Hüseyin Akyüz, “Toplumsal Bir Kurum Olarak Din.” Türk Yurdu 204, no.24 (2004): 24. 
16 Karl Jaspers, The Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy (London: Yale University Press, 
2003), 41. 
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Religion, or as a simple approach, belief, has been a component of human 
life within a long history. With the time passing, problems and/or necessities of 
individuals have varied from one to another; consequently, religion demonstrates 
variety and splits into different faiths. For instance, there are religions without any 
founders, such as Hinduism; without any understanding of a sacred god, such as 
Buddhism; or with monotheist or polytheist approaches. Even monotheist religions 
vary with different perspectives of practices and god figures.  
 
2.1.2. A Historical Approach to Religious Systems 
 
The variety in religious systems should be examined within a historical 
process in order to see the relation between change in time and necessities, and 
emergence of different religious systems. 
 
Apart from the relation between change in necessities of human beings and 
religions, there is another approach regarding the variety of religions in world 
history. As religion has been connected to social order against chaos and mentioned 
as an accumulated experience of human beings by scholars,17 it was distinguished as 
an order, from which human beings cannot be distanced; instead, a religious system 
was shifted with a new one.18 Acceptance of either way will lead this part to a 
historical approach to world religions in order to see differences in religious orders. 
 
History of religion goes back to the first written records regarding religious 
components of life. However, the remainders of Neolithic people’s settlement in 
Çatalhöyük (central Anatolian historical settlement in Turkey) were studied within 
religious perspective and considered as proof of existence of religion even before the 
first written records. Çatalhöyük was seen as the spiritual center of Anatolia with its 
well-formed female figurines, which represented female deity of Great Goddess. 
These figurines were found in grain bins, and that was connected with ensuring or 
protecting harvest.19 Due to security issues regarding food supply, Neolithic people 
believed in figurines, which were referred as God. However, a systematical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Betty R. Scarf, “Dine Sosyolojik Yaklaşım: Öncüler.” trans. Bünyamin Solmaz, İlahiyat Dergisi 7 
(1997): 154. 
18 Şemsettin Günaltay, Dinler Tarihi (İstanbul: Kesit Yayınları, 2006), 71. 
19 James Mellaart, Çatal Hüyük: A Neolithic Town in Anatolia (Michigan: Thames & Hudson, 1967), 
181. 
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formation of religion cannot be found in mentioned figurines; instead, that can be 
considered as a simplest approach to a protector. 
 
Within the time of written records, the most important period with respect to 
history of religion was accepted as Axial Age, between 800 and 200 B.C.20 The 
period has been highlighted due to simultaneous enlightenment in different 
geographies with various approaches regarding spiritual components of life. 21 
During Axial Age, many different systematic belief systems were occurred, such as 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism in the Far East, Zoroastrianism and Judaism, as 
representatives of monotheism, in the Middle East and Persia.  
 
The aftermath of Axial Age witnessed emergence of Christianity, 
Manichaeism, Tengriism, Shamanism22 and Islam. All these were born in different 
geographies; however, they were in interaction for a long time due to clashes 
between different groups of people through wars, invasions, migrations, etc. For 
instance, Shamans were in conflict with Buddhists, Taoists, Muslim and Christians 
as a result of Mongol invasions. Muslims were in conflict with Hindus in Indian 
subcontinent and with Zoroastrians in Persia during Muslim conquests. Christians 
were in conflict with Jews in the time of Crusades, Reconquista and Inquisition, and 
with Muslims during Byzantine-Arab Wars, Crusades, Reconquista, and Ottoman 
era.23 
 
Interaction between different religious systems brought about the emergence 
of religious syncretism. Due to relation with outsider groups as a result of invasion 
or migration, people intended to maintain their original cultural components while 
being affected from different ones. Eventually, within a long process like decades or 
hundreds of years, different belief systems occurred with inspiration of various !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Chad V. Meister, Introducing Philosophy of Religion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 9-11. 
21 Jaspers, The Way to Wisdom, 98. 
22 Shamanism is not a religion but a spiritual calling. It is based on the philosophy that everything is a 
part of the Creator - every tree, every creature, the elements, the sun, moon, the planets, even the four 
elements themselves. Everything is sacred and behind what appears to the external observation as 
inert or mindless, is a supportive energy that is not only intelligent but cognisant and communicative. 
Source: “About Shamanism,” The Globalight Experience, n.d.,  
<http://www.globalight.com.au/healing.html> (1 May 2013). 
23 Alexander Smith, The Holiest Lie Ever: Glorified by Myths, Mysticism, Symbolism, Rituals and 
Traditions (Bloomington, IN: Trafford Publishing, 2012), 10. 
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religions without turning into none of them. Religious syncretism is basically 
defined as a fusion of diverse religious beliefs and practices. 24  For instance, 
Manichaeism is one of the syncretic religious systems. Manichaeism was founded 
by Mani, who was accepted as an Iranian prophet, as a combination of Christianity, 
Zoroastrianism and Buddhism; hence, Manichaeism became a different religious 
system composed by significant components from listed religions. Alevism, which 
forms the case study of this thesis, is also a considerable example for religious 
syncretism. Formation of Alevism from diverse religious systems will be examined 
with details within a dedicated part in following chapters. 
 
Religion has been a fact in individual’s life and it has been carried by 
mobilized people to different geographies. As a consequence of interaction between 
different groups of people, new religions or religious components were introduced to 
diverse geographies. Within this context, what has been the role of religion within a 
society? What are the effects of religion in different orders? 
 
2.1.3. Effects of Religion 
 
Religion has been defined within different perspectives as mentioned above; 
however, in every single definition, individuals form a significant part of belief 
systems. Hence, mutual effects between religion and individuals’ life become 
unavoidable facts. This connection between religion and individuals is considered as 
the way of life. 
 
A reference to “way of life” demonstrates another connection, which is 
between religion and culture. Culture, which is a recently occurred term, is an idea 
as a witness of the great changes, which occurred in all ways of social life. Clifford 
Geertz explained culture as; 
 
“(...) There is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture. Men 
without culture would not be the clever savages of Golding’s Lord of the Flies 
thrown back upon the cruel wisdom of their animal instincts; nor would they be the 
nature’s noblemen of Enlightenment primitivism or even, as classical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "religious syncretism," (1 May 2013), 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/497438/religious-syncretism>. 
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anthropological theory would imply, intrinsically talented apes who had somehow 
failed to find themselves. They would be unworkable monstrosities with very few 
useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and no intellect, mental basket 
cases. (...)”25 
 
Therefore the idea generates a concept, which provides a principle of 
unification for people, through the time and the world, as religion did.  
 
Relation between religion and culture has been studied by different scholars. 
For instance, Malory Nye distinguished the relevance as “The religious life is the 
cultural life, one’s religion not only emerges from one’s culture – religion is 
culture.”26 With this comment, Nye pointed out the connection between culture and 
religious life, which can be defined as the practical way of religious system. He 
distinguished religion as the only component, even further, as the exact same 
concept of culture. However, as it is a subjective issue, there should be different 
perspectives. Hence, apart from being the culture itself, religion should be taken into 
account as one of the components of human life.  
 
Durkheim stressed that religion played a significant role as a reason of 
solidarity of individuals in the society in 19th century. He added that religion 
strengthened morals and social norms and provided social control within a society.27 
In 20th century, Weber mentioned that religion was a pivotal component of social 
structure and culture.28  
 
Religion and culture, or way of life has been connected even further, 
sometimes these concepts taken into account as one. This is, as mentioned, a modern 
approach that started to be discussed since the last three centuries. However, with 
different examples, religion can be associated with diverse orders, such as economic, 
juridical, and political, or with treatment methods. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Chris Jenks, Culture (New York: Routledge, 2005), 6. 
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Shamanic culture, for instance, has been a method used for special 
treatments both in history and in present day. On this point, components of 
Shamanism serve as a part of medical service. On the other hand, there are more 
influential examples regarding religious influence on different orders. 
 
Belief systems and religion have been effective on economic issues through 
money. For instance, in ancient times Christian Church had some actions, which 
were related with money. In New Testament, money was described as a path to evil 
and as a master in competition with God.29 Besides, for Islam, money is the way to 
wealth, which should be gained in Islamic way.  
 
Today, Islamic implementations can be monitored within a new capital 
system with the name of Islamic banking system. While conventional banking 
system is based over interest and credit, in Islam there is no place for interest. This 
was the reference that the Islamic way of gaining money points out. According to 
Islamic rules, a Muslim cannot deposit his/her money to an account with interest. 
Additionally, he/she is not allowed to make any investment to haram sectors, such 
as alcoholic drinks, pork, porn or gambling. Even, it is not allowed to be involved in 
a system, where money is used for listed sectors. Due to that necessity, Islamic 
tradition had created its own banking system: Interest-Free banking. According to 
Interest-Free banking, profit sharing system is used instead of interest, and the 
deposited money is invested in helal sectors with guarantee of official acts with 
respect to Islamic Law (Sharia) and its practicals.30 The origin of Interest-Free 
banking does not go far in history. System started to be used in late 1940s, and today 
it functions not only in Muslim countries, but also in laic or secular countries such as 
Turkey, France, United Kingdom and United States of America.31 
 
Economic rules have been arranged within a juridical approach in Islam; this 
is to say that Islam possesses a legislative characteristic to deal with judicial issues, 
as well. Religious law of Islam is named as Sharia law. According to Islamic faith, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Sharia law is responsible for managing different issues including religious, 
economic, legislative and political issues.32 Sharia law is believed as an expression 
of God’s command for Muslim society. Hence, the law forms a path leading 
Muslims towards an expression of conviction in this world for the purpose of 
goodness in the other one, as meaning of the name sharia, which is the path leads to 
watering place.33 Today, Sharia law is in function in many Islamic countries. 
 
Involvement of religion into political order is an important theme that should 
be focused with respect to the purpose of this thesis. Within diverse historical 
processes, both Christianity and Islam had involved, and still involve, into politics. 
The reason why two religious systems are being examined is to enlighten the 
process between religion and politics in order to give a background for the process 
of laicism and secularism, which is one of the basic issues that this thesis focuses on.  
 
If the history of Christianity and Islam are taken into account, two different 
processes will be appeared. Christianity, on one side, was born to a, relatively, well-
organized state, to the Roman Empire; hence, relation between religion and politics 
were cut at the time of Jesus with his notable saying: “So give back to Caesar what 
is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s.” Islam, on the other hand, was born to an 
unorganized political structure in Arabian Peninsula, where the tribal sovereignty 
used to play significant role among political order. Accordingly, while Christianity 
did not use to possess a political functionality, which was already set under the rule 
of the Roman Empire, Islam created its proper state and became more than a 
religious system, which manages the relation between two worlds. Islam became a 
way to govern a state in order to fulfill the lack of a mobilized society.34 Therefore, 
Islamic states were born, and these states were governed within an Islamic 
perspective, under the sovereignty of Allah. On the other hand, there is one thing 
that should be distinguished on that point. Although, Christianity was born 
independently from politics, within three centuries, Christians mobilized and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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institutionalized the Church with political, juridical and social power. Due to 
increased numbers of Christians and a systematic formation of Church, in 381 A.D., 
Christianity was accepted as official religion of Roman Empire by Constantine, and 
religion involved in politics with an official base.35 Within time, religion possessed 
dominance over politics; consequently, popes gained more power over kings. The 
crown ceremonies, in which kings were crowned by popes, is a significant example 
for the mentioned dominance.36 After different historical processes, today, Vatican 
City stands as a unique example with Pope, who holds both religious power for all 
Catholic people around the world, and political power for the state. 
 
According to Islam, political concepts, such as a juridical system, leadership 
with Caliphs, were already included in Islam traditionally.37 Hence, within the 
established Islamic states, Islamic seminaries (medrese) were built in order to 
provide Islamic education and to educate Muslim scholars. Sharia was constituted 
with Muslim judges (kadı), states were governed by Caliphs, and with all these 
components, political Islam was applied. As sovereignty belongs to God in political 
Islamic perspective, Caliphs were the successors of God for the implementation of 
his justice, and representatives of this sovereignty.38 Briefly, the political order of 
Islam demonstrates no difference between religion and politics.39 With the title of 
Caliph for leaders and all listed implementations, Ottoman Empire was a 
considerable example for political Islam. Today, the title Caliph does not exist; 
however, political Islam is being applied in different states, either directly with its 
entire components, or indirectly with implementations. 
 
2.2. Separation of Religion and State Affairs 
 
During history, different political systems have occurred and they have all 
interacted with the sociological conditions of the time. As it was mentioned, religion 
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has been a significant component of culture not only in individual but also in social 
levels. Unavoidably, political systems have been affected by religion, as well. 
 
Religion should be considered as an important component of life with being 
guidance both in human and social behaviors. Within the perspective of political 
system, it has been the tool to construct social order with its rules and control 
mechanism. On this point, it is possible to distinguish three different forms of 
religion-state affairs based on different levels of involvement of these two 
components.40 These three forms are theocratic system, in which the government is 
under the rule of religion, like in the example of Vatican City or in the example of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran; semi-religious system, in which the state accepts a 
religion as official state religion, for instance the former Ottoman Empire; and laic 
and/or secular system, in which religious and state affairs are separated with 
different approaches, like the secular United States of America (USA) and the laic 
Republic of Turkey. 
 
Separation of religion and state emerged as an idea in the 17th century, and it 
has been generally associated with John Locke. As it will be mentioned, his idea was 
about limitation of responsibilities of Church and disallowance its intervention to 
commonwealth. His idea regarding this separation was supported during the Age of 
Enlightenment (during the 17th and 18th centuries) within different levels. Charles 
Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued the 
separation and its necessities. Ideas of these intellectuals will be analyzed one by 
one. 
 
Age of Enlightenment has become a considerable point for the World history 
with a scientific and reformist perspective, which took place of dogmatic and 
traditional ideas. First Europe, then American colonies were affected from 
mentioned scientific approach within different orders. Among all, separation of 
religion and state was one of the ideas of this period. The idea was taken into 
account as one, separation of Church and State, in order to decrease and/or cut the 
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political power of Church; however, two different approaches emerged after this 
period. 
 
 Separation of religion and state affairs is named as secularism or laicism with 
respect to different experiences. This separation, either laicism or secularism, plays a 
significant role on today’s Western politics. Many times these two terms, secularism 
and laicism, are used on behalf of the other; however, it will not be wrong to claim 
that they are not exactly the same terms.  
 
Between laicism and secularism, there is a difference, which keeps them 
from synonymous usage. Laicism is a political theory aimed that focuses on 
separation of politics and religion. On the other hand, there is a direct or an indirect 
control mechanism of state authorities via ministries or committees over religion. 
Secularism can be defined as an advanced version of laicism within the perspective 
of relations between state and religious organizations. Different from controlling 
religion, secularism is more far aimed, which is to say, secularism does not interfere 
to the freedom of religion both in public and private life.41 Two different approaches 
regarding separation of religion and state were distinguished by T. Jeremy Gunn 
with these two different cases; 
 
"Unlike France, where "laicite" might have the connotation of the state protecting 
itself from the excesses of religion, the term "religious freedom" in the United 
States would be more likely to have the connotation of religion being protected 
from the excesses of the state. Thus Americans are more likely to be predisposed to 
have suspicious about state laws regulating religion while the French are more 
likely to be suspicious of an absence of regulation of religious activity. At least this 
is the theory.”42 
 
Within this part of the thesis, two different approaches will be given with 
brief descriptions, the evolution of laicism within French political tradition since 
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French Revolution will be analyzed and discussions regarding compatibility of Islam 
in a laic structure will be focused. 
 
2.2.1. Secularism and Laicism 
 
 Within the history, there are many terms underlying pivotal evolutions. 
These kinds of terms, generally, are possessed by individuals unconsciously and 
lead to evolutions. The idea of separation of church and state relations should be 
considered as one of these concepts. It emerged in western political structure and 
possessed an important role as an ideological term. 
 
The idea of separation is, generally, associated with European Enlightenment 
of 17th and 18th centuries, in which French Revolution of 1789 was an important 
milestone. Although France possesses a different approach to religion-state affairs -
this is to mention laicism - in its actual political structure, role of French Revolution 
on the evolution of secularism is significantly considerable. In this part of this thesis, 
two different approaches will be analyzed with differences. 
 
 Secularism, etymologically, is originated from “sæculum”, which is a Latin 
word meaning age, generation, and one belongs to this world.43 Within a general 
perspective, secularism is separation of religion and state affairs in governmental 
level, and it points out undistinguished distances to each religious system, including 
atheism. In other words, secularism highlights the right to be free from any religious 
rule and the right to freedom from governmental pressure regarding any religion 
over its citizens within a neutral state to different belief systems.44 
 
Secularist approach includes various perceptions. With respect to one of 
these approaches, made by George Holyoake, secularism is a code of duty, which is 
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founded on evaluations based on perspectives of human beings free from religious 
point of views.45  
 
Within historical evolution of secularism, it will be beneficial to highlight 
Locke’s explanation about the term. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke 
stated that; 
 
“This only I say, that, whencesoever their authority be sprung, since it is 
ecclesiastical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in 
any manner be extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing 
absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both 
sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things 
most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their 
original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different 
from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical office he be 
dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church and faith either of 
liberty or of any part of his worldly goods upon the account of that difference 
between them in religion. For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole Church cannot 
by any ecclesiastical right become lawful to any of its members.”46 
 
He made his statement with respect to Bible’s sentences with many 
references. The reason why he distinguished the importance of separation of church 
and state in 17th century can be defined as necessity with a very simplest approach. 
Social conflicts of England during mentioned period emerged due to the clash 
between these two institutions, state and church; for that reason, the only way to end 
the conflicts was the separation of them. In the same letter, Locke also pointed out 
the freedom of individuals regarding ceremonies. Within this point, the only 
responsibility of Church was mentioned as; 
 
“The only business of the Church is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns 
the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony be there !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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made use of. Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious 
assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any 
man.”47 
 
Briefly, perception of Locke regarding separation of church and state has 
been an important milestone for the actual concept of human right as a matter of 
freedom of conscience.  
 
 On the other hand, Montesquieu highlighted the importance of Church 
within state structure as long as it supported obedience to the authority and played 
significant role in order to provide public order.48 According to the model of 
Montesquieu, the church and the state are two distinct institutions that should work 
within an exact harmony in order to generate good citizens for the commonwealth.49 
 
 With respect to aforementioned definitions, secularism is an order and a 
concept based on science, causation and experimentation, on which states are built, 
instead of a dogmatic belief. In the modern age, general perspective is the 
superiority of a political structure, which legally guarantees the idea of freedom and 
equality, than a political structure that puts religious dogmas and wills of kings or 
any clergy in its center.  
 
 The idea of separation of religion and state was developed within two 
different aspects, as mentioned above, and secularism is one them. The term laicism 
should be analyzed with its background, as the second approach. Etymologically, the 
word laic is a direct usage of French word “laïque”, which is originated from Greek 
“laikos” that means belonging to the people (with relation to “laos” meaning 
people).50 In French, the word laïcité has been used for the separation of religion and 
state affairs shaped within a proper historical process. This French term cannot be 
translated into English with an exact word. Generally, the translation is made as 
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secularism; however, as these two terms have been evolved within two different 
perspectives, they cannot meet at the same meaning. 
 
 Separation of religion and state was carried out by the purpose of securing 
the allegiance of individuals to the republic. Within the historical context, it aimed 
to break the dominance of Catholic Church over political order. During the French 
Revolution, with providing private spheres to individuals regarding their religious 
identities, state maintained undivided loyalty of citizens to the nation. In other words, 
religion was swept away from political sphere to private one. This implementation 
also aimed to protect individuals from the claims of religion. 51  With this 
characteristic, laicism separates from secularism; because, (Anglo-American) 
secularism aims to protect religion from the state and to protect state from religion; 
on the other hand, in (French) laicism, the state intends to protect individuals from 
religion in addition to mutual protection of religion and state.52 Therefore, within a 
laic structure, individuals are protected from dominance of any religious system with 
the help of equal conditions regardless of any recognized privilege to any part of 
society due to religious preferences.53 
 
 Voltaire, who is accepted as one of the most important influencers of French 
Revolution,54 pointed out the unnecessity of dogmas that led to intolerance, in order 
to stop the conflicts. According to him, the reason of intolerance was the dogmas 
emerged with Christianity with significant reference to the Catholic Church. The 
intolerance was an outcome of dogmas and consequent conflicts. Hence, less 
dogmas, less conflicts.55 
 
 With significant critics to the Church, Voltaire, in one sense, pointed out the 
necessity of religion, which was one of the basic components of a society within 
Voltaire’s interpretation. Religion was a tool to provide public order.56 On that point, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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similarity between Montesquieu and Voltaire attracts the attention. These two 
intellectuals meet at the necessity of religion. However, within political perspective, 
Voltaire supported the separation of church and state in order to provide a stable 
political structure free from religion based dogmas.57 
 
 In The Social Contract, Rousseau pointed out two different perspectives 
regarding the role of religion. He stated that; 
 
“Religion, considered in relation to society, which is either general or particular, 
may also be divided into two kinds: the religion of man, and that of the citizen. The 
first, which has neither temples, nor altars, nor rites, and is confined to the purely 
internal cult of the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality, is the 
religion of the Gospel pure and simple, the true theism, what may be called natural 
divine right or law. The other, which is codified in a single country, gives it its gods, 
its own tutelary patrons; it has its dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed 
by law; outside the single nation that follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel, 
foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of man extend for it only as far as its 
own altars. Of this kind were all the religions of early peoples, which we may 
define as civil or positive divine right or law.”58 
 
With this statement, Rousseau separated religion into two different spheres, 
that is the private and the public spheres. Within this context, religion of the man 
was a matter of private sphere; on the other hand, religion of citizen, in other words 
the civil religion, was a composition of divinity of a religion and the love of country 
for the sake of the nation. 
 
Rousseau, additionally, discussed the source of sovereignty, which should 
have belonged to the people. Rousseau formed a chain starting with single law and 
ending with sovereignty. According to him, laws were the basis of legislative power, 
and there should be no law without ratification of people. Hence, the legislative 
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power, as a composition of laws, should belong to the people. At the end of the 
chain, he mentioned legislative power as the only source of sovereignty.59  
 
With respect to the aforementioned chain, it will not be wrong to claim that 
Rousseau took the sovereignty from God and handed it over the people; although, he 
did not made any direct references for the shift. He just pointed out how sovereignty 
should be understood without any previous source of it. However, for a classical 
approach regarding religious power over politics, both the power of Church in 
Medieval Europe and the power of Sharia in political Islam, the sovereignty used to 
belong to God and his representatives, this is to mention Pope or Caliph, who were 
responsible to constitute it. Within this interpretation, the shift of the source of 
sovereignty was a significant point for the separation of religion and state. 
 
2.2.2. Evolution of Laicism: From French Revolution to Fifth Republic 
 
French Revolution was started as an opposition to significant power of 
clergy among social, political and economic orders on 14 July 1789.60 Hence, it was 
a revolution against the monarchy; however, with the ideas of mentioned 
intellectuals regarding the separation of church and religion, opposite movement 
aimed to remove Church from political order.  
 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des droits 
de l'homme et du citoyen) of 26 August 1789 was significant to understand the aims 
of the opponents and the aim of the Revolution. It was a declaration of 17 Articles 
distinguishing the liberty and rights of individuals. Among them, the 10th Article 
was a considerable statement regarding the freedom of conscience. According to this 
article “No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his 
religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order 
established by law.”61 With this article, as René Rémond stated, the ties between 
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Catholicism and political society were cut, in other words, people of France were 
relieved from religious identity.62 
 
Aftermath of the Revolution, various implementations were carried out by 
the National Constituent Assembly (Assemblée Nationale Constituante). It worked 
between 1789-1891, regarding the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, most specifically its 10th Article. In order to sweep away the power of 
Church from political order, economic sources were cut. For instance, special taxes 
collecting by the Church were annulled on 4 August, and Church’s assets were 
nationalized on 2 November 1789.63 With these implementations, it was not only the 
economic power that the Church lost, but also its independence; as, it became 
dependent on the state economically. Besides, the new Assembly intended to 
reorganize the structure of Church in order to establish a new order compatible with 
the new regime. However, according to some scholars, this intention was not about 
the compatibility of the Church; instead, it was an initiative to gain certain control 
over the Church.64  
 
Reorganization of the Church, in fact, was a considerable step in order to 
change the balance of power. Eventually, on 24 August 1790, Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy (Constitution Civile du Clergé) was accepted, and according to it, 
bishoprics were established for each Department; bishops and priests were to be 
elected locally, and to be assigned by the archbishop; accordingly, authority of Pope, 
who had had the responsibility to assign, was to be reduced to be informed regarding 
local elections’ results, and Assembly of French Clergy (Assemblée du Clergé de 
France) was annulled. Abolishment of the Assembly was not welcomed by the 
clergy, obviously. It was considered as another step to deprive Church from its 
power and liberty. On the other hand, according to the Constituent Assembly, it was 
the gallicanism, in other words, nationalization of the Church.65 Therefore, the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy should be accepted with entire loyalty by clergy. On 27 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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November 1790, the Constituent Assembly made a call for the oath of members of 
clergy; however, there were only seven bishops responded to call.66 That was the 
point that the polarization started among clergy. Due to a campaign carried out by 
Pope against these seven bishops, they were excluded from the society; and 
eventually, they were excommunicated. This campaign was supported by the 
members of clergy, who refused to oath for the Civil Constitution. 67  This 
polarization among loyal members of clergy to the Civil Constitution with support 
of the Constituent Assembly on one side and opponent members with the support of 
Pope on the other, lasted until 1793 within a bloody conflict.68 
 
Implementations of the Constituent Assembly were, obviously, against the 
political power of the Church, and the idea of separation of church and state was the 
inspiration point of this movement. However, an entire separation was not a point of 
achievement; instead, control of state over religious issues was intended. Therefore, 
with the origin of a separation idea, it was a shift in power. On the other hand, 
making an evaluation of laicism with respect to actual perspectives regarding 
religion and politics would be an anachronistic approach, as it was highlighted by 
Rémond. Nevertheless, as an unavoidable fact, the process played a significant role 
in history of politics regarding the actual concept of laicism, like a primitive 
approach. 
 
With the abolishment of kingdom and the establishment of republic, on 10 
August 1792, various implementations were carried out by the Legislative Assembly, 
which was on duty between October 1791 and September 1792. With these new 
implementations, the Church was disqualified from its responsibilities regarding 
birth certificate, marriage and divorce, and listed issues were carried out within civil 
laws regardless from the Church.69 Besides, in order to reduce the importance of the 
Church, Gregorian Calendar was annulled; instead, French Republican Calendar 
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(Calendrier Républicain Français) was applied on 5 October 1793. Additionally, 
festivals of Republic were popularized instead of Catholic festivals.70 
 
During the process of separation, different religious approaches were 
intended to be popularized. First, the approach was considered as concrete hostility 
to religion; then, it shifted to a perspective, which was suggested by Rousseau, it 
was the religion of the citizen. According to this perspective, limited freedom was 
provided for the religion. With respect to this limitation, on 22 July 1794, tolls of 
church bells were prohibited.71 
 
 Polarization between supporters and opponents of the new regime could not 
be dissolved until the time of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821). He ended the 
conflicts with a special agreement with Catholic Church known as Concordat of 
1801, on 15 July 1801. Concordat was applied until 1905, and according to it, the 
idea of separation of church and state was abandoned; Catholicism was accepted as 
the religion of majority; and members of clergy was started to be paid by the state, 
since they were accepted as officers.72 Besides, clergy was not the only group, who 
were started to be paid by the state; instead, the religious functionaries of four 
different religious groups, which were recognized with the Concordat: Catholicism, 
Judaism and two different sects of Protestantism. Hence, they started to be 
considered as public servants. The rest of the functionaries from different religious 
groups than in the four listed, were not under control of the state, were not paid by 
the state, but were provided tolerance regarding their distinct religious identity.73 
 
 The process of laicization was significantly strict regarding religious issues, 
including religious education. However, with the Second Empire of N. Bonaparte, 
the Church was allowed to be involved in educational order, and on 15 March 1850, 
primary school education became mixed, in which some of the primary schools were 
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72 Baubérot, Dünyada Laiklik, 58. 
73 Robert, Batı’da Din-Devlet İlişkileri, 45-47. 
! 38!
under supervision of the state, but some of them were given to supervision of local 
priests with Falloux Laws (Loi Falloux).74 
 
 Education was an important tool regarding the leaning of head of states. 
Hence, many implementations were applied to the educational order; consequently 
the responsibility of supervision of schools were handed over many times between 
state and church within time. The Church was in good relations with the Second 
Empire, due to provided rights, recognition and the official intervention in the 
education system. However, the Third Republic of France (1870-1940) possessed an 
approach based on separation of church and state, and reorganized state’s relations 
with the Church. Within this perspective, religious freedom and neutrality of state 
were provided once again with respect to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen. In this process, education system, once again, was changed with 
respect to shifted perspective of state. Jules Ferry Laws were adopted to education 
system in 1882, in order to laicize it. According to Jules Ferry Laws, education 
system was unified and became laic, in which entire supervisory responsibility 
belonged to state, and mandatory system was applied. 75  Within time, laic 
republicans gained more power over politics with increased support of society. 
Between 1901 and 1904, religious foundations were either closed or given under 
state control; religious schools were closed; and with order of the Minister of Justice, 
court rooms were cleaned from religious symbols, as the crosses were removed.76 
 
The year 1905 possesses significant importance regarding the separation of 
state and religion, because of the 1905 French law on the Separation of the Churches 
and State (Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État). 
With the law, which was applied on 9 December 1905, state ensured the freedom of 
conscience with its First Article and within a general perspective, religion lost its 
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importance among society, and independence of citizenship from religious identity 
was provided.77 
 
Separation Law was interpreted as an assertive secular approach due to its 
strict rules based on cleaning of public sphere from religious components. In fact, 
that cannot be considered as a surprise, because when the conditions of the period 
are taken into account, strict separation would be the only way. On one side, there 
were the supporters of the old regime, in which the Church possessed social and 
political power, on the other hand, there were the supporters of the new laic regime. 
Since, the second group was on the power, it was unavoidable to apply an assertive 
way of the separation.78 
 
The strict separation of church and state, in fact, was not an unfamiliar 
concept for France, as Civil Constitution of the Clergy was adopted more than a 
century before the Separation Law. Hence, Catholicism was not the basic 
characteristic of France anymore; however, there was not an intention to popularize 
a republican civil religion as it was done with Civil Constitution, either. Briefly, 
Civil Law can be considered as an inspiration point for the Separation Law; however, 
it would not be true to claim considerable continuity between the two of them.79 
Instead of any religious identity, laicism was popularized as the basis of France. As 
they succeeded to do so, after a century, in 2003, then French President of Republic, 
Jacques Chirac, was to distinguish laicism as the core of French republican identity 
with this statement: “Laicism is in our veins. It has been the core of our republican 
identity.”80 
 
Separation Law had been discussed strongly, it was not welcomed instantly; 
however, the Constitution of 1946, which led the establishment of the Fourth French 
Republic (1946-1958), with its laic structure was not reacted negatively. As the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 “Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat,” Le Service Public de la 
Diffusion du Droit, n.d., 
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80306> (2 May 2013) 
78 Kuru, “Dynamics of Secularism,” 170,  
79 Rémond, Religion and Society, 43. 
80 Jeremy T. Gunn, Din Özgürlüğü ve Laisite: ABD ile Fransa Arasında Bir Karşılaştırma, trans. 
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Church did not stand against the constitution, laicism gained base among the 
society.81 
 
In 1958, politics of France witnessed another new constitution that led to the 
today’s Fifth French Republic. Laicism was implemented as one of the main 
characteristics of the regime in the constitution, which was composed with 
significant references to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 
France was defined as below in the First Article: 
 
“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall 
ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race 
or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis. 
Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts 
as well as to position of professional and social responsibility.”82 
 
With the First Article, laicism was highlighted with the equality of citizens 
regardless of their religious identity. In the Third Article, which is “National 
sovereignty shall vest in the people, who shall exercise it through their 
representatives and by means of referendum.”83, sovereignty was given to the people, 
which is another proof of laicism. Within the same system laic education was 
applied and freedom of conscience of individuals was guaranteed.84 For the financial 
issues of functionaries of religious groups, state has not been involved in salaries of 
any of them. For the implementation of this rule, Separation Law of 1905 has been 
effective.85 
 
 Today, in France, the state is involved in some of the religious activities, 
such as financial support for the buildings, which handed over to religious 
authorities only if they were maintained as public assets; providing social security 
for the religious functionaries; tax reduction for the favor of religious foundations; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and special allowance for higher education within religious perspective unless it is 
for the commonwealth.86  
 
Discussions regarding the clash of power between Church and state was 
dissolved with the 20th century step by step. However, due to the strict prohibition of 
religious components from public sphere in France, led to a shift of the basis of 
discussions and the parts, who were the clergy and republicans before, changed. 
Today, discussions are being carried out between supporters of assertive secularism, 
in other words traditional French laicism, and supporters of passive secularism, who 
are in favor with secularist idea without state control over religion. For instance, the 
law regarding the prohibition of “conspicuous signs” of religions in public schools, 
which was applied on 15 March 2004, was discussed a lot between these two groups. 
According to the Law; 
 
“In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing 
which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations is prohibited. 
Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion 
with the student.”87 
 
The aim was to prevent students wearing skullcaps, turbans and headscarves 
of Jewish, Sikh and Muslim students. However, it has been an issue regarding the 
limitation of freedom of individuals due to their religious identities. While the 
supporters of laicism were in favor with the law, the law was criticized for being 
against the human rights.88  
 
2.3. Separation of Religion and State: Compatibility with Islam? 
 
The critics regarding laicism are an issue not only in France, but also in 
Turkey. However, there is one thing that should be distinguished for these two states. 
Although, they are both laic states with respect to similar interpretations of laws and 
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constitution, the religion of the majority of society differs, Catholic Christians and 
Sunni Muslims. As the revolution that led to possession of laic idea was carried out 
in a Catholic society, it is important to examine the compatibility of laicism and 
Islam. 
 
Islam, traditionally, has been considered as a set of rules or a comprehensive 
worldview governing both personal and political aspects of life, as it was mentioned 
in previous part. Within this perspective, Islam, as contrary to Christianity that 
became the base of separation idea, has intended to sanctify political system based 
on religious order. Consequently, the idea of separation of religion and state has 
been considered as a threat to assimilate religion of Islam. Besides, there is no such 
instruction regarding mentioned separation in Islamic society, as distinct duties of 
God and Caesar in history of Christianity. 
 
Laicism was started as a rebel movement to the dominance of Catholic 
Church in Europe, and concluded after a process of Enlightenment, which brought 
about thinking based on scientific interpretations instead of dogmas of Church. 
However, in Islamic history, there has been no such rebel movement against the 
authority, which was the Caliphate before its abolishment, then, to the Islamic rules, 
such as political Islam, Sharia, or economic ones.  
 
With the Age of Enlightenment, Western societies integrated the idea of 
laicism/secularism; consequently, there is not insistence of an exact religion to 
individuals. With the loss of Church’s dominance, dogmas, which were the obstacles, 
were swept away and scientific perspectives gained more importance. Additionally, 
as the sovereignty was handed over from God to people with laicism, democracy 
was framed as a modern approach to political scenes. Hence, the will of people 
possessed significant role in evolution of actual concepts, such as modernity and 
democracy. 
 
Briefly, the idea of separation of state and religion has been interpreted as 
two distinct ways. According to the Western world, laicism or secularism has been 
related with the freedom of political structure, accordingly mutual protection 
between state and religion, and protection of individuals from religious oppression 
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and with modernity. On the other hand, in Islamic societies, it has been associated 
with an obstacle, which prevents Muslims to live their life with respect to their 
Islamic components. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, a theoretical perspective was intended to be 
given to the lecturer, in order to clarify the role of religion and the emergence of 
laicism within French concept. Laicism of France was adopted to the Turkish 
political structure step by step after the establishment of the republic. The Republic 
of Turkey possesses significant importance regarding discussions of compatibility of 
laicism and Islam with its majorly Muslim society.  
 
With respect to the necessities of the modern world, abolishment of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate were followed by emergence of the Republic of 
Turkey with adopted implementations from Western world, which was the 
inspiration point with its modern structure for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) 
and his companions. Laicism was one of these concepts that adopted into Turkish 
political structure and made Turkey the unique example with its majorly Muslim 
society.  
 
Turkey’s 90-year-politics has witnessed many discussions regarding its laic 
structure and state’s approach to different religious identities. The third chapter will 
examine the laicization process of the Republic since its establishment and the 
aftermath discussions up until today. With the help of third chapter which will help 
to understand how far religious freedom goes in Turkey, the fourth chapter will be 
dedicated to Alevism as a different belief system with its millions of believers and 
both their position and problems in a laic political and a majorly Sunni-Islamic 
social structures.  
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3. REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND PLACE OF RELIGION 
 
 Change, or better to say, evolution into a better one, both in political and 
sociological orders, is an unavoidable fact that should be followed in order to be 
capable of responding the needs of time. Within political perspective, states need to 
adapt their structures to the conditions of time to maintain their existences. The 
Ottoman Empire is a considerable example for relation between importance of 
adaptation to changes and existence of a state. 
 
 Implementations regarding modernization, which has been a synonymous 
usage for Westernization due to changed ideological structure originated from 
French Revolution, had been applied in the late Ottoman Period; however, could not 
be sufficient to catch the needs of time. Consequently, the Empire was weakened 
and after the World War I (1914-1918) the Empire was dissolved; eventually, with 
the establishment of the National Assembly of Turkey in 1920, the Empire lost its 
legitimacy. With a new state, many implementations should be applied in order to 
catch the level of Western civilizations, in other words, to modernize the structure.  
 
 Laicism, as mentioned, has been one of the most pivotal requirements for a 
modern structure of state, in which the possessors of sovereignty and free will 
shifted from God to the people. Hence, modernization of the Turkish Republic was 
based on laic ideology, which was adapted from the French political history. 
 
 The Republic of Turkey was established with the basis of many different 
principles related with modernization; however, they were all associated firstly with 
laicism. As it was argued by Ali Kirman, laicism was to be used to refer modernity 
and modernization (çağdaş - çağdaşlaşma) in Turkish politics, within time.1  
 
                                                
1 M. Ali Kirman, Din ve Sekülerleşme (Adana: Karahan Yayınları, 2005), 53. 
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 Modernization process based on laicization was welcomed by a significant 
part of the society; however, that part cannot be considered as entire population of 
the state. As focused on second chapter, laicism gained its actual form in more than 
two centuries within French political system, in which the Age of Enlightenment 
was significantly effective. When it is compared with the foundation process of the 
Turkish Republic and application of reforms, which was lasted less than two 
decades, the lack of entire support will not be surprising. It was transition process, in 
which a laic structure was applied over the heritage of Ottoman Dynasty with 
Caliphate. Hence, unexpectedly, oppositional groups mobilized against laic structure. 
 
 Turkish politics have witnessed many conflicts between the supporters and 
opponents of laicism since its foundation. Arguments against laic implementations 
were for the favor of defending Ottoman system based on Islamic rules aftermath of 
foundation; however, within time, in addition to yearning for Ottoman system, 
arguments have been decreased within different points of view regarding the 
application of laicism in Turkey; for instance its incompatibility with human rights 
or its malfunctioning. 
 
 This chapter will focus on laicization process of the Republic of Turkey with 
details regarding different orders, institutionalization of laic implementations and 
consequent discussions between supporters and opponents of laicism, which have 
been expanded within long history since the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
until present day. Today, laicism is still an issue being discussed on Turkey’s agenda 
within different perspectives. According to supporters, laicism has been under threat 
due to Islamic implementations aiming to integrate political Islam into Turkish 
political scenes; according to Islamists, laicism has undermined the real identity of 
Turkish people based on Sunni Islamic Ottoman heritage; within humanistic 
perspective, rigid approach of laicism to religion cannot meet with human rights as 
in examples of the ban of veil; and according to Alevis, laic structure has not 
functioned properly as it has favored Sunni Islamic identity within different ways. 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to give different perspectives of various parts of 
society, which have led Turkey to military interventions, bloody attacks, and 
concrete polarization of society, by distinguishing the first three of aforelisted four 
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types of interpretations within Turkish political structure with respect to 
chronological order. Hence, whole political structure of the Republic with its 
conflicts based on religious references will be given in order to place Alevi 
perspective and state’s approach to Alevism as a different religious identity. This 
relation between Alevis and the State, which is the case study of this thesis, will be 
analyzed with details in fourth chapter. 
 
3.1. From the Empire to the New Republic 
 
 Modernization of Turkey was completed with various implementations 
dealing with many different orders of both individuals and state structure. Said 
modernization process was started in the 19th century under Ottoman rule; however, 
with the foundation of a new state, this is to refer the Republic of Turkey, the 
process gained a more significant progress with concrete outcomes.  
 
 Foundation of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his 
companions aimed to form a state with a level of Westernized civilizations, which 
led the modernization process of the World with the Age of Enlightenment. In order 
to achieve that level of civilization absolute monarchy of Ottoman Empire, Ottoman 
Dynasty and Caliphate should be changed with a modern state, in which the source 
of sovereignty was the people, instead of God, and consciousness of individual 
identity was embedded, instead of beings subjects of the Sultan.  
 
 In this part of the chapter, reforms of modernization process will be analyzed 
starting from 19th century under Ottoman rule until the second half of the 20th 
century, in other words, until the end of Single Party Period. 
 
3.1.1. Modernization in the Ottoman Empire 
 
Today’s modern, westernized Turkey was established in 1923; however, the 
modernization process had begun in the 19th century during the Ottoman Empire. 
There were several movements that the Empire intended to modernize its structure 
and to catch the developments of its time. 
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The Ottoman Empire was established in 1299 in Söğüt/Bilecik, northwestern 
Anatolian city, and within short time, it expanded its territories with new conquests 
from Eastern Europe, to South-Western Asia and to Northern Africa. Ottoman 
Dynasty was a member of tribal nomadic Turkmen groups; however, there was 
significant variety among peoples of the Empire in linguistic, ethnic, and religious 
bases. Among all, religious diversity is quite significant for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
The variety among society under the Ottoman flag regarding religious 
diversity was not only between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also among Muslim 
people. As the Ottoman Empire possessed Sunni-Hanafi Islam as its official state 
religion with support of Caliphate after 16th century, said understanding of Islam 
was strengthened with education networks, such as Islamic seminaries (medrese) led 
to a systematically well-defined written theology with the basis of Quran and 
Sunnah (Sünnet), while entire understandings of Islam were considered as heterodox 
Islam and as oppositional identity for the central authority. Hence, Islamic 
understandings apart from the Sunni-Hanafi one were maintained unsystematic, 
based on oral transmission, and accordingly syncretic.2 This information will be a 
pivotal reference point regarding the Alevi culture maintained under the Ottoman 
rule, which will be examined with details in following chapter. 
 
Until the end of its rise and growth in 17th century, the Ottoman Empire had 
a self-contained structure; consequently, the Western World used to mean just new 
territories to conquer. Besides, within hierarchical order, the Empire considered 
itself in a better position than the West. However, after the late 17th century, the 
Empire started to lose its power on military base, which led to loss of territories; 
hence, the superiority was vanished, and the relations between the Empire and the 
West was changed. While the Empire focused on its internal problems, the Western 
World witnessed the Age of Enlightenment that led to modernization of western 
political and social structure; consequently, within different orders, Europe became 
the superior power for the Ottoman Empire. 
 
                                                
2 Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 17. 
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 Modernization of Europe was an important challenge for Ottoman politics 
with its Islamic and monarchic state structure. These two concepts were not 
compatible with understanding of modernization; however, the Empire took 
European modernization as a model, which was seen as a way to overcome the 
problems of its dissolution. Except from the reforms in military structure during the 
18th century, the first embassies were established in order to possess diplomatic 
relations with Europe and to monitor its modernization process. The reorganization 
of state structure with the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Tanzimat Fermanı, 
hereafter Tanzimat Reforms) was originated from this idea based on acceptance of 
European modernization as a model.3 
 
 Modernization process was started with significant implementations 
regarding military structure, such as the change of military order with respect to 
European understanding. Because, reason of the loss of territories was associated 
with insufficient functionality of Ottoman military.4 Abolishment of the Janissary 
System5 by Mahmud II with respect to fatwa of Muslim theologians (ulema) was 
considered as the abolishment of an obstacle for reforms, due to significant power of 
Janissaries in Ottoman politics.6 The power of Janissaries was pointed out by 
Voltaire with this description; “Janissaries are generally in favor with Sultan; 
however, there is always a possibility that they take the power to disorganize the 
politics.”7 Apart from the military structure, abolishment of Janissary System was to 
cause social change concerning Alevi identity under the Ottoman rule, due to its 
Bektashi origin. This relation and the social change will be discussed in next chapter. 
 
With the Tanzimat Reforms, the modernization process of Ottoman state 
institutions was expanded to different orders in addition to military, such as the 
fields of law, education, and state bureaucracy,8 and modernization movement was 
                                                
3 Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 10. 
4 Şerif Mardin, Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu, trans. Mümtaz'er Türköne Fahri Unan, and İrfan 
Erdoğan (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 153-154. 
5 Ottoman military system, from the late 14th century to 1826. 
6 Metin Heper, Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayınları, 1974), 60. 
7 Paul Imbert, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yenileşme Hareketleri: Türkiye'nin Meseleleri, trans. 
Adnan Cemgil (İstanbul: Havass Yayınları, 1981), 129. 
8 Umut Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State (New York: 
I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2010), 4. 
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actually started.9 The importance of Tanzimat period was to provide equality for the 
subjects of Sultan and to take a step forward laicize the state structure with 
decreased power of ulema. Due to the Reforms, implementations of religious law 
(Sharia) was reduced to issues regarding marriage and heritage, and the juridical 
system for the rest of the issues, such as administrative and trading, was reorganized 
with adaptations from the Western World.10 
 
During Tanzimat, absolute power of the Sultan-Caliph was limited, as Grand 
Vizier and bureaucrats, officially, involved in politics and legislative process;11 
hereby, this group became civil servants of the Empire, instead of being subjects of 
the Sultan. Within traditional Ottoman understanding, maintaining the power of 
empire was only possible with good education of sultans’ sons; however, with 
Tanzimat, limitation of power of sultans was started to be discussed as effects of 
Western enlightenment, which was based on liberalism and modern constitution, 
instead of monarchic state structure.12  
 
Idea of equal citizenship became a concept that was pointed out with the 
Tanzimat Reforms. Within social structure, a laic understanding was adopted for the 
purpose of sweeping away difference approaches to different religious groups. For 
instance, non-Muslim groups were started to be represented in regional 
administration offices. With the declaration of Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856 
(Islahat Fermanı, hereafter Islahat Reforms), the implementations of Tanzimat 
Reforms were strengthened.13 
 
With the declaration of Islahat Reforms, Muslims were provided with equal 
rights as non-Muslims were granted with Tanzimat Reforms in order to ensure 
equality between Muslim and non-Muslim people in front of the law, in other words, 
in order to embed the idea of the citizenship of the Ottoman Empire known as 
Ottomanism (Osmanlıcılık). Under Ottoman rule, the society possessed 
                                                
9 İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, 2006), 31. 
10 Günay, Din Sosyolojisi, 586. 
11 Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun, 101. 
12 Şerif Mardin. “Tanzimat,” in Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset, ed. Mümtaz’er Türköne, and Tuncay 
Önder (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 298. 
13 Teyfur Erdoğdu, “Osmanlılığın Evrimi Hakkında Bir Deneme: Bir Grup (Üst Düzey Yönetici) 
Kimliğinden Millet Yaratma Projesine.” Doğu-Batı 45 (2008): 29-30. 
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heterogeneous structure regarding diverse religious and ethnic origins. These diverse 
groups were named as “Millet” with respect to their religious origin, and each Millet 
was granted with autonomous self-governing system regarding their own laws. 
Millets were headed by religious leaders, who were the representatives of their 
communities for the responsibilities of taxes and internal security.14 Briefly, the 
Ottoman Millet System was a way to guarantee the existence of diverse religious 
identities, which were important components of the Empire.15 According to this 
system, other peoples of the book apart from the Muslims, this is to say Christians 
and Jews, were granted with aforelisted rights. The ruling millet was the Muslim 
millet composed by people from different ethnical origins regardless of which sect 
they were from. Apart from the Muslim Millet, there were the Greek, Jewish, and 
Armenian millets under the rule of Ottoman Empire, and these millets were to 
become official minorities of the future Republic of Turkey.  
 
As Kemal Karpat points out that millet system was not only to maintain 
diverse religious and cultural continuity, but also to permit their incorporation with 
the Empire by their religious leaders.16 With the 19th century reforms, the idea of 
equal citizenship, which is a laic approach for individuals regardless of any religious 
components,17 was started to be spread; consequently, the power of millets started to 
be dissolved. The reforms were applied in order to embed a modernist approach for 
individuals and to take their status a step forward. 
 
With Tanzimat and Islahat Reforms education system was, relatively, 
relieved from religion and western style schools were established as alternatives to 
medreses. During Tanzimat, General Directorate of Schools (Mekatib-i Umumiye 
Nezareti) was established in 1846, Mekteb-i Mülkiye was established in 1859 as a 
vocational high school and education system was divided into three parts as primary 
schools (sıbyan mektebi), secondary school (rüşdiye) and schools of higher 
education (Dar-ül Fünun). While primary schools were divided into two for Muslim 
                                                
14 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "millet," (2 May 2013), 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/382871/millet>. 
15 Jorgen S. Nielsen. “New Perspectives on Ottoman History,” in Religion, Ethnicity and Contested 
Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 4. 
16 Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002), 611-612. 
17 Ibid., 611. 
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and non-Muslim students, secondary schools were unified for all religious groups. 
Besides, in 1857, General Directorate of Schools was turned into Ministry of 
Education (Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti), primary and secondary schools were given 
under the control of the Ministry in 1861.18 Involvement of girls to the education 
was encouraged, and primary and secondary schools for the education of girls 
(1858), and schools of vocational teacher education for girls were opened as result 
of official encouragement. 19  Additionally, Regulations of General Education 
(Maarif-i Umûmiye Nizamnâmesi) were composed with the basis of French 
education model and declared in 1869. With these regulations, primary school 
education became obligatory for girls and boys.20 
 
With the reforms that led to political and juridical westernization, dichotomy 
between two identities, traditional Ottoman identity and the westernized one, started 
to occur. In fact, the idea being discussed was the laic approach, which stressed 
equality of Muslim and non-Muslims Ottoman subjects within the fields of 
administration, education, and juristic. The new concept of Ottoman citizenship was 
associated with every single person living under the rule of the Empire regardless of 
religion and ethnicity. The change has been evaluated within two different 
perspectives. On one side, it was criticized by some scholars, such as Hilmi Ziya 
Ülken and Bülent Tanör, as being an outcome of Western states’ oppression with the 
excuse of protecting the rights of religious minorities in order to involve internal 
Ottoman politics;21 and on the other hand, as İlber Ortaylı argues clearly, the 
Ottomanism with the reforms of 19th century, no matter how they occurred, were the 
Orientalist approach of Western modernization and modern understanding of 
becoming a nation.22 
 
Regulations in the fields of law, state bureaucracy and education were laic 
implementations with respect to reduced responsibilities of Sultan-Caliph and Sharia. 
                                                
18 İlyas Doğan, “Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Aydınlarında Çağdaşlaşma Sorunu ve Arayışlar.” Kamu 
Hukuku Arşivi 3, no. 2 (1999): 114. 
19 Kışlalı, Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi, 80. 
20 Zülfü Demirtaş, “Osmanlı’da Sıbyan Mektepleri ve İlköğretimin Örgütlenmesi.” Fırat University 
Journal of Social Science 17, no. 1 (2007): 179-180. 
21 Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: YKY, 2007), 95; 
    Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 2005), 36. 
22 İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı Kimliği.” Cogito 19 (1999): 78. 
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With all these implementations, the source of sovereignty was started to be shifted 
from Sultan-Caliph (representative of God) to the superiority of law.23 With this 
shift of sovereignty and the reduced role of religion, the power of ulema in 
administration, the judiciary and the educational systems was undermined. This loss 
of power was deepened with the graduates of new-opening middle schools based on 
a laic approach, as they started to take part in administrative process with their 
critical interpretations of Islam.24 
 
 Tanzimat, as a period, ended with the first and the last constitution of the 
Ottoman Empire named as the 1876 Constitution (Kânûn-i Esâsî). With this 
constitution, Ottomanism based on equality among all subjects of the Empire was 
guaranteed, and strengthened the process, which opened the path to acceptance of 
non-Muslims to all administrative ranks with Islahat Reforms.25 
 
 With the beginning of the 20th century, a new movement based on laic and 
nationalist ideas carried out by Young Turks (Jön Türkler - Genç Türkler), who 
were young intellectuals educated in abroad mostly in France and affected from the 
ideas of Enlightenment, started. With the graduates of the schools based on laic 
education both abroad and in the Ottoman Empire, Young Turks intended to spread 
Ottomanism with ideas of modernization, westernization, laicism and nationalism. 
As discussed by Yıldız Atasoy, with respect to Young Turks’ perspective, 
modernization was not a rejection of traditional Islamic-Ottoman identity as contrary 
to aforementioned dichotomy; instead, the aim was to create an Ottoman nation as a 
synthesis of east and west.26 According to them, among all Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah 
Cevdet, and Ziya Gökalp, who is believed as the father of Turkishness, a social 
change was to be carried out in order to embed the ideas of modernization. For 
instance, religious superstitions should have been swept away in order to progress 
within a modernist perspective; hence, they supported the reform of Islam.27 
                                                
23 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme (İstanbul: 
Alfa Yayınları, 2000), 14. 
24 Azak, Islam and Secularism, 4. 
25 Yıldız Atasoy, Islam's Marriage with Neo-Liberalism: State Transformation in Turkey (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 44. 
26 Ibid., 50. 
27 Azak, Islam and Secularism, 6. 
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Because, the cause of the backwardness was not the religion itself; instead, it was 
the usage of religion and religious superstitions.28 
 
 The ideas of Young Turks were systematically unified with the Committee 
of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) that was in power for interrupted 
periods, between 1908-1918. The movement of the Committee popularized the 
ideologies regarding the synthesis of east and west with the idea of Pan Turkism 
(Türkçülük); however, this endeavor could not be sufficient to save the Ottoman 
Empire. Nevertheless, accumulation of modernist implementations were to become 
an important part of the Ottoman heritage for the foundation of the new state, and 
most importantly, and as a consequence of modernization endeavors, a new 
reformist group, who was to lead the process of the establishment of the Republic, 
was educated with the components of modern state structure.29  
 
 The dichotomy between the Islamist-Ottoman identity and the westernized 
one was also one of the components of Ottoman heritage for the Republic of Turkey. 
According to Sencer Ayata, difference between these two approaches regarding the 
social identity is the source of different perspectives between laic and Islamist 
political parties of modern Turkey.30 This difference was analyzed by Emre Kongar 
within a deeper interpretation. According to Kongar, starting from language, there 
were different components of different parts of the Ottoman society. Among them, 
there were two dominant cultures, which were elitist and public cultures, and they 
were strictly separated with no interaction. The elitist culture was possessed by the 
ruling class, who were the former subjects of the Sultan-Caliph became the 
bureaucrats with the 19th century reforms, while the other one belonged to public. 
The political and sociological origin of the difference dominated the cultural 
components of these two groups.31 During the dissolution of the Empire, the culture 
of ruling class was also divided into two, which led to political parties’ different 
                                                
28 Kışlalı, Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi, 178. 
29 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
230-238. 
30 Sencer Ayata. “Poverty, Social Policy and Modernity in Turkey,” in Turkey's Engagement with 
Modernity: Conflict and Changement in the Twentieth Century, eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, 
and Philip Robins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 193. 
31 Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000’li Yıllarda Türkiye`nin Toplumsal Yapısı (İstanbul: 
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ideological structures. The ruling class became the statist-elites as the saviors of the 
Empire, who led the reforms of the Republic with the basis of modernization. As its 
dialectic, the opponents of western style modernization gathered around the 
traditional-liberal ideology based on Islamic-Ottoman identity.32 This interpretation 
of Kongar will be referred in upcoming parts regarding political structure of the 
Republic of Turkey. 
 
 After the World War I (1914-1918), the Ottoman Empire was officially 
partitioned with respect to the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), as a result of the 
defeat of Central Powers composed by the German Empire, the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire, the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire by the Entente Powers, 
composed by the French Republic, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, and 
lately attended Italy, with many others allied later. 
 
 The government of the Empire based in Istanbul (hereafter, Istanbul 
Government) signed the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918 with the Entente 
Powers to declare the acceptance of defeat, and this armistice led the partition of 
Ottoman territories in case of necessity that might occur as a security issue. The 
Treaty of Sèvres (1920) was an outcome of this necessity. However, between 1918 
and 1920, the years of two important agreements, the Anatolian people started to be 
mobilized against the Entente Powers.  
 
 Although the World War I was lost, many generals (paşa-pasha) made name 
with their success in different fronts. Among them, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (1881-
1938), İsmet Pasha (1884-1973), Kâzım Karabekir (1882-1948), Refet Pasha (1881-
1963), Ali Fuat Pasha (1882-1968) and Rauf Bey (1881-1964) were the most well-
known ones, who were to become the leaders of the Turkish War of Independence 
(Kurtuluş Savaşı - 1919-1923), which was the national mobilization of Anatolian 
people against invasion of the Entente Powers.  
 
                                                
32 Ibid., 610. 
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As expressed by Gökalp, in times of great political disasters national feeling 
gains its utmost ascendancy.33 The nationalist idea was based on religion during the 
late Ottoman period, as the idea of citizenship could not be successfully embedded 
to the society; hence, the “national feelings” that Gökalp referred was associated 
with Islamic identity of Ottoman people. With the invasion of the Entente Powers, 
the Muslim Millet of the Empire was mobilized against the hostile “Christian” 
countries; in other words, the Turkish Muslim ethnie34 turned into the guardians of 
the Empire.  
 
The War of Independence was started with Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s arrival to 
Samsun, a northern Anatolian city, on 19 May 1919 with an assignment by the 
Istanbul government in order to provide public order during the invasion. However, 
the real aim was to mobilize people for a national disobedience against the invasion 
of Anatolia. 
 
After 19 May, Mustafa Kemal Pasha initiated the process with sending the 
Amasya Circular (Amasya Genelgesi - 22 June 1919), which was the first written 
document regarding the War of Independence, to aforelisted four Pashas in order to 
distinguish the deficiency of Istanbul Government for the independence and to 
organize a congress in Erzurum, eastern Anatolian city, in secrecy.35 With the 
Erzurum Congress on 22 July - 4 August, “national power” was distinguished in 
order to reject the European invasion into Anatolia, to maintain the unity and 
integrity of fatherland (Vatan), and to save the Sultanate and the Caliphate.36 There 
is one thing that should be distinguished on that point. Anatolian people were 
mobilizing for the sake of the Sultanate and for the Caliphate; however, the War of 
Independence was ended with official abolishment of the Ottoman Empire and the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Islam was used as an important tool to 
attract the attention of the Anatolian people and to mobilize them for the movement. 
 
                                                
33 Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 8. 
34 Anthony Smith defines ethnie as a pre-modern ethno-religious community “that possesses a 
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After Erzurum Congress, another congress was organized in Sivas, central 
Anatolian city on 4 September 1919. For the Sivas Congress, delegates were sent 
from different parts of Anatolia to be represented for the decisions regarding the 
War of Independence and its aims. Among these delegates, there were religious and 
tribal leaders as well as the selected ones.  
 
Sivas, due to the Congress, is believed as one of the most important cities in 
Turkish political history, as the movement of independence gained a concrete 
structure in there. Due to the purpose of this thesis, details of the War of 
Independence will not be focused; instead, the role of Islam during the War will be 
pointed out.  
 
In March 1920, the Istanbul Government annulled itself due to British 
invasion into Istanbul. With this occasion, the necessity of a government gained 
official base, and in Ankara, central Anatolian city, the Grand National Assembly 
was established on 23 April 1920, as the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly 
introduced itself as the unique representative of Anatolian people and the members 
proclaimed their loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed Vahideddin and reaffirmed 
their will to save him from the hostile powers.37 As a tool of the mobilization, 
Islamic references were significant on the establishment of the Assembly. First of all, 
it was opened on Friday, after special Friday prayers, in which all delegates 
attended, 38  then, opening speech made for the sake of the Sultan-Caliph. 39 
Additionally on 5 May, the Mufti of Ankara, Börekçizade Mehmed Rifat Efendi, 
issued a fatwa, endorsed by 152 other muftis in Anatolia. This fatwa declared that a 
fatwa written under the oppression was not valid (this referred to the fatwa of 
Shaykh al-Islam with collaboration of Sultan-Caliph, in which a religious duty was 
distinguished regarding the murders of rebels, in other words, the members of the 
national movement), and the real duty was to liberate the Caliph from captivity. This 
was a significant call for the Muslims in order to gather them around the 
movement.40 
 
                                                
37 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 251. 
38 Please see Appendix I on page 283 for the photo of Opening of the Assembly. 
39 Yalçın Bayer, “Dua ve Tekbirle Açılan Meclis,” Hürriyet Daily Newspaper, 23 April 2013. 
40 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 252. 
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The day after the establishment of the Assembly, on 24 April, Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha was selected as the Head of the Assembly. Within time, while the War 
of Independence was continuing on different fronts in Anatolia, the Grand National 
Assembly took the power as the representative of the people of the former Empire, 
and on 20 January 1921, declared the first constitution of the Turkish State. 
According to the First Article of the 1921 Constitution, the sovereignty was given to 
the nation without any reference to state regime, and according to the Fourth Article, 
the delegates of the Grand National Assembly were to be selected by the city 
population that to be represented. 
 
The shift of the source of sovereignty was a significant point regarding the 
character of the War of Independence. The Assembly was opened with oaths for the 
sake of the Sultan-Caliph; however, the sovereignty was taken from him, although 
his existence might have been maintained in the future. Nevertheless, on 1 
November 1922, the Sultanate was abolished by the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - TBMM)41 by a declaration about the official 
rejection of the Istanbul Government. This declaration was like a response for the 
Conference of Lausanne, in which both the Istanbul Government and TBMM were 
invited. As TBMM introduced itself as the unique representative of the Anatolian 
people, it should represent the Turkish State in a conference, where negotiations 
were to be carried out for the future of the State with the Entente Powers. Eventually, 
with the abolishment of the Sultanate, TBMM became the unique and legitimate 
representative of the Turkish State in the Conference of Lausanne.42 
 
In 1923, the war on the fronts was won, and the TBMM was recognized by 
the Entente Powers, as two significant victories in military and political bases. 
However, it was not considered as a complete success, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
mentioned the point that the Turkish people were to be achieved as below; 
 
“The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded 
as having achieved the real salvation of our country. These victories have only 
                                                
41 The name of the Assembly was changed from Grand National Assembly to Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey on 8 February 1921. 
42 “Biography of Atatürk,” Republic of Turkey - Ministry of Culture, n.d., 
<http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,31350/biography-of-ataturk.html> (25 April 2013). 
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prepared the ground for our future victories. Let us not be puffed up with military 
victories. Let us rather prepare for new victories in science and economics.”43 
 
3.1.2. Foundation of the Republic and Aftermath 
 
 In territories of the former Ottoman Empire, the reforms had already been 
started with a new Assembly, a new state, and the Constitution of 1921 by which the 
sovereignty was taken from the Sultan and vested in the nation. On 1 April 1923, the 
first Assembly proposed an election for a new assembly, and meanwhile a 
workgroup was formed with Mustafa Kemal Pasha`s leadership in order to make a 
new constitution in which there would be a specific definition of a state and a more 
detailed constitutional structure regarding to the new Turkish State.44 
 
At the same time with the workshops of a new constitution, Ismet Pasha was 
in Switzerland for the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty was a strong proof of 
TBMM’s being the unique representative of newly-founded Turkish State not only 
in internal, but also in international affairs. When the Treaty was signed by Turkey 
and allied British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Romania on 24 July 
1923, TBMM and the new Turkish State were recognized officially and 
independently from the former Ottoman Empire.  
 
With the Treaty of Lausanne, many issues were clarified regarding to borders, 
capitulations and foreign debts of the former Empire, Aegean Islands, war 
reparations, the possession and the right to use of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, 
foreign schools, the legal status of Orthodox Patriarchate45, and last of all the legal 
status of the minorities of Turkish State, which forms an important part of this 
section. 
 
According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the concept of “minority” was based 
on religious distinction. Since there was not a specific “national consciousness” in 
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the Ottoman Empire, the only diversity was formed by religion. All the people living 
under the sovereignty of the Empire were the “subjects” (teb`a) of the Sultan. As 
aforementioned in previous part, according to the “millet system”, all religious 
groups, that is to mention Greek-Orthodox subjects, Armenian subjects and Jewish 
subjects, were officially recognized by the laws and these groups had their own law 
under the Ottoman rule. Consequently, this heterogeneity made the religious groups 
relatively free in their own homogeneity. After the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire, there was nothing to identify the people but the religion.46 Eventually, in the 
Treaty of Lausanne these religious groups were recognized as the minorities of the 
Turkish State and their rights were granted with a dedicated section of nine articles 
named as “Protection of Minorities”.47   
 
The Turkish Government guaranteed the life protection, religious freedom 
and right to practice and granted equality among all citizens without any distinction. 
The articles 38 and 39 explain the responsibilities of the Turkish Government with 
these sentences: 
 
“ARTICLE 38. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection 
of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in 
public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not 
be incompatible with public order and good morals. 
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of 
emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, 
to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for 
national defense, or for the maintenance of public order.” 
 
“ARTICLE 39. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same 
civil and political rights as Moslems. 
                                                
46 Henry J. Barkey. “Turkey and Great Powers,” in Turkey’s Engagement With Modernity, eds. Celia 
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All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal 
before the law. 
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish 
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for 
instance, admission to public employments, functions and honors, or the exercise of 
professions and industries. 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of 
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities 
shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their 
own language before the Courts.”  
 
As it is visible in the articles written above and also in entire section 
dedicated to the minorities, there was not any specific definition of either the Jews 
and the Armenians, or the Greek-Orthodox. The list has been clarified with the 
interpretation of the Turkish Government with regards to the social and 
demographic structure of the former Ottoman Empire and, accordingly, to the Millet 
System. With respect to Turkey’s official position, only the three aforementioned 
groups were recognized as minorities, as a result of being the three largest Millets in 
the former Ottoman administration system. Other non-Muslim religious groups, for 
instance, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Nestorians, who were not included in the 
Ottoman Millet system, were not recognized as official minorities. Likewise, the 
Bahaʼis, the Yezidis, and believers of the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Catholic 
United churches (the Chaldean Church and the Syrian Catholic Church), and the 
Roman Catholic Church were not included in the official interpretation of the 
Treaty.48 In addition to aforelisted religious groups, Alevis were not defined as 
official minorities either, as they were counted as members of the Muslim Millet, 
and under the new state, they were still a part of the Muslim society. According to 
the treaty, apart from the minority rights, “all inhabitants of Turkey” were granted 
with equal treatment by the State; however, religious freedom and citizenship issues 
were discussed for more than a decade among religious identity of individuals. In 
following parts, these issues will be explained.  
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The Turkish State was recognized officially among international scenes; 
however, the form of the state was an issue of discussions among internal scenes. 
There were three opinions those were being discussed.49 The first group proposed to 
maintain the Caliphate and to charge the Sultan-Caliph as the president of the new 
state with concrete support of the Islamic societies. The second group, similarly, 
proposed an extended authority for the Caliph. As contrary to these two, there was 
the idea of a republic of reformist group including Mustafa Kemal and his 
companions. In fact, the idea of a republic was not declared officially; however, 
there were significant signs pointing out a republic before the official declaration. 
For instance, in an interview with Maria Lazar for Wiener Neue Freie Presse on 22 
September 1923, Mustafa Kemal expressed:50 
 
“The sovereignty belongs to the nation. Executive power and legislative 
authority are concentrated in the assembly, which is the unique representative of the 
nation. It is possible to express these two phrases within one word: republic. The 
reformation of Turkey has not been completed yet. The Constitution cannot be 
considered as entirely completed. It is essential to make amendments and revisions 
to make it perfect. The mission that is started has not been completed. Within a 
short time, existing form of Turkey will be constitutionalized. The governmental 
proposal will be presented to the Assembly. All the outcomes of this regulation will 
develop the Constitution. Within the basic characteristics, as there is no difference 
among all the European and American republics, but the form of state, the only 
existing difference of Turkey from these republics is its form, as well. We have an 
assembly that has the sovereignty, like the other countries governed by republic. 
However, our TBMM has both the legislative and the executive powers. In our 
system, members of parliament are responsible of their own duties, like in other 
countries. The executive members of the parliament are believed to be puppets of 
the National Assembly. However, this is a mistake. Regarding the issue of duties 
and responsibilities of members of the parliament, these will be clarified with the 
revisions of the Constitution. Eventually, we will establish a government composed 
of the president of the republic, the prime minister and the members of the 
parliament. 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
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When it comes to the issue of capital of Turkey, the answer is clearly 
visible. Ankara is the capital of Turkey.”51 
 
On 13 October 1923, Ankara was declared as the capital of the Turkish State, 
while the aforementioned three opinions were under discussion in the Assembly 
until the official declaration of the republic on 29 October 1923. The reasons why 
Ankara was selected as capital of the new state should be examined within different 
perspectives. On one side, as it was not invaded by hostile forces, it was safe in the 
middle of Anatolia and difficult to invade due to its geographical location. And on 
the other hand, as it was mentioned by İsmet Pasha, in foreign forces’ perspective, 
Istanbul was the representative of the Caliphate and the government of the former 
Ottoman Empire and the seat of the Ottoman Dynasty. Although with the Lausanne 
Treaty, TBMM was considered as the unique representative of the Turkish State, the 
Caliphate was still an existing power in Istanbul. Selecting Ankara as a capital was a 
considerable chance to cut ties with Caliphate, even though the Caliph was not 
supposed to be granted with responsibilities within the Turkish State.52 Besides, as 
Ankara was a small and not-urbanized city, it would be easy to build a capital with 
respects to the needs of a new modern state. With the declaration of the capital, the 
Caliphate and accordingly Istanbul lost their symbolic importance.  
 
 On 29 October 1923, the form of the state was declared officially in the 
Assembly after a long process of discussions between reformists and supporters of 
the Caliphate, and with the approved final version of draft, the first article of the 
Constitution of 1921 was revised and changed into: “Turkey is a people’s state 
governed by a republican form of government.” 53  Due to the discussions between 
two groups, the opponents did not attend to the session as a remonstrance and only 
the 158 over 287 members of parliaments attended to the voting of the form of the 
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state. 54 At the same day, Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president of the 
republic.  
 
Declaration of the republic strengthened the change from a centralized 
religion based empire to a state based on sovereignty of nation that started with the 
foundation of the Assembly. There is one another concept that was to be changed 
with the republic: the concept of patriotism. Under the Ottoman and the authority of 
the Sultan-Caliph, loyalty to the Sultan and loyalty to the religion were the basic 
components of patriotism; however, with the new rule the religious authorities were 
dismissed, the president of the republic became a civil person without the title of 
Caliph, and the concept of nation was to be embedded to the minds of individuals. 
Depending on this, an ideological resistance to establishment of a republic after a 
religion-based empire could not be considered as an unexpected event. For instance, 
Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) explained his doubts about extended authority of the 
President of Republic with his ability to the government, even a Sultan had not been 
granted with such power. As another example, Ahmet Emin (Yalman) criticized this 
instant change with being a unique example in the history. Additionally, Rauf Bey 
(Orbay) gave a statement in which he explained his disagreement with instant 
approval of the republic.55 
 
The action plan of Mustafa Kemal was composed of two basic ideas. These 
were the mobilization of Anatolian people against the hostile forces and to inspire 
the idea of Turkish nationalism. With establishment of the republic, the first mission 
was completely accomplished; however, the Turkish nationalism was not a familiar 
stream among the former Ottoman subjects. Bernard Lewis stated; 
 
“Among the people of the Ottoman Empire the last to be affected by the 
national idea was, not unnaturally, the masters of the Empire themselves. It was 
only slowly, under foreign influence, that the Turks at last began to recover a 
                                                
54 Can Dündar, “Avrupa’dan Kopmayacağız,” Can Dündar Personel Web Page, 29 October 2002, 
<http://www.imge.com.tr/product_reviews_info.php?products_id=4818&reviews_id=57> (12 
January 2013). 
55 Ibid. 
 
65 
sense of their separate national identity as Turks, as a Turkish nation distinct from 
–though included in- the Ottoman State and the Islamic religion.”56  
 
  Briefly, when the republic was declared in 1923, the aims of the new 
Turkish State were already defined. The laicization process had already been started 
with a republican structure; however, creating a “nation state” out of diverse ethnic 
and religious groups and institutionalizing a coherent political entity were not easy 
tasks. Indeed, the aim was not only to create a nation state with the civilizational 
norms, but also to replace religion with national identity.57 In order to create a new 
state with these characteristics, the first thing should be done was to create an 
identity due to the lack of a concrete concept of identity. Because concept of 
citizenship was considered as a cultural requirement of a western modernity,58 and 
as it was mentioned, the subjects of the Ottoman Empire were conscious about 
neither an individual identity nor concept of citizenship.  
 
As Alev Çınar explained, building a nation-state from scratch embodies 
clarifying both material and metaphorical boundaries, such as territorial, national, 
ethnic, racial, cultural and religious components. To clarify these components, the 
nation is supposed to involve in determining who will constitute the nation - who 
will be the members of the national community, what language they will speak, 
what their history will be, what sort of a lifestyle they will have, what their identity 
will be. In order to create this homogeneous structure, Mustafa Kemal and his 
companions applied series of reforms by shaping and monitoring the lifestyles of 
individuals and their private affairs.59 What they achieved in fifteen years after the 
establishment of the republic until the death of Mustafa Kemal was to initiate the 
complex and comprehensive transformation of a traditional society that had been 
lived under outmoded state institutions. Like Heinz Kramer mentioned, the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey was simultaneously an endeavor for not 
only a nation building process but also a political institutionalization, a cultural 
revolution and a social and economic change. Although the modernization process 
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started far before than the republic in these territories with Tanzimat policies, the 
reforms of the republic went to cultural roots of Anatolian population by abolishing 
the religious foundations of the state.60 
 
The reforms of Mustafa Kemal, as it was mentioned, were different than the 
previous modernization movements with involving every single order of the social 
and political life of the new state. The all reforms were considered coherently, and 
this entire ideology was named as Kemalist ideology (Kemalizm or Atatürkçülük in 
Turkish); however, it is still being discussed whether a set of reforms can be named 
as an ideology or not.  
 
The Kemalist ideology was based on six basic principles, which became the 
second article61 of the first constitution of the Republic with a change on 5 February 
1937, as definition of the characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. These six basic 
principles are: republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik), nationalism (Milliyetçilik), 
populism (Halkçılık), secularism (Laiklik), statism (Devletçilik) and revolutionism 
(İnkılapçılık). These reforms were meant to organize all the orders from political to 
economic, from social to educational. The said reforms cannot be considered as 
symbolical, because, even for the daily life of individuals, they were for the 
modernization. The reformist implementations, which will be explained in 
upcoming pages, such as educational ones or the ones related with the appearance, 
were all planned in order to strengthen the change of sovereignty by civilizing all 
with decreased importance of Islam. Consequently, laicism became the principal 
one among all the others, except the statism, which is related just with economic 
conditions of the new state’s market.  
 
Laicism’s importance cannot be surprising, though. Laicism is the basis of 
freedom of thought, modernization, and it can be considered as a prerequisite for 
democracy. Laicism is the prerequisite of nationalism; because, with the lack of 
laicism, the tie among the citizens of a state will not be the nation, nor the territory. 
Instead, it will be the religion; the solidarity will be related just with the religion 
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(ümmetçilik) as it was during the Ottoman era. However, that cannot suit with a 
multi religiously based state. Besides, laicism is the prerequisite of populism. In a 
religious state, the will of the religious elite play a significant role among the society, 
while the will of people is null. Moreover, laicism is the prerequisite of 
revolutionism. Within a religious state, the science cannot possess an importance 
due to the existence of religious terms. Additionally, religion is traditionalist; that’s 
why, a reform, a change cannot be considered as a necessity in order to catch the 
time with its improvements. Last of all, as aforementioned, laicism is the 
prerequisite of republicanism, as a result of the change of possessor of sovereignty. 
With the help of laicism, religion was removed from the political scenes in which it 
possessed a competitive role against the sovereignty of the people. Besides all, 
thanks to laicism, religion was saved from being a political tool of anti-reformist 
politicians. As a result of all these reasons, as aforementioned, laicism became the 
most pivotal principle for a modernized and a democratic state.  
 
The basic characteristics of the reforms of Mustafa Kemal can be listed 
within four different specifications, as argued by Kongar.62 First of all, it, as a whole, 
aimed to create a westernized society. It is to say, the reforms were adapted from 
western societies. As its second characteristic, they were adapted to the society from 
top to the down by statist-elites. Hence, laicism was understood as the civilizing 
mission of the Kemalist elite. However, that statist-elitism was an Ottoman concept 
that was formed by the Tanzimat reformists and by the Young Turks as the unique 
social and political power of initial years of the republic. Thirdly, it was planned as a 
systematic progress, in other words they were not implemented instantly. The social 
needs were considered and every single reform was formed as a necessity of the 
society and put in practice one by one. The last characteristic to be listed was the 
basis of all reforms, which was built on sovereignty of people in a theoretical 
perspective. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal and his companions not only used 
the political power that was gathered by themselves, but also with controlling the 
religion, they prepared the society for every single change. That was an 
unpredictable progress, as a result of settled consciousness of equality between 
loyalty to the religion and loyalty to the Sultan/Caliph. However, as a result of this 
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implementation, Kemalism was considered as an anti-religionist movement, while 
there was only one issue that it dealt with Islam: taking its political sovereignty off 
the state. 
 
Among three Abrahamic religions, Islam can be considered as the most 
systematic and institutionalized religion. It is not just a set of belief; instead, it was 
born as a whole system that involves to political, social, cultural, juridical, and 
family issues and, last of all, to the moral code, as a matter of fact.63 During the 
former Ottoman Empire, Islam used to possess its political, social, cultural and 
juridical importance within all orders of both individual`s and society’s. After the 
abolishment of the Sultanate, the reforms were salient necessities in order to achieve 
to the required level, which was defined as westernized and a modernized 
civilization. In order to do so, they not only involved to political order, but also to 
the cultural and social life. The characteristics of Kemalist reforms were formed as a 
result of that said necessity. What implemented by Mustafa Kemal and his 
companions was to address a laic and republican system, which aims a democratic 
structure within a frame of a nation-state, as a response to all philosophical 
questions.64 With the help of this action, they succeeded to keep both the religion 
and the new state from any probable maltreatment as a natural fact of the existence 
of laicism. Although that kind of a movement can be considered as reasonable and 
legitimate in present time, the Kemalism was assumed to be an anti-religious 
doctrine among the Islamic spiritual leaders and imposed to the society in that way. 
 
As it was mentioned, there was the necessity to establish simultaneously the 
Republic of Turkey, the Turkish people as a nation, and the Turk as a citizen with an 
identity different from being a Muslim subject of the Sultan.65 As stated by Ahmet 
Taner Kışlalı, revolution is an outcome of the new people, if it is a result of the 
evolution; however, if not, within an undeveloped society, the revolution itself 
should create the new people. Consequently, the first mission to be accomplished 
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should be the cultural revolution.66 Within this context, set of implementations will 
be the most salient example. 
 
In addition to all characteristics of the reforms, there is another thing that 
should be distinguished before analysis of the implementations. As it was mentioned 
by Falih Rıfkı Atay, to be Westernized was most specifically meant to escape from 
being Arabicized; it meant being Turkified.67 This was a consequence of the 
nationalization part of Kemalism. Mustafa Kemal asserted that Turks were already 
an old and well-known nation before their Islamization; however, Arab culture was 
spread over the Ottoman Empire after taking the Caliphate and accordingly the 
responsibility of all Muslim World by Selim I in 16th century. With this claim, he 
not only wanted to encourage the consciousness of Turkishness, but also tried to 
purify it from any religious identity, in this case from Islamic identity and 
interrelated Arabic culture. Due to these conditions, the reforms will be examined 
within that frame and chronologically ordered.  
 
In 1924, after a little while of the declaration of republic many reforms were 
implemented simultaneously. First of all, the Unification of Education Law (Tevhid-
i Tedrisat Kanunu) came into force in order to unify the form of education.68 
According to that law, the Islamic seminaries (medrese) were meant to be closed. 
This implementation was a considerable stroke to the religious culture because, as a 
result of the closure of seminaries, the next generations would not be educated 
according to the Islamic principles. Besides, after a while of the Law, lectures of 
Quran, from primary schools’ curriculum, and the Persian and Arabic lectures, from 
the secondary schools’ curriculum were removed.69 As a starting point, religion 
classes became optional, then in 1930 from secondary schools, in 1931, from 
schools of vocational teacher education, in 1933, from schools of provinces, and in 
1939, from schools of rural areas religion classes were removed. Consequently, 
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between 1939-1948, a religion-free formal education was experienced in the 
Republic of Turkey.70  
 
In the same year, Ministry of Military (Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekaleti) 
and Ministry of Religious Affairs (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) were abolished. 
According to the new state structure, military and religion should be separated from 
the daily politics; that’s why there was no role in the cabinet to be possessed by 
these two offices. Instead of an abolished ministry, Presidency of Religious Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey (Tükiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı - DİB) was established on 3 March 1924.71  
  
While the new government was in intention to laicize the form of the state by 
pushing Islamic culture out of people’s mind, a new religious office was opened by 
the same government under the authority of Prime Minister. Even though, its name 
is “religious affairs”, the aim of its establishment has become governing the Islamic 
faith, practices, and ethic, enlightening the people about religion, which is Islam, 
and managing the places of worship within time.72 DİB has been the basic tool to 
spread official Islam both over the country and to abroad. The new state preferred to 
keep control of religious affairs with a presidency. With this preference, Mustafa 
Kemal and his companions both took the management of religious issues on their 
hand, and they managed to break the sacred importance of the DİB.73  
 
Not only in initial years of the Republic, but also during all period including 
the present, DİB has always been an issue on the agenda. Its existence has brought 
nothing but predominance of Sunni Islam to the country. Today, with its budgets, its 
domestic and international implementations, and the reasons why it exists within a 
laic structure are still being discussed. A detailed analysis about the issue will be 
examined in the upcoming parts of this thesis. 
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 Late on the same year, on 2 November, the Caliphate was abolished 
officially.74 After the abolishment of Sultanate in 1922, the Caliph existed just 
symbolically; however, in order to keep on with the laicization process, a probable 
obstacle in front of the modernist implementations should be abolished. The 
Ottoman Dynasty lost its sovereignty in 1922 with the abolishment of Sultanate, and 
eventually, with the abolishment of the Caliphate, the sacred source of that 
sovereignty was forced to vanish and Islam was saved from being a political tool.75  
 
In 1925, the second part of the cultural revolution began to be implemented. 
The appearance was taken into account and the implementations targeted the 
clothing. Between 25-27 August, Mustafa Kemal made a visit to Kastamonu, a 
northern Anatolian city, and he made a public speech in Inonu (a town in 
Kastamonu) regarding to the clothing. The Hat Law of 1925 was an implementation 
through which the state intervened with regard to bodies toward instituting 
secularism, nationalism and Westernism in the public sphere.76 Mustafa Kemal 
made a special effort to prepare the public to this new kind of headdress. That is the 
reason why his Inonu speech is important. His visit to Kastamonu was three months 
before the declaration of the law. The Hat Law was come into force on 28 
November 1925.77 However, the said visit was the first time that he introduced the 
Western style hat to the public. In fact, it was not an introduce. He, himself, wore 
the said hat in order to encourage the men. Since then, Mustafa Kemal wore a 
western style hat at his conferences and meetings to display it with the aim of 
making people accustomed to it. As a result, when the government declared the Hat 
Law, as a part of the Law of Outfit Costume, the people had already gotten used to 
wear it. With this law, any kind of religious outfit costume was prohibited, (such as 
cübbe, sarık), and the Muslim women were discouraged to wear Islamic veil. The 
reason why Mustafa Kemal chose Inonu/Kastamonu for this display at first sight 
was the city’s conservative atmosphere. Due to the conservatism that possessed by 
the people of Kastamonu, it would be possible to have a negative reflection against 
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the new implementation when it was declared.78 Hence, the choice of Kastamonu 
was a planned action.  
 
 During this visit, the target group was not composed by only men; instead, 
the women were also encouraged to change their appearance. The Ottoman heritage 
about the appearance of women can be seen within this statement. According to 
Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım, Islamic law (şeriat) required women to cover their bodies, 
including their hair, by wearing a form of dress that did not arouse sexual desire in 
men.79 He supported his discourse within “primordial human nature” theory of men. 
He expressed:  
 
“It is not within a husband’s capacity to resist the allure of and desire for a 
younger and more beautiful woman than his wife. Such and inclination, which is 
beyond the husband’s capacity and power to control, will destroy not only the 
affection between a husband and his wife but also the ties between woman whom 
he desires and her husband. In other words, the happiness of both families will be 
destroyed as a result of the man’s lust and uncontrollable sexual appetite. It is in 
view of these sorts of circumstances that the Muhammedi seriat requires women to 
cover themselves.”80 
 
That was the general perspective about the clothing of women. As a matter 
of fact, modernization about clothing could not be considered as surprising within 
these conditions while whole state was in a transformation process. On his speech, 
Mustafa Kemal stated: 
 
“...The nation that established the Republic of Turkey is civilized. Both in history 
and present, it is civilized... ...Briefly, the civilized nation of Turkey that claims it is 
civilized should prove that it is civilized entirely, including the appearance... …Is 
our clothing civilized and international?  
(as a response from the public): No, no! 
I am totally agree with you... Than, is there a nation without clothing? Friends, will 
you contend with being defined so? 
(as a response from the public): No, no! 
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Does it make sense to show valuable jewelry surrounded by mud? Is it logical to 
say: “Actually, there is a valuable jewelry hidden in that mud; however you cannot 
understand”? In order to show the jewelry, its cleaning is an obligation and a 
natural fact... What our nation deserves is civilized and international clothing. We 
will wear that!..”81 
 
 In the same speech, Mustafa Kemal also mentioned his disapproval about 
women’s facial cover: 
 
“In my travels I observed not in villages but in towns and cities that women friends 
are covering their faces and eyes with great care. This must inflict them with pain 
and a great deal of suffering, especially on hot summer days such as these. Male 
friends, our own selfishness is in part of the cause of this outcome... Women should 
show their faces to the world. And, they should see the world with their own 
eyes.”82 
 
 Within this speech, Mustafa Kemal encouraged the women for modernized 
clothing. There was not a law about the clothing of women; however, a significant 
discouragement was being promoted by the state and by Mustafa Kemal, himself. 
For instance, he endeavored a lot to promote the image of the new women as a 
“symbol of the break with the past”.83 His appearance in public with his wife and 
adopted daughter at social meetings and official ceremonies was a significant effort 
to do the promotion of a modernized visibility of women. In addition to that, not 
only the appearance, but also the visibility of women in the public sphere was being 
promoted with these visits. The state was in duty to promote the appearance of 
women in public places, with modernized clothes and a member of the modernized 
activities. For instance, the photographs of women lawyers, women parliamentarians, 
women pilots, women in athletics and women in military training were the parts of 
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the said state mission.84 As it was mentioned, the mission of state aimed to cut ties 
with the past regarding to women’s role in social life. According to the European 
perceptions of Ottoman Empire and its Orientalist Islamic structure, image of the 
Turkish women was a veiled figure behind the harem walls, and what the Turkish 
State tried to replace the new modernized image of the Turkish women in social life 
with the old figure. In fact, apart from all the political change, visibility of the new 
modernized Turkish women in public sphere can be considered as one of the most 
salient proof of the Republic’s break with former Empire and its social structure. 
With the help of implementations concerning the women’s role in social life, the 
Turkish women gained more self-confidence that led Keriman Halis (1913-2012)85 
to be the winner of International Pageant of Pulchritude86 of 1932,87 and it was a 
significant moment that the Republic of Turkey proved her existence in international 
scenes with her nationalized, secularized, and unveiled Turkish women. Hence, 
Keriman Halis became the symbol of the modern Turkish women, and she 
mentioned that her success was an outcome of the Kemalism in her telegram to 
Mustafa Kemal: “My success is the result of the ideas inspired by you in the women 
of our country.”88 In the telegram that Mustafa Kemal sent her in order to celebrate 
her success, he mentioned her mission with these sentences:  
 
“We are so proud about the decision of the international members of the jury who 
have shown that the Turkish race maintained its beauty forever. However, Keriman 
Ece89 mentioned, as we all heard, that she is not the most beautiful one among all 
Turkish girls. Our beautiful Turkish girl is so happy and content to be introduced 
with her beauty that she was granted as a natural fact of beauty of her race, to the 
world by international jury. Turkish nation sincerely congratulate its beautiful 
girl.”90 
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She was the winner of the contest with 25 of 28 votes, which were not only 
representing the beauty of Keriman Halis, but also the Westernization of Turkey.91 
However, according to the Islamists, that victory could not be something to 
celebrate; because, the laic ideology used and abused the female body as a symbol 
of modernization and Westernization process. It could represent everything but the 
Turkish woman who was alienated from her own body and her own home, where 
she used to belong.92 If one compares the statement of Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım and 
the final point that the Turkish women arrived with the Republic, the progress will 
be visible about the change of Turkish women`s social status. 
 
In 1926, Turkey became closer to the Western world with the help of the 
new implementations. A change, westernization indeed, was proposed for the 
calendar and the hours. On 26 December 1925, a law was adopted regarding the 
calendar system for a shift from the Islamist (Hicrî Takvim)93 and solar (Rumî 
Takvim)94 calendar systems into the Gregorian one (Milâdî Takvim)95. The law was 
come into force on 1 January 1926. 96  This implementation prevented any 
inconvenience that the state could face regarding the complexity of the former 
system due to the existence of two different calendar systems in use. In the 
meantime, the hours were changed. Regarding to a draft composed on 25 December 
1925, a day was planned to be started in the midnight and divided into 24 equal 
hours, from “0” to “24”, like the Western world. Before the change, a Turkish-style 
timing system (Alaturka Saat)97 was in used and the system was not applicable for a 
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unification of the whole Empire. The draft was accepted officially on 2 January 
1926,98 and, since then, western style timing and calendar systems were adopted in 
the new Turkish State. Obviously, these former systems were different from the ones 
being used in the Western World. The difference would be a significant obstacle that 
used to complicate the international social, economic, and official relations, and 
used to cause confusions. During the late Ottoman period, the differences were 
intended to be decreased; however, the outcome was not sufficient to solve the 
problem. Regardless from the chronological order that has been followed so far, the 
implementations related with the Westernization will be listed in this paragraph. In 
1931, with a new law, the units of measurement were changed.99 Besides all, the 
most salient adaptation was implemented on 1935. The official workdays were 
rearranged, and the official weekly holidays became Saturday and Sunday, instead 
of Fridays. It was an adaptation to the Western World; however, there was another 
thing to be distinguished. The importance of Friday was a religious culture among 
Islamic World due to the special Friday Prayers (Cuma Namazı). Accordingly, the 
meaning of working on Fridays was being unable to go to the Friday Prayers.  
 
In the same year with the change of calendar and timing, in 1926, more 
reforms were implemented, related with legal issues and aimed to create a laic, 
democratic, pluralist, liberal, and egalitarian, state and social structure. On 17 
February, TBMM declared that they approved a secular Civil Code, which was 
adapted from Swiss Civil Code.100 A primitive version of a civil code was composed 
during the Tanzimat; however, it was not sufficient to solve the issues about family, 
proprietorship, inheritance, purchasing and leasing. According to the new Civil 
Code, the listed articles were adopted to the social structure of the new Turkish 
State:101  
 
- An egalitarian structure was possessed between man and woman, within the family. 
- A civil marriage was accepted as an obligation. 
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- Monogamy was adopted. 
- Within the social structure, the women were granted with the right to work, as they 
will. 
- An egalitarian system was adopted between men and women in being witness in 
courts, on issues related with inheritance and divorcement.  
 
The Civil Code was composed and declared; however, it had not been come 
into force until 4 October.102 On the other hand, the Shari’a courts were still in use. 
On 4 October, the government annulled the Shari`a (Islamic) courts, by declaring 
that the Islamic law103 was null and void, and the Civil Code was come into force, 
instead.  As it was visible, the Islamic culture was being swept away from all parts 
of the state one by one. With this implementation, the juridical order was distanced 
from religious judgments. According to Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt)104 (1892-1943), the 
new Civil Code of Turkey would close the doors of old civilization and open those 
of contemporary civilization.105 
 
 In 1928, on 10 April,106 the Kemalist commitment to laicism was proclaimed 
with the removal of the second Article of the 1924 Constitution, which declared 
Islam as the official state religion.107 The exclusion of Islam from the Constitution 
should be considered as an intelligent step due to social structure of the Republic 
and the path that the state followed. First of all, the society was not composed just 
from Muslims; there were other religious communities, which were recognized 
officially by the state. An official definition regarding the religion would cause just 
hostility among the society which would be resulted with the exclusion of the 
                                                
102 İhsan Ulusan, “Türk Medeni Kanununun Dünü ve Bugünü,” İKÜ Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 1, no. 
1-2- (2001): 161. 
103 Sharia is the moral code of religious law of Islam. Also meaning "path" in Arabic, sharia guides 
all aspects of Muslim life including daily routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial 
dealings. It is derived primarily from the Quran and the Sunna--the sayings, practices, and teachings 
of the Prophet Mohammed. Precedents and analogy applied by Muslim scholars are used to address 
new issues. The consensus of the Muslim community also plays a role in defining this theological 
manual. Source: Toni Johnson, and Lauren Vriens, “Islam: Governing Under Sharia,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, 9 January 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-
sharia/p8034#p2>, (10 January 2013). 
104 He was one of the close colleagues of Mustafa Kemal and worked a lot on the new juridical 
system of the Republic of Turkey. 
105 Alan Duben and Cem Behar, İstanbul Hanleri: Evlilik, Ail eve Doğurganlık 1880-1940 (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 229. quoted in Azak, Islam and Secularism, 10. 
106 Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey, 14. 
107 Azak, Islam and Secularism,10. 
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minorities. Moreover, there could not be a “Muslim State” in these religion-based-
multicultural-territories with the Western values. Therefore, laicizing the state was 
the best way to achieve to aforementioned goals.  
 
 In the meantime, a change on 26th Article was implemented and TBMM was 
saved from being the executer of the Shari’a. According to the new regulation, the 
oath that was taken before the duty on the Assembly started to be based on the 
personal honor instead of the “God”.108 
 
In the same year, there was another change implemented to create a symbolic 
rupture with traditional daily habits.109 The Arabic alphabet was abandoned, and 
instead, a new Latin-based alphabet was adopted. The law was declared on 1 
November 1928,110 and it was stated that the new alphabet would be taught from the 
beginning of the new year (from the 1 January 1929).111  It was a powerful change 
for the Muslim society, because they would not be able to learn to write and read in 
Arabic, which is the language of Quran, anymore. Furthermore, it was a limitation 
for the next generations with respect to their links with the Ottoman past and with 
the Islamic World.112   
 
 In 1932, with a regulation, the language of the call for prayers (ezan) was 
shifted to Turkish, from Arabic, the sacral language of Islam and the Turkish 
translation of Quran was composed. Mustafa Kemal mentioned the necessity of this 
regulation with these words:  
 
“Turks do not know what their religion is. That is the reason why the Quran 
should be in Turkish. Turks follow the Quran; however, they do not understand 
what it says. What my aim is to help Turks to understand what is written in the 
book that they follow.”113  
 
                                                
108 Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, 113. 
109 Azak, Islam and Secularism, 11. 
110 “Latin Alfabesi’nin Kabulü (1 Kasım 1928),” Uludağ Üniversitesi, n.d., 
<http://gemlik.uludag.edu.tr/ataturk/?p=300> (12 October 2011). 
111 Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey,14. 
112 Erik-Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 196. 
113 Kışlalı, Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi, 39. (Author’s translation) 
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 That was one of the most controversial attempts to bring Islam under the 
control of the secular state.114 The Quran was read in Turkish for the first on 22 
January 1932, in Istanbul.115 On 30 January 1932, the first call for prayers translated 
into “pure Turkish” by the Turkish Language Association, was chanted in 
Istanbul. 116  In July the Presidency of Religious Affairs standardized the 
implementation throughout mosques all over the country.  When the call for prayers 
chanted in Turkish five times a day all over the country in Turkish, the laic state 
proved both the control that it has over the religion and Turkification of state saved 
from the Arabic culture that was spread and interiorized during the Ottoman Empire.  
 
 In fact, the desire of a call for prayer in Turkish was first declared in 19th 
century.117 Ali Suavi118 (1839-1878) was the first person that defended the use of 
Turkish in worship. In the journal of Ulûm, he defended the idea of a prayer (namaz) 
and the Friday sermon (hutbe) in Turkish. During the sultanate of Sultan 
Abdulhamit II, between the years 1876-1909, he was assigned as the director of the 
Galatasaray High School, he gave the sermons in Turkish in Ayasofya and Beyazit 
Mosques in Istanbul.119 Furthermore, there are more studies that prove there are 
Turkish religious rituals before the official implementation. The first sermon in 
Turkish was read by Müfid Efendi, the MP of Kırşehir, on 22 November 1922.120 
Besides, during the Independence War, sermons began to be used for mobilizing 
popular support for the national government.121 The first parts of the sermons were 
in Arabic due to its references to the prophet, his companions and the caliphs, and 
the second parts, as they were dedicated to the daily issues related with the national 
government and the principal of the integral sovereignty of the nation, were read in 
Turkish.122 Additionally, Gökalp wrote a poem named as Vatan (Homeland) about 
the idea of Turkification of the worship. He described a Turkish homeland with 
these words: 
                                                
114 Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularity, 17. 
115 Emre Kongar, “Aydınlanma,” Emre Kongar Official Website, n.d., 
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117 Azak, Islam and Secularism, 47. 
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120 Ibid., 107. 
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“A country where the call for prayer is recited in Turkish. 
Peasants understand the meaning of the prayer in its call 
A country where Turkish Quran is recited in its schools 
Everybody, from the oldest to the youngest, understands what the God’s orders are 
You, Turk! This is where your homeland is.”123 
 
Although, the year that the poem was written could not be clarified, when the 
year of death of Gökalp took into account, it would be visible that the idea was 
mentioned publicly before the legal arrangement. In fact, there were some 
significant regulations those had been adopted before the change of language. In 
1924, in the year that the Caliphate was abolished, the prayer for the Caliph was 
removed, as well. Before the said removal, the prayer was devoted to the “peace and 
happiness” of the Caliph; however, it changed into the “nation and the Republic” on 
23 February 1925.124 Within time, DİB began to publish a sermon journal (hutbe 
mecmuasi),125 and in 1927 a book was published named as Türkçe Hutbe (Turkish 
Sermon) by Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, then vice-chair of DİB (1887-1951). Copies of 
the book were sent to local religious officers (müftü) over the country.126 Although, 
a translation was prepared, the sermons did not become entirely Turkish. Only the 
“admonition” (mev‘iza ve nasihat) part of the sermon could be in Turkish.127 
 
A long process was experienced in order to adapt the Turkification to the 
religious rituals, until the final regulations about the change in language. As it was 
mentioned, it could be considered as a double victory by the state both in terms of 
nationalization, that is to say Turkification, and state control over the religion. 
                                                
123 “Bir ülke ki, camiinde Türkçe ezan okunur. / Köylü anlar manasını namazdaki duanın / Bir ülke ki, 
mektebinde Türkçe Kuran okunur / Küçük büyük herkes bilir buyruğunu Hüda'nın / Ey Türk oğlu, 
işte senin orasıdır vatanın.” Author’s translation. 
124  “Halifenin durumu ve halifelik makamının kaldırılması dolayısıyla hutbelerde millet ve 
cumhuriyetin selamet ve saadetine dair dua edilmesi.” 7 March 1924. Devlet Arşivleri Genel 
Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.1..30. 
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Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.7..13. quoted in Azak, Islam and 
Secularism, 50-51. 
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81 
Despite all the mentioned endeavors, Turkish call for prayers could not be 
institutionalized, and as it will be mentioned in upcoming parts of this thesis, the 
language was shifted back into Arabic in 1950.  
 
In 1934, the Surname Law was adopted on 21 June.128 According to that law, 
every single citizen was obliged to possess a surname, and it became the basis of 
Turkish identity of individuals. The reason of this implementation was not only 
about the Westernization, but also it was about building an egalitarian society all 
over the country. With the adoption of this law, any kind of nicknames and titles 
those might privilege their possessors were prohibited, and within a logical frame, 
all adults were allowed to possess a surname according to their will.  
 
The Surname Law was applied as a part of the Turkification. As the old, pre-
Islamic Turkic states and their historical heroes were very popular among the society 
as a result of denial of the Ottoman period with its Islamic identity, the surnames 
those were possessed “generally” used to belong to said period and heroes. As it was 
mentioned, the state was in duty of promotion the pre-Islamic Turkic civilizations in 
order to awaken the consciousness of being a “Turk” instead of a “Muslim”, which 
was related with the Muslim subject of the Ottoman Sultan. For instance, an outline 
of Turkish History was prepared as a result of the said duty of promotion. In this 
outline, the Turkish nation was said to be originated in Central Asia sometime 
around 9000BC. The most significant part of that study was the part related with the 
Ottoman Empire. Among all 467-page-study, the pages dedicated to whole Ottoman 
Period, about 600 years, was limited just with 26 pages.129 
 
With the Surname Law, Mustafa Kemal was granted with the surname of 
“Atatürk” which means the “father of Turks”.130 This surname was given just to 
Mustafa Kemal, and not to anybody from his family. Instead, his family was given 
the surname of Atadan, which means “from Atatürk”. The most significant part of 
this surname process was the list of proposals. The list was composed from the 
names of the said heroes of the said Pre-Islamic period. 
                                                
128 “Soyadı Kanunu,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, n.d., 
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In 1934, the egalitarian place of women in society was secured with a new 
law. Women were granted with the right to vote on local elections in 1930, and in 
1933 to vote for elections of reeve. Finally, on 5 December 1934, they gained the 
right to vote on general elections and to be selected as members of parliament.131 As 
it was mentioned by Sirin Tekeli, granting of full suffrage and allowing the presence 
of women in the parliament were strategic moves on the part of the state to show 
Europe that Turkey belonged to the world of Western democratic societies.132  
 
The achievement of the progress of granting women with an equal role in the 
society was mentioned by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with these sentences: 
 
“This decision has earned Turkish women a higher status than that of the 
women of other nations. In the future, it will be necessary to search for covered and 
veiled women (only) in history books... By participating in general elections, 
Turkish women are now using the most important of all rights. This right, which is 
denied to women in many civilized countries, is now fully available to Turkish 
women. She will use that right effectively and confidently.”133 
 
In 1937, on 5 February, a new regulation was come into force in order to 
complete all progress that has been achieved in less than two decades. The definition 
of the state, which was saved from religion in 1928, was completed with an 
additional part to the Second Article of the Constitution: “The republic of Turkey is 
a laic state.”134 
 
Within the implementations and regulations those were adopted to political, 
social, educational orders, the Republic of Turkey was already in a secular function; 
however, with this article, laicism in Turkey was guaranteed within constitutional 
frame.  
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3.1.3. After M.K. Atatürk’s Death 
 
 When M.K. Atatürk passed away on 10 November 1938, the Republic of 
Turkey had been laicized entirely within constitutional frame. This was the most 
salient characteristic of his ideology, as he mentioned in 1937 in parliament’s 
opening speech. “Our principles should not be confused with the dogmas of books 
supposed to have come down from heaven. We derive our inspiration not from 
heaven and the other world, but directly from life.”135 This characteristic of him was 
the reason why Andrew Mango described him as an empiricist.136 He relied on the 
positive sciences and showed a significant distrust to metaphysical arguments, in 
other words religious arguments. This was the heritage of M.K. Atatürk and his 
companions as ruler group of his time. 
 
On 11 November 1938, the day after death of M.K. Atatürk, İsmet İnönü was 
elected as the second President of the Republic. According to a draft that was 
proposed by deputy General Manager of Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi – CHP), Celal Bayar, and accepted unanimously, he was assigned as 
the President of the Party, as well. 
 
Andrew Mango stated that, İnönü gave priority to maintain the main success 
of the republic, such as political and economic independency, territorial unity, 
cultural reforms of M.K. Atatürk, and development of national economy. 137 
Accordingly, he made a significant effort to control the functionality of reforms, and 
he focused on the counter implementations. For instance, he tried to determine the 
actions, which were against the new Alphabet, the Hat Law, and Turkish calls for 
prayer those were considered as Islamist movements. 
 
The state was still in duty of progress in order to achieve to the high level of 
modern civilizations. Between 17-23 July 1939, during the first Meeting of Ministry 
of Education was held and the committee implemented new regulations. As a result 
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of the proposal of then Minister of Education, Hasan Ali Yücel (1897-1961)138, 
Greek and Latin, which were the languages of European Enlightenment, was 
intended to adopt to high school transcripts in order to free the new generations’ 
mind and to embed the humanist culture.139 For 1940-1941 educational year, 3 high 
schools, which were Ankara Atatürk High School, Ankara Female High School, and 
Istanbul Galatasaray High School, were selected and since their first years Greek 
and Latin were taught as the second foreign language for 5 hours per week, under a 
new section named as Classic Section apart from Science and Literature sections. 
However, the Classic Section was closed in 1949.140  
 
For the aims of the republic, girls’ education was encouraged in order to 
ensure women integration to the society, building schools to villages, and 
establishing conservatories and state radios could be listed as the most salient 
implementations.141 These regulations and Greek and Latin classes were reacted 
negatively by a part of the society, as they were all related with Westernization, 
which meant an escape from Ottoman components and threat to Islamic Ottoman 
heritage. On 15 December 1942, in an article published in Magazine of Türk Yurdu, 
the humanist perception of Yücel and the implementations were protested with these 
words: “We are neither humanists, nor communists. We are the Muslim Turks!”142 
 
 The most salient implementation of this period regarding to educational 
order was the village institutes (Köy Enstitüleri). The aims of village institutes were 
to provide improvement on the progress of villages not only on educational order, 
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with his regulations related with the educational system. During his time, the World Classics were 
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but also on social and agricultural life of farmers. They were planned to be the basis 
of the struggle against fanaticism and reactionary.143 
 
 Village institutes were legalized in 1940; however, the project had been 
discussed during the period of M.K. Atatürk. During the presidency of M.K. Atatürk, 
then Prime Minister Inönü and then Minister of Education Reşit Galip (1897-1934) 
paid significant attention with a specific committee to provide sustainable 
educational services to hard-to-reach villages. According to results of said 
committee, there was a certain necessity of providing teachers, who were capable of 
living under rural conditions, helping villagers to advance the conditions of life, 
leading the village not only with his/her knowledge, but also with ability to change 
vision of villages and to provide overall development.144 In 1934, there were 
approximately 38000 villages and the lack of teachers could be counted as 50000, 
while the schools of vocational teacher education were able to graduate only 150 
teachers per year.145 According to the census of 1935, only the 19.25% of total 
population was literate. Furthermore, ratio of literacy was not equally divided 
between two genders: the ratio was 26.35% for women and 73.65% for men.146  
 
Village institutes were opened in 1940 as unique examples dedicated to rural 
conditions. According to the system, the instruction period was 5 years, the weekly 
credits were shared for four, and half were dedicated to cultural lectures, one fourth 
to agricultural lectures and the other one fourth to technical lectures. Institutes 
accepted students, who were healthy and competent and who completed five-year-
basic education in a village school, regardless of any gender differences. The 
students were planned to be educated as teachers for village school with 20-year-
obligatory-service. Within this circulation, the state would be able to provide well 
qualified teachers for villages and modern, laic, and scientific (free of charge) 
education service to hard-to-reach villages. 147  Laicization of education was 
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specifically. Not only the general and cultural classes, but also the agricultural 
techniques based on science and technology were included within the system instead 
of traditional culture techniques based on faith and destiny. İsmail Hakkı Tonguç 
(1893-1960)148 mentioned the significance of laicism in the Magazine of Village 
Institutes, with this statement: 
 
“We should hope that the future world would not be feed by invisible 
power which comes from the sky or by transcendental ideas. If we want to establish 
it on a safe and content base, we should give a rational and humanist religion free 
from lies. Our children who are educated in village institutes are intended to be 
saved from being slaves of outdated philosophy.”149 
 
 The same importance was highlighted by Sabahattin Eyüboğlu (1908-
1973),150 as well. He mentioned; 
 
“One of the most important aims of the founders of this project was to 
replace the moral of religion with moral of profession and science. Laicism in 
Anatolia, where various races, beliefs, languages, and traditions coexist and clash, 
was not only a tool to achieve to a modern mentality, but also a prerequisite of a life 
as a nation. Dignity of work in village institutes dedicated to different conditions of 
each region was like a new common religion.”151   
 
 Within a limited time, village institutes achieved concrete success. For 
instance, the number of teachers for village schools tripled within ten years.152 
However, it could not be institutionalized as a result of protests against its structure, 
and they were transformed into regular teacher-training schools by the Democrat 
Party Government153 as a concession to the opponents of laicism.154 
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The regulations were implemented with significant support from society; 
however, the said support could not be considered as hundred percent support from 
the entire society. There were individual events, which were detected and punished 
within the laws, against the regulations. In fact, those could be considered as normal 
reflections; since, complete transformation among the entire society could not be 
institutionalized instantly; although, the society was encouraged with maximum 
endeavor by the state. Like M.K. Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, also, faced with these kinds 
of reactions during his presidency. For instance, in 1939, in the villages of Erzurum, 
some people were arrested and sent to the courts, as they were accused with 
disobedience to the regulation and teaching in old Arabic alphabet.155 As another 
example, in Trabzon, a group of people, who were accused of teaching Quran 
without authorization, was sent to the courts.156 It was not just the alphabet protested, 
but also there were other reactions related with yearning to the Islamic Ottoman past. 
Within this perspective, the usage of titles, most specifically the religious ones such 
as Hadji (Haci), Hodja (Hoca), Mulla (Molla Efendi), propagandizing Islam, 
protesting the state, and Arabic calls for prayer were the issues that the state would 
deal with.  
 
As it was mentioned, Turkification of calls for prayer was a long-time 
endeavor that started before the republic; however, it could not be institutionalized 
all over the country. There were individual protest actions, which started in Bursa, a 
northwestern Anatolian city, in 1933.157 The problem in Bursa was solved; however, 
the protests did not end during 1930s and 1940s,158 and kept its importance until the 
implementation was nullified in 1950. The change of the implementation will be 
analyzed with its details in upcoming parts.  
 
As laicization process was a threat for Islamic Ottoman identity, there were 
some aspects those were considered as a threat or the laic republican identity, such 
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as Nurculuk, the Islamic movement. Said-i Nursi159 (1878-1960), the founder of 
Nurculuk, was considered as a “security issue” and became one of the most salient 
topic that the state watched. Although, Said-i Nursi was under state`s surveillance, 
his commentaries were spread over the society in order to find his followers with the 
help of Nur Talebeleri.160 
 
State control was taken more seriously day-by-day, and the state had 
involved more issues within time. The newspapers were not allowed to publish any 
articles, which would support reactionary movements or criticize the state, for 
instance. Eventually, in the middle of 1940s, the Office of Press (Matbuat Umum 
Müdürlüğü) published an instruction, in which the newspapers and the journalists 
were warned about not to promote religion in their articles.161 In the meantime, as a 
governmental initiative, Encyclopedia of Islam, which was published in 
Leiden/Netherlands, was started to be translated into Turkish in 1939. In fact, it was 
not only a translation; instead, it would be a new edition based on the said 
publication but with annexes and commentaries of Turkish theologians. The 
initiative was strongly refused by Eşref Edip, the publisher of Sebilürreşad, and by 
other Islamist intellectuals.162 The Islamist intellectuals accused the Encyclopedia of 
Islam of being published by missionaries in order to abolish Islamic culture, and 
they published Turkish-Islam Encyclopedia (Türk-İslam Ansiklopedisi), in 1941, as 
an alternative Islamic encyclopedia and a tool to abuse the one that translated by the 
government. As it was argued by Bernard Lewis, that was considered as the first 
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sign of opposition to laic policies of the state163, and the religious awakening164. The 
Encyclopedia was published until 1950,165and apart from the Encyclopedia, over 
100 books related with religion were published during the Single Party Period.166  
 
Within general perspective, all implementations including translation of 
Islamic encyclopedias, prohibition of newspaper articles were parts of control issue. 
The state intended to take every single issue regarding Islam under its own control 
without any exception; hence, there was no movement, or publications that would 
promote Islam, but the government. Due to this approach to religious issues, Single 
Party Period has been criticized even stronger. Edip accused the Single Party Period 
of being an enemy to Islam within these words: 
 
“They have completely ignored the society. The have not hesitated to 
offense the sacred feelings of society. The entire country was covered by misery 
and suffer. They have stabbed the consciences. They have changed the calls for 
prayer. They have even involved into the mosques, they have involved into the 
prayers. They have closed religious institutions.”167 
 
Tension in society increased with religious promotions on one side and 
governmental prohibitions on the other hand, during the late 1940s. In the same 
magazine, Sebilürreşad, Ali Fuat Başgil mentioned that the tension resulted with 
society’s discontent attitude to Single Party Period that led to Democrat Party rule, 
168 which will be a topic of the following part. Besides, there were some scholars 
argue that the heritage of M.K. Atatürk was changed into another form with strict 
implementations and legal punishments. For instance, Henry J. Barkey mentioned 
that M.K. Atatürk’s ideology was sanctified by his followers,169 and Bernard Lewis 
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described the change as a transformation of his authoritarian and paternalistic mode 
of government into a form close to “dictatorship”.170 
 
3.2. Experiencing Democracy 
 
 During transition period, M.K. Atatürk and his companions intended to solve 
all issues within a laic and republican structure. In fact, the planned path was for the 
cleaning of political scenes from Islam, by its limitation with private sphere and 
taking it under control in order to protect both the religion and the politics. However, 
there is one thing that should be highlighted; the said revolutions were not applied 
by the society itself.171 In other words, laicism process of Turkey was not brought 
about by an enlightenment process as the Western World had experienced.  
 
In the Western World, as a result of economic development and 
enlightenment process, the institutionalization of modernism occurred as a natural 
fact. However, in Turkey, modernization process was intended to catch after the 
republic within a shortcut. During the time of M.K. Atatürk, all political groups 
were unified under his control. Within this time, the statist-elitist group172 including 
M.K. Atatürk and his companions embraced the socialist groups as they were all in 
favor of the modernization process. On the other hand, traditional-liberals173 were 
suppressed by the ruling group.174 That is the reason why Kongar states that, M.K. 
Atatürk has been the symbol of unification of the country.175 However, the lack of a 
progressive background brought about many complications to the Turkish political 
history. 
 
During the presidency of İnönü, the government faced with many protest 
movements concerning the regulations of modernization, and these protest 
movements resulted with judicial processes. Consequently, the tension caused more 
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reaction among society and displeasure about the single-party period. Besides, the 
Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) issue was also another problem that led to displeasure 
of society. The law regarding the Wealth Tax was put into force on 11 November 
1942 for a probable involvement into the World War II, and targeted wealthy 
citizens to oblige to pay high amounts of taxes. That was the official reason declared 
officially; however, then Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu (1887-1953) declared in 
on of party meetings that it was the Turkification of markets.176 This tax has been 
criticized strongly as being an unfair application to non-Muslim citizens. Besides, 
that application with significant focus on the statement of the Prime Minister opens 
a debate of both “citizenship” and the role of Islam in it, and the usage of “Turk”. 
Although the law did not directly target non-Muslim citizens, the discourses cannot 
suit with egalitarian principle of both the Treaty of Lausanne and the constitution. 
This issue will be discussed with details in upcoming parts.  
 
Under these conditions, the Republic of Turkey took a step into an 
experience of democracy with Democrat Party in 1946. Within this part of the 
chapter, multi-party period, military interventions, the rise of political Islam, Turkish 
Islamic Synthesis, and transformation of the society will be examined. The events of 
a half-century of Turkish politics until the 21st century will be analyzed within the 
frame of laic and anti-laic discussions. 
 
3.2.1. Multi-Party Period - Democrat Party 
 
 The displeasure about the Single Party Period increased during the second 
half of the 1940s. The strict control of state over the citizens brought about tension 
among the society; eventually, debates around laicism had a part on the agenda of 
CHP. In fact, it was a competitive process on Turkish politics due to the 
establishment of Democrat Party. 
 
CHP, due to its structure, was a party of different ideologies in itself. 
However, the tension was effective on its meetings, and in 1945 the budget debates 
of the government became one of the most heated debates among all; especially, the 
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law concerning the farmers in order to make them possessors of their own fields 
(Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu) was argued a lot by opposites.177  
 
 The law has been discussed a lot regarding its articles, its necessity, and its 
benefits to economic system. As the economic benefits and its background are 
irrelevant with the purpose of this thesis, only the political outcomes will be 
discussed. The budget debates hosted many discussions, and according to different 
scholars there were many different reasons.178 According to supporters, it was a 
movement concerning the protection of little farmers against powerful landowners; 
besides, unused fields were supposed to be valued as they would be owned by the 
farmers working for the mentioned landlords. Herewith, both the unused fields 
would become valuable and the farmers would work for their own favor. The 
opponents considered the law as an adaptation of a Nazi-German land regulation as 
a fascist implementation. According to another opponent idea, the government 
intended to control the powerful landowners, who were, generally, the leaders of 
oppositional movements, with the law. Among all, the most salient part was the way 
that it paved to the multi party period.   
 
 The law concerning the farmers was accepted on 11 June 1945; in the 
meantime, it caused the increase of oppositional discourses and made the 
oppositional voices official. Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) and Fuad Köprülü (1890-
1966), the deputies of CHP, were not in favor with the law, and they published 
articles in daily newspaper Vatan, which demonstrated an official opposition against 
the party.179 Eventually, due to their oppositional discourses, Menderes, Köprülü and 
Refik Koraltan (1890-1974) were excluded from the CHP, on September 1945.180 
                                                
177  M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “Bir Tepeden Reform Denemesi: "Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma 
Kanunu"nun Hikâyesi.” Birikim 107 (2003): 
<http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim/dergiyazi.aspx?did=1&dsid=99&dyid=2340>. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Sanem Gök, “Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Vatan Gazetesi (1950-1960)”, (M.A. diss., University of 
Ankara, 2003). 
180 “Adnan Menderes,” Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, n.d., 
<http://www.msb.gov.tr/anasayfa/html/Bakanlar/BakanPotre/AMenderesB.htm> (2 May 2013);  
      Kadir Özdamarlar, “Develi`de Siyasi Hayatın Gelişimi-3,” Çağdaş Develi Haftalık Yerel Gazete, 
n.d., 
<http://www.cagdasdeveli.com.tr/index.php/arsiv/kose-yazarlari/27-yrd-doc-dr-kadir-
ozdamarlar/708-develide-siyasi-hayatn-geliimi-3> (2 May 2013); 
      Osman Akandere, “Fuad Köprülü ve Demokrat Parti’nin Kurulmasındaki Rolü.” Türkiyat 
Araştırmaları Dergisi 3 (1997): 240. 231-242. 
 
93 
After the resignation of Celal Bayar (1883-1986), these four former CHP members 
declared that they would found a new party.181 Regarding to that declaration, İnönü 
asked for a promise regarding not to involve any reactionary movement (irtica) as 
the oppositional party. Eventually, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - DP) was 
founded on 7 January 1946.182 
  
 Since the beginning of 1946, the TBMM hosted two parties, and the said 
competitive process was started. The debates regarding laicism started with CHP’s 
implementations. Two CHP deputies, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver from Istanbul and 
Hakkı Baha Pars from Bursa, proposed a regulation concerning religious instruction 
in curriculum of public schools to TBMM on 24 December 1946.183 They stated that 
religious instruction would protect the society from involving into communist trend, 
which was originated from the Soviet Union.184 In 1947, the proposal was supported 
by more deputies, who were Vehbi Dayıbaş from Sinop, northern Anatolian city, 
Abdülkadir Güney from Çorum, central Anatolian city, Şükrü Nayman from Kayseri, 
central Anatolian city, Sinan Tekelioğlu from Adana, southern Anatolian city and 
Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver from Istanbul; additionally, they took it one step 
forward, and they proposed religious instruction for primary schools and opening of 
theology faculties. They defended these regulations because, in their opinion, the 
national solidarity was in need to be protected and the only way was the use of 
religion. Aforelisted deputies criticized the interpretation of laicism, as well.185 
These opponent proposals were not accepted by the Assembly in that year; however, 
in 1949, CHP Government put some regulations regarding the religious education 
into force. According to the said regulations; religious instructions were applied to 
curriculum of primary schools as optional lectures that will be elected with a special 
petition,186 courses for preachers and prayer leaders (imam-hatip kursları) were 
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opened,187 and the Faculty of Theology of University of Ankara was opened in 1949. 
Moreover, a law regarding the allowance of visits to some of the tombs of Ottomans 
Sultans and some religious leaders was applied on 1 March 1950,188 just two months 
before the general elections. As it was stated by Şadiye Ay,189 these regulations 
could be considered as given concessions in order to get closer with conservative 
part of society before 1950 elections. 
 
 As it could not be institutionalized, Turkish calls for prayer started to be 
discussed once again. According to Ömer Rıza Doğrul (1893-1952), Turkish calls 
for prayer was an unnecessary implementation due to the originality of calls. He 
stated: 
 
“We are not against the recital of ezan in Turkish. Nevertheless, we believe that it is 
an unnecessary trouble and a useless initiative. The ezan of Mohammed, which is 
known and adopted by the Turk, is not in Arabic, but in the language of Islam. 
Because it is in the language of Islam, it is in Turkish, in Persian, and even Hindu 
and Chinese. It is a shared language, which is understood by all who belong to this 
community. Maybe they cannot comprehend its words, but their spirits grasp the 
real truth of the words. … This issue [of the ezan] has been kept alive for centuries 
by history, tradition, blood of martyrs. According to us, the government should pull 
its intervention in this issue back and leave this to the conscience of the nation.”190 
 
 On the other hand, the implementation was criticized within a different 
perspective: involvement of a laic state into religious issues. For instance, Edip 
stated his disagreement: 
 
“It is now time to be able to talk about the need to remove treatments against 
religion which have been conducted for long years under the guise of secularism. 
Therefore, it should also be natural to talk about the issue of the ezan. … If the 
government is secular, it should not interfere in affairs of religion neither positively 
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not negatively… How can a secular government intervene in the nation's recital of 
the ezan, which is a totally religious affair?”191 
 
In fact, the issue was not only the Turkish calls for prayer, but worship in 
Turkish within a general perspective. The opponents of implementation were in 
favor of originality of the language due to distrust in equality between a translation 
and original. For instance, M. Raif Ogan published various articles in Sebilürreşad 
concerning his distrust in translation in worship.192  Due to these discussions, 
implementation had never gained whole trust from the society; consequently, it did 
not take too long to be annulled. 
 
 According to latest implementations and concessions of CHP government, 
Bernard Lewis argued that a considerable religious awakening was occurred among 
the society; consequently, prayers in the mosques got crowded, religious orders such 
as Nurcu movement got more power, and religious press with its special target group 
composed by conservative and even clericalist people emerged.193 These policies of 
the CHP were criticized by journalists and writers with undermining the reforms of 
M.K. Atatürk and encouraging reactionary movements.194 On the other hand, as it 
would be obvious with the results of 1950 Elections, concessions that CHP 
Government gave could not be sufficient to make the conservative parts of the 
society content.195 
 
On 14 May 1950, the general elections ended an era and led a new start in 
Turkish politics. The elections concluded with DP’s success with 408 seats over 487, 
while CHP gained 69 seats in the Assembly.196 The percentages of each party are as 
shown in Chart I. 
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 With the DP Government, two new terms occurred in Turkish political 
scenes: the reforms possessed by people (millete malolmuş inkılaplar) and the ones 
not possessed by people (millete malolmamış inkılaplar).197 These terms were used 
by Menderes, the Prime Minister of the DP Government, during his speech about the 
party program, which was composed by the DP’s perspective concerning laicism 
and religious issues. He mentioned that; “As it was written in our election 
declaration, we will secure the reforms possessed by people.”198 As it will be 
mentioned, reforms not possessed by people would be the first issues that DP 
Government would pay attention. As Kongar stressed, this policy of government 
was considered as “leaving behind the modernization process” by supporters of 
laicism.199 
 
 
Chart I: 1950 General Elections 
Source: “1950 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları,” TBMM, 
n.d.,<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.secimdeki_partiler?p_secim_yili=
1950> (20 May 2013). 
 
 The DP Government supported its actions within a different perspective of 
laicism, while it was criticized strongly by supporters of laicism. In fact, it was a 
significant occurrence of an alternative laicism, which has been the first but not the 
last time of redefinition of laicism. As argued by Umut Azak, said alternative 
laicism discourse has been used; possible to say still is being used, by the right-wing 
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political parties in Turkish politics.200 For instance, Celal Bayar, the chairman of the 
DP, had stated before the elections that his party respected to sacred religious values 
unified with laicism with these sentences: 
 
“According to the policies of the DP, we respect to religious freedom as much as 
we respect to other freedoms. Citizens are totally free to possess any religion they 
will and free to practice it. The way it functions will be discussed when it is the 
time. Due to DP’s policies, which respect freedom, the party in power [this is to say, 
CHP] was obliged to discuss religious issues and religious education; accordingly, 
they proposed negotiations and put the topic on the agenda of the Assembly.”201 
 
Similarly, after the DP came into power, Menderes stated his perspective of 
laicism in his public speeches, in which he pointed out the freedom of conscience as 
the basis of laicism. However, his discourses were not referring total freedom; 
instead, he referred the Islamic identity of Turkish nation. For instance in his speech 
in Adana, on 6 December 1952, he pointed out the importance of freedom of 
conscience: 
 
“Turkish nation is Muslim and will remain Muslim. Nobody in this country has the 
right to violate the right of others. Real believers and sincere Muslims can be 
completely sure of the freedom of conscience. And just the real Muslims know to 
respect to others’ religious beliefs and freedom of conscience. Within the 
framework of the principle of freedom of conscience, religion as a sacred and 
respectable concept should be protected from any kind of offenses. To understand 
laicism as opposing religion or hostility does not suit with our government's 
understanding of freedom of conscience. Apart from our decision to protect religion 
from all kinds of offenses, our decision to prevent religion from becoming a tool for 
suppressing citizens having other beliefs and personal ideas is definite, as well. This 
country has no tolerance to abuse of a sacred concept like religion by certain social 
debris and self-seeking politicians.”202 
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 Within DP perspective Turkish calls for prayer was considered as a reform 
not possessed by people,203 and it became the first issue that the DP Government 
paid attention. On 16 June 1950, within a month of the establishment of government, 
Arabic calls for prayers were allowed over the country.204 Two deputies from the DP 
Government, Ahmet Gürkan from Tokat, northern Anatolian city, and İsmail Berkok 
from Kayseri, prepared a draft of the law, and they mentioned that then 
implementation was a violation of freedom of conscience and a contradiction of 
principles of laicism.205 Contradiction of laicism issue was also distinguished by 
Menderes with this statement: 
 
“While never permitting any reactionary provocation, we will respect the 
necessities of the freedom of religion and conscience. This is how we understand 
the meaning of true secularism. As it is also expressed clearly in our program, we 
understand that true secularism requires the lack of any relation between religion 
and state politics and the absence of influence of any religious idea on legal 
arrangements and practices.”206 
 
In fact, Turkish calls for prayers were considered as an issue that should be 
solved by conservatives. As it can be seen in Appendix V (on page 293) the daily 
newspaper Vakit announced the regulation on 14 June 1950, even before the official 
acceptance, by this headline: “The DP has solved an important issue: The calls for 
prayers will be recited in Arabic”. As it was the DP Government that solved the 
issue, Menderes was considered as “the heroic figure that was a true Muslim and a 
true Turk”.207 Because the Arabic call for prayer was a return to the Islamic roots of 
the country. That was the reason why the debate of language of worship was so 
significant. Shift to Arabic was an unprogressive step within laic republican identity, 
and its supporters believed in the necessity of Turkish calls for prayers as a pivotal 
component of laicism, as they saw the lack of reformed Islam on the way to achieve 
a real modernization. However, due to the certain unpopularity of the Turkish calls, 
the initiative could not be resisted. The attitude of CHP was clarified by Cemal Reşit 
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Eyüboğlu, MP of Trabzon, northern Anatolian city, on behalf of his party with this 
declaration: 
 
“The concepts of nation-state and national consciousness were established with the 
republic in this country and CHP followed this path. Within this framework, the 
calls for prayers were considered as a topic related with language and national 
consciousness. According to the nation-state policy, the Turkish language should be 
used as much as possible. That is the reason why we preferred the calls in our 
native language in our homeland. We are not in favor of an argument concerning 
the language of calls for prayers. We believe that national consciousness will solve 
the issue and we will not stand against the regulation.”208 
 
Accordingly, some MPs of CHP voted in favor with acceptance of the law, 
and this was announced by daily newspaper Cumhuriyet as a headline with this 
expression “The MPs of CHP also approved and accepted the law”. 
 
 The acceptance of the law was a gladsome regulation within the perspective 
of Islamic Ottoman identity. Apart from the allowance of Arabic calls for prayers, 
with another regulation put into force on 5 July 1950, Qur’an recitations and 
sermons recorded by 2 hafız under the supervision of DİB, would be broadcasted in 
state-owned radio (Ankara Radyosu) three times a week.209 Supporters of Islamic 
Ottoman identity considered it as an “auspicious success” (hayırlı başarı). 210 
Besides, it was considered as a will of the public, and “any Kemalist reform might 
be abolished with respect to the people’s will” was said in Sebilürreşad.211 
 
 Religion-based implementations and Menderes’ Izmir speech of 1951, in 
which he stated; 
 
“We set our religion, which was under constraint so far, free. We did not take the 
blind-followers of reforms seriously, and we Arabized the calls for prayers. Turkey 
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is a Muslim state, and will remain Muslim, and it will accomplish all the duties of 
Islamism.”212 
 
gave a relief to Islamic movements and caused irritation among supporters of laic 
republican identity. With support of Islamic discourses of the government, 
conservative media started to promote Said-i Nursi and his teaching Nurculuk. As 
contrary to the promotion of Nurculuk, it was considered as proof of reactionary 
Islam by supporters of laicism.213 As Kongar stated, the DP Government, which 
came to power after a long time of single party period as a result of people’s 
harassment, intended to institutionalize the “political Islam” by making concessions. 
Herewith, the promotion of Said-i Nursi and his strong relationship with Menderes 
became the said proof of reactionary. 214 
 
There are many different perspectives regarding the role of Said-i Nursi 
among the society. Some scholars stated that he was the missing personality of a 
religion-based daily life, 215  or within a sociological definition, the missing 
personality of transformation from Gemeinschaft (communal society) to 
Gesellschaft (associational society) among people.216 With a different perspective, 
Said-i Nursi could be considered as an important personality by many different parts 
of the society, such as a religious leader by conservatives, a Kurdish Molla for 
Kurdish nationalists with his ethnic origin, an anti-communist or an Islamic 
reformist by his proper approach to Islam.217 On the contrary, within laic republican 
perspective, he was an objector of reforms and M.K. Atatürk,218 and a leader of a 
fake Islamic movement.219  
 
 As a result of the strict control over Said-i Nursi by CHP Government and 
the lack of significant support by the DP Government until the second half of the 
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decade, he was not able to proceed in his works within sight. For instance, his book 
Risale-i Nur was published within an informal process until 1956.220 In 1956, the 
first year that Risale-i Nur was published in book format, the government facilitated 
the process of publication.221 In fact, the support was not one-sided; instead, the 
government supported him in order to get votes of conservatives and Said-i Nursi’s 
disciples222 and he supported the government due its policies regarding the religious 
issues. Although the truth of the event is still being discussed,223 due to the mutual 
support and strong relationship between Menderes and Said-i Nursi, Menderes is 
said to kiss Said-i Nursi’s hand in respect and flattened him.224 Whether it is true or 
not, the closeness between them caused significant enmity among supporters of laic 
republican identity that gave birth tension between two parts of the society. 
 
Since the beginning of the DP Government, Islam was promoted due to its 
role in real Turkish identity. Islam was seen as a savior, which would be helpful to 
lead the Turks in true path, which could never ever intersect with communism – the 
real enemy of the state. Regarding this policy, DİB was assigned to fight with the 
enemy with the help of sermons those would be chanted from the mosques. As it was 
quoted in one of the sermons by Sabahattin Nal, the policy was mentioned with this 
statement: 
 
“For many years, we isolated ourselves from the Qur’an. With the left of the Qur’an, 
obviously a setback occurs. The salvation is possible only with remaining true with 
the holy Qur’an. Only Islam will save people from the malady of communism.”225 
 
Relatively, former CHP Government was accused of being the reason of 
communist trend existing in Turkey. Village institutes became a reason of this 
accusation.226 They were considered as the schools of communism, where the youth 
was being taught with communist principles; consequently, they were closed 
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officially and transformed into schools of vocational teacher education with an 
official regulation on 27 January 1954.227 As a result of the closure, reformist groups 
criticized the DP Government, because it obstructed a type of education, which 
would bring up an enlightened generation for the sake of a laic and modern 
republic.228 
 
 As it was mentioned in French experience, education system has been one of 
the most intervened orders in the clash of two identities. Before the 1950 Elections, 
CHP intended to get votes of the conservatives with courses for preachers and 
prayer leaders; however, it failed. When the DP came into power, the government 
took the regulation one step forward and transformed the courses into schools for 
preachers and prayer leaders, which was organized as two steps. The first step was 
composed by four years as secondary schools and the second step was for three 
years as high schools.229 Said vocational schools, which were supposed to educate 
qualified religious men, has always been an issue of educational system, but most 
significantly an issue of politics. Within years, the number of these schools has been 
increased, and its form was changed according to the religious policy of different 
governments. The issue will be examined within chronological order in upcoming 
parts. 
 
As aforementioned in previous parts, the regulation and Turkification of 
language was a considerable endeavor on the way of a nation-state process, and that 
process was including all means of escape from Arabic culture. Within this 
perspective, the usage of old Ottoman words in schools books and in official 
discourses attracted the attention of supporters of laicism, obviously in a negative 
way, and intensified their enmity to DP Government. For instance, the Turkish 
usage of the Commander of Turkish Armed Forces (Genelkurmay Başkanı) changed 
with the old Ottoman version (Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi) during the time of 
DP governments.230 
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 Conservatism became visible in many different orders. For instance, the 
beauty contests became an issue once again by conservative media. The contests 
were considered as “an attempt to lead Turkish girls into prostitution and to sell 
them to ‘American Jews’”.231 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek stated that the beauty contests 
were a new version of prostitution and totally against the national honor.232 
According to another work that Azak carried out, there were many different 
demands proposed by local branches of DP that could be considered as anti-
reformist. For instance, on 11 March 1951 in Konya, central Anatolian city, some 
members of the DP proposed to apply the Arabic alphabet and to encourage people 
to wear Ottoman style hat (fes) and çarşaf; on 15 September 1952 in Çorum, central 
Anatolian city, compulsory courses on the Qur’an, the ban of beauty contests, and 
parties and to disallow women to work were the proposals on the agenda.233 
However, due to an official warning that was sent by the party leadership, the 
proposals were stopped as they were against the Turkish revolution.234 
 
Governmental support on Islamic traditionalism encouraged women with 
çarşaf in the city centers, which was entirely opposite of the laic republican vision of 
the Turkish women.235 With increased tension, the society was divided into two with 
labels of progressivists (ilerici) and reactionary (gerici).236 The said division started 
with the DP Government period, and has played a significant role in Turkish 
political scenes since then. 
 
Polarization of society has caused many bloody attacks in political history of 
Turkey, and Istanbul Pogrom (6-7 Eylül Olayları) has become one of the most 
significant ones targeting non-Muslims, most specifically the Greek-Orthodox 
citizens of the republic. 
 
On 6 September 1955, non-Muslim merchants were targeted by mobilized 
groups and their stores were looted in Istanbul, after a news coming from 
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Thessaloniki - Greece concerning an attack to M.K. Atatürk`s house. Attacks and 
loots lasted two days and according to court proceedings, more than four thousands 
houses, more than a thousand stores, 73 churches, one synagogue, two monasteries, 
many schools and more than five thousand buildings including factories, restaurants, 
hotels and bars were damaged.237 In fact, news of the attack in Thessaloniki cannot 
be considered as the real reason, as there were many other reasons based on different 
orders. For instance, the oppression to Turkish Cypriots was an important issue on 
then agenda of Turkey. On the other hand, economical power that non-Muslims 
possessed was a fact, and nationalization of economy could be considered as a 
policy. After the events, non-Muslim population of Istanbul significantly decreased 
due to security issues, and this consequence was commented as “scratch of the 
mosaic” with reference to solved diverse characteristic of Istanbul.238 
 
 Regarding the whole information given above, Turkey could be considered 
as a state undergoing another transition period. In all means, there were significant 
differences from the early republican period. The meaning of glorious-past was 
shifted from pre-Islamic time into pre-republican Ottoman period, which was the 
dark-past of Kemalists. Even, the early republican period was considered as the 
dark-past of the Turkish State by the DP Government. The concept of nationalism 
was interpreted within a different perspective; rather than laic-nationalism of CHP, 
Muslim-Turkish nationalism was promoted by the DP governments.239 Moreover, 
the interpretation of laicism was changed and it was considered as expanded limits 
for Sunni Islamic belief. Meanwhile, definitions of personalities were changed. For 
instance, Said-i Nursi, who was a spied-by-state man during CHP governments, was 
considered as a “harmless old man”240 and even was asked for a support by 
government. This transformation process satisfied the supporters of traditional 
Islamic Ottoman identity; however, supporters of laicism were extremely disturbed 
due to anti-laic regulations and Islamic gestures of Menderes. For instance, his visit 
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to the Eyüp Sultan Tomb241 or his welcoming ceremony by Said-i Nursi in Emirdağ 
by green based flag with sultan’s signature on it (as a significant symbol of Islam)242 
were considered as clear proofs of reactionary.  
 
 Besides the conservatives, the DP was also supported by the capital owners, 
powerful landowners and businessmen due to the changing economic system of 
Turkey; even, the party was considered as a product of the said economic system, as 
discussed by Kongar.243 Additionally, the party was supported by the society, who 
was bored with single-party. Herewith, a capitalist party became the leader of a 
popular action,244 and possessed both economic and political power. However, when 
Turkey arrived to the end of 1950s, the division among society, the supporters as 
listed above on one side and the opponents on the other, became obvious in media, 
in political and sociological orders, and even on the streets. That was the final 
situation of Turkish political scenes before the first military intervention. 
 
3.2.2. 2 Decades – 3 Military Interventions 
 
 The establishment of DP, and as its consequence, the transition to multiparty 
system were considerable steps for the path to democracy on Turkish political 
history. However, as the transition process could not be governed with sustainable 
success, four elections after the multi-party period, Turkish political scenes 
witnessed a military intervention.  
 
Support of DP from different parts of society was mentioned in previous part; 
however, the oppositional front was mobilizing due to its implementations 
simultaneously. While the religious discourses of government were causing 
considerable annoyance among supporters of laicism, different levels of annoyance 
were emerged among economic circles due to the inequality in the distribution of 
income, which led to socio-political problems.245  
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 Critics to DP were gathered around the oppositions on political scenes; so 
that, Liberty Party (Hürriyet Partisi - HP)246 dissolved itself and many members 
attended to CHP, and Peasants’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye Köylü Partisi) joined 
Republican Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi), these two parties formed a 
new party named Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet 
Partisi – CKMP), in order to mobilize as a stronger oppositional front against DP.247 
Apart from the political parties, press members, academicians, even military 
personnel were unified against DP. This reunification was called as “evil front” (şer 
cephesi) by DP, and its member were criticized by Menderes, strongly. For instance, 
he pointed out the academicians with this sentence; “These heroic academicians (...) 
Some puppets wearing black robes hired by a certain group (...)”248 On the other 
hand, supporters of DP gathered around Fatherland Front (Vatan Cephesi). 
Fatherland Front was a governmental initiative, in which its supporters were listed 
publicly everyday in radio programs.249 While the tension was rising each day both 
in politics and social life, the discourses of DP and CHP representatives were getting 
more aggressive day by day. For instance, CHP accused DP of establishing an 
oppressive regime; correspondingly, DP accused CHP of encouraging people for a 
revolution (ihtilal) because of İnönü’s speeches, such as: 
 
“If, human rights cannot be executed and the rights of citizens are forced, a 
revolution will be a necessity. Even me, I cannot save you. A revolution is a 
legitimate right, when the terms are matured.”,250 
 
or with references to Syngman Rhee, the first President of South Korea,251 who 
resigned due to popular protests. Eventually, in 1960, DP established a so-called 
Investigation Commission (Tahkikat Komisyonu) in order to investigate the claims 
regarding “CHP’s politics with illegal methods and with support of some press 
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members” with a strict prohibition of any news about that commission’s and DP’s 
works.252 
 
 With restrictive implementations of DP, public protests were carried out at 
the end of April, both in İstanbul and in Ankara. These protest meetings ended up 
with one dead, one seriously injured by police, and a serious boundary among 
security forces, this is to say, between police officers and military personnel.253 For 
instance, after the arrival of military personnel, the protesters shouted out the slogan 
of “The youth and the military are united!” 254 (Ordu, gençlik elele!). That was a 
significant moment that the military showed its side against the DP government.  
 
 During May, the problems could not be solved, and the reaction of military 
was ended with an intervention on 27 May 1960, which was the first intervention in 
the republic. With the 27 May Military Intervention, the rule of DP was over after 
ten years.  
 
 On 27 May 1960, the first proclamation was made by a colonel, named 
Alparslan Türkeş (1917-1997), who was to become the leader of nationalist 
movement in Turkish politics. He highlighted the necessity of an intervention in 
order to solve the disagreement of political parties with a supra-party neutral power, 
which was the military, and added that the power would be handed over as soon as a 
result, whatever it would be, was obtained after a legitimate election.255 After the 
military intervention, leaders of DP were arrested and were judged between 14 
October 1960 and 15 September 1961; eventually, Menderes, the Prime Minister; 
Zorlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Hasan Polatkan, the Minister of Labor 
and Finance were sentenced to death, and they were executed on 16-17 September. 
Additionally, Bayar, the President of Republic was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.256  
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 In the meantime, a committee of five law professors was appointed in order 
to make a draft for a new constitution. That draft was submitted to National Unity 
Committee,257 and after a revise by another committee, it was approved and put on 
force by 61% of votes after a referendum on 9 July 1961.258 According to the new 
constitution, the principle of laicism was protected and many articles were accepted 
regarding equality before the law for all citizens regardless of any variety of religion, 
ethnic origin or language, such as articles 11-12-19. In addition to that, one of these 
articles, Article 19, was dedicated for “Freedom of Religion and Conscience”, in 
which below mentioned paragraphs were written: 
 
“Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to 
choose own religious faith and to have his own opinions. 
Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not 
in opposition to public order or morals or to the laws enacted to uphold them. 
No person shall be compelled to worship, or participate in religious ceremonies and 
rites, or to reveal his religious faith and belief. No person shall be reproached for 
his religious faith and belief. 
Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual’s own will and 
volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians. 
No person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion or religious feelings or 
political or personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the 
fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State on religious 
dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition or those who induce others to do so 
shall be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of associations and 
political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by order of authorized 
courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Court.”259 
 
 The new constitution encouraged freedom of thought; hence, it was 
considered as a liberalistic constitution,260 which led to the occurrence of leftist and 
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proletarian ideologies.261 Additionally, as it will be mentioned in upcoming parts of 
this thesis, 1961 Constitution caused politicization of Alevis, with the freedom of 
thought and with the freedom of conscience with journals (Journal of Cem) or 
political party (Unity Party; Türkiye Birlik Partisi – TBP).262 
 
On 11 February 1961, a new party named Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - AP) 
was formed by Ragıp Gümüşpala (1897-1964), a retired general of Turkish Armed 
Forces. Although, 11 new parties were established after the military intervention, AP 
has a significant importance with playing a pivotal role among Turkish political 
scenes for almost two decades as the successor of DP.263 During the general 
elections of 1961, votes of supporters of former DP were shared between AP, 
CKMP and another new-established political party New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye 
Partisi - YTP). The results were as shown below in Chart II.264  
 
 
Chart II: 1961 General Elections 
Source: “1961 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları,” TBMM, 
n.d.,<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.secimdeki_partiler?p_secim_yili=
1961> (16 April 2013). 
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 As it is visible, new-established AP gained significant public support among 
three right wing parties. Although any of these four parties gained enough votes to 
form a government, a coalition government was established by CHP and AP in order 
to stabilize Turkish politics.265 Ironically, this coalition government became the 
beginning of an unstable period of coalition governments until the end of century. 
 
 AP had always mentioned that the party possessed the same ideology with 
DP both in political and economic orders not only with welcoming the former 
members of DP, but also with implementations or at least intentions, such as the big 
campaign for an amnesty for sentenced members of DP.266 As AP marketed itself as 
the successor of DP, it obtained the support of Nurculuk, as a consequent.267 When 
Gümüşpala died in 1964, Süleyman Demirel (1924-...) was elected as the new party 
leader by party members, and he visited the house of Said Nursi, in order to pray for 
his soul.268 This visit can be considered as a significant proof of the relation between 
AP and Nurculuk. On the other hand, there was another Islamic movement named 
Naqshbandi that gained importance in the liberalistic atmosphere of 1960s. With 
increased freedom of gathering around foundations and associations with the basis 
of freedom of thought, which was granted by the 1961 Constitution, mentioned Sufi 
orders established associations in order to build mosques, and these associations let 
them to get legitimized and gain power during the decade.269 
 
 As will be discussed, a legitimate power of political Islam started after 1980; 
however, some scholars argued that the decade starting with 1960 became the period 
of “ideological formation”, which led to following decades with a consistent base of 
supporters. For instance, İlhan Tekeli distinguished the importance of second half of 
1960s regarding the mutation of relation between political parties and religion. He 
indicated that the liberalistic structure of 1961 Constitution allowed the born of 
leftist ideologies; simultaneously, the interpretation of religion was changed within 
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the perspective of right wing parties. As leftist ideologies were in favor with 
Marxism/socialism, conservative part mobilized around Islam as if it was a savior; 
moreover, that perspective became the point of intersection that Turkist (Türkçü) 
group and Islamists unified. Communism became a common enemy of these two 
groups, and Islam, the savior, caused these two groups became closer to each other 
on ideological level. He also added that in order to succeed against leftists, laicism 
was sacrificed, as it was considered as an obstacle to use the religion. Laicism was 
seen as the reason of loosening of family and religious ties. That was the reason why 
degenerated youth turned towards left. Therefore, a religious awakening became a 
necessity to succeed in the struggle against communism within this perspective.270  
 
 Reliance on religion was not an unfamiliar perspective among Turkish 
people; in fact, it would not be wrong to claim that the unification of Turkists and 
Islamists was a familiar consequence. If Ziya Gökalp’s perspective on nationalism 
was taken into account, the similarity would be obvious. It was laicism that 
separated Turkish nationalism from Islam; and as indicated by Tekeli, that concept 
was considered as an obstacle consequently it was sacrificed. Eventually, Islam once 
again took its place on Turkish politics with a struggle at the end of 1960s, and most 
specifically in 1970s; however, this time the hostility was not against supporters of 
laic republican identity, instead, with a general perspective to left ideology, which 
was considered as an enemy to religion.  
 
 Islamization of politics includes significant examples, such as the case of 
CKMP. In 1965, Alparslan Türkeş was elected as the chairman of party, and in 1969 
on a congress, the name of party was changed into Nationalist Movement Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP). 271  As another change, the party flag was 
changed into three crescents on a red background, which was an obvious Islamic 
symbol. However, the most considerable event of that congress was the discourse of 
Alparslan Türkeş. He used the motto of “We are as Turk as Tian Shan (Tanrı 
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Mountain) and as Muslim as Hira Mountain” 272  in order to distinguish the 
characteristics of MHP.273  
 
 Islamic references of rightwing political parties can be considered as a trend 
because, after the establishment of MHP as a political party with strong references to 
Islam, another party was established in 1970. However, this time, it was not pointing 
out Islam as a reference point; instead, it took Islam on its center, because it was a 
party that was established by Sufi orders. That was the exact time, when the Sufi 
orders would rather form a new party totally loyal to their rules than support any 
existing one, within liberalistic atmosphere of 1961 Constitution;274 hence, on 26 
January 1970, National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi - MNP) was established. 
 
 Two important Sufi orders of the time, Nurculuk and Naqshbandi orders 
played a significant role on the establishment of MNP. There were three important 
members of the process: Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) was said to be a member 
of Naqshbandi order, while two other members, Hüseyin Abbas (1934-2013) and 
Hüsamettin Akmumcu (1923-2011), who was also the lawyer of Said-i Nursi during 
his judgment process,275 were said to be members of Nurculuk.276 Within these two 
Sufi orders, support of Naqshbandi was dominant; for instance, Necmettin Erbakan 
was said to be appointed by Mehmet Zahid Kotku (1897-1980), a Sheik from Bursa, 
a member of Naqshbandi order and founder of İskenderpaşa Cemaati277, as a 
representative of order on political scenes, while Esad Coşan (1938-2001), the 
groom of Kotku family, was appointed as the successor of Mehmet Zahid Kotku as 
the leader of order. With MNP, political Islam became a legitimate actor of political 
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scenes and gained a considerable base of voters among Anatolian capital and small 
entrepreneurs by the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan,278 who would take his 
Islamist party (not with the same name but with successors of MNP) to the power 
and become the first obviously Islamic supporter Prime Minister within two decades. 
Economic references were considerable points those should be highlighted, because 
during 1980s Islamic capital would play an important role on intensification of 
political Islam, as it will be mentioned.  
 
Tension among political and social orders once again increased due to the 
struggle between conservative nationalism, even Islamism, and left ideologies, such 
as socialism the enemy of religion. On this atmosphere, left and right ideology 
struggles took the streets. Additionally, as left ideologies were seen as threats, 
liberalistic 1961 Constitution was being limited with additional laws.279 As a result 
of limitations to syndication, protest meetings were started as a chain with the 
leadership of labor unions in June 1970. The most considerable part of this chain 
was actualized during 15-16 June, as the incident was named as Events of 15-16 
June (15-16 Haziran Olayları). Due to the protests, a martial law was declared for 
60 days, many labor unions’ leaders were arrested, and two laborers, one artisan and 
a police officer died during the protests. 
 
 While all these incidents were happening, the Prime Minister and the 
chairman of AP Süleyman Demirel intended to maintain relations stable with 
military as he did during all his prime ministry. For instance, presidency of Cevdet 
Sunay (1899-1982), who was a former Commander of Turkish Armed Forces (Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri – TSK), was said to be supported by AP government in order to 
keep the relations calm with military.280 As it had been just a decade after the 
military intervention, which was ended with executions of important members of 
government, that cautiousness cannot be considered as baseless; although, it should 
have been unnecessary within a real democratic system. However, this entire 
endeavor was ended in failure, and on 12 March 1971, another military intervention 
took place. As different to 1960, a three-article memorandum was presented, the 
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government dissolved itself, and instead of a military-based government, 
establishment of a new government was asked by military.281 
 
 1971 Military Intervention possessed different characteristics from 1960; 
however, Turkish politics faced with similar outcomes. Instead of composing a new 
constitution, the existing one was revised in 1971 and 1973, and regarding to these 
revises individuals` rights, freedom of establishing associations and labor unions 
were limited and government officers were excluded from the right to establish a 
labor union.282 Martial law was declared in order to maintain social order and 
security, many leftist intellectuals were arrested, and three socialist university 
students Deniz Gezmiş (1947-1972), Yusuf Aslan (1947-1972) and Hüseyin İnan 
(1949-1972) were executed.283 The execution of these three people was considered 
as a revenge of 1961 executions of three government members, one prime minister 
and two ministers; it was “three to three”.284 Last of all, two parties were closed: 
Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - TKP) due to its socialist ideology 
and MNP due to its anti-laic implementations. Both of them were accused of 
protesting the constitution.285 
 
 MNP was closed; however, party members were not banned from politics, 
which would be a common way on further party. Hence, another party named 
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi - MSP) was formed on 11 October 
1972, and as the successor of MNP, support of Sufi orders was granted.286 The 
ideology of MSP was exactly the same with MNP: right wing, Islamist and 
possessor of National View (Milli Görüş). National View Movement was an 
ideology based on conservative modernization, as Hakan Yavuz stated, becoming 
modern with Islam. 287  Modernization was industrialization, within Erbakan’s 
perspective, that would lead the society to better conditions of living, with one 
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specific characteristic: Turco-Islamic values. According to National View, state was 
responsible of economic and spiritual development of country within a frame of 
conservative approach. While the family issues were significant components of this 
conservative approach of National View, religious education was pointed out as an 
important tool in order to create a loyal Muslim generation.288 Hence, religious 
education was to become a political tool in upcoming years within the decade. 
 
As mentioned, Islam was the savior of previous decade, and nothing changed 
during 1970s. Besides, it became an ideology named as Turkish Islamic Synthesis 
(Türk İslam Sentezi), consisting both Turkish nationalism and Islam as its basic 
components. The synthesis was a political-philosophical idea 289 , and it was 
developed by a group of conservative intellectuals during the 1970s within an 
organization known as Hearts of Intellectuals (Aydınlar Ocağı). The Hearts of 
Intellectuals were established on 14 May 1970 and formed as a think-tank center by 
conservative nationalist academics, politicians and businessmen. During the 1970s it 
became a political movement, which was composed by, so-called, similarities 
between Islam and pre-Islamic Turkish culture, herewith Turks were to become 
linked with Islam as a natural fact,290 in order to unify all rightwing political parties 
of the time (AP, MHP, and MSP).291 
 
Ideology that the Hearts of Intellectuals developed was a synthesis of 
Kemalist elements, such as Kemalist perspective of laicism and nationalism, and 
Islam. Hence, according to the intellectuals of the said Hearts, M.K. Atatürk was the 
most progressive nationalist of the Turkish political landscape, with his commitment 
to ideas, which were the basis of this newborn ideology. 292  However, Islam 
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possessed a specific role, and the ideology aimed to create a Sunni-Muslim identity 
accompanied by strong Turkish nationalism within this proper interpretation.293 
 
 With the elections of 1973, MSP entered to the Assembly with 48 members 
and more importantly, it became the shareholder of power with CHP-MSP coalition 
government.294 Turkish Islamic Synthesis was to become more important during 
1980s, and it would be non-official state policy after the military intervention; 
nevertheless, according to Kongar, said coalition government was the 
institutionalization of Turkish Islamic Synthesis on rightwing politics even before 
1980s.295 This argument of Kongar`s has been affirmed many times, and the success 
of MNP has been considered the initial of political Islam on power.296 CHP-MSP 
coalition government was the first important event on the (unofficial) Islamization 
of state-policy; although, the coalition government was dissolved after a little while 
of its establishment, on 17 November 1974.297 
 
The dissolution of CHP-MSP coalition caused government crisis, which 
lasted until the September 1980. The politics was dominated by right-wing parties 
year by year, and CHP was not considered as sufficient for left ideologies. Hence, 
the crisis and anarchy, as a result of conflicts between leftists and rightists, were 
deepened.298 In order to decrease the hostility between leftists and rightists, in other 
words Marxists/socialists and Islamists/nationalists, religious education was pointed 
out. Therefore, Imam-Hatip schools were distinguished as a tool to shape the youth 
with Islamic sensitivity, as it was mentioned regarding the Turkish Islamic Synthesis. 
Therefore, as an antagonist tool to socialist threat, Islamic education was promoted, 
and the existing number of Imam-Hatip schools was augmented from 108 to 341 by 
opening 233 during 3 years between 1975-1978.299 However, as contrary to the 
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promotion of religious education, increase of anarchy and social crisis could not be 
precluded; so that, atmosphere of chaos dominated the social order.  
 
With the help of a study that was carried out by Banu Eligür, results of the 
conflicts as consequent of increased anarchy and crisis can be listed with numbers: 
Between the years of 1975-1980, more than 5000 people died, and almost 15000 
people were wounded. Violation was intensified by radical groups with 
assassinations, bank robberies, kidnappings and bombings between 1978-1980. By 
the summer of 1980, number of political murders was an average of 20 per day. That 
was a brief overview for the results of conflicts with the lack of public security due 
to the lost control of security forces.300 The sides of these brutal conflicts were listed 
as many different leftist groups on one side and idealist youth (ülkücü gençlik), who 
were linked with MHP unofficially,301 and MSP’s Raiders Organization (Akıncılar 
Teşkilatı), who were said to be out of armed conflicts,302 were on other side as the 
representatives of rightist groups, and the hostility was spread with the mottos of 
“Fascism is here!” to provoke leftist groups and “Communism is here!” to provoke 
rightist ones. Within this period, there is one important thing that should be 
highlighted. As the sensitivity of Islam was increased, Alevis, who were left-wing 
politics supporters and were considered as “less-believers”, or worse, “unbelievers” 
by conservative Sunnis, became the targets of rightist groups’ attacks. Between 
1978-1980, three massacres (on 18 April 1978 Malatya Massacre, on 24 December 
1978 Maraş Massacre and on 29 May 1980 Çorum Massacre) targeted Alevi 
populated towns and caused mass murders of hundreds of people.303 These issues 
will be discussed with detail in upcoming chapter; however, in order to understand 
the tension and hatred, these unfortunate but considerable examples should be 
referred.  
 
On the way to 12 September Military Intervention, conservatism reached to a 
level that an Islamic state was mentioned as the will of some rightist groups. On 6 
September 1980, a meeting was held by MSP in Konya in order to protest the 
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decision of Israel regarding its official declaration of its capital, Jerusalem.304 
During the day, National Anthem of Republic of Turkey was protested, slogans were 
shouted like “We want Sharia back!” with Islamic costumes, such as green robes 
and turbans.305 That was a yearning to an Islamic state,306 which was considered as 
the “straw that broke the camel's back”307 by military and would cause the closure of 
MSP after the military intervention. 
 
Unstable period of political order, which led to social chaos, ended with 
another military intervention on 12 September 1980.308 As a result of this stroke to 
democracy, all political parties were closed, and the state was governed by military 
with National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu - MGK) for three years.  
 
During three years under military control, many lawsuits were carried out, 
and many people were sentenced due to their political activities. For instance, 650 
thousand people were in custody; 1 million 683 thousands were labeled with regards 
to their political ideology; 517 were sentenced to death, and 50 were executed; 30 
thousands people were dismissed from their jobs because of being inconvenient due 
to their political stands; 300 were death suspiciously; 117 were death by torture; 30 
thousands emigrated as political refugee; 937 films were banned because of being 
inconvenient; 3854 teachers, 120 academicians, and 47 judges were discharged; 400 
journalists were sentenced to 4000 years totally; newspapers could not be printed 
freely for 300 days and 39 ton newspapers and journals were destroyed due to their 
political stands.309 12 September and military in power have been criticized strongly 
by being entirely against to left ideology based on Marxist, socialist approaches and 
by allowance existence and empowerment of right ideology.310 According to the bill 
of indictment of 12 September military intervention, explanation of democracy can 
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be pointed out as the proof of said argument. On fourth part of Section two, pluralist 
democracy was defined as: 
 
 “(...) Pluralist democracy was a tool that aimed to achieve ideal freedom with 
freedom. Within this approach, freedom is both a tool and an achievement. 
However, freedom is not an achievement, instead it is just a tool, according to 
Marxist democracy. The path ended with that achievement is not freedom but just 
dictatorship of proletariat.”311 
 
That definition has been the proof that the military intervention intended to 
eliminate leftist movements;312 instead, nationalist rightist movement was possessed 
and promoted by the military. As Kramer argued, it was an equivalent of Turkish 
Islamic Synthesis, which was to become an unofficial basis of new Turkish politics 
of 1980s with new implementations.313  
 
 A new ideological approach was developed including Islamic perspective, 
and with respect to that approach, MGK in power carried out some implementations 
in order to spread religious morality with the help of educational system and DİB. A 
new constitution was composed by a committee instead of the libertarian 1961 
Constitution, and it was accepted by a referendum on 18 October 1982. 1982 
Constitution, which is the actual Constitution of Republic of Turkey, has been the 
tool that MGK applied Islamic interpretations with. According to the Article 136, 
DİB was pointed out as responsible of national solidarity and integration.314 With 
respect to same article, it was considered as a non-political, neutral power to all 
ideologies; however, the religious identity has played a significant role, which is still 
an issue on the agenda of Turkey. Additionally, according to Article 24, religious 
education became obligatory in primary and secondary schools;315 in order to protect 
new generations from any threat both might come from Marxist, socialist ideologies 
and baseless religious dogmas.316 On the other hand, the graduates of Imam-Hatip 
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schools, who were specially educated to be Islamic religious staff, were allowed to 
enter any faculties with a change on Article 32 of Education Law.317 This allowance 
would let Imam-Hatip schools to be exact alternates of regular schools. With all 
these implementations, MGK aimed to shape new generations within correct 
religious morality, which would protect them from any provocation of neither leftist 
nor rightist movement. There is one thing that should be clarified on that point: The 
aim of MGK was not put political Islam on the center of Turkish politics; instead, it 
aimed to depoliticize new generations with the help of religion. Because, within the 
perspective of MGK, the implementations were put in force in order to protect laic 
structure of Turkey with respect to Kemalism; however, in a decade it would turned 
into Islamization of laicism, which will be described in upcoming parts.  
 
 In 1983, MGK handed the power over political parties after an election, 
which was a return to democratic structure; however, there were only three political 
parties allowed to elections: Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi - ANAP) 318 , 
People’s Party (Halkçı Parti - HP)319 and Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi 
Demokrasi Partisi - MDP)320. The elections ended with success of ANAP, and its 
leader of Turgut Özal (1927-1993) became the first Prime Minister after the return 
to democracy.321 
 
 Apart from mentioned three political parties, there were two new political 
parties more, True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi - DYP) and Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi - RP), which were not allowed to enter to elections due to administrative 
problems. In fact, Turkish politics was not unfamiliar to these two parties, because 
they were successors of banned political parties. DYP was the successor of DP of 
Menderes and its successor AP of Demirel, and RP was the successor of MNP and 
MSP of Erbakan. These two parties could not be active members of Turkish politics 
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until 1987, the following elections; however, both would play significant roles 
during 1990s and would lead a coalition as two shareholders of it. 
 
3.2.3. 1990s in Turkey with Its Complexity 
 
 The Islamic atmosphere among public sphere was a reality since the 1950s, 
and it would not be wrong if one claims that it gained its utmost rise during 1980s 
with military intervention, Motherland Party and its leader Özal. By some scholars, 
Özal was the responsible person of this rise with his implementations;322 on the 
other hand, as another perception, he was said to have no intentions to undermine 
the laic structure of the state; but, his laissez-faire approach both in political and 
economic orders caused significant Islamic revival.323 As a result, 1990s started with 
tension and accordingly separation among society, and that tension had not fallen 
since then.  
 
 Sociological circumstances were as mentioned above; additionally, 
complexity of the decade was not limited with society; instead, the politics was also 
in an unstable process. During the decade, the government was changed eight times, 
and TBMM hosted the 49th Government at the beginning of decade and entered to 
21st century with 57th Government. Due to the purpose of this thesis, all 
governments will not be examined one by one; instead, the Islamic implementations, 
gestures of the political leaders, sociological atmosphere and military on the scenes 
will be focused in order to clarify the background of the actual situation of country.  
 
 As mentioned with details, Sufi orders, such as Nurcu and Naqshbandi 
movements, were active actors of Turkish politics since 1950s, and that did not 
changed during 1990s. When Özal became the eighth President of Republic in 1989, 
the leadership of ANAP was possessed by Yıldırım Akbulut  (1935-...) first, then 
Mesut Yılmaz (1947-...), and none of them was supported by Naqshbandi leaders as 
considerable as Özal due to their laic approach against Islamic wing of the party.324 
That caused a lack of power for ANAP. As argued by Kramer, withdrawal of 
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Naqshbandi support to ANAP brought about the rise of RP of Erbakan, which was 
the successor of MSP.325 
 
 In 1991, with the General Elections, RP entered to TBMM with 62 MPs. As 
it will be mentioned in upcoming paragraphs, it raised its representation ratio in 
TBMM, and became the first party of following election in 1995. A year before the 
general elections, RP gained important municipalities with significant support of 
conservative part of society. The events and implementations of RP municipalities 
will be discussed within the perspective of political Islam. 
 
Existence of RP in TBMM after the 1991 General Elections was a result of 
increased conservatism among society; however, it will not be wrong if one claims 
that its real victory was the Local Elections of 1994, in which it gained 329 
municipalities with 19.07 vote percentage and most significantly six of the 15 
metropolitan municipalities with 22.4% of votes. A general view of the said 
elections can be seen below. 
 
Chart III: 1994 Local Elections 
Source: “İllere Göre Belediyeleri Kazanan Partiler,” Yerel Seçim, n.d. 
<http://www.yerelsecim.com/YerelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=1994> (25 December 2012). 
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The Elections resulted with the highest percentages of votes in favor with 
ANAP, RP and DYP, in other words with rightwing parties. When the results 
regarding gained metropolitan municipalities by each party are examined, success of 
rightwing politics will be more visible. 
 
Chart IV: 1994 Local Elections – Gained Municipalities by Each Party 
Source: “İllere Göre Belediyeleri Kazanan Partiler,” Yerel Seçim, n.d. 
<http://www.yerelsecim.com/YerelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=1994> (25 December 2012). 
  
 As demonstrated in Chart IV, In 1994 Local Elections, ANAP gained three 
coastal metropolitan municipalities (Bursa, Adana and Mersin), and DYP gained 
three metropolitan municipalities (İzmir, Eskişehir and Antalya), which have been 
important for the leftwing politics of Turkey. The number of gained metropolitan 
municipalities by RP included two important metropolitans: İstanbul with Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan (1954 - …), the current Prime Minister and the chairman of AKP 
and Ankara with İbrahim Melih Gökçek (1948 - …), who is still in the same duty 
from AKP. That inclusion of two biggest municipalities, obviously, depened the 
victory of the Party. The mentioned victory of RP and the political fact of 
augmentation of conservatism with general success of rightwing parties caused the 
mobilization of supporters of laic republican identity. For instance, according to that 
mobilization, M.K. Atatürk became a visible symbol, which was used in order to 
demonstrate oneself as the guardian of the laic regime, and Atatürk pins, mugs, key 
chains became very popular.326 Atatürk pins took their places on coats, jackets, 
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shirts, sweaters, suits, in other words, on most visible parts of everyday dressing. 
The mugs were on duty as the representatives of office stuff. Briefly, supporters of 
laicism felt the necessity to demonstrate themselves against conservatives and 
government established by their representatives of political Islam, and this social 
mobilization was an autonomous movement327 of the civil society. 
 
 Islamism was in agenda of Turkey since the DP; however, the ideology 
spread by RP was seen as a hostile, an antagonist approach to Westernized laic 
identity of the Republic of Turkey, due to its accusations of undermining the real 
characteristics of Turkishness against the laic structure of the state. According to 
Erbakan and the ideology his party, Islam was exclusively for Turkish people not 
only with its religious but also cultural characteristics originated from Ottoman past. 
Hence, Islamic Ottoman identity was promoted as the basic national culture that was 
swept away by Western style laic implementations. Furthermore, as a concrete 
reason of hostility between supporters of laic republican identity and RP supporters, 
accusations were made for the time of M.K. Atatürk by Erbakan with claiming that 
the laic regime caused the ban of worship in mosques, the ban of veil (peçe) and 
execution of theologians of Islam.328 Accordingly, the Islamist movement of 1990s 
leaded by RP developed an alternative national identity that was defined within the 
frame of Islamic Ottoman civilization,329 in which Islam was the basic component 
that unified people, the Islamic community (ümmet). He mentioned his and his 
party’s mission within a speech he made in Sivas in 1994. He said: 
 
“One cannot be a believer without dedicating oneself to jihad (cihat). The first 
obligation (farz) is to find a leader, to obey him and to create the army. RP is the 
army of Islamic Jihad (İslam-i Cihat Ordusu). We all will be the soldiers of this 
army. The one who dedicates oneself is in a better and higher level than all Muslim 
world and sheiks. Even, if you see that leader sins directly, you will obey his orders. 
For instance, you see him drinking alcohol. Then he ordered you while he is sober. 
You should obey. Everyone will obey and follow the representative of RP of his/her 
city. It is not possible to be a Muslim without financing the jihad. The level of 
being Muslim is measured with the money given. A Muslim does not give his zekat 
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to a poor needy. He will give his zekat to the treasure (beyt-ül mal), to the army of 
jihad. If you do not serve to RP, none of your worship will be accepted on God’s 
level. If you support other political parties, you will be responsible of the people 
who fail. We all will obey and follow RP. The one who does not support RP is a 
member of religion of potato.”330 
 
That was a clear proof of Islamist discourse of RP and Erbakan. Additionally, 
that was a discourse that separated Muslims between supporters of RP, who were the 
real Muslims according to him, and the ones, who support other political parties. 
 
 When RP representatives were elected as mayors to municipalities, the 
ideology of the party was localized; accordingly, many national and international 
conferences, workshops, and panels were organized in order to spread this 
alternative national identity with a new historical memory.331 As a result of official 
promotion of the said ideology, İstanbul became a part of the process with its 
Islamic Ottoman culture, as contrary to laic structure of Ankara. In a magazine 
article, Istanbul was said to be established regarding the Western cultural institutions 
in order to construct a European city, and republican regime was accused of being 
the architecture of it.332 
 
 İstanbul is believed to be compromised to the Muslim world, by a hadith of 
Prophet Muhammad. What is believed in Islam is that the conquest of İstanbul in 
1453 was announced by Prophet Muhammad in his lifetime with this saying; 
“Certainly, Constantinople (İstanbul) will be conquered. Blessed is the commander 
who will conquer it, and blessed are his troops.”333 That’s why, Mehmet II (The 
Conqueror) of the Ottoman Empire was considered as a blessed commander due to 
his success to take the city from Christians (Byzantine Empire) and to include it to 
the Muslim world. In addition to that, İstanbul had been the capital of the Empire for 
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five centuries with the Caliphate for four centuries; accordingly, the city was built 
with considerable Islamic influence. Due to all that historical background, Istanbul 
has been an important city of Islamic culture. As it was mentioned, that was one of 
the reasons why the capital was shifted to Ankara, a small town of Anatolia, which 
was planned to be built with respect to a laic state structure without any religious 
influence. Within this perspective, the promotion of İstanbul by RP should be seen 
as a result of construction of an alternative ideology, which was based on Islam, as 
contrary. Within this frame, the conquest day of Istanbul, 29 May, started to be an 
unofficial commemoration day; furthermore, this commemoration day was 
published as “re-conquest” of İstanbul by Islamist press. For instance, Akit, a daily 
newspaper (which was known with its Islamic articles) mentioned the event with 
these sentences; 
 
“This Muslim community (ummet), which is brought together by an iron will and 
the unity of Allah (tekbir), will understand the real meaning of conquest and make 
İstanbul once again the capital city of Islam, as it was before.”334 
 
In fact, usage of “re-conquest” belonged not only to press, but also to 
Erbakan. He mentioned the importance of the day on 29 May 1996 with these 
sentences: “We are on the eve of a new conquest, which merges with the incident 
that took place 543 years ago... As the Islamic world, we will accomplish this with 
the help of Allah.”335  The aim of this usage was to distinguish the importance of the 
conquest and İstanbul for the Muslim world. In the same year, religious importance 
of İstanbul was highlighted by a different author. A special newspaper of an 
international conference named HABİTAT II, a columnist claimed that the 
characteristics of İstanbul were “spread out from mosques and minarets, from the 
domes and from the tombs of its saints (evliya)” Within this interpretation, “İstanbul 
is primarily an Islamic city” as it was mentioned by the same columnist.336 
 
 The local governments under the power of RP opened many public parks, 
restaurants and public places; however, there was one common characteristic of 
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these places: Sale of alcoholic beverages was banned.337 The conservative and 
Islamic ideology of the mayors was spread with the public services of municipalities. 
For instance, in İstanbul during the time of Erdoğan, alcoholic beverages were 
banned in all restaurants those belong to the municipality, any advertisement 
consisting a photo of a woman with swim-suit was banned to be published on 
billboards of the municipality, and the municipality refectories and cafeterias were 
closed during the month of Ramadan.338 These are the most significant examples of 
the time, and can be multiplied, as it will be in upcoming paragraphs.  
 
 In June 1996, a coalition government was formed by RP and DYP (known as 
REFAH-YOL), while Erbakan became the Prime Minister; Tansu Çiller (the 
chairwoman of DYP) became deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in this government. The duty that Erbakan possessed was not welcomed by 
supporters of laicism due to the hostility with the party; additionally, this political 
event was discussed among international media by Western allies.339 Political Islam 
had been on the agenda of Turkish politics since 1950s; however that was the first 
time that a party with its obvious Islamist discourses was in power and had its leader 
as Prime Minister. Within the form of REFAH-YOL government, Erbakan and 
Çiller shared the relations with international allies; hence, within the policy that they 
developed Çiller was responsible for the relations with Europe and Western 
countries, and Erbakan was in charge of the relations with Eastern countries; that is 
to say, he was in charge of a more Islamist foreign policy. His visits to Egypt, Libya, 
Nigeria and Iran were criticized within this frame. On the other hand, these visits 
were seen as a proof of RP’s difference from previous parties in power within the 
perspective of foreign policy initiatives.340 
 
 On domestic issues, implementations of the party were still on the agenda as 
a reason of hostility with supporters of laicism. The Islamic Ottoman identity was in 
promotion; for instance, in addition to the list above, encouragement of the 
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headscarf, the ongoing relations with Sufi orders,341 the promotion of Sufi leaders 
such as Said-i Nursi with his series of book, Risale-i Nur, by Ministry of Culture,342 
a special invitation to the Sufi leaders for a Ramadan dinner by Erbakan in Prime 
Minister’s official residence,343 proposal about preventing Turkish Civil Aviation 
Foundation (Türk Hava Kurumu) from collecting and selling the hides of sacrificial 
sheep (that is one of the most significant part of the budget of said foundation) and 
to give the right to the religious foundations, the proposal about changing the 
working hours during the month of Ramadan,344 and the rising number of Imam-
Hatip schools345 (whose graduates were considered as “natural allies” and “base of 
voters” of RP)346 were the issues those were being discussed. 
 
Islamic Ottoman identity was being promoted by municipalities on individual 
level. For instance, during the third Traditional Youth Festival, the Mayor of 
İstanbul, Erdoğan, talked to youth about the Turkish nation with these sentences: 
 
“As the grandchildren of a nation that has always been at the forefront in the quest 
for civilization, you have to put an end to mimicry. If Turkey is to reach the height 
of contemporary civilizations, it can only do so with its own civilization. The youth 
has to return to its true roots. The poet, who wrote our National Anthem, Mehmet 
Akif Ersoy, did not write his poem in a disco or when he was drunk. He wrote it in 
Tacettin Dergahı (a dervish lodge), where he disciplined his soul.”347 
 
The root mentioned here was the Ottoman Empire with its Islamic culture, 
and in order to find their own identity, the Turkish youth should take the Ottoman 
era as the source of civilization and national identity.  
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There was significant endeavor about visual changes of cities.348 As it was 
mentioned, Ankara was selected as the capital in order to construct it due to 
requirements of a laic and modern state without any religious impact; hence, Ulus 
Square, where the first Assembly building is, and Çankaya district were urbanized 
within planned structure. Other city centers were arranged within the same 
requirements, as well. For instance in İstanbul, the Taksim Square has its own 
characteristics with its Monument of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Anıtı), which was 
inaugurated in 1928 as a symbol of the newborn republic. The election of Taksim 
Square in İstanbul to put the Monument should be seen symbolic; because, the 
square is located in one of the hills of city, where it is not possible to see any 
minarets of the great mosques of Ottoman capital. With this characteristic of Taksim 
Square, it will not be wrong to claim that it has been the republican face of the city. 
The municipalities of İstanbul and Ankara, both were governed by RP, offered to 
build mosques in Taksim Square and Çankaya district, and these proposals were 
criticized for being political more than a religious necessity.349 The discourse of 
Erbakan about the mosque project, which was “We will complete the conquest of 
Istanbul with building a mosque in Taksim.”,350 showed the political background of 
the project, and spread fear among supporters of laicism.  
 
The blurred situation of country got worse and became more complicated by 
an accident on 3 November 1996, known as Susurluk Scandal. The accident became 
one of the most important debate of the decade, because the involvement of state, 
politics and mafia on the accident was an issue that could not be solved. It was a 
traffic accident in Susurluk near a western city, Balıkesir, in which Abdullah Çatlı, a 
former ultra-rightist militant wanted by police for multiple murders and drug 
trafficking; Hüseyin Kocadağ, a senior police official; and a beauty queen were 
killed and Sedat Bucak, a parliamentary deputy from DYP was injured, creates 
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political uproar and charges that this incident highlights the illegal relationship 
between state officials and the mobsters.351 The accident caused a considerable 
public reaction, because the Prime Minister Erbakan referred the accident as 
“nonsense”,352 and accident reports were considered as suspicious by the public due 
to the bloody past of the decade full of unsolved murders. Hence, with the leadership 
of a lawyer named Ergin Cinmen353 and a public initiative named Aydınlık İçin 
Yurttaş Girişimi,354 a public action called “One Minute of Darkness for Permanent 
Light” (Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık) started on 1 February 1997. 
According to the action, at 21:00 o’clock everyday all the lights would be turned off 
in order to attract the attention of the REFAH-YOL government for corruption and 
lawlessness, and the action was planned to be continued until the end of February.355  
 
Agenda of the month of November 1996 was not just busy just with Susurluk 
Scandal; instead, in addition to it, the mayor of Kayseri, an Anatolian metropolitan 
municipality governed by RP, publicly announced his discontentedness in 
participating to the Commemoration Day of M.K. Atatürk’s Death, 356  on 10 
November 1996 that has been commemorated with public ceremonies all over the 
country. The mayor also made a speech on the same day in Provincial Council 
Meeting of RP, in which he mentioned; 
 
“Do not count me as a laic just because of my fancy appearance. I participated a 
ceremony due to my official duty. Perhaps, the Prime Minister, ministers and 
members of parliament have some obligations. However, you do not have any 
obligations. Even if I will be the only one as member of RP in the world, this 
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persecution order has to be changed. You, the Muslims! Do not skimp the ambition, 
the grudge, the hatred and the belief. This is our duty.”357 
 
Obviously, that was another issue for the supporters of laic republican 
identity and caused rise of tension among country between two poles of the state. As 
another action, on 31 January 1997, RP member mayor of Sincan (a town of 
Ankara), Bekir Yıldız, had invited the Iranian ambassador to Turkey, Mohammad 
Reza Bagheri, and organized a commemorative ceremony for the Palestinian 
intifada, known as Jerusalem Night (Kudüs Gecesi), in which the policies of Israel 
were criticized,358 the yearning of an Islamic state was mentioned,359 and a play 
about intifada was presented with posters of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.360 The 
ceremony was criticized strongly and caused reaction among supporters of laicism; 
hence, it was protested afterwards by a crowd leaded by CHP in Sincan,361 where the 
Jerusalem Night took place. As aforementioned, as the symbol of decade, M.K. 
Atatürk pins were given with Turkish flags to the protestors like a visible proof of 
the values that they defended. 362  As a result of protests, the mayor was investigated, 
and he was imprisoned, and the Iranian ambassador was called to be protested by 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.363 
 
 Before shifting the theme into the political outcome of aforementioned 
process, there is one more thing that should be distinguished: the other side of RP-
Islamic-based politics. As it was mentioned, the politics of RP was criticized for 
undermining laic structure of the republic; hence, the Islam-based-politics was 
considered as a threat that should be resolved. However, conservatives accepted and 
welcomed the said politics of RP as a guarantee of their religious freedom. In fact, 
the subject of religious freedom had always been an argument that RP used: 
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“religious freedom for everyone”.364 However, the religious freedom issue was a 
theme that should be discussed for this decade, when well known academicians and 
journalists, who supported the laic structure of state, were killed; a hotel was put into 
the fire just because Alevis, who are considered as “less” believers than Sunni 
majority, or worse “non-believers”, were in a meeting; and the municipalities 
established alcohol-free places and restaurants in order to make them more family-
friendly and Islamic,365 which was a way to otherize the people, who drink alcoholic 
beverages. Therefore, the society was tensed by the political structure. Besides, the 
intentions to Islamize the social structure apart from the political one by supporting 
new dress-codes and Islamic structure of family issues caused suspicion about RP’s 
ideology based on religious freedom; even further, said issues supported the fear of 
“political Islam”.  
 
 The Jerusalem Night caused a problem in political arena with its outcome, 
which is not limited with the aforementioned information. The separation of society 
was considerably visible; however, the most significant part was the supporters of 
two parts of society: while the conservative part was supported by the government 
of REFAH-YOL, supporters of laicism were supported by the military. That support 
did not occurred as a result of collaboration; instead, it was a natural occurrence due 
to the historical self-duty possession of military. Before 1980s, the last two decades 
were witnessed three military interventions with the reason or excuse (the usage of 
these two terms totally depends on one`s perspective) of protecting the state from 
reactionary Islamic movements (irtica). Within this perspective, implementations of 
RP were considered as a proof of reactionary movements, which should be stopped. 
Therefore, the military with power of popular support became an actor of Turkish 
politics of 1990s, as well, and the Jerusalem Night had been the most significant 
event of the process. Even though, the process has been called as “February 28”, it 
was a long process of entire month of February or even before, on January during 
the meeting of ranking officers of Turkish Naval Forces, in Gölcük/Kocaeli, a 
western city where is one of the naval bases. 366  During the Gölcük meeting, 
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reactionary movements were discussed and eventually a general comment was 
made: “Reactionary movement is in power!” 367 
 
 After the Gölcük Meeting, the tension raised to its highest level with 
Jerusalem Night; hence, on 4 February 1997, the tanks were sent to Sincan, where 
the Jerusalem Night took place, and they rolled through the streets of Ankara in 
order to challenge the government led by Erbakan.368 Although, TSK announced 
that the event was a previously organized periodical training,369 it has become the 
symbol of February 28, which was considered as a “post-modern” military 
intervention. During the month of February, the tension never decreased; instead, it 
was raised with public protests, such as “Women Protests Against the Sharia” 
(Şeriata Karşı Kadın Yürüyüşü) on 11 February, or with hostile discourses against 
the other side of the process, such as the speech of Admiral of the Fleet of Turkish 
Naval Forces Güven Erkaya regarding the danger of reactionary movement. 
Additionally, the tension increased with the comment of the Minister of Justice, 
Şevket Kazan, who was a member of RP and a lawyer worked as a defense lawyer 
of Sivas Massacre suspects, regarding the “One Minute of Darkness for Permanent 
Light”. He commented the action as; 
 
“The opposition is keeping itself busy with childish actions. They think they can 
clean up the country by turning off their electric switches. They play “candles 
off”370 by turning the lights off. Do Alevis turn candles off?”.371 
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His comment was strongly criticized by the society, the press, and obviously 
by Alevis, who took the streets in order to protest his speech.372 This event will be 
discussed with more details under dedicated chapter. 
 
 Within the Turkish political structure, MGK has been an important 
component for the military-civil bureaucracy, and with its meetings for every two 
months, it had significant power among politics. It would not be wrong to claim that 
the origin of this power has been the society; because, according to the public 
surveys, after 1980s, TSK had been the most trusted institution over all 
governmental offices among the society.373 On the other hand, February 28 was a 
considerable proof of the power that the military had. After a tensed period, the 
periodical meeting of MGK on 28 February 1997 lasted nine hours, and during the 
meeting the members of the TSK submitted their perspectives on issues regarding 
laicism and political Islam within a frame of the danger of reactionary movement 
due to recent events and implementations of RP led government. Laicism and 
Kemalist principles composed the basis of the meeting, in which a nine-article 
proposal was presented to the government regarding the said principles. Within this 
proposal, laicism was referred as not only a guarantee of the regime, but also as the 
basis of democracy and community amenity, and overall, it was referred as a 
lifestyle.374 The proposal was re-composed after the meeting, and became a 20-
article document, in which final decisions were written. The document implied 
general’s decisions, which were basically concerning laicism, Dress Code (in order 
to prevent from Islamic clothing), eight-year-obligatory classes (in order to close the 
secondary school of Imam-Hatip Schools), courses on Quran, Turkey-Iran relations, 
                                                                                                                                    
where they were, in order to protect themselves from outsiders. This is the historical background why 
the term “candles off” is used in order to insult the Alevis.  
(source: Ali Balkız (author and the ex-Chairman of Alevi-Bektashi Federation), interview by Didem 
Doganyilmaz, Ankara/Turkey, 12 April 2011; 
   Zafer Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness Leads to Daylong Controversy,” Hürriyet Daily News, 14 
February 1997, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/one-minute-darkness-leads-to-daylong-
controversy.aspx?pageID=438&n=one-minute-darkness-leads-to-daylong-controversy-1997-02-14> 
(2 March 2011).) 
371 Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, 280; 
     Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness.”        
372 Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness.” 
373 Kramer, A Changing Turkey, 32. 
374 Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, 283.  
For all proposal (in Turkish), please see Appendix IX on page 301. 
 
135 
recruitment of state officers, strict control of Sufi orders and control of press, and 
sent to the Prime Minister Erbakan to sign.  
 
 February 28, as an event, became another turning point of political history of 
Turkey with outcomes of process, the unstability, party closures, bans from politics 
and new political parties.  
 
Since 1960, after the first military intervention within a decade of multi-party 
period, political scenes faced with a controversial competition between so-called 
representatives of two antagonist identities, almost every decade until the end of 
century. February 28 was one of the political attempts that TSK made political 
decisions against the government; that is the reason why it was listed with the 
anterior military interventions with a title of post-modern coup-d’etat.375 
 
 February 28 was named as a post-modern coup-d’etat; however, the 
implementations of TSK were applied with the support of a part of society and 
certainty of accomplishing a duty. This duty of TSK, accordingly the National 
Security Council, was to protect the laic structure of state against any kind of threat, 
in this case, against reactionary movements and political Islam.376 
  
On 13 March, Erbakan signed the document, and declared that the decisions 
would be applied. The Assembly was tensed; and on 8 May, an MP of RP from 
Şanlıurfa, a southeastern city, İbrahim Halil Çelik, made a speech in TBMM, and 
commented on February 28 with these sentences; 
 
“If you dare to close the Imam-Hatip schools under Welfare Party, blood will be 
shed. It will be worse than Algeria. I do not want it, either. The democracy will 
arrive in this sense, it will be perfect. The military could not overcome 3500 PKK 
terrorists, how come they will defeat six million of Islamists. Who pies against the 
wind, shall taste his own pie. Who hits me, I hit back him. I am an entire Sharia 
supporter (şeriatçı). I want that Sharia be applied.”377 
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This speech caused significant hatred among supporters of laicism, made 
them more confident on their fear about threat of an attempt to establish an Islamic 
state, and encouraged MGK with support of major part of society. 
 
Simultaneously with the tension in TBMM, TSK intended to form a specific 
public opinion against political Islam and reactionary movements, which were 
unified within military discourses, with briefings given in order to gather around the 
laic ideology with contrast to the government. Target groups of these briefings were 
composed by press members, academics, prosecutors and adjudicators. During these 
briefings, recruitment among juridical, economic, and national police offices; 
intentions to abolish the laic, democratic republic; the lack of a political authority 
and as a result of it, self-assignment of military for protection of state as an 
obligation in order to fill the lack; intentions to prove a religious hostility of the 
military in order to cause distrust among society; and the necessity of 
accomplishment the task, which was to protect the state against internal threat even 
with arms if necessary were the issues highlighted. Besides, economic references 
were given such as the privileges given to Islamic holding companies and the 
amount of encouragement provided to Islamic and Sufi orders supporter. MGK 
briefings also included numbers about Islamism among different orders. For 
instance, the support to Islamic capital was demonstrated with a list of the highest 
asset of businessmen, in which the amounts were mentioned with billions. 
Additionally, 19 newspapers, 110 journals, 51 radio and 20 TV channels were listed 
with support to political Islam, and 2500 foundations, 500 waqfs, 1000 enterprises, 
1200 dormitories, 800 schools and courses and 5000 Sufi orders were mentioned as 
political Islamist institutions.378  
 
With the briefings, MGK asked for the support of aforementioned target 
groups, most specifically from Constitutional Court, Council of State, and Supreme 
Court. On the other hand, the Chief Prosecutor of Supreme Court Vural Savaş filed a 
lawsuit for the closure of RP with the accusation of “dragging the country into a 
civil war” on 21 May.379 After less than a month, on 18 June, Erbakan resigned from 
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137 
prime ministry. He mentioned the reason of his resignation as to hand over the office 
to Çiller, to other member of coalition government. However, the President of 
Republic, Demirel, assign Yılmaz then chairman of ANAP with the duty of 
establishing the government, instead of Çiller. Hence, the REFAH-YOL era was 
closed, and on 30 June, a new government was established by the leadership of 
ANAP and prime ministry of Yılmaz with Democratic Turkey Party 380  and 
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP). The government was 
supported by CHP inside the Assembly, and with the approval of new education bill 
composed by MGK, the tension was relatively lowered.381 However, the new 
government had been the target of critics for applying the decisions of MGK by 
conservative part of the society, press members and by RP in TBMM. For instance, 
on newspapers named Yeni Şafak and Zaman, which are known with their 
conservative approach to social and political issues, the issue was discussed by 
many columnists, who accused the new government of being in favor with MGK 
and its decisions.382 Besides, after special Friday prayers, the crowd gathered and 
protested the education bill, which would cause the closure of secondary part of 
Imam-Hatip schools and the new government who applied the bill.383 Hence, once 
again educational system became a tool of political competition. With the new 
education bill, primary and secondary schools were laicized and unified within 
eight-year-uninterrupted education system and became obligatory regarding the Law 
of Unification of Education. Accordingly, Imam-Hatip Schools were limited with 
high school level. Erbakan and RP members pointed out that the new education bill 
was not an educational reform; instead, it was a laic project. However, as the most 
significant part of this discourse was the accusation of this laic project’s being 
against the path to an Islamic state (şeriat devleti).384 In the meantime, Rıza Zelyut, 
a reporter of a newspaper named Akşam, went to Iran and discussed the closure of 
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Imam-Hatip secondary schools with Meclis-i Hubregan (the Assembly of Iran). 
According to his report, quoted by Bekir Coşkun in another national newspaper, the 
members of Assembly, who were also religious leaders, mentioned their 
disagreement on closure of Imam-Hatip secondary schools and added, “Because the 
Iranian Revolution initiated on these kinds of schools... We experienced, we know... 
The only way is to educate these children...”.385 
 
The political instability that started at the beginning of the year could not be 
resolved until the end of it. While the lawsuit of RP`s closure was continuing, the 
members of the party were trying to reach their supporters in order to mobilize the 
conservative group of society. For instance, Erdoğan made a speech, in which he 
read a different version of a poem of Ziya Gökalp, in Siirt, a southeastern city, in 
December 1997. The poem he read was: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes 
our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers”.386 This 
discourse of his caused him ten-month prison because of inciting hatred among 
society; eventually, he was sentenced with four-month prison in 1999.387  
 
 On 16 January 1998, the Constitutional Court solved the case about closure, 
and regarding to the decree, RP was closed and Erbakan was banned from politics 
for five years, because of being the origin of anti-laic implementations.388 Closure of 
parties was not something new for the political scenes of Turkey. In fact, it was 
considered as a way to overcome political Islam; however, RP was not the first 
political party with National View ideology, and it did not become the last one. For 
many years, RP used to be a considerable representative of political Islam with a 
strong reference to Islamic Ottoman identity, which was a total contrast of the laic 
republican identity. Their discourses and implementations were obviously against 
the laic structure of the republic; however, they had very considerable support from 
conservative part of the society, as it was visible in results of the last elections 
before their closure. Hence, former party members, who were allowed to do politics, 
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established a new political party named Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP) on 17 
December 1996 with same ideology.389 The party was established before the closure 
of RP in case it should be dissolved. Hence, after the closure of RP, its members of 
parliament became new members of FP. 
 
 Closure of RP or bans from politics could not be considered as sufficient for 
the dissolution of tension, or better to say, fear among supporters of laicism. RP and 
Erbakan were considered as the origins of threat to actual republican regime, and 
although, they were both banned, supporters of laicism were gathered around the 
regime and mobilized for a protective stand. Hence, the ceremony of 75th 
anniversary of the republic on 29 October 1998 turned into a significant 
demonstration with a great participation all over the country.390 The slogans those 
were shouted by the crowd were about the protection of regime like “Live Long The 
Republic!” (Yaşasın Cumhuriyet!); about M.K. Atatürk, such as “Our Great Leader, 
We Follow Your Path!” (Atam izindeyiz!) and “We Are Proud, We Are Strong and 
We Are Kemalists!” (Gururluyuz, Güçlüyüz, Atatürkçüyüz!); and about laic structure 
of republic, for instance “Laic Turkey Will Remain Laic!” (Türkiye Laiktir, Laik 
Kalacak!).391 The demonstrations were supported by military, by governors, by 
mayors of different political parties mostly excluding FP members, by university 
students and by different parts of society. For all these reasons, it would not be 
wrong to claim that the demonstrations were a show of strength against former RP’s, 
and its successor FP’s anti-laic discourses. 
 
 In 1999 General Elections, FP managed to enter to TBMM with less 
members (111 members of parliaments over 550) and a lower percentage of total 
votes (11%),392 if we compare with the last elections of 1995, in which RP had 158 
members and gained 21.37% of total votes.393 The most significant event of this 
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government led by a coalition of DSP, MHP and ANAP was the oath-taking 
ceremony, which hosted an incident regarding headscarf (türban). Merve Kavakçı, 
one of the MPs of FP from İstanbul, intended to enter to TBMM with her headscarf 
in order to take her oath to start her mission officially. However, she was protested 
by other MPs, she was criticized and prevented from taking her oath by then-Prime 
Minister, Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) with the following speech, which was 
broadcasted by one of the public broadcaster, TRT 2; 
 
“In Turkey, nobody interferes in the clothing and in the headscarf of women in their 
private life. However, here is not a domain of private life of anybody. Here is the 
greatest institution of the state. Those who serve here have to suit the tradition and 
the rule of state. This is not the place to challenge the state. Please put this lady in 
her place.”394 
 
This speech of Ecevit was protested by conservatives, MPs of FP and 
with protest meeting in Iran and Palestine. According to different national 
newspapers, Tehran University hosted one of the very first protest meetings 
about the incident.395 On the other hand, discourse of Ecevit and his attitude 
towards Kavakçı were considered as a helpful stand in order to end a greater 
crisis and a probable military intervention.396 Thus, his stand was supported by 
then-President of Republic Demirel, and then-Commander of TSK.397 Besides, 
Kavakçı was criticized by Demirel for being provocative and causing trouble, 
even aiming to transform Turkey into Iran, Afghanistan or Algeria.398 On the 
other hand, supporters of Kavakçı claimed that there was not an exact law about 
the outfit of MPs; hence, the protests against her could not be considered as a 
fair stand. Eventually, her membership of parliament was reduced; however, the 
debate could not be closed as actors of February 28 Process are being indicted 
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since 2012. This issue will be mentioned under the relevant title in upcoming 
parts of this thesis. 
 
 As another important event of decade regarding Islamism was the left of 
Fethullah Gülen, who became one of the leading names of political Islam, or as 
mentioned by Kramer, Turkish Islamic Synthesis, with his discourses. 399 Gülen 
with his teachings derived from Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur, has become a well-
known Sufi order leader, and formed the Gülen Movement (Gülen Hareketi) or 
Service (Hizmet).400 During the decade, he and his followers mobilized, and they 
established a network with private courses (dershane), dormitories (ışık evleri, 
literally: house of light),401 and media institutions402 (daily newspaper, such as 
Zaman; radio station, such as BURÇ FM; TV channels, such as Samanyolu TV 
and Dünya; journals, such as monthly scientific Sızıntı, theological journal Yeni 
Ümit, magazines Aksiyon and Ekoloji). In fact, subjects of that list were 
matching with the ones in list of MGK, which was declared to be controlled due 
to security concerns regarding reactionary movements; however, nothing 
changed regarding Gülen’s network; contrarily, he supported MGK and as he 
had been one of the actors of political arena during the decade, he made several 
positive declarations regarding the action that was carried out by military.403 At 
the end of the decade, in 1999, he left the country and settled in the U.S.A. and 
his departure was explained with health concerns.404 In the same year as his 
departure, an investigation was initiated about him regarding his Islamic 
discourses, and this investigation turned into a lawsuit in 2000 with accusation 
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of “forming an illegal organization in order to establish a state based on 
religious rules with changing the laic structure of it”.405 
 
 At the end of decade, political arena of Turkey was not stabilized due to 
familiar discussions regarding reactionary movements. The decade had started 
with assassinations and ended with another one, in which Ahmet Taner Kışlalı 
(1941-1999), an academic, politician and author was assassinated with a bomb 
in his car on 21 October 1999, after a few days that Akit published an article 
about him with his photo and a cross on it.406 Concerning the discussions about 
reactionary movements, Gülen movement and FP were on the agenda of Turkey. 
Briefly, Republic of Turkey closed the century with familiar discussions and 
familiar hostility between supporters of laic republican identity and supporters 
of traditional Islamic identity.  
 
3.3. Beginning of Justice and Development Party Governments 
 
 After the establishment of the republic, with various implementations in 
different orders, laicization process was almost accomplished; however, single party 
politics cannot be sufficient to carry out a real democratic regime. As there was no 
other political party apart from CHP, which embedded oppositional ideas and its 
supporters in it. Hence, it was not only the party in power, but also its own 
opposition. With the establishment of DP, Turkey started to experience democracy. 
 
 During 50 years, political scenes of Turkey hosted many different actors, 
such as military or politicians under Sufi orders’ leaders’ control, apart from 
political parties, which possessed a significant variety due to party closures and re-
forming their successors. However, the most significant point of this half-century 
was the polarization of politics and accordingly the polarization of society between 
two different groups. 
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 The Republic of Turkey was established with a westernized approach based 
on laicism. Laicism was considered as prerequisite of all other reforms; so that, any 
threat to laicism was interpreted as a threat to regime. As DP started its 
implementations with religious actions, such as Quran recitals in public state radio 
station and Arabization of calls for prayer, its approach was perceived as a move 
away from laicism. Besides, the power of Sufi orders among political and economic 
scenes deepened the concerns of that move away. Simultaneously, tolerance to other 
was lowered and polarization started. Thereafter, for the sake of democracy, Turkey 
faced with three military interventions, which were strokes to democracy in fact. 
First, a right-wing government was abolished by the military intervention, then the 
same military fight against the left-wing politics and its supporters with the help of 
Islam as an antidote. 
 
 Conservative perspective of politics, which started with DP, developed in 
time and became political Islam during 1980s; then, as snowball effect, it was 
radicalized and turned into a concrete discourse of Islamic state (şeriat) under RP 
and its successor FP politics. While the politics intervened in religion, with the 
Islamization, the politicians started to abuse religious sentiments of society in order 
to do politics. For instance, RP politicians’ discourses regarding the relation of 
worship value with voting to their party was a significant proof of abuse. 
Theoretically, this is the second reason of existence of laicism. Acceptance of 
laicism is supposed to protect not only the state from religion, but also the religion 
from any kind of political abuse. This very simple example should prove the 
importance of laicism in order to free both parts of the debate. On the other hand, as 
it will be discussed in upcoming chapter, rise of conservatism brought about 
hostility to adherents of different belief systems. 
 
 There is another thing that should be highlighted before a deepened debate 
about the separation of society: the education system. As it was stated, the education 
system has been changed many times during this half century due to government 
policies. This debate had started with Village Institutes and continued with Imam-
Hatip Schools and religious ethic classes; however, the most significant changes 
targeted Imam-Hatip schools. For instance, the number of newly-opened Imam-
Hatip schools, (although it was way too much than the necessity), considerable ratio 
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of girl students of these schools (although, they would not be able to become imams), 
and the acceptance of Imam-Hatip schools’ graduates to various university faculties 
rather than theology faculties have been the sources of discussions regarding the 
issue. While these implementations were applied by rightwing governments, they 
were discussed among supporters of laicism, and RP`s interpretation about the 
Imam-Hatip schools` graduations as their “base of voters” deepened the concerns of 
laics.  
 
Chart V: New Opening Imam-Hatip Schools (1950-1997) 
Source: “Hangi Hükümet Döneminde Kaç Tane İmam Hatip Açıldı,” Oda TV, 3 January 
2013, <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=hangi-hukumet-doneminde-kac-tane-acildi-
0301131200> (1 March 2013); 
“İmam Hatiplerin Yeniden Doğuşu,” Radikal Daily Newspaper, 19 September 2012, 
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1100847&Ca
tegoryID=86> (1 March 2013); 
Özlem Soğukdere, “İmam Hatip Liseleri'nin Tarihsel Gelişimi,” CNN Türk, 28 May 2004, 
<http://www.cypriot.org.uk/Documents/Haber1/Imam-Hatip-Liseleri.htm> (1 March 2013). 
 
 The Chart V has been drawn with the help of different sources in order to 
show the increase of Imam-Hatip school numbers with the total number. As it can be 
seen, every single government contributed to existing numbers of Imam-Hatip 
schools; however, periods of 1975-1978 (coalition government of AP, MHP, MSP, 
CGP), 1984-1989 (the time that Turkish Islamic Synthesis was being promoted), and 
1995-1997 (coalition government of RP and DYP) were the ones, when numbers of 
Imam-Hatip schools were significantly increased. For instance, in 1995-1996, there 
were 492.809 students in 561 Imam-Hatip schools, and 53.553 graduates. However, 
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the number of imams needed was 2288.407 The discrepancy between the numbers of 
graduates and necessity of imams was considerable, and it was the issue that 
concerned the supporters of laicism. The number of Imam-Hatip schools was just 
one of the issues attracting the attention regarding the concerns of supporters of 
laicism. In addition to that, there were the Islamic discourses of politicians, Islamic 
implementations of municipalities, and rising budget of DİB as a government policy. 
The reason why the issue of Imam-Hatip schools was highlighted was, indeed, as the 
explanation of Meclis-i Hubregan of Iran: the revolution starts with education.  
 
Separation among society became more obvious during the 1990s. These two 
different groups were gathered around two different identities. As the republic was 
established on modernized and westernized values, these two characteristics became 
the basis of the identity promoted for citizens of modern republic. However, with 
increased conservatism, an alternative identity was started to be promoted by 
politicians with a concrete accusation of the existing identity by undermining the 
real culture of Turkey. The real culture mentioned here was the one used to belong 
to the Ottoman Empire blended with significant Islamic motives. The separation was 
turned into a kind of hostility between these two groups. While the identity 
possessed by supporters of laic republican identity was westernized, recently 
promoted identity based on Islam was traditional, briefly. If the explanation is 
expanded, the description of Çınar will be helpful, 
 
“Secularism is public, Islam private; secularism is knowledge, Islam is belief; 
secularism is modern, Islam is traditional; secularism is urban, Islam is rural; 
secularism is progress, Islam is reactionary (irtica); secularism is universal, Islam is 
particular.”408 
 
That was the point that perspective of society against the other arrived at the 
end of century. Two different identity interpretations were dominant among 
different parts of society at the same time. Therefore, these two identities were 
entirely contrary to each other, and it would not be wrong to claim that, this 
contrariness has kept its place during the new century. 
                                                
407 Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, 286-288. 
408 Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularity, 47. 
 
146 
In 2001, Turkey faced major economic crisis, which effected both economic 
and political structure of Turkey. Same year AKP was founded to enter the 
upcoming elections of 2002. The founders of AKP were coming from the National 
View. However, its founding members have often declared that their ideas were 
changed and they embraced the new conditions of 2000s. AKP made its propaganda 
with a new vision for Turkey for the elections of 2002. As expected, AKP had the 
majority of valid votes and become the first party according the results of the 
election with 34.28% percentage of total votes.409  
 
3.3.1. 2002 Elections 
 
 After the 2002 Elections, the first AKP government was formed by Abdullah 
Gül (1950 – …), who is the current President of Republic. As Erdoğan was not 
eligible to enter the 2002 Elections, Gül formed the single party government and 
lead the government as Prime Minister between 18 November 2002 and 11 March 
2003. In March 2003, elections in Siirt province was renewed and Erdoğan became 
an MP, then took the Office of Prime Minister from Gül.410 
 
 With AKP, Turkey had single party government after many years of coalitions. 
As a government formed by a single party, AKP used its power for the reforms, 
which were declared during the propaganda period for the elections of 2002. AKP 
started its reforms with respect to the European Union (EU) perceptive, and between 
2002-2004 eight legislative reform packages were approved for the Copenhagen 
Criteria of the EU. The reforms were considered as Turkey’s and AKP`s declaration 
of commitment to human rights in international convention by EU Officials.411 The 
reform packages fulfilled the European perspective and also helped solving 
numerous internal problems regarding the social and political life. As a result of 
reforms packages, many improvements had placed, such as; on government-military 
relations European standards were adopted, State Security Courts abolished, 
freedom of expression within a wider perspective was provided, laws which led easy 
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punishment due to critics of military and state system were changed, limits of 
freedom on gathering and demonstration were expanded, necessary changes have 
been made for television broadcasting other than Turkish, usage of languages other 
than Turkish become possible for private language courses, etc.412 
 
 As a consequence of AKP’s efforts on reform packages, in 2004 EU 
confirmed that Turkey had made all necessary changes in its legal system and was 
ready for the negotiations for full admission to the EU, and negotiations started on 3 
October 2005.413 AKP’s efforts also affected the party’s image in Western media. As 
Yavuz argues, when AKP was established in 2001, Western media described it as 
“fundamentalist party”, then after the victory of elections in 2002 Western, media 
started to refer AKP as “Islamist or Islamic Party”, and with the reform packages 
they started to refer AKP as “Party with Islamic roots”.414 While AKP had critics 
about coming from National View as a political structure from Western and local 
media, Erdoğan stated in 2003 that AKP was not coming from the National View, 
which was led by Erbakan, but coming from the DP tradition, which was led by 
Menderes.415 One can say that with reference to DP, Erdoğan tried to avoid the long 
fear of Islamism in Turkey. As stated earlier, National View movement was often 
considered as reactionary movements against the laic values of the republic. 
Nevertheless, AKP has been associated with religious references and critics 
regarding its Islamic roots is still an issue within the perspective of supporters of laic 
republican identity.  
 
 With the help of reform packages and support of liberals in Turkey, AKP won 
the 2004 Local Elections and raised its votes to 40.18%. 416 The rise of AKP started 
with 2002 General Elections, then continued with 2004 as it had majority of 
municipalities. Starting in 2004, founding members referred the party as an example 
of “conservative democracy”. It is to say, AKP accepted the concept of democracy, 
                                                
412 “Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri,” TC Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, 2007, 
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/abuyp.pdf> (14 April 2013). 
413 “Accession Negotitations,” Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey, n.d., 
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=37&l=2> (04 April 2013). 
414 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 1. 
415 “Erdoğan: Milli Görüş’ün Değil Demokrat Parti’nin Devamıyız,” Zaman Daily Newspaper, 17 
May 2003, <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/05/17/politika/h2.htm> (17 April 2013). 
416 “2004 Yerel Seçim Sonuçları,” Seçim Anketi TV, n.d., <http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2004-yili-
yerel-secim-sonuclari> (01 April 2012). 
 
148 
which often refers to Western concept, but paid significant attention to Turkish 
traditions based on conservatism. Briefly, AKP tried to place itself in between 
traditional – historic- identity of Turkey and laic – republican – identity.  
 
 As AKP has conservative roots, supporters of laicism have questioned every 
AKP action whether it harmed the laic republican character of state and society or 
not. Consequently, AKP has faced many problems. For instance, in 2007, the 
Presidential Elections period was started with high tensioned debates. At the 
beginning of April 2007, rumors started to circle around that AKP would select Gül 
as their candidate for Presidential elections. In mid-April street protests started be 
organized by some NGOs under the name of “Republic Protests” (Cumhuriyet 
Mitingleri).417 AKP officially declared in 24 April that their candidate was Gül.418 
As he was a former member of RP, in other words was an active politician in 
National View movement, and has a veiled wife, many people started to argue that 
Gül could not represent the laic state structure of Turkey. Three days after the 
nomination of Gül, TSK published a press release in its website and stated that, TSK 
was aware of certain groups` intention to erode the laicism in Turkey.419 The press 
release was considered as a message against the nomination of Gül, and even further, 
a secret message for a possible coup d’etat in case of his election.420 
  
 According to the Constitution of Turkey, to be elected as president, at least 
367 over 550 members of parliament should be presented in the assembly, in other 
words a quorum of two-thirds of MPs should be presented in the assembly. The 
quorum of two-thirds was also the necessary yes number to be elected in first or 
second round. If not, election process continued with the third tour and the necessary 
yes votes would decrease. Gül had 357 valid votes in the first round for his 
nomination, which was not sufficient to be elected, but AKP had the idea to continue 
with second and thirds round and select Gül as President in third round. However, 
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the Constitutional Court of Turkey declared that quorum of two-thirds were not 
present at the time of election in first round, therefore the election process could not 
be started. 421  Hence, AKP faced a major problem, which was supported by 
opposition parties and had legal base by the Constitutional Court’s decision on the 
election of Gül. Consequently, AKP decided on snap general elections to overcome 
the problem. On 4 May 2007, all parties accepted AKP’s proposal for early general 
elections date as 22 July 2007.422 
 
3.3.2. 2007 Elections 
 
 In 2007 General Elections, AKP kept its pace on receiving more votes in every 
election. According to the results, AKP had 46.58% and gained 341 seats in 
TBMM.423 After the election, first issue on agenda was the Presidential elections 
again. A part from AKP, MPs of MHP were present in the assembly at the time of 
election; so that, the quorum of two-third was not a problem to start the election 
process. Eventually, Gül was elected as 11th President of Republic in the third round 
with 339 votes on 28 August 2007.424 
 
 As AKP had overcome the major problem of presidential elections with 
support of general elections, it proposed a constitutional change for next election in 
order to prevent probable future problems. According to proposed change, starting 
with the election of 12th President, presidents will be elected by public voting. The 
aforementioned change needed to be approved by the population. Hence, on 21 
October 2007, general referendum took place and AKP’s proposal was approved by 
68.95% of valid votes.425 With this result, related articles of the Constitution 
regarding the election of president of republic were changed. If everything goes 
according to the calendar, the next presidential election will take place in 2014 and 
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the 12th President of Turkey will be selected by public votes. 
 
 In 2009, local elections for municipalities took place in Turkey. According to 
the results, AKP lost around 2% votes then the elections of 2004. In 2009 Elections, 
AKP had %38.64 of votes and gained 1442 municipalities.426 Many columnists and 
intellectuals considered the results as a message from the public regarding AKP 
policies and some of them even stated that AKP’s lost on public support would 
continue in 2011 General Elections. 
 
 While AKP was often criticized by becoming the representative of traditional 
Islamic Ottoman identity, some improvements about religious freedom for non-
Muslim took place in Turkey. For instance in 2010, Monastery of Sümele, which is 
important for the Greek-Orthodox and serves as museum, was opened for religious 
ceremony for 15 of August.427 Starting on 15 August 2010, Monastery of Sümela, 
became the place of worship only for 15 of August in every year. However, religious 
freedom that AKP Government provided was limited. On the other hand, the right to 
practice (even it is one day annually) of Greek-Orthodox religious rituals after 88 
years is a huge step in the perspective of religious freedom. On the other hand, said 
AKP Government started a series of workshop regarding the problems of Alevis. 
The Workshop will be discussed with its details on upcoming chapter; however, it is 
another significant example regarding AKP`s approach to different belief systems 
regarding to religious freedom. 
 
3.3.3. 2011 Elections 
 
 On the way to 2011 Elections, AKP repositioned itself on the problem of veil 
in universities. After the military intervention of 1980, a lot of changes happened in 
Turkey regarding religious freedom. Starting from 1984, wearing veil became 
prohibited in universities; however, the ban of veil haven’t been applied strictly 
during the rest of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. Nevertheless after the February 
28 Process, the ban of veil applied strictly by a notice of Council of Higher 
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Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu – YÖK) to universities in September 1997.428 
According to the notice, YÖK ordered to universities not to allow any student with 
veil or headscarf. One can see that the ban of veil was obviously against the 
religious freedom. However, as the military and some state officials considered 
veil/headscarf as a symbol of political thought rather then religious necessity, the 
ban came from the State. As a party of ‘conservative democracy’, AKP took 
problem of veil on its agenda to solve. Months before the 2011 Elections, YÖK sent 
a notice to universities and ordered to allow students with veils and headscarves to 
the classes and not to issue any rapport against them.429 One can see that the ban of 
veil, which was implemented by the State back in 1984, was lifted by the State, as 
well. At this points, different policies of State officials under different governments 
are an obvious evident of the clash between traditional Islamic Ottoman identity and 
laic republican one.   
  
 AKP entered 2011 Elections in an atmosphere, in which a solution for veil 
problem was relatively founded, applied and accepted by public. 2011 Elections 
took place on 12 June 2011, and according to results, AKP had 49.83% and gained 
327 seats in TBMM.430 One can see that the claims after the local elections of 2009 
about AKP’s future on losing public support in elections became insignificant. In 
fact, AKP raised its percentage of votes significantly; besides, having almost 50% of 
valid votes is a significant success in a representative democracy. With the results of 
2011, 4th AKP Government period started.  
 
 4th AKP government continued its reforms on legal basis and, as usual, faced 
critics about implementing the Sunni-Muslim ideology with the power of State. For 
instance, AKP proposed a change to educational system at the beginning of 2012. 
The new system, known as ‘4+4+4’, planned for twelve continuous year of 
education for children. According to the plan, 4 year for primary school, 4 year for 
middle school and last 4 year for high school education were to be applied. However, 
last 4 years for high school does not require continuous attendance, and makes it 
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possible to have lessons via dedicated TV channels. The plan promoted by AKP as 
improvement over uninterrupted 8-year educational system. It is true on paper that 
4+4+4, indeed, makes improvements over educational system; however, option of 
having high schools classes at home harms the idea of having uninterrupted 
education. The 4+4+4 system was approved on 30 March 2012 by the TBMM,431 
and after its approval critics about the new educational system continued. Many 
columnists claimed that AKP introduced the 4+4+4 system in order to re-open the 
middle sections of Imam-Hatip schools. Regarding Imam-Hatip schools, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan stated, “Imam-Hatip Schools will be the dearest of this country 
and nation” in one of his speeches.432 This declaration of Erdoğan was considered as 
an evidence of a special attention over Imam-Hatip schools. It would not be wrong 
to argue that in a laic state structure, a prime minister could not point-out any type of 
school, which does not target all parts of society, as special one.  On the other hand, 
that issue should taken into account that, while Imam-Hatip schools are being 
represented as dearest, Theological School of Halki has been maintained closed 
since 1972 as its status cannot be clarified within Turkish education system. There 
are discussions that AKP Government considers to open it; however, any concrete 
steps have not been actualized yet.  
 
 2013 brought different political discourses on the agenda. As generally known, 
the agenda of Turkey changes day by day. Hence so far, agenda of Turkey has 
shifted from one to another. 
 
 In March 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç (1948 – …) stated that 
the state of Turkey made wrong implementations towards the religious minorities 
through its history and called the members of minorities back to Turkey.433 In the 
same speech, he described the differences among society as richness. As AKP 
promoted the party as the guarantee of freedom, that call should be considered 
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significant for religious freedom for those emigrated due to security reasons.  
 
 During the first half of 2013, AKP introduced a regulation about consumption 
and sale of alcoholic drinks. AKP promoted the regulation as a measure of 
protection of adolescents. Unsurprisingly, the party has faced many accusations 
about this regulation. Commonly, critics made to AKP by saying that the regulation 
was made with Islamic references and to intervene to life styles of individuals. 
According to the regulation, sale of alcoholic drinks are prohibited from 22:00 to 
6:00. Additionally, companies that produce and sell alcoholic drinks cannot promote 
their brand with giveaways – like glasses with brand names, ashtrays etc.-, and 
cannot be sponsor to any event, unless the event is an international fair.434 Erdoğan 
answered these critics in one of his speeches in TBMM and claimed that the 
regulation was made to protect the adolescents. He also said, “Why a law which was 
made by two drunks is legitimate but the one that is also the order of religion 
supposed to be rejected?”435 Erdoğan’s speech raised the tension as he gave the 
religion – in this case Islam- as a reference for said regulation, and used the term 
“two drunks”. The debate started over: How come a PM can defend a law by saying 
it is an order of religion in a laic state. On the other hand, about the term “two 
drunks”, Spokesman of the Government stated that it was a saying without a 
reference to anyone. However, significant portion of public opinion considered it as 
a reference to Atatürk and İnönü. With this assumption, critics started to circle 
around, as AKP is against the ideas of Atatürk and even Atatürk himself.  
 
 While the discussions were continuing about the regulation, groundbreaking 
ceremony for the third bridge in Bosphorus took place in Istanbul on 29 May 2013, 
started with prayers leaded by the Mufti of Istanbul, and the name of bridge was 
declared as ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim’ by Gül.436 Yavuz Sultan Selim was the 9th Sultan 
of Ottoman Empire, who is also known for massacres of Alevis during his time of 
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rule of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, naming the bridge with his legacy started 
another debate. Alevis’ main argument was the name Yavuz Sultan Selim was a bad 
reference for their history. Discussions started with the groundbreaking ceremony 
continued for a while among society, which is explained in detail in related part of 
following chapter. 
 
 Meanwhile in Istanbul, a group of people was protesting against Government’s 
plan to destroy the Gezi Park in Taksim and built a replica of Ottoman Barrack 
(name of the barrack was Topçu Kışlası). Erdoğan promoted the plan of the Ottoman 
Barrack as re-establishing the history where it belonged. Ecological protests to 
protect the Gezi Park from destruction evolved after the police intervention towards 
protestors early in the morning of 31 May 2013. After that moment, thousands of 
people gathered in Taksim Square against police brutality. However, police forces 
tried to disrupt the crowd with tear gas and water cannons. The harsh attitude of 
police sparked multiple demonstrations in multiple cities all over Turkey. The 
protests started with Gezi Park, turned into anti-government protests and gained 
global support within a short time. People hit the streets, shouted slogans and 
demanded freedom without any interfere to life styles. Many of the protestors stated 
that government`s attitude nearly on every topic was affecting and undermining their 
private life. The most recent given example was the regulation of alcoholic drinks. 
 
 Gezi Park Protests were carried out in different cities of Turkey, and apart 
from protest meetings in the streets or workshops on city parks, many people 
supported the movement from their houses by banging pans and pots and blinking 
the lights. These protests had a significant difference than any other previous ones, 
which used to base on directly laic structure of state; because they were about 
limited freedom with religious references with respect to conservative identity of 
AKP. This time, it was about individuals. Additionally, protests were supported by 
some groups of conservative part of the society as well. With the first special Friday 
prayers, solidarity between conservative part of the society and the rest of the 
protesters became visible and with the month of Ramadan, protesters gathered 
around Ramadan dinners in order to demonstrate that they were not against the 
religion itself, but to usage of religion for politics and AKP`s interfere to different 
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orders of individuals` life.437 
 
 With Gezi Park Protests, polarization among society became visible one again: 
on one side, supporters of AKP Government and most specifically Erdoğan, and on 
the other hand, opponents composed by supporters of laic republican identity, Alevis, 
official religious minorities, a significant number of conservative part of the society, 
who was not content with AKP Government. On the other hand, it would not be 
wrong to claim that polarization was encouraged by political discourses on religious 
base. For instance, on 22 June 2013, the PM Erdoğan stated in his speech in Samsun 
that, “They send millions of tweets, our one basmala ruins the plans.”438  
 
 Since the beginning of protests, they have been associated with foreign actors, 
internal provocateurs, marginal groups and interest lobby with economic interests of 
capital holders by political discourses of AKP members.439 At the writing time of 
this thesis, the protests seem to be faded away; however, there are still individual 
demonstrations based on different reasons on different orders with one common 
point: discontent of recent applications. During the time of writing this thesis, the 
most salient example is demolishment of METU (Middle East Technical University) 
forest with a mid-night operation in order to build a highway.440 
 
 On the way to a new constitution, AKP Government declared the 
Democratization Package with significant regulations concerning many different 
orders and different parts of the society. The most significant outcome of 
Democratization Package regarding the aim of this thesis has been the abolishment 
of veil ban from governmental offices excluding the ones, where uniforms are worn. 
This abolishment was associated with expanded limits of religious freedom for 
conservative Sunni population. In addition to that, territory of Mor Gabriel 
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Monastery, world`s oldest surviving Syriac Orthodox monastery, in Mardin, 
southeastern city, was handed over the Syriac community. Concerning Alevis, a 
university was decided to be named as Haci Bektas-I Veli University as a response 
to critics regarding the name of third bridge on Bosphorus. These applications were 
considered as positive for religious issues; however, the entire package was 
evaluated as insufficient for democratization.441 Most specifically Alevis declared 
their disappointment for the package; nevertheless, Government officially declared 
that there is another package on the way dedicated to problems of Alevis.442 This 
debate will be discussed in following chapter with its details. 
 
 As has been discussed in the entire chapter, there have been two dominant 
groups shaping Turkish politics and the society. The clash between these two groups 
has become concrete that led the country to unstable periods, most specifically to 
military interventions. Regarding the limits of religion, these two groups have taken 
different positions: laic republican identity has taken certain limits for religious 
issues with taking it under its strict control; and on the other hand, Islamic Ottoman 
identity representatives (such as DP, AP, RP, FP and AKP within different 
perspectives) have taken religious freedom into account as an issue concerning 
conservative Sunni part of the society, who have been limited within their 
perspective. There is one thing that should be highlighted in this point: Although 
conservatization of the society has its utmost ascendency during the last decade, 
AKP governments have been the ones those have paid more attention to religious 
issues including official/social minorities when we compare with its successors. The 
opening of Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Van, solution of territory issue 
of Mor Gabriel Monastery’s are the most salient examples. In addition to those, a 
series of workshops have been carried out by AKP Government regarding the 
problems of Alevis as the first systematic governmental initiative of Turkish politics. 
These initiatives have not been considered sufficient and even sincere; nevertheless, 
they show that the religious freedom issue has taken into account not just for 
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conservative Sunnis, but also for different parts of society. Among all, Alevi 
initiative will be discussed with its details on following chapter.  
 
 Within the clash of aforementioned two identities, Alevis have maintained 
their position in between, and within different applications of different governments, 
they supported one or another regarding their own interests without having their own 
representatives. On social order, there have been different events affected their 
social life, including industrialization, urbanization, Marxist movements and 
conservatization of society. Within this chapter, political trends and consequent 
situation of Turkey have been analyzed and during the following one, reactions and 
position of Alevis against these social and political trends will be examined. 
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4. ALEVISM: UNRECOGNIZED IDENTITY 
 
Identity is a characteristic that belongs to an individual, or to a group of 
people, a community of common shared components. These components may vary, 
and each of them forms a different theme to study within different principles of 
social sciences. This thesis, most specifically this chapter of it, will focus on cultural 
and religious components of an identity, Alevism, and the place of its adherents, 
Alevis, in Turkish social and political orders regarding their religious freedom. 
 
 Alevism has been the target of many discussions based on its characteristics 
to see whether it is a religious identity, a cultural one, even social or political 
identities. In either way, Alevism is a component of identity, which has been used 
for centuries in order to make self-definition or to be defined by others, under 
different names, in different geographies and with different approaches.   
 
 Today, Alevism is a religious component with its distinctive cultural 
characteristics and has been spread to a wide geography, which can be defined 
basically: from Central Asia to Central Europe with historical roots. In fact, it would 
be beneficial to make a certain definition of Alevism; however, Alevism is not a set 
of beliefs with certain limits; instead, it is a religious syncretism that has been 
formed and enriched by many different religious and cultural components. 
 
 Under this chapter of the thesis, Alevism will be examined within different 
perspectives, which are historical, political and social, in order to give detailed 
information to the lecturer for the answers of questions regarding Alevism, such as: 
What is Alevism? How has it been formed? What components does it include? How 
different is Alevism, within political and social perspectives? How were they 
differentiated from the majority under different state rules? What has been the place 
of Alevis in the Turkish society, and what did affect their place throughout history? 
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How far their religious freedom goes under a laic state structure, this is to say, in 
Turkey? 
 
4.1. What is Alevism? 
 
Alevism can be defined, briefly, as a set of belief with different components 
of various independent religious systems not only monotheistic, but also Iranian and 
Indian ones, which have been melted in order to form a new religious and cultural 
way of life. This definition, obviously, is a general perspective without any 
historical or geographical references, which form an important part of formation of 
Alevism.  
 
In order to understand what Alevism is, or who Alevis are, it is essential to 
deepen the discussion within history. For all these reasons, Alevism will be 
examined with historical roots from Central Asia starting with nomad Turkmen 
tribes, to Anatolia with significant references to Safavid and Ottoman empires, 
which had affected Alevism directly or indirectly. This part of the chapter will focus 
on historical evolution until the time that name Alevi started to be used in order to 
define this community. These historical references will lead this study to analyze 
current form of Alevism, and the relation of Alevis with the laic Republic of Turkey. 
However, as historical references will not be sufficient to understand Alevism, a part 
will be dedicated to Alevi worships to see Alevis’ distinctive religious way of 
practicing and to comprehend the necessities of Alevis in order to live and maintain 
their identity freely. Eventually, discussions will be examined regarding the 
definition of Alevism by different communities and authorities. 
 
Alevism has been spread to a wide geography by transaction and mass 
immigration flows, as it was mentioned. This immigration route and evolution of 
Alevism has been clarified by Ali Balkız as following; 
 
Alevism is a path, a philosophy, and a way of life, which has been fed from 
various elements within its route starting from Khorasan, going to Iran, then to 
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Mesopotamia and then to Anatolia. It embedded various characteristics of local 
cultures, and has not turned into any of them.1 
 
If one should mention the limits of existence of Alevism, it will not be wrong 
to start with Kazakhstan in Central Asia and go to Balkan region or far more, to 
Poland and to Russia through Iran, Iraq and Turkey.2 As a historical consequence, 
which will be mentioned in upcoming parts, Alevism is a considerable component of 
Balkan region (apart from Anatolia), especially Ludogorie region including Babadag 
in Romania, Silistra, Dobrich, Kubrat, Razgrad, Ruse, Targovishte, Sliven, Yambol, 
Haskovo, Kardzhali in Bulgaria, and Didymotikon in Greece and Albania within 
different names and diversity.3 Due to aforementioned expanded geographical limits, 
Ercan Geçmez stated; 
 
“I am against the usage of ´Anatolian Alevis`. It is very limited, while 
Alevism is not something limited to a certain geography. You mention the Alevis of 
Anatolia; however, there are many Alevis outside this region.” 4 
 
Due to geographical diversity, Alevism has been varied within time in 
different regions; however, only the Alevism of Anatolia will be focused with 
respect to the aim of this thesis. In order to analyze relation of Alevis with the 
Republic of Turkey, Anatolian Alevis will be examined; nevertheless, necessary 
references will be given with respect to its relevance with the main theme.  
 
 Apart from the territorial diversity, Alevism of Turkey also contains 
significant inner diversity. Alevis are spread almost all over the country, as it is 
shown in Figure I: Alevi Population in Turkey.5 Since there is not an official record 
about religious preferences in Turkey, there is not an exact number of Alevi 
                                                
1 Balkız, interview. 
2 Ercan Geçmez (Chairperson of Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation), interview by Didem 
Doganyilmaz, Ankara/Turkey, 12 April 2011;  
  Irène Mélikoff. “Bektaşiler Tarikatı ve Hacı Bektaş’a Bağlı Zümreler: Probleme Toplu Bakış” in 
Uyur İdik Uyardılar, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınlari, 2006), 22; 
  Mustafa Şen (Associate Professor of Sociology in Middle East Technical University), interview by 
Didem Doganyilmaz, Ankara/Turkey, 14 April 2011. 
3 Irène Mélikoff. “Bulgaristan’da Deliorman Kızılbaş Topluluğu” in Uyur İdik Uyardılar, trans. 
Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 130. 
4 Geçmez, interview. 
5 Please see Appendix XI on page 305. 
<http://www.aleviforum.com/showthread.php?t=29393&page=12> (17 December 2010). 
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population; however, according to different sources, it varies from 10 to 20 million.6 
The word Alevi, within a general perspective, refers to two different groups living in 
Turkey as the representatives of said inner diversity: Anatolian Alevis (known as 
Kızılbaş–literally red headed) and Arab Alevis (known as Alawi, Alawite and 
Nusayri). Origin of difference between these two groups is the territorial background, 
and it led to a significant dissimilarity among Anatolian Alevis and Alawis with 
respect to way of practices, cultures and languages. As they form the majority of 
entire Alevi population of Turkey, Anatolian Alevis will be examined with their 
distinctive culture; however, it will be undeniably essential to give brief information 
regarding Alawis to the lecturer, in order to mention the synonymous usage of word 
Alevi for these two groups and brief instruction regarding their history and worship 
before the definition of Alevism of Anatolia. 
 
Alawis living in Turkey are ethnically Arabs and that is the reason why they 
are named as Arab Alevis, as well. Alawis arrived to Turkish territories as a result of 
immigration flows, initiated from Yemen and headed to north, due to economical 
conditions and political pressure. Within this route, Alawis settled in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Syria and Turkey. As it is shown in Figure I, Alawis of Turkey live generally in 
three southern cities, Mersin, Adana and Hatay, which are close to the borderline 
close to Syria.7  
 
Alawis living in Turkey are identical with the Alawis of Syria, who form 
approximately 10% of Syrian population; despite, of being demographically 
minority among Sunni majority (65% of total population).8 Alawis of Syria are in 
power since 1971, with Assad Family, Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad 
from the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Since 2011, as a part of Arab Uprisings, anti-
government demonstrations targeted Baath Party, in other words Assad Rule, and it 
                                                
6 Ali Balkız, Sivas’tan Sydney’e Aleviler (Ankara: İtalik Kitaplar, 1999), 87; 
  John Shindeldecker, “Turkish Alevis Today,” Alevi Bektaşi Araştırma Sitesi, n.d., 
<http://www.alevibektasi.org/xalevis_home.htm> (22 January 2011). 
7  Ahmet Özuğurlu (an Arbiter of Nusayri Community), interview by Didem Doganyilmaz, 
Mersin/Turkey, 18 April 2011. 
8 Nir Rosen, “Assad's Alawites: The guardians of the throne,” Aljazeera, 2011, 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/20111010122434671982.html> (12 March 
2013). 
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turned into a civil war, in which significant references are being made to religious 
diferences between Alawis and Sunnis.9 
 
Alawis are named after Caliphate Ali; however, there are other names in use 
in order to mention them. For instance, name Nusayri is a common usage in Turkey, 
even more than Alawi, or Arab Alevi. Name Nusayri has its historical roots. Alawis 
are not content to be named as Nusayri, because, it became a way to discriminate 
Alawis and to accuse them of being unbelievers. Nusayri has been used as followers 
of Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who was a follower and a pupil of Hasan al Askari, the 
11th of Twelvers, in order to isolate them from Muslim society.10 According to 
another approach, Alawis maintained in An-Nusayriyah Mountain, which formed 
the natural border between the Alawite State and Syria during 1920-1936, in order to 
be safe; consequently, they were named after the Mountain as Nusayri.11 Name 
Nusayri is still in use in Turkey with an intention to differentiate Alevis and Alawis, 
which are homonyms with their translation to Turkish. 
 
 Alawis differentiate themselves from Sunni majority of Turkey with their 
strong belief in Ehl-i Beyt, which means the family, the people of the house in pre-
Islamic time; however, after Islam, it is used to mention the family of the Prophet 
Muhammad,12 and they believe that Ehl-i Beyt is one of the two most weighty things 
that Prophet Muhammad left (the other is the Book, Quran). They comment Quran 
within the frame of Ehl-i Beyt; however, apart from that their religious rituals are 
mostly similar to Sunni Islamic ones, such as five times a day prayers (in a different 
form), fasts in Ramadan and religious festivals as in Sunni belief. There is another 
thing that should be distinguished that they practice in mosques, separately for 
different gender groups similar to Sunnis and entirely different to Alevis.13 The 
difference between Alevis and Alawis will be clearer with detailed information 
regarding Alevi faith. On the other hand, although, there are not much similarities 
                                                
9 “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Baath Party,” BBC News Middle East, 2012, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755> (14 March 2013). 
10 Mustafa Ali Bedir, Ehl-i Beyt Sevgisi Cennet’in Anahtarıdır (Adana: Koza Matbaası, 2000), 6-10; 
    Özuğurlu, interview. 
11 Bedir, Ehl-i Beyt Sevgisi, 7. 
12 “Ehl-i Beyt,” Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2011, 
<http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/DiniBilgilerDetay.aspx?ID=299>  (06 May 2011). 
13 Özuğurlu, interview. 
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apart from being supporters of Ali,14 Alawis feel themselves close to Shia branch of 
Islam, and to Sunni belief as well, they define this complexity with an expression, 
which is “We are neither Alawi nor Sunni; we are both Alawi and Sunni.”15 
Similarities to Sunnis regarding the form of rituals have already been mentioned, 
and ´Alawi` in this sentence probably refers to Shia Islam. This reference can be 
supported by their accounts of their historical scholars. Because, Alawis possess the 
Shia authors, lecturers and men of letters as they are Alawis.16 
 
4.1.1. History of Alevism 
 
Alevism is a set of belief, which has been composed by many different 
components from different religious systems. This syncretic structure makes history 
of Alevism a pivotal theme to define the characteristics of Alevism with significant 
historical references.  
 
As it was mentioned for the case of Alawis, Alevi is a word that refers to the 
supporters of Caliphate Ali. However, apart from being the supporter/follower of 
Caliphate Ali, there is another usage of Alevi, which means to be from the same race 
of him. For instance, in Iran, Alevi has been used to point out to be Seyyid, which 
means a relative of Caliphate Ali. For that reason, Irène Mélikoff points out the 
etymological mistake with the usage of Alevi in order to mention the Alevis of 
Anatolia, as Alevis of Anatolia have no relation in ethnic level with Caliphate Ali.17 
Hence, it will be beneficial to understand the historical usage of word “Alevi”.  
 
Alevis had been named as Kızılbaş, which was mentioned above as one of 
the names of Alevis, after the Safavid Empire during 15th and 16th century with 
                                                
14  İsmail Engin. “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevi Kimliğinin Oluşumu, Gelişimi ve 
Değişmesinde ‘İmaj’ Sorunu ve Düşman İmajlarının Etkileri” in Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Döneminde 
Alevi Tarih ve Kültürü, ed. İbrahim Bahadır (Bielefeld: Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 
2002), 287. 
15 Özuğurlu, interview. 
16 Mehmet Es-Salih, Gerçeklerin Işığında Aleviler, trans. Ahmet Bedir (Ankara: Baran Ofset, 2007), 
73. 
17 Irène Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” in Uyur İdik Uyardılar, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: 
Demos Yayınları, 2006), 34;  
    Irène Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” in Uyur İdik Uyardılar, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: 
Demos Yayınları, 2006), 51. 
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reference to the red hat of the Turkmen tribes under the rule Safavids.18 This name 
had been used as a self-description and as description of others for a long time until 
the end of 19th century. 19  Within this period, name Kızılbaş had become 
synonymous with unbeliever, in order to define this non-conformist and heterodox 
community. The name Kızılbaş is still in use in Turkey; although, self-definition had 
changed with Alevi due to the faith in Ali, after the initials of 19th century in order to 
avoid being insulted or being accused.20 With respect to the inner diversity of 
Alevism, and in order to avoid any insulting usage, related community will be 
named as Alevis in this thesis and necessary information will be given to point out 
the diverse structure and to differentiate a specific group. 
 
Alevism has a syncretic structure that has been affected by many different 
religious systems. The origin, or better to say, the first components of Alevi belief 
belong to Central Asian Turkic customs, because nomad Turkmen tribes played a 
significant role, while they emigrated to west from Central Asia, they carried their 
traditional belief systems to Anatolia. Anatolia has been the region, where 
traditional belief systems were mixed with Islamic customs.21 
 
Nomad Turkmen tribes were in cultural interaction with Chinese and Indian 
people; hence, Turkish paganism, based on spiritual leadership of every single 
creature, was occurred as a consequence of effects from Buddhism and 
Manichaeism. Additionally, these nomad tribes were affected by Shamanism with 
respect to religious rituals, as well as the deification of Sun. On the other hand, in 
old Turkic tribes’ culture, such as Oghuz Turks and Altay people, there were 
significant proofs regarding Bai-Ulgen (Ülgen22) belief, which was considered as an 
effect of Abrahamic religions regarding the soleness of God (Bir Tanrı).23 As the 
belief Ulgen led to the belief in Tengri (Gök Tanrı), nomad tribes buried their 
                                                
18 David Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 
(1999): 78.  
19 Mélikoff. “Bektaşiler Tarikatı,” 25-26;  
   Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 51. 
20 Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 34. 
21 Balkız, interview. 
22 A benevolent deity and the God of Upper World, which led to the belief in Tengri (Gok Tanri). 
23 Kutluay Erdoğan, Alevi-Bektaşi Gerçeği: İslamiyetin, Türkmen töreselliği içinde özümlenerek 
Anadolulaşması (İstanbul: ALFA, 2000), 19-20. 
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corpses in uphills in order to be close to the Tengri.24 At the end of the 11th century, 
immigration flows of Turkmen tribes started and during 12th and 13th centuries, 
flows became more intense due to the necessity of escape from Mongol invasion.25 
During the mentioned period, Anatolia was under the rule of Seljuk Sultanate of 
Rum (Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti). With the immigration of Turkmen tribes, a three-
year religio-political revolt, Baba’i Revolt was carried out with leadership of Baba 
Ishaq, a popular Turkmen preacher, against the rule of Sultanate.26 This revolt 
affected Alevi belief significantly because of the new settlement of Hacı Bektaş. 
 
Hacı Bektaş, who had immigrated with Turkmen tribes to Anatolia, was a 
Muslim mystic philosopher from Khorasan. He escaped from the Baba’i Revolt and 
settled in Central Anatolia, in Nevşehir (Soluca Kara Öyük), central Anatolian city, 
where his tomb is now.27 
 
Hacı Bektaş, although he did not form a systematic doctrine, became the 
eponym of a religious order after his death. Despite different records of his death in 
different sources, he is believed to die before the establishment of the Ottoman 
Empire (1299). Neither, he was not alive in Ottoman period, nor he formed a 
systematic doctrine or possessed pupils in order to convey his thoughts, he affected 
the Ottoman Empire with indirect influences in military and social orders. 
 
Hacı Bektaş was peer with Sheik Edebali, the father-in-law of first Ottoman 
Sultan Osman I; that’s why, there was not a direct interaction of him with Ottoman 
Sultans due to age discrepancy. However, when the first military force was 
established by Murat I, the third Ottoman Sultan, named Janissaries (Yeniçeri), it 
was connected to the Bektashi order, which was not yet institutionalized. Janissaries 
were named as “Sons of Hacı Bektaş”, and a Vekil represented the Bektashi order by 
remaining in the Heart of Janissaries.28 By the way, Janissaries were not only 
                                                
24 Ibid., 24. 
25 Irène Mélikoff. “Bektashi/Kizilbas: Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences,” in Alevi Identity: 
Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives, eds. Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Ozdalga and Catharina 
Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), 1.  
26 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Anatolia," 02 April 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/22897/Anatolia>. 
27 Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 32. 
28 Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 55. 
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responsible with military, but also they were used to Islamize the newly conquered 
territories by building dervish lodges (tekkes) and small ones (zaviye). This was seen 
as the reason of existence of Alevis in Thrace and Balkan region. Consequently, 
Alevis/Bektashis became an important actor of Ottoman Empire with the help of 
Janissary system, until its abolishment in the 19th century.29 
 
Hacı Bektaş is believed to be respected by first Ottoman Sultans, as his 
dervish lodge was built and enriched by different sultans. His tomb was built by 
Murat I, and it was enlarged by Murat II, the sixth Sultan and Bayezid II, the eighth 
Sultan. However, the period of Selim I, the ninth Sultan, who took the Caliph title 
from Mamluk Sultanate with the Battle of Ridaniye in 1517, was not clear 
concerning support to Dervish Lodge of Hacı Bektaş. According to different sources, 
the same support was either kept,30 or cut.31  
 
 Hacı Bektaş is considered as a Sufi belonging to Turkmen tribes.32 He is 
considered as a good Muslim; although, he was not practicing within a concrete 
form such as prayers for five times a day.33 This liberalistic form of worship would 
considerably affect the process, which led the actual form of Alevism. In fact, he did 
not institutionalize a systematic order; however, his doctrine turned into one during 
the first years of 16th century by Balım Sultan, who was assigned as the head of 
Dervish Lodge of Hacı Bektaş (Postnişin) by Sultan Bayezid II. Institutionalization 
process was carried out by taking little lodges under control of Dervish Lodge of 
Hacı Bektaş.34 
 
                                                
29 Irène Mélikoff. “Anadolu’da Cemaat Dışı İslamlık: Örf-dışılık, İnanç Karışması, Gnose,” in Uyur 
İdik Uyardılar, trans. Turan Alptekin (Ankara: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 101-103.  
30 “Hacı Bektaş Veli Müzesi,” Hacı Bektaş Web, n.d., 
<http://www.hacibektas.com/index.php?id=hacibektas_veli_muze> (1 March 2012). 
31 Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Haci Bektas: Social Position and Economic Activities.” Journal of 
Middle East Studies 7, no.2 (1976): 183-208 quoted in Irène Mélikoff. “Bir Kolonileştirici Dervişler 
Tarikatı: Bektaşiler Sosyal Rolleri ve İlk Osmanlı Sultanlarıyla Bağlantılari,” in Uyur İdik Uyardılar, 
trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 204. 
32 Mélikoff. “Bektashi/Kizilbas,” 4. 
33 Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 54-55. 
34 İbrahim Bahadır. “Haci Bektas Veli Tekkesi’nin Dini Merkez Olarak Yükselme Süreci,” in Haci 
Bektas Veli: Güneşte Zerresinden. Deryada Katresinden, eds. Pınar Ecevitoğlu, Ali Murat İrat and 
Ayhan Yalçınkaya (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2010), 238;  
    Mélikoff. “Bektaşiler Tarikatı,” 21-22. 
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 There is one thing that should be clarified on this point. So far, the 
community of the case study of this thesis was named as Alevis; however, right now, 
Bektashi order has been highlighted. In order to avoid any inconvenience or 
misunderstanding, Alevi - Bektashi definition should be done before the explanation 
of doctrine. Alevis and Bektashis are both from the same historical root, which was 
composed by the nomadic Turkmen tribes with their distinctive belief system 
synthesis. Both groups respect the doctrine of Hacı Bektaş. As it was stated by 
Mélikoff, the difference is not coming from the origin; instead, from the forms. 
Since Bektashi lodges were used as a tool to Islamize newly conquered territories, 
they were settled in urban places as a state policy; on the other hand, Alevis, who 
were to be named as Kızılbaş after 15th and 16th century, maintained in rural areas.35 
This is the point, where two different approaches have occurred: While Bektashis 
are generally considered as a significant part Alevis, 36  with respect to Fuat 
Köprülü’s argument Alevis were a part of Bektashism, as Mélikoff referred. 
Köprülü described Alevis as “rural Bektashis” in order to unify two groups, who 
were considerably identical with one exception based on urban/rural distinction.37 In 
addition to that distinction, Bektashi order, as a Sufi order, is open to anybody; 
however, being an Alevi requires lineage. Additionally, due to strict endogamy, 
some scholars have considered Alevism a quasi-ethnic group.38 
 
As name of Alevi was started to be used in 19th century, and mentioned rural 
communities of Turkmen tribes those were to be named as Kızılbaş under Ottoman 
rule more than four centuries before, the word Alevi should have covered both 
Bektashis and Kızılbaş under one significant definition including all religious 
references those have been and will be mentioned within this part. It is clear that the 
difference between urbanized Bektashis and rural Kızılbaş people would be 
increased within time; however, name Alevi will be efficient to refer both of these 
groups, who were not separated with certain limits on the level of religious practices 
and doctrines. Because, within time, Safavid style religious components of Kızılbaş 
                                                
35 Mélikoff. “Anadolu’da Cemaat Dışı İslamlık,” 101-103. 
36 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Bektashi," 06 May 2011, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/58980/Bektashi>; 
   “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples-Turkey: Alevis,” Minority Rights Group 
International, 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749c9950.html> (3 April 2013). 
37 Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 33. 
38 Azak, Islam and Secularism, 141. 
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people started to be spread among Bektashis, as well.39 That should have been the 
reason why their distinctive culture has been referred as Alevi-Bektashi culture. 
Since the name Alevi has been considered efficient to refer the target community of 
this thesis, it will be used so in entire explanations. 
 
After the 16th century, Alevism of Anatolia started to be affected from the 
Safavid Empire established in 1501 by Shah Ismail, who was to become an 
important influencer not only to belief system, but also to Alevi literature with his 
native Turkish language.40 Turkmen tribes settled in Azerbaijan and northern Iran, 
who formed significant part of Safavid subjects, supported Safavid Dynasty.41 As it 
was mentioned, the rural community of Turkmen tribes were named as Kızılbaş 
after Safavid Empire due to their headdresses: a red bonnet with twelve facets 
referring to Twelvers of Shi’a Islam.42 Within a decade, Shah Ismail achieved great 
territorial unity including Iran and some provinces of Iraq, such as Baghdad and 
Mosul, and despite predominantly Sunni character of said territories, he declared 
Shi’a Islam as state religion.43 In Shi’a Islam of Shah Ismail, strong belief in 
Twelvers, in Caliphate Ali and his deity, and anthropomorphism, which led Shah 
Ismail to consider himself as a sacred personality and an incarnate of Ali, were 
significant components, which were to be components of Anatolian Alevism due to 
interaction of Turkmen tribes with the Safavid Empire and its religious 
propaganda.44  
 
Shia Islam, as opposed to Sunni Islam official religion of the Ottoman 
Empire, and its obvious supporters, who were Turkmen tribes of eastern Anatolia, 
were considered as threats against the Ottoman Empire; consequently, the name 
Kızılbaş turned into a way to point them as rebels, followers of Shah Ismail,45 and 
unbelievers to insult them. In Ottoman documents, said Turkmen tribes were named 
                                                
39 Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 56. 
40 Roger Savory, Iran Under The Safavids (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 213. 
41 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Safavid Dynasty," 04 April 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516019/Safavid-dynasty>. 
42 Mélikoff. “Bektashi/Kizilbas,” 5-6. 
43 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Safavid Dynasty," 04 April 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516019/Safavid-dynasty>. 
44 Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 51. 
45 Ibid., 52-54. 
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as zındık, heredic, rafızi,46 schismatic, shi’ite, mülhid and atheist; so that, significant 
hostility, which will be discussed with details under relevant topic, occurred.47  
 
Heart of Janissaries possessed more importance with expanding territories of 
the Ottoman Empire, and became a political power. Soldiers of Janissaries were 
recruited by Christian youth, who were converted to Islam before the service, and 
apart from their military capability, they were well educated. However, after the late 
16th century, the restrictions were relaxed; consequently, the system lost its 
functionality. During the 17th and 18th centuries, many revolts were carried out by 
Janissaries against the Ottoman Dynasty; eventually, in 1826 Heart of Janissaries 
were abolished by Sultan Mahmud II, 30th Sultan. Most of Janissaries were killed or 
executed after prison.48 With the abolishment of Heart of Janissaries, the official 
status of Bektashi lodges were changed, and they were closed, and all asset 
belonging to Bektashi lodges were sold.49 Closed lodges of Bektashis were handed 
over the Naqshbandi order, which was defined in previous part, due to their loyal 
stand to official Ottoman Islamism, in other words, Sunni Islamic culture.50 
 
After the closure of Bektashi lodges, the order lost its power in the Empire 
and hided from the authority; however, its adherents did not disqualify themselves. 
Therefore, the lodge was assumed to be carried to a different level.51 According to 
Mélikoff, Bektashis became freethinkers and, in the 20th century, often Freemasons 
(Franc-maçonnerie) 52  as progressivists due to common ideals, such as non-
conformism and freethinking. According to many scholars, this interaction between 
                                                
46 A person, who does not accept the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar, the first and second Caliphs 
according to Islamic belief. However, Shia Muslims and Alevis do not recognize their caliphate, and 
Ali is believed as the first Caliph. 
47 Mélikoff. “Bektashi/Kizilbas,” 5-6;  
   Ali Yıldırım, Osmanlı Engizisyonu (Ankara: Öteki Yayınevi, 1996), 151. 
48 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Janissary," 04 April 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/300350/Janissary-corps>. 
49 “Cemevi Tartışması,” Türkiye’nin Nabzı, Habertürk TV (Istanbul, December 12, 2012). 
50 Irène Mélikoff. “1826’dan Sonra Bektaşiler Tarikatı,” in Uyur İdik Uyardılar, trans. Turan 
Alptekin (Ankara: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 211. 
51 Ibid., 212. 
52 The teachings and practices of the secret fraternal order of Free and Accepted Masons, the largest 
worldwide secret society. Spread by the advance of the British Empire, Freemasonry remains most 
popular in the British Isles and in other countries originally within the empire. Secret lodges 
developed modern symbolic or speculative Freemasonry, which particularly in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, adopted the rites and trappings of ancient religious orders and of chivalric brotherhood. 
Source: Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Freemasonry," 08 April 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/218618/Freemasons-order-of>. 
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Bektashis and Freemasons of France fastened the revolutionary movement of Young 
Turks,53 even further, the Committee of Union and Progress, with personal endeavor 
of Ziya Gökalp, who was a Bektashi himself, and his students Fuat Köprülü, Hamid 
Sa’di (1914– 1949) and Baha Said (1882–1939). Mélikoff counted Fuat Köprülü, 
Namık Kemal, and Abdülhak Hamit as Bektashis, also.54 
 
 The time Bektashis started to associate with Freemasonry was assumed to be 
the most increasing moment of differentiation process between Bektashis and 
Kızılbaş people.55 On the other hand, simultaneously the name Alevi started to be 
used in order to refer these two groups. Hence, the abusal usage of Kızılbaş left its 
role to name Alevi for the same purpose. The name Alevi started to be used; 
nevertheless, re-emergence of Alevi identity as a systematic component of society 
was not a fact in this period, and would not be a significant one until the second half 
of 20th century. 
 
4.1.2. What Makes Alevism Different? 
 
 Today’s Alevism has been evaluated within hundreds of years as it was 
examined in previous part, and it was enriched by many different belief systems and 
cultures within this historical process. Alevism re-interpreted these components; 
eventually, it possessed its distinctive culture with distinctive religious rituals as a 
heritage of mentioned traditional belief systems.  
 
Within time, Alevism has gained its own characteristics, which have 
considerably been effective to their distinctive culture. Their support of gender 
equality, Turkish-speaking rituals, its special type of music, and its minstrels form 
the Alevi culture. There are many discussions regarding the characteristics of 
Alevism, if it is a culture or an entire religion; however, this discussion will be put 
                                                
53 Irène Mélikoff. “Bektasi-Alevi Senkretizmini Meydana Getiren Ögeler Üzerine Araştırmalar,” in 
Uyur İdik Uyardılar, trans. Turan Alptekin (Ankara: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 101-103; 
    Mélikoff. “Bektashi/Kizilbas,” 7; 
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aside, and this part will focus on the rituals in order to clarify the difference of 
Alevism. On the other hand, it is important to distinguish that there is not an exact 
form of Alevism, in other words, Alevi rituals may vary from one group to another. 
This variety might have occurred due to lack of a systematic interaction of Alevi 
communities within history; therefore, it will not be wrong to say that while a group 
live their religion with dominance of Shamanism within syncretic structure of 
Alevism, another group in a different geography live under dominance of Islam. 
Additionally, possession of Sunni Islam as official religion of the Ottoman Empire 
led systematic transformation from older generations to new ones with its distinctive 
schools and written sources; and, as it was mentioned, Alevism remained oral. With 
the lack of written sources and difficulties of interaction between diverse groups in 
different geopgraphies, it could not possess a unique form and varied within time. 
This variety has been alleged as an obstacle to the recognition of Alevis by 
authorities, as it will be mentioned in following part; however, this variety has been 
supported by Alevis as it forms the richness of Alevi identity. Alevis refer this 
theological variety with a saying: “The way is one, the form a thousand and one.”56  
  
 Within this part, mentioned variety led to ritualistic differences of Alevism 
will not be discussed; instead, general perspectives will be given regarding Alevi 
rituals. Whether Alevism is a religion itself, or a culture, it has its own way of belief, 
practices and place of worship. These differences will lead the lecturer to understand 
reasons of problems, which Alevis face with, in today’s laic Turkey. 
 
According to Islamic belief, the prerequisite of being a Muslim is to testify 
in Allah (God) as the creator and Muhammad as his prophet with Shahada (Şehadet). 
As Alevis have considerable fellowship to Caliphate Ali, the form of Shahada 
changes, and they testify in the trinity of Hak-Muhammed-Ali.57 With this saying, 
four references are made. First of all, God (Hak) is unique. Secondly, Muhammad is 
his prophet, who conveyed the words of God to people and lived accordingly. 
Thirdly, Caliphate Ali is his Wali (Veli), he understood the word of God, lived 
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accordingly, and interpreted under changed circumstances. And last of all, Hak-
Muhammed-Ali is an inseparable completeness.58 
 
Quran is the book Islam, which is believed to be completed in 23 years as the 
words of God revealed to Muhammad through Gabriel. Alevis have faith in Quran, 
as well, and they do not limit the words of God with Quran; instead, they believe in 
four holy books.59 They have faith in Torah, Psalms, Bible and Quran; however, 
with a significant distinction. Alevis believe that Quran was changed while it was 
written to be copied by Caliphate Osman, which is named as Quran-e Samit 
(Kuran`ı Samit) and the one in use today. Instead of Quran-e Samit, they believe in 
Quran-e Natik  (Kuran`ı Natik), which is believed to be the original version of 
Quran memorized by Caliphate Ali.60 
 
Hak-Muhammed-Ali is believed to be a way of unification of God and 
human. This is to say; the difference between creator (referring the God) and 
creatures (referring humans) is vanished. Additionally, the creed of En-el Hak61 
leads Alevis to believe that God is embedded in every single person and creature. 
Hence, there is not a concept of a God figure that provokes fear; so that, they do not 
afraid of God and possess a questioning approach. As God is not a frightened figure, 
they do not believe in reward or punishment system, in other words heaven or hell, 
which would come from God as a result of their obedience or disobedience. Instead, 
they believe that human nature includes both heaven and hell inside oneself. 
Therefore, a person may live any of them as result of his/her attitudes.62 Briefly, 
Alevis believe that a person is responsible to himself/herself instead of a creator, due 
to personal conscience. 
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Responsibility to oneself due to personal conscience is mentioned with three 
limitations. According to these limitations, a person should be the master of his/her 
hands, tongue and loins (Eline, diline, beline sahip ol!); this is to say, “Take 
responsibility for your words, actions, and morals.”63 This saying forms the basis of 
Alevi morality. There are two different perceptions regarding the origin of it. 
İbrahim Aksoy claims that Mansur Al-Hallaj converted the creed of “think well, 
speak well and do well” of Zoroastrianism into taking responsibility of words, 
actions and morals.64 On the other hand, Mélikoff argues that Manichaeism affected 
Alevism on this characteristic with its creed three seals (üç mühür), which are seal 
of mouth, seal of hand and seal of heart.65 
 
There is a concrete ethic of Alevis, which forms the path to understand the 
entire doctrine and to achieve the perfect human being. According to Four Gates and 
Forty Levels (Dört Kapı, Kırk Makam), there are four different spiritual levels that a 
person can achieve, and within every new level, the individual gets closer to the aim. 
The first gate is Sharia (Şeriat Kapısı). There is one thing that should be 
distinguished on that point that there is no relation between Sharia the Islamic Law 
and Sharia the Gate. A person, who arrives at this gate, becomes conscious that 
he/she is nothing but a speaking living being. The second gate`s name is Tariqa 
(Tarikat Kapısı). One, who achieves here, gets aware of him/her and become able to 
think individually. For instance, taking responsibility of words, actions and morals is 
a part of this level;66 because, now he/she is more than a speaking living being, is an 
individual who is aware of his/her responsibilities. When an individual arrives at the 
third gate, Marifa (Marifet Kapısı), the individualism vanishes, and “consciousness 
of community” occurs. And when a person achieves to the last gate, which is called 
as Haqiqa (Hakikat Kapısı), he/she will get aware of unity of all nature and mankind 
that leads him/her to perfect human being. A person, who arrives at that level of 
ethic, is considered as a saint (ulu).67 
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Ramadan is the month of fasting according to Islamic belief. A person, who 
fasts, does not eat and drink anything during the day, which starts with sunrise and 
lasts until sunset. Alevis also fast, however not in same time and not in same form. 
Differently from Sunni fasts, Alevi fast is not about nourishment. They eat and drink, 
but with strict limitations. First of all, pure water is strictly prohibited; it is allowed 
to drink tea or other drinks containing water in order to serve the need of water of 
body. Knifes get out of use; hence, any solid food need to be cut or chopped is not 
preferable.68 Personal moral purification plays a significant role in Alevi fasts, 
which is why it is believed that telling anyone about the fast is inappropriate.69 
 
 Time of fasts also differs from Ramadan. Alevis have their own special days 
to fast. Muharrem fasts form an important part of Alevi fasts. Muharram is the first 
month of Islamic Calendar (Hicri Takvim), and the month of Battle of Karbala, in 
which Imam Husayn, the son of Caliphate Ali was killed in 10 Muharram 61 
according to Islamic Calendar. In Shi’i Islam, Muharrem fasts are for ten days; 
however, Alevis fast for 12 days, while the first ten days are regular fasts like in 
Shi’i Islam, to understand the cruelty of Imam Husayn, and the last two days are for 
being grateful for the salvation of Ali ibn Husayn (son of Husayn) in order to 
maintain the generation of Muhammad.70  Muharrem fasts end with sacrificed 
animals and a special dish named Aşure, which is a special soup with different 
ingredients like fruits, nuts and grains. Usually it contains 12 ingredients with 
reference to the Twelvers.71 During Muharrem fasts, attending any ceremonies, such 
as weddings or celebrations, is not appropriate. Additionally, shaving was not an 
appropriate behavior; however, under urban conditions, it became inapplicable.72 
 
 Muharrem fast is not the only fast that Alevis follow. Fast of Hızır is another 
one, which is practiced by people suffering for any reason in order to obtain relief 
and to achieve welfare.73 Hızır is believed to be one of the saints or prophets, who is 
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capable of solving problems of suffering people.74 During 5-6 May, Hıdırellez 
(Hızır-İlyas) Bayramı is celebrated as a spring festival of Alevis;75 however, today it 
is celebrated within a wider geography and not just by Alevis. According to the 
belief, Hızır delivers health, success, life (it is to refer spring, as plants turn into 
green as if they get back into life) and chance.76  
 
 Muharrem fasts and fast of Hızır can be considered as the most important, or 
better to say the best-known fasts; however, there are some other days that Alevis 
fast. These fasts are generally a part of religious festivals. For instance, Hızır 
Bayramı is one of them. It is celebrated as the new year of Earthly Branches system 
(12 Hayvanlı Türk Takvimi), which was used by Turks and still being used in China. 
According to Gregorian calendar, it is celebrated in February. Before Hızır Bayramı, 
people fast for three days, and the day after the last fast is celebrated as festival, in 
which they wear white according to old Turkic traditions.77 Earthly Branches is not 
the only calendar system that Alevis celebrate. In central Anatolia, in Sivas, the new 
year of Julian Calendar is also being celebrated with the name of Kagant. Process 
starts on 10 January with three days of fasts and on 13 January, which is the 
beginning of new year according to Julian calendar, Kagant festival is celebrated.78 
Haftamol Bayramı is another festival of Alevis, again in Sivas, between 7-12 March 
as commemoration for all saints, prophets and late-family members.79 Additionally, 
new year of Iranian Calendar (Celali Takvimi) is celebrated as Nowruz (Nevruz) by 
Alevis on March equinox, 21 March that refers both the new year and the day that 
Turks left Ergenekon.80 Today, it is celebrated not only by Alevis, but also by entire 
population in Turkey. Moreover, it is celebrated in all Turkic states, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Armenia and many other ones. 
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 It is important to highlight the geography, where a certain Alevi culture is 
practiced, as it was explained for Kagant and Haftamol festivals. There is another 
thing that varies from one group to another: Qibla. According to Islamic belief, 
Qibla is Mecca, where Kaaba is. It is accepted so by some groups of Alevis from 
Kahramanmaraş, a southeastern city. In addition to that, there are two other 
perceptions regarding the direction of Qibla. According to the heritage of Shaman 
culture, some Alevi groups deify the Sun; hence, it becomes the Qibla. They feel 
thankful to the sunrise, and they mention it every single morning (şükür). Moreover, 
they bury their corpses situated “head-to-Sun” as they deify it.81 Last of all, 
according to another belief, Qibla is the human, as human contains God in oneself, 
and as he/she has responsibility for oneself due their personal conscience.82 
 
 According to aforementioned Four Gates and Forty Levels, an individual 
gets consciousness of community, when he/she arrives at Marifa the third level of all 
four. Hence, the community is one of the most important components of Alevism. 
For that reason, the most powerful penalty system was based on being excluded 
from the community. The most shameful punishment, named as Shunned 
(düşkünlük), is believed to be one of the most important components of Alevism. 
However, like Tamer Kaya mentioned, under urban conditions the penalty system 
lost its applicability; because, the predominance of being an isolated community was 
vanished; instead, the terms of metropolitan life got more power. Consequently, 
dependence of people to other was decreased.83 
 
Within an Alevi community, there is one other important concept, which is 
named as Companionship (Müsahiplik). This companionship is composed by four 
people, who are two married couples. It is an alliance between these couples, and it 
means that, four people possess all responsibilities of each other and should take 
care of themselves till their death. It is considered as important as blood relation; 
that why, it is named as spiritual brotherhood, as well.84 On the other hand, there is 
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another information regarding Companionship, and according to that, every single 
person should have a companion, who will help him/her in marriage, death, good or 
bad days.85 Hence, this should be done before marriage as contrary to the first 
information given. In both ways, the companions are responsible of each other. 
Companions may share everything they have, except honor (namus)86 and have 
responsibilities to solve other`s problems. Companionship is an important spiritual 
tie that connects people as brothers; that’s why, children of companion couples 
cannot get married.87 Pir Sultan Abdal, who is considered as one of the most 
important poets of Alevi culture, distinguishes the Companionship as a prerequisite 
of entering ceremonies and acceptance of one’s supplications (niyaz) in one of his 
incantations (nefes).88 
 
Considerable effects of Shamanism to Alevism has been mentioned many 
times. It is also visible in the best-known Alevi ritual, cem ceremony, with songs, 
rhythms, dances and attendance of both women and men.89 Geçmez defined cem as 
following: 
 
“It is wrong to define cem just as a religious ceremony. Alevis consider many 
things as religious practices, including working, human respect, self-respect etc. 
Because if an Alevi does not possess inner peace, he/she cannot be in peace with 
others. Hence, cem becomes the place where he/she judges himself/herself.” 90 
 
With this explanation, Geçmez emphasized that a cem ceremony is not only 
a religious ceremony or a ritual, but also a social and judgmental meeting. It is led 
by a dede, who is spiritual leader of Alevi community. Responsibilities of dedes are 
far more than responsibilities of a spiritual leader. They will be listed after 
explanation of cem ceremony. 
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Cem can be defined as a special meeting, which is held in a place called 
cemevi, not only to fulfill religious responsibilities, but also to socialize and to face 
with oneself for anterior attitudes. In cem ceremonies, community plays a significant 
role; because, before beginning the ceremony, dede should ask for a consent (rızalık) 
from every single attendee for the entire attendees. That’s why the members of 
community should be familiar to each other and be content with attendance of all 
members of cem. This is to say, there should be no problem, or all problems should 
be solved before starting to ceremony. A cem is composed by three different parts,91 
and the first part is dedicated to mentioned consent process. If that part cannot be 
completed, in other words, if all attendees cannot agree on members of cem, it will 
not be possible to carry out the ceremony. The second part is the longest part, in 
which self-questioning is made. Within this part, members of cem face with 
themselves and with their community. This part functions as a judgment process 
under the guidance of dede. This judgmental process occurred as a result of unfair 
decisions of Ottoman judges (kadı) after 16th century (time of Selim I). As Kızılbaş 
people were offended by Ottoman judges, they started to form this unofficial 
judgmental process within their community; eventually, cem ceremonies became 
meetings, in which judgmental process are carried out.92 The third and the last part is 
for religious rituals, in which the Semah is performed. Semah,93 which has been 
selected to be a part of cultural world heritage by UNESCO,94 can be described as a 
set of mystical and aesthetic body movements in rhythmic harmony performed by 
semah dancers (semahçı), accompanied by musical performers (Zakir) playing the 
ritual music by saz.95 Within this harmony, hand and body motions have symbolical 
meanings. For instance, the motion in which one palm faces the sky, while the other 
faces the earth is meant to say “You are God, we are the people, I come from You 
and hold your essence in me, I am not separate from You”.96 The aim of this ritual is 
to be unified with God and purified from world materials.97 In general perspective, 
aesthetic body movements within harmony are related with moves of crane. Crane is 
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not only the symbol of nomad life, but also the symbol of Caliphate Ali.98 
Symbolization of birds is also a cultural component originated from Shamanism.99 
 
Cem ceremonies, as other components of Alevism, differs from one group to 
another, as well. For instance, a cem from southern coast of Turkey show 
dissimilarities from a central Anatolian one.100 They are performed once a week on 
Thursday nights in urban centers; however, in villages, where a dede does not live, 
people gather for cem whenever a dede arrives. Dedes have responsibilities for a list 
of villages, and he is obliged to visit every single village at least once a year in order 
to fulfill his duties.101 As it was mentioned, a dede is more than a spiritual leader for 
Alevi community as he was assigned for different duties within history as result of 
necessities. Responsibilities of a dede for his community can be listed as below:102 
 
● leading the community within social and religious aspects, being a role-
model with his behaviors and lifestyle,  
● instruct and unify his society,  
● leading the social and religious ceremonies,  
● providing justice,  
● leading the rituals,  
● being the person to be consulted for any problems or sickness of the society 
due to his blessed personality. 
 
 Today, under different conditions, responsibilities of dedes may change; 
however, obviously they keep their importance with regards to being the spiritual 
leader of community. 
 
 Alevi belief does not possess a regular understanding of time, which passes 
within a linear dimension. Instead, they believe in renewal of time with a new day 
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after a night or with a spring after a winter.103 Accordingly, the life of human 
possesses an immortal formula; it is to say that they do not believe in death.104 A 
person is a composition of can (soul) and ten (body), and the death is only about the 
body but not about the soul.105 It is to say that, the immortal soul changes only its 
temporary body. Belief in reincarnation is said to be originated from Buddhism, 
which was considerably common among Uyghur Turks (Uygur Türkleri), and 
gained base in Anatolia during the Great Seljuq Empire.106 As a soul changes its 
temporary possessor, it might be a human or any other creature in the world, which 
is why Alevis pay attention to the nature. Because, they give credence to the unity of 
human and nature, as each might have other’s previous or following soul. On the 
other hand, there is another reason of the credence in unity of human and nature. 
According to creed of En-el Hak of Mansur Al-Hallaj, nature has its own sacred 
power, and every single part of nature has a part of God inside. This is a component 
that was originated from Zoroastrianism.107 
 
 According to Alevism, understanding the nature is one of the most important 
components as they have faith in unity of human and nature. This necessity 
strengthens the questioning approach that they possess. The question “why” is said 
to form the basis of Alevism; accordingly, it is claimed that Alevism welcomes 
science, instead of getting isolated with excuse of religion.108 This characteristic of 
Alevis was pointed out by Mélikoff as a reason that some Bektashis became 
members of Freemasonry after 1826. 
 
 Alevis aim to achieve the level of Perfect Human Being (Kamil İnsan). In 
order to achieve this level, a person should not only have the sufficient intelligence, 
but also the responsibility of mankind.109 Additionally, as individualism vanishes 
after a level, community possesses significant importance. Therefore, it is aimed to 
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form a Perfect Community (Kamil Toplum) by individuals, who are nothing but a 
part of their community.110 
 Alevis are defined as can with reference to their souls, but not the bodies. 
Can is a soul, as aforementioned, regardless from any gender characteristic.111 It has 
an egalitarian structure among men and women. With respect to traditional culture 
of nomadic life, women and men do not separate in social, either in religious life, as 
contrary to the patriarchal culture of Islam. Today, Alevi religious rituals are being 
actualized by both women and men, side to side, while both Sunni Islamic and 
Alawi rituals are performed separately.112 This is what makes Alevism “the belief of 
equality” concerning gender discrimination. Besides, while a community can be led 
by a dede, who is a male figure, as the spiritual leader, a woman can be an ana and 
perform the same functions as the dede.113  
 
4.1.3. Discussions on Defining Alevism 
 
 For Alevism, there are various definitions; even though, as stated by Geçmez, 
Alevis are bored with being defined by Sunni majority.114 Making a definition is not 
one of the purposes of this thesis. Within this part, different perceptions of different 
authorities and/or individuals will be given regarding the place of Alevism both in 
society and in politics, in order to explain self-definition and other-definition 
regarding Alevism to the lecturer. 
 
There are many different interpretations about Alevism; for instance, some 
claims that it is a belief with its distinctive components, others argue that it is just a 
sect under Islam with denial of its characteristics, or as a different perception, it is a 
Turkish way of Islam as a response to dominant Arabic Islamic culture. These 
perceptions will be given to see how Alevism has been placed so far. 
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 Examination of Alevism, in fact, is a different task to accomplish, as its 
literature has been developed in oral base, instead of systematically written sources. 
However, there are undeniable facts that it has different characteristics from Sunni 
Islam, as it was mentioned above one by one. For instance, with respect to 
significant effects of Zoroastrianism, specifically by Mansur Al-Hallaj, Aksoy 
claims that Alevism is a subversion of Zoroastrianism despite of being affected also 
by Hinduism or Shamanism.115  
 
 During the Ottoman Empire, Kızılbaş people were defined as zındık, heredic, 
rafızi, schismatic, shi’ite, mülhid and atheist in order to make a clear 
distinguishment for being unbelievers. Alevis have been defined as unbelievers by 
some Sunni societies during the Republic, as well, and those led many bloody 
attacks between these groups and Alevis. On the other hand, there is a significant 
ratio among all, who define Alevism as a part of Islam. This proposal has been 
accepted by many different parts of the society; however, a considerable difference 
occurs after that point. Some of the supporters of this idea claim that, as Alevis are 
members of Islam, then there is no point to mention different characteristics of it, 
while there is another group, who argues that Alevism is obviously a part Islam, but 
with its special syncretic structure.  
 
 Balkız refers four current different descriptions of Alevism being talked in 
public: First of all, it is the core of Islam with belief in God, Muhammad, Quran and 
Ehl-i Beyt. Secondly, it is the Anatolian comment of Islam. Thirdly, it is a religion 
itself, which is affected by Islam. And lastly, it is a culture, a way of life and a 
philosophy, an approach with its Anatolian origin, and it was affected by 
Shamanism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity and blended all together with its pre-
Turkish-Anatolian culture; and emerged in Anatolia against the Arabic pressure on 
the region.116 Both the second and the last perspectives based on Anatolian comment 
were discussed strongly in Republic of Turkey during mid-twentieth century. These 
perspectives will be analyzed with details in following sections. 
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 Since the Ottoman era, especially after the possession of Caliph title, Sunni 
Islam, which has been based on Arab culture, affected Anatolia as the dominant 
culture. This is the Arabic pressure pointed out as Anatolian people resisted and 
developed Alevism in aforementioned descriptions. As Mélikoff mentioned, there 
are many references made to mention the difference of Alevism, most specifically 
Bektashi order, from Arabic or Persian interpretations of Islam. She also pointed out 
the syncretic characteristic of Alevism and non-conformist structure, since there 
were no conformist components of Islam such as Ramadan, mosques, or prayers.117 
In addition to certain ties between Bektashi order and Alevism, she pointed out both 
of them as Turkish popular Islam.118 Besides, as she agreed on “rural Bektashis” 
distinguishment of Fuat Köprülü for Kızılbaş people, her definition can be expanded 
for all Alevis, instead of a reference only to Bektashis. Mélikoff defined the 
syncretic characteristic of Alevism as a composition of Manicheism, Buddhism, 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam within its evolution during the history. It is based on 
humanism, and an outcome of non-Islamic Turkmen religious culture varnished by 
Safavid religious propaganda. It was sufficient to fulfill the lack of religious 
necessity of people as an adaptation of Turkic religious and cultural life into a 
primitive form of Islam; even though, it was not similar to Sunni Islam, which was 
the religion of majority in Anatolia.119 
 
 The synthesis of Islam with Turkish culture was referred by other scholars, 
as well. For instance, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886-1978), an author, politician, 
educationist and a scholar, who supported the ideas of Ziya Gökalp regarding 
Turkish Islam, defined Alevism as an outcome of Islam and Turkish culture and 
civilization, which were melted together. It was a self-defense of Turks for their pre-
Anatolian culture, a survival strategy of Turks against Arab culture, which was 
based on “inequality between men and women, male despotism, slavery and 
mysticism.” On contrary, he highlighted the characteristics of Turkish customs, such 
as “free thought, fine arts, literature and music, respect towards the elderly, mutual 
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trust, solidarity and tolerance.”120 Azak, underlines that Alevism was managed to be 
maintained for centuries as it was thanks to isolated community despite the 
dominance of Sunni political center.121 
 
 Ercan Geçmez, points out the syncretic structure of Alevism, as well; and he 
declines any concerete ethnicity belonging to Alevism. He stated that; 
 
“… There is a general but incorrect understanding regarding Turkishness of Alevism. 
This is wrong. Alevism affects any ethnic identity and it accepts it as richness; 
however, it denies to be possessed by any of them. It blesses humanbeings and it 
accepts any language, religion, race and places, where those humanbeings were born. 
That demonstrates on an absolute decree that Alevism is not a concept concerning 
ethnicity. In Turkey, there are Kurdish-Alevis commonly, Arab-Alevis as well, and 
Turkish Alevis. In Bulgaria, there are many Bektashis; in America, there are Alevis. I 
mean, there are Alevis in different geographies; that`s why it has been varied.” 122 
 
 Ethnicity of Alevis has been detailly analyzed by Bruinessen. He points out 
the existence of Kurdish Alevism in Turkey. As he stated, Kurdish Alevism does not 
possess many differences from Turkish Alevis. There is a significant similarity 
between Turkish and Kurdish Alevism, majority of the poems (nefes and gülbank) 
are in Turkish; that means the religious rituals are performed in Turkish. The sun 
worhip, for instance, was pointed out by Bruinessen, and it was linked with Kurdish 
Alevi villages. This sun worship is identical with the one that Geçmez stated: being 
thankful to the Sun and explaining it every day with the sunrise. Additionally, 
Kurdish Alevism has also strong connectivity to Hacı Bektaş, as a spiritual leader. 
Bruinessen argues that Kurdish Alevis were not Turcomanos those immigrated from 
Central Asia.123 
  
 Alevism has an Islamic characteristic; however, as mentioned, variety occurs 
after that point. According to İsmail Engin, Alevism is a part of Islam, and it 
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contains Turkishness, as well. Nevertheless, he argues that it is identical to Sunni 
Islam within different perspective. Alevism, which played significant role to Turkify 
Anatolia with Hacı Bektaş, is a nationalist, Turkist sect. It is nothing but Turkish 
Sunni Islam, which is more liberal and compatible with laicism than the Arab based 
Sunni Islam.124 
 
 Since the establishment of the Republic, there have been many discussions 
that DİB involved regarding the situation of Alevism. These discussions will be 
examined within chronological order in following parts; however, it will be 
beneficial to see the actual definition of Alevism in official website of DİB, which is 
the representative of the state in religious affairs. According to that definition;125 
 
“Alevism has been developed as belief, worship and morality within the frame of 
Quran and Sunnah (Sünnet) in history of Islam. A minstrel named Virani defined 
Alevism as, to profess the unity of Allah, the prophethood of Muhammad and the 
imamate of Ali. Accordingly, it is not true to accept any cultural component, which 
was possessed by Alevism, as ritualistic component. Instead, they should be 
interpreted as cultural richness, and distinction. Culture of Alevism has a 
considerable place within the frame of morality and humanitarian affairs. 
Friendship, brotherhood, neighbourliness, hospitality, bravery, generosity, love to 
minors and respect to elders and honesty are some of the leading ones. Besides, the 
doctrine of being master of his/her hands, tongue and loins was possessed in order 
to be protected from any kind of prohibitions and the things forbidden by religion.” 
 
Special characteristics of Alevism and some basic components have been 
accepted by DİB; however, some of them have been ignored and not accepted as 
ritualistic distinctive. This definition; although, it has relatively correct references, 
led to ignorance of some significant components, and caused problems for relations 
between the State and Alevis. 
 
 As a general perspective that has been accepted by many other scholars, 
Faruk Bilici claims that, Alevism is not a religion itself; instead, it is a way of life 
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that has been composed by various religions.126 As it was mentioned, the purpose of 
this thesis is not to define what Alevism is; however, it is undeniable that, Alevism 
has its distinctive components from different religions; hence, it is a synthesis, a 
syncretic belief system, even further it is a particular philosophy, a belief, a moral 
code, a culture, a doctrine and most importantly a social fact, which puts human in 
its center, with specialty to Anatolia. Therefore, denials of its distinctive 
characteristic or considerations of Alevis as unbelievers or identical to Sunni 
Muslims caused many problems, and the way that state intended to solve these 
problems has been considered as a part of assimilation process.  
 
4.2. Alevis in the Republic of Turkey 
 
 Existence of Alevism goes back until the late 11th century in Anatolia; 
however, its current form had not been composed in that time. Since then, Alevis 
have lived under different states’ rules, and were affected by different cultures, and 
now, they form considerable part of population of the Republic of Turkey.  
 
 Before the establishment of the Republic, Alevis had unstable period under 
the Seljuk and Ottoman empires. In fact, during the first decades of the Ottoman 
Empire, the religion was not affected from the Sunni Islam like in the late 15th and 
16th centuries; so that, Alevism-Sunnism was not a considerable dualism among 
society. As contrary, the first sultans of the Ottoman Empire were in a good 
relationship with lodges of Bektashi order, as it was mentioned in previous part. 
Furthermore, the Janissary system helped Bektashis to gain more power, especially 
in political order, with significant success in wartime. Until disband of the Janissary 
system in the early 19th century, Bektashi influence was considerable in the Empire. 
However, Selim I and the Battle of Chaldiran against Safavid Empire in 16th century 
has been mentioned as the first “mass targeted attack” to Alevis, because of Selim 
I`s “massacre” to Kızılbaş people on his way back to the capital after the battle.127 
                                                
126 Faruk Bilici. “The Function of Alevi-Bektashi Theology in Modern Turkey” in Alevi Identity: 
Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives, eds. Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Ozdalga and Catharina 
Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), 52. 
127 Ugraş Ulaş Tol. “Ayrımcılık ve Alevilik,” in Aleviler Ayrımcılık ve İnsan Hakları, ed. Cahit 
Korkmaz (Ankara: Akademi Matbaası, 2007), 43. 
 
188 
 Battle of Chaldiran brought about a new era for Alevis, due to their support 
to Shah Ismail of Safavid Empire against Ottoman rule. Kızılbaş people, supported 
the Safavid Dynasty against the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as a hostility 
against Islam by heretics that should be eliminated, due to their religious 
compatibility to the Safavid Empire.128 That support of Kızılbaş people to Safavid 
Empire caused usage of pejorative names, which were to become like synonymous 
with Kızılbaş witin time. While the Islamization of the Ottoman Empire, or better to 
say Sunni Islamization of Empire under significant effect of Arabic culture was 
deepened in state level, Kızılbaş people were discriminated from the society. This 
clash between two parts of Anatolian people, between Sunnis and Alevis (in this 
time, Kızılbaş people) increased. Kutluay Erdoğan argues that it has been the first 
division due to religious propaganda in Anatolian history.129 
 
 The state authority started to inspect the Kızılbaş people, since they revolted 
against the Ottoman Empire as a result of their oppositional attitude within religious 
perspective during the Battle of Chaldiran.130 Consequently, inspection of state 
authority brought about isolation of Kızılbaş people from society and made them 
close communities within territorial limit of their villages or towns. Besides, with 
respect to their egalitarian social structure, their co-attendance of both women and 
men at different occasions, such as ceremonies, rituals and social life, were found 
odd and inappropriate by Sunni people. That was the time that pejorative discourses 
started to be spread among society about them. In addition to all these, their isolated 
life caused curiosity and helped to strengthen mentioned pejorative discourses. For 
instance, their cem ceremonies became a significant tool to insult them. “Candles 
off” (mum söndü) has been the mostly used sentence for the intention of said 
insulting approach.131 As Kızılbaş people were isolated in their villages and were 
being inspected by state authority, they used to actualize their cem ceremonies with 
help of watchmen, who were in duty at the entrances of their villages. These 
watchmen were responsible for warning people performing cem, for any probable 
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attack coming from state authority or neighbour villages. Hence, after a warning of 
watchmen regarding a probable danger, they used to turn the lights (candles) off in 
order to hide, and, that became the reason that they were insulted for. As they attend 
to cem regardless of gender difference, they were accused of incest, which started to 
be carried out after the candles went off.132 Mélikoff, on the other hand, interpreted 
“candless off” with a different perspective, in which she commented that cem started 
with 12 candles with respect to Twelvers and during ceremony they sacrificed a 
cock. That means, as it was commented by outsiders, first the cock was sacrified, 
then the candles went off and eventually the revel (alem) started.133 
 
 Pejorative discourses were carried to juridical level with fetwas of Ottoman 
judges (kadı) after the 16th century. Most specifically, the fetwas of Seyh-ul Islam 
Ebussuud (1490-1574) regarding the Kızılbaş people show that they were pointed 
out as “the ones who deserve the most severe imprisonment and punishment”.134 
With these fetwas, he also declared that,  
 
“The assets and the lives of Kızılbaş people are legitimate (helal) to take away.”; 
“Mass murders of Kızılbaş people are both legitimate and considerable jihads for the 
sake of Islam. One who dies in a war against a Kızılbaş, will be rewarded with the 
most valuable level of martyrdom.”; 
“Slaughter of a Kızılbaş is more considerable than slaughters of other unbelievers.”; 
“Kızılbaş women are allowed to be raped, as soldiers of Islam will be strengthened 
with abusal of religious enemies (this is to mention Kızılbaş people).”135  
 
These social and juridical approaches against Kızılbaş people deepened the 
desire to hide from state authority and closed them to their villages until the 20th 
century, most specifically after the second half of it. Due to mentioned juridical 
unjust implementations, dedes started to be in charge of basic juridical issues, which 
were and still are carried out in first parts of cem ceremonies, as it was mentioned 
above. Additionally, İbrahim Bahadır argues that these social and juridical 
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constraints caused Alevis to escape from Anatolia to Dobruja and Albania with 
respect to the information collected in Ottoman assessment records.136 
 
 Pejorative discourses, unjust fetwas against Alevis, curiosity to their way of 
ritualistic and social lives had started in Ottoman era, and they still are the issues 
regarding Alevism in the laic Republic of Turkey. Within this part, from the War of 
Independence, until present day, the relation between Alevis, Sunni majority and 
state authorities will be examined, and the problems will be analyzed with different 
perspectives of listed parties in order to see reasons and outcomes of distinctive 
interpretations regarding Alevism. 
 
4.2.1. Early Republic Era 
 
 The very first decades of the 20th century witnessed the abolishment of the 
Ottoman Empire, which was down after the World War I, and the establishment of 
the Republic of Turkey. Within this process, as other populations of Anatolia, Alevis 
played a significant role and supported the movement of M.K. Atatürk. 
 
When the movement of Anatolia for independence started, there was neither 
a privilege for, nor dominance of any religious system; instead, majority of the 
Anatolian population with different religious bases including Alevi and Sunni orders 
(Mevlevi and Naqshbandi) supported.137 However, in order to provide significant 
mobilization of different parts of society against hostile forces, personal endeavors 
came into prominence. For that intention, Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge was a pivotal 
point to obtain entire support of Alevis of Anatolia. Therefore, M.K. Atatürk’s 
intention to have support of Alevis started with his meeting with Cemalettin Çelebi 
then postnişin (religious leader) of Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge and was to be 
selected as a member of parliament from Kırşehir, a central Anatolian city, which 
used to include Soluca Kara Höyük,138 in 1920 for the first Assembly. The Dervish 
Lodge was a significant point to attract the attention of Alevis; hence, with respect 
to an order of M.K. Atatürk, in June 1919, representatives of movement contacted 
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with Cemalettin Çelebi in order to convince him to support the movement with 
every single Alevi village.139 Although the form of visit varies from one to another, 
there are many scholars quoted the connection between the Dervish Lodge and 
representatives got deepened with M.K. Atatürk`s personal visit to Hacıbektaş in 
December 1919.140 As a result of this visit, Cemalettin Çelebi mediated between 
Alevi people and the movement, hence he traveled to different Alevi villages to 
mobilize Alevis.  
 
Alevis’ support cannot be considered as a surprise; because, first of all, it 
was a national struggle against hostile forces. Secondly, within time, it turned into a 
struggle against the Ottoman Empire, which used to be governed by Caliph and had 
an official Sunni Islamic identity that formed significant oppression over Alevis for 
four centuries. However, according to different scholars, there were some other 
reasons that brought about the entire support of Alevis to Ankara movement. For 
instance, Cemal Şener stated that Alevis considered Mustafa Kemal as one of them, 
due to his Turkmen race,141 during his interview with Sabah Daily Newspaper.142 On 
the other hand, there was a creed based on Mustafa Kemal’s personality, who was 
believed as Mehdi, the savior sent to help Alevis in order to end their sufferings 
from the Ottoman Empire.143 According to Cemal Bardakçı, Cemalettin Çelebi was 
the one, who had spread that idea based on Turkishness of Bektashi order/Alevism, 
which protected Turkish customs and language against dominant Arab culture.144 
Briefly, for various reasons, Alevis mobilized around the Kemalist movement that 
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aimed to form a modern and, more importantly for Alevi point of view, laic state 
structure. 
 
Laicism, as it was mentioned in previous chapters, has not meant simply a 
formal separation between religious and political authority and institutions; instead, 
a positivist state ideology to engineer a homogeneous and stratified society.145 
However, the separation is difficult to apply to Sunni Muslim societies due to the 
lack of established institutions of religion.146 Islam, as a result of its own structure, is 
more political than the other two other religions. Hence, it does not separate state 
and religion; it seeks to regulate public life with its own conception of the law and 
provides an alternative sense of loyalty, identity and community. The characteristic 
of Turkish laicism was to take the absolute control of Islam; as aforementioned, 
instead of a separation between all religious and political affairs. The 
institutionalization of laicism included bringing all religious activities under direct 
control of the laic state.147 Besides, it was linked with democracy within Turkish 
interpretation. Laicism became the basis of democracy; consequently, any anti-laic 
political force was considered as non-democratic.148 
 
For the sacralization term, there was another idea that was argued by 
Dankwart Alexander Rustow. As it was quoted by Azak, he mentioned that the 
charismatic figure of M.K. Atatürk filled the lack of emotional gap resulted with the 
surrender of the Muslim heritage.149 In fact, that could not be considered as 
surprising, due to social structure of the former Ottoman Empire, in which the 
Sultan was the Caliph and, most saliently, the shadow of the God;150 consequently, 
the Sultan was a holy figure for his subjects. Even though, M.K. Atatürk intended to 
suppress this sacred loyalty, it just shifted into a different form, from loyalty to the 
shadow of the God, to a man who leaded the society with his charismatic figure. As 
an “instant” change cannot suit with any society, the said outcome can be considered 
as a simple fact. As it was mentioned, M.K. Atatürk was considered as a sacred 
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personality by Alevis, as well. These two explanations demonstrate that the entire 
society, traditionally, made their references with a religious point of view.  
 
The establishment of a new state was a hope for Alevis, as they believed in 
relief from the Ottoman Empire and its Sunni Islamic characteristic. Hence, they 
supported the Kemalist implementations as they had supported the movement. A 
laic state was seemed to be the best guarantor for recognition of their distinctive 
religious identity. In fact, many implementations suited well with their culture. 
 
New implementations were not only to laicize the newborn republic, but also 
to escape from dominance of Arabic culture, as it was mentioned in related chapter. 
That was a significant point for Alevis, who have defined themselves as a resistance 
movement against the dominance of Arabic Sunni culture. Within this interpretation, 
encourage for unveiling of women; given equality to women and men in social, 
political and business life; closure of Islamic seminaries; gradual liberalization of 
education from religion; new Civil Code; abolishment of Sharia courts; 
Turkification of rituals, such as calls for prayer, translation of Quran from Arabic; 
and new alphabet different from Arabic one became the implementations that 
attracted attention of Alevis. The most salient one was, obviously, the constitutional 
guarantee of laicism, which was carried out with a change in Second Article, in 1937, 
stating that the Republic of Turkey was a laic state. All listed implementations were 
in perfect coherency with Alevism, regarding its secular-leaning, progressive and 
egalitarian structure. The sovereignty was taken from God and handed over to 
individuals. As it was mentioned, human is in the centre in Alevism; therefore, 
he/she should be source of sovereignty. Within this perspective, it was not surprising 
that Alevis welcomed and supported the entire movement. Even further, with respect 
to these changes, Gökalp, whose Bektashi identity was already mentioned, argued 
abolishment of Bektashi order, as the Republic had already accomplished what 
Bektashis had supported with their strong confidence in Turkishness.151  
 
Listed implementations were in favor with cultural values of Alevis; 
however, the newborn laic state intended to fulfill the religious necessities of Sunni 
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Muslims, and left Alevis aside with no official intention to end social and religious 
oppression. Within this perspective, there were two significant implementations, 
which caused disappointment among Alevis: the opening of DİB (1924), and the 
closure of dervish lodges (1925). 
 
Abolishment of Caliphate was a significant step for the laicization progress 
of newborn republic. In addition to that, it brought about considerable hope among 
Alevis to end political and social dominance of Sunni Islamic culture; however, 
opening of DİB was seen as a new threat for continuation of mentioned cultural 
dominance among religious issues. Besides, DİB, as it is a religious institution under 
the control of government, could not be acceptable within a laic state within the 
perspective of Alevis, and they took DİB into account as institutionalization of 
political intervention of state into religious order. 152  The founder article was 
expanded within time according to governments’ political leanings, and it became 
the target of discussions regarding not only Alevism-Sunnism, but also entire 
religious diversity of Turkey. Besides, it was seen as the pivotal institute of official 
assimilation of Alevis, with references to DİB’s Sunni Islamic structure and 
changed responsibilities within time. The interviewees commented on this issue as 
following: 
 
Geçmez: “The advanced democracy is being obstacled. There will be no certain 
success, unless the DİB is closed. The constitution talks about laicism, but there is the 
DİB. It is under the control of Sunnis.”153 
 
Mustafa Şen: “There is a significant assimilation policy targeting Alevis, even 
stronger during republic. The DİB is significantly effective on this policy.”154 
 
Tamer Kaya: “We strongly criticize DİB, but we cannot say that it should be 
demolished. We are not that powerful.”155 
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Ahmet Özuğurlu: “I think that the DİB should also be demolished. The DİB goes and 
evey sect will have its own foundation. Meantime the control mechanism will 
function. It should be so. Because the most important thing is the sake of state. I 
should clarify that, the control mechanism should not be carried out by governments, 
but the state itself.”156 
 
 As it has been pointed out by different people, the DİB has not been an 
institute that welcomed by Alevis. On the other hand, the critics cannot be 
associated just with Alevis, as there are many people criticizing its functionality, its 
budget and its increasing importance among society. 
 
In 1925, another implementation was put into force, which is still being 
discussed with its outcomes whether they targeted Alevis or not. With the new 
implementation, Law Number 677,157 dervish lodges and shrines were closed and 
religious titles, such as dede, çelebi, baba, derviş, mürit, which were (and, 
unofficially, still are) used in Alevi communities, were prohibited. That caused 
dedes to be disqualified from leading their community and cemevis to be closed. 
During the republic, cemevis found places for themselves; however, their legal status 
is either a cultural center or a foundation. With other minor legal obstacles, Law 
N.677 became the main reason to exclude cemevis from being a worship place. 
 
In 1826, Mahmud II abolished the Janissary System, and handed Bektashi 
lodges and all their assets to Naqshbandi order, as it was mentioned in previous 
chapter. Hence, according to some scholars, Law Number 677 of 1925 did not take 
Alevis or their lodges as target, as they had already been closed in 1826. For 
instance, Melikoff referred an article of Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper written by 
Haluk Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, in which many important Bektashi dervish lodges (Hacı 
Bektaş Dervish Lodge, Seyyid Baba, Mürsel Baba, Şah Kulu Sultan, Şehitler, 
Çamlıca tekkes, and Nafi Baba, Karaağaç and Karyağdı dergahs) were recorded as 
Naqshbandi assets. Hence, according to Melikoff, the closure of listed dervish 
lodges were not an outcome of Law N. 677.158 Additionally, same issue was 
discussed recently in a TV Programme, and Cemal Canpolat stated that the Law 
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N.677 did not pointed out cemevis; so that, it cannot be considered as an obstacle 
regarding decisions of cemevi’s legal status.159 On contrary, Bahadır stated that Abdi 
Bey Dervish Lodge, which was functioning for Bektashi order, was closed in 1925, 
after acceptance of mentioned law, and it was demolished step by step.160  
 
Law N.677 was not only about Alevism, but also about all Islamic orders, 
such as Naqshbandi and Mevlevi orders, with respect to its content. Although, the 
outcome, directly or indirectly, had negatively affected Alevis, according to a 
considerable part of Alevi population, it was seen as a change developed within a 
modern state perspective.161 However, there is one point that should be underlined. 
According to the Law, Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge and central lodge of Mevlevi 
order in Konya (Shrine of Mevlana) were both closed. Nevertheless, within a short 
time, Shrine of Mevlana transformed into a museum and opened for visit in 1927,162 
while Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge was maintained closed until 1964, when it was 
transformed into a museum and opened for public visits.163 That was the point that 
state favored Sunni based Mevlevism between two equal religious orders; in other 
words, official intention was not to Turkify Islam for the sake of cultural similarities 
with Bektashi order/Alevism as it was pointed out by Ziya Gökalp. Instead, it would 
not be wrong to claim that it was the Turkification of Sunnism with Turkish calls for 
prayer and Turkish Quran and with the favored state approach.  
 
The Law N.677 was mentioned as the basic obstacle among other minor ones 
for recognition of cemevis as a place of worship of Alevis. Regarding the minor 
obstacles, common necessity of people should be examined with its official 
explanation in different articles. As Islam has always been understood as Sunni 
Islam in Turkey, Islamic place of worship has been mentioned as mosque. Hence for 
the common necessities of people, mosques were pointed out for fulfillment of 
places of worship. That was the point that all people, regardless of diversity, were 
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underlined as the ones who were in need of a mosque to practice. For instance, 
according to the Article 2 of Village Law N.442 accepted in 1924,  
 
“Common properties, such as mosque, school, pasture, mountain pasture, 
coppice, and people, who live within a group or separated houses, with their 
vineyards, orchards and fields form a village.”  
 
and Article 91 of same law, 
 
“The headman of village, who does not keep a copy of present law in 
village room and another copy in mosque and/or in school, will be punished with 
five lira penalty with the order of local administrator (kaymakam).” 
 
mosques were mentioned as one of the basic necessities of a village. In fact, it was 
not surprising for the year 1924, when Islam was the official religion of the Republic 
of Turkey. However, mentioned laws are still in use, and the issue that has been and 
still is being discussed was the word mosque that state used to constitute a 
settlement. Instead of mosque, place of worship may serve for the same purpose in 
order to mention the place, where religious necessities are fulfilled regardless of 
difference. This issue will be discussed with its details, while Alevi Workshops are 
examined. 
 
Political, educational and social orders were cleaned from Arab-dominated 
cultural components with implementations of newborn state; however, there was not 
a specific legal regulation, which would lead to recognition of Islamic variety 
including Alevism. Apart from distinguishment of mosque as a basic necessity of 
the smallest settlements regardless of any diversity, in the censuses of 1927 and 
1935, Islamic faith was considered as one religion.164  
 
 In 1928, mentioning Islam as the religion of the state was removed from the 
Second Article of Constitution, and in 1937, same article was revised, and laicism 
was taken under constitutional guarantee of state. That was the ultimate point that 
                                                
164 For more information about religious minorities on the censuses, see Cagaptay, Islam, Secularism, 
66-69. 
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Alevis’ support to Kemalist implementations achieved. Although, there were 
unfavorable implementations caused disappointment as listed above, addition of 
laicism into the constitution was deepened their trust and support to the movement, 
as it perfectly suited with their credence in laicism. Muzaffer Karan, who would be a 
member of parliament in 1960s, was to mention Alevism as following for a survey 
regarding Alevism in Cem, which was a journal published by Alevis. 
 
“Alevism is a social organization and a progressivist social outlook, which 
is based on the principles of nationalism, populism, statism, reformism and 
secularism; in short, it was Ataturkism itself.” 165 
 
The new implementations and the new state order were welcomed by 
majority of Turkish society; however, some revolts, which were in favor of Islamic-
based Ottoman culture, occurred in the meantime. Dersim Rebellion of Kurdish 
Alevis took place in 1937-1938 in Dersim (Tunceli), an eastern Anatolian city, 
which is majorly populated by Kurdish Alevis. 166  According to Martin van 
Bruinessen, Dersim always had complex relations with governments, as tribal 
Kurdish families had never accepted the laws entirely. Due to existence of their 
tribal laws regardless of state laws, they used to refuse to pay taxes to the central 
government, which used to form the basis of disagreement.167 Due to previous 
rebellions, starting from 1936, military control was increased with a special law 
accepted the TBMM,168 and under this pression, Seyyid Rıza, a religious leader of 
the town, started to call for an uprising against infrastructure constructions being 
built in the meantime. According to his call, state built bridges and other 
constructions were to take away sheiks’ and large landowners’ authorities on the 
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region and to destroy tribal tradition.169 The rebellion started with the burnt of a 
bridge on 21 March 1937.170 However, there are different perspectives regarding the 
reason. On contrary to aforementioned one, Abidin Özgünay was to mention that the 
Dersim Rebellion was not as a revolt against state authority; instead, it was a 
defense of honor of Alevi people due to gendarmerie’s abusal attitudes to Alevi 
women.171 With increased tension, troops surrendered the city, and as stated by 
Bruinessen, during the rebellion, almost 10 percent of entire population of Dersim 
was killed and this ratio has been expressed even higher than that by Kurds.172 
 
Dedes were officially disqualified from being religious leaders of their 
communities, they became mediators between their communities and the state 
during the Dersim Rebellion, and they sided with the state.173 Dersim Rebellion has 
always been discussed if it was a Kurdish or Alevi revolt. It was generally 
mentioned as a Kurdish revolt, as it had not any religious reference, and was carried 
out by Kurdish tribes due to power issues.174 Besides, this revolt, which was carried 
out in the time of M.K. Atatürk’s presidency, did not bring about any hostility to 
him as mentioned by Hüsniye Takmaz, the Chairwoman of Federation of Alevi 
Foundations (Alevi Dernekleri Federasyonu). Alevis maintained their support to laic 
modern state.175 Murtaza Demir, the Founder Chairman of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural 
Foundation, mentions two significant periods, in which Alevis were not under 
oppression. The first one is the aforementioned early Ottoman period between 1299-
1450, started with Osman I lasted with Mehmed II., and the second one is the early 
republican period between 1923-1950.176  
 
 Alevis, both Kızılbaş people and Bektashis were in favor with the new 
implementations, and mentioned the period starting with republic until the end of 
single party rule as period of peace; however, as they were restricted within religious 
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perspective, they maintained in their rural settlements and lived their Alevi culture 
within secrecy. This secrecy was identical for both Kızılbaş people and Bektashis, as 
Melikoff stated. She mentioned the year 1925, when dervish lodges and shrines 
were closed with Law N.677, was the time that Bektashis, who were still in action -
semi-officially- after 1826, were drawn back to exact secrecy.177 
 
 After the death of M.K. Atatürk, progressivist implementations were carried 
out, as well. Among them, establishment of Village Institutes was a significant step 
based in rural settlements in order to achieve entire development within different 
orders of life, such as agriculture, literature, education and so on. Village Institutes 
with their progressivist, enlightened and laic structure were welcomed by Alevis as 
representatives of development. Today, they are still being commemorated with 
respect and yearning by many different Alevi Foundations, due to listed 
characteristics of institutes.178 Within this perspective, personal endeavors of Hasan 
Ali Yücel and İsmail Hakkı Tonguç to escape from Arab-dominated culture in 
educational order with translations and shift of foreign languages, to support laicism 
in education, and to support humanism and science were also respected by Alevis, as 
it is visible in programmes of mentioned commemoration ceremonies. 
 
 1950, as it was mentioned as the end of peace period, was a significant year 
for Alevis regarding the relations between Alevis and the state authorities. In 1950, a 
new era started with 1950 Elections, in which religious implementations became a 
political tool both in elections and anterior propagandas. 
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4.2.2. Urbanization in Democracy: Neighborliness of Alevis and Sunnis 
 
 1950 Elections was a significant point of Turkish political history, as it was 
already discussed earlier. However, taking only 1950 Elections and its aftermath into 
account would not be correct, as its anterior witnessed considerable changes.  
 
 Laicization period, which also included an escape from Arab-dominated 
cultural components, was welcomed by majority of people; however, there were 
negative reactions, as well. The establishment of DP was an outcome of that 
unsupportive reaction against CHP’s implementations. Meantime, it was a 
prerequisite for a real democracy, in which people from different ideologies might 
be represented in the assembly. In previous chapter, a part dedicated to CHP’s 
implementations between 1946, when DP entered into the Assembly, and 1950, 
when DP established its government, it was a period of “soft laicism”. Within that 
part, CHP’s initiatives targeting conservative side of society were discussed with its 
details and outcomes. While CHP intended to gain votes of conservative side of 
society in order to cut the support to DP for the following elections, it caused 
religious awakening. The support that CHP obtained from conservatives as a result 
of soft laicism was not a considerable success for itself, with respect to the election 
results; however, said religious awakening led DP to form the government with 
usage of religion as a political tool, as it might be seen in its implementations. 
 
 CHP’s implementations between 1946-1950 were criticized strongly as it 
was undermining the Kemalist reforms. These critics were already mentioned; 
however, it is important to distinguish that Alevis were a side of these critics. As 
they supported Kemalist reforms, they were against backward steps. Within this 
perspective, religious instructions, although they were optional, courses for 
preachers and prayer leaders, shifts regarding educational structure of Village 
Institutes and opening of theology faculty in Ankara were considered as unfavorable 
by Alevis.179 Eventually, displeasure among Alevis led them to support DP against 
CHP in 1950 elections.180 
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 It would not be wrong to claim that Alevi votes played decisive role on DP’s 
victory in 1950 Elections due to its democratic-leaning propagandas before the 
elections. However, DP Government could not be sufficient to respond all 
democratic needs of different parts of society, including Alevis; instead, DP’s 
implementations aimed the necessities of Sunni-Islamic side of society. 
 
 Within a month of establishment of DP Government, the language of calls 
for prayers was re-shifted into Arabic. This implementation of DP was responded 
with significant pleasure by conservative part of the society, as it was discussed 
earlier. However, it was not suited with what Alevis expected as a response to their 
support during the elections. Besides, Quran recitals as auspicious success, and DP 
members` discourses with significant references to Islamic identity to the Republic 
of Turkey were the implementations that excluded Alevism and favored Sunni 
Islam.181 
 
Since the Ottoman Empire was abolished, many implementations were 
carried out, and newborn state was Westernized, which meant to be modernized as it 
was mentioned, and laicized. However, Islamic references, which were pointing out 
the superiority of Sunni Islam could not be swept away; therefore, egalitarian 
approach regarding religious identity could not been embraced by all parts of society, 
as it could not achieve to a sustainable success in political order. For instance, Edip -
the publisher of Sebilürreşad- had supported Islamic thought against any reformist 
implementations; hence, considerably respected by Islamist intellectuals, pointed out 
Alevis as below regarding the national unity issue during the period of transition to 
multiparty government. 
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“These miserable wretches constitute the most ignorant, the most credulous 
community in Anatolia. Beliefs incompatible with reason, culture or even humanity 
have reduced these unfortunates to the level of animals.” 
[…] 
“Wouldn't it be more reasonable to achieve unity between Sunnis and 
Alevis by raising them to our own level rather than lowering ourselves to theirs.”182  
 
These discourses can be considered as a proof of continuous insulting 
approach to Alevis that was significantly effective since 15th century under 
Ottoman flag. Besides, as the second phrase underlines raising Alevism to the 
superior level of Sunni Islam, that can be considered as a reference to 
assimilation of Alevis and insistence on Sunnifying them. Alevis mention that 
they have been faced with assimilation, which was to be considered as a state 
policy after 1980s, in many different ways.  
 
Period of DP became significant disappointment for supporters of laic 
republican identity due to re-definition of laicism with favor of Sunni Islam, 
consequent implementations with respect to superiority of Sunni Islam and Islamic 
discourses of party members. As Alevis have been significant supporters of laicism, 
their support to DP lasted short because of the listed reasons.  
 
Islamic implementations in educational order were started to be discussed 
with CHP’s soft laicism period; however, with DP government, religion gained 
significant importance in different levels of education with various regulations 
applied step by step. As religious education has been a serious issue, which is being 
discussed by not only Alevis, but also considerable part of the society supporting 
laic republican approach, it will be useful to examine the origin and the history of 
implementations in different levels of education. Therefore, chronological order of 
regulations of DP Government regarding religion in educational order will be given 
as a list,183 which is: 
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- in 1950, primary school teachers were obliged to give lectures of religion; lectures 
of religion for curriculum of fourth and fifth grade of primary school were approved 
by Government; students, who did not want to take lectures of religion, were 
allowed to be exempted unless their parents applied with a petition to the school 
administration; and DİB published a report regarding religious education, which 
played significant role on opening of Imam-Hatip schools; 
- in 1951, courses for preachers and prayer leaders turned into Imam-Hatip schools 
in level of secondary schools for four years in seven cities; and religious education 
was applied to Village Institutes’ curriculum; 
- in 1953, Council of National Education agreed on necessity of professional 
teachers educated specifically for lectures of religion; and first and second grades of 
schools of vocational teacher education were obliged to take lectures of religion; 
- in 1954, mentioned second part of Imam-Hatip schools were opened for the level 
of high school education for three years; consequently, total period of Imam-Hatip 
schools were increased to seven years; 
- in 1956, optional lectures of religion were applied to curriculum of first and second 
grades of secondary schools; 
- in 1958, Imam-Hatip schools, which were opened under regulation of 
Administration of Private Schools (Özel Okullar Müdürlüğü), were taken under 
regulation of General Administration of Secondary Schools (Ortaöğretim Genel 
Müdürlüğü); 
and; 
- in 1959, Higher Islamic Institute (Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü) was opened in Istanbul 
in order to educate teachers of lectures of religion.  
 
All listed implementations were responded positively by conservative part of 
the society; however, religious education regarding Sunni Islamic doctrines was not 
welcomed by Alevis, who were excluded from the contents of lecture. Additionally, 
Alevis could not associate these implementations with a laic state. As mentioned, 
regulations were applied by the DP Government step by step, optional classes were 
expanded to different levels of education, then they were turned into obligatory, and 
firstly, courses for preachers and prayer leaders was changed into Imam-Hatip 
schools, then the period was expanded to seven years, and eventually, they were 
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considered as an equivalence of regular secondary schools, as they were both taken 
under regulation of General Administration of Secondary Schools.  
 
Religion in educational order was to become a tool that would change 
regarding the ideology of governments as it was in French history, and within two 
decades after DP Governments, lectures of religion would be a constitutional 
obligation, and would be one of the main targets of discussions with increased 
numbers of Imam-Hatip schools as shown in Chart V: New Opening Imam-Hatip 
Schools (1950-1997) on page 149 among Alevis and other supporters of laic 
republican identity. Within time, graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools would be 
considered as a growing army of reactionaries by supporters of the laic republican 
identity,184 and as dearest of all education system by supporters of conservative 
identity.185 
 
At the end of 1950s, Alevi support turned back to CHP, which was granted 
with Alevi votes as indicators of their loyalties. As the support to DP was ended, 
Alevis strongly supported the 1960 military intervention against DP.186 After the 
intervention, same support was carried out for the new constitution by Alevis. 
 
The Constitution of 1961 has been the most liberalistic constitution of 
Turkish politics. Within this respect, support of Alevis cannot be considered 
surprising. Besides, aforementioned Article 19 was the most valuable part regarding 
the support of both Alevis and entire supporters of laic republican identity.187 Article 
19 was the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience, which was 
considerably important to respond various necessities of different parts of society, as 
it did not point out any superior belief or religion among others.  
 
 Within the political atmosphere based on freedom of thoughts thanks to the 
Constitution of 1961, socialism and communism were spread among Turkish society. 
These ideologies were associated with economic development with the basis of 
                                                
184 Cahit Tanyol, “Aydın Din Adamı Sorunu.” Cem 2 (1966): 10-11, quoted in Azak, Islam and 
Secularism, 167. 
185 “Imam Hatipler milletin gözbebeği olacak.” 
186 Azak, Islam and Secularism, 152; 
     Balkız, Kent Koşullarında, 12. 
187 “DP Dönemi.” 
 
206 
statism, workers’ right, social justice, and rejection of religion-based nationalism, 
which was promoting Islamic Ottoman identity. Within this context, the Kemalist 
principles were reinterpreted as socialism due to similar understandings of populism, 
reformism and statism.188 With respect to the link between Kemalist principles and 
rejection of religion-based nationalism with the Turkish interpretation of socialism 
and communism, Alevis took their side with this ideological trend. 189  The 
connection between Alevism and socialism were deepened with endeavors of 
minstrels (aşık), as they wrote their poems with significant references to socialism in 
order to distinguish the political and economic rights of individuals within socialist 
ideology. This link was strengthened within time; eventually, during the process of 
1980 military intervention, these records were collected due to their inconvenient 
(sakıncalı) content.190 Additionally, with the annual festivals starting to be organized 
after 1966 in Hacıbektaş, Hacı Bektaş became more than a religious leader and 
started to be defined as a socialist revolutionary thinker with respect to his humanist 
and egalitarian approach.191 
 
Kemalist reforms took modernity into account not only as laicism and 
Westernization, but also as an escape from Arab-dominated cultural components, 
which was not a reflection of real Turkish culture, as it was mentioned. With DP 
governments, real Turkishness was connected with Islam, which was considered as 
the basic component of Turkish culture. Hence, as Islam found its principal basis 
within Arab culture, Arabization, due to its relevance to Islam, was promoted, 
especially in philological order. That brought about significant dichotomy regarding 
real Turkishness. According to DP, real Turks were the Muslims, who accomplished 
the practices of Sunni Islamic doctrine. On the other hand, there were significant 
references to Alevism, which protected Turkic culture against Arab domination 
during Islamization of Anatolia. With the discussions of socialism, humanism, and 
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laicism related with characteristics of Alevism, Alevis defined themselves and were 
defined by entire laicism supporters as the protectors of laicism and modern 
Republic of Turkey. This is what Şen pointed out as the reason that a laic Sunni 
feels herself/himself close to Alevism. He argued; 
 
“There is not much difference between Sunni people supporting laicism and Alevis. 
Many of Sunnis supporting laicism feel themselves closer to Alevism. Its egalitarian 
structure regarding the gender, Turkish worships, Turkish poems etc. are significant 
components attracting the attention of Sunnis supporting laicism. 
On significant points, it goes beyond theology and reaches to political differences. 
For instance, you cannot find many differences between an Alevi and a Sunni 
supporting left-wing politics. Yes, in recent history, left-wing politics has gained 
dominance in Alevism.”192 
 
1950s and 1960s possess importance not only regarding changed political 
balances for Alevis, but also regarding sociological changes. As it has been 
mentioned many times, Alevis settled in rural areas due to security issues since 
Seljuk and Ottoman empires, and they managed to maintain their situation until 
1950s. They were economically, sociologically and politically (relatively) 
homogeneous groups under the conditions of rural life until then.193 During this time, 
they used to have their own religion-based hierarchical order in their life; 
accordingly, they formed their own communities. These homogeneous and 
hierarchically ordered communities used to perform their rituals with the 
guardianship of watchmen in their villages, due to being under control by 
gendarmerie.194  
 
With the time of Menderes after 1950, mechanization process for agriculture 
started, and it brought about unemployment in rural areas. Consequently, this 
process led to domestic immigration flows from villages to cities within a decade. 
1960s became the period that Alevis urbanized and settled in city centers due to 
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increasing unemployment.195  Immigration flows caused significant changes for 
Alevism. Due to prejudgments, Alevis could not demonstrate themselves with their 
Alevi identity in the social life. They hid their Alevism within their urban life; 
however, they intended to maintain their identity with differentiation of districts196 
among Sunni and Alevi communities and villager associations or cultural 
foundations that they founded. 197  For instance, in 1961, The Foundation for 
Touristic Beautification of Hacibektas (Hacıbektaş’ı Turistik Bakımdan 
Güzelleştirme Derneği) in Hacıbektaş; in 1962 Hacibektas Cultural, Development 
and Aid Foundation (Hacıbektaş Kültür, Kalkınma ve Yardım Derneği) and a year 
after Hacibektas Tourism and Promotion Foundation (Hacıbektaş Turizm ve 
Tanıtma Derneği) in Ankara; and in Istanbul, Hacibektas Cultural Foundation 
(Hacıbektaş Kültür Derneği) were established.198 Within this secrecy, not only in 
our personal interviews, but also in many inquiries, Alevis have mentioned that they 
used to woke up early in the morning during the month of Ramadan for the special 
meal before dawn (sahur) as if they were fasting in order to hide their Alevism from 
their Sunni neighbours, as they started to be excluded from the society when their 
identity was coming out due to their non attendance to special Friday prayers.199  
 
Among all changes of decade, the most significant one was the interaction 
between Sunnis and Alevis, who started to share same settlements and became 
neighbours. As a consequence of increased Alevi visibility in public sphere and 
newly-emerged institutionalization, considerable curiosity regarding Alevism 
occurred in social life among Sunni majority. Additionally, disengagement of Alevi 
communities due to immigration to urban areas weakened practibility of Alevi 
practices. As communities possess significant importance in Alevism, immigration 
caused to spread the members of these communities to different parts of the country; 
hence, communities were broke up. Dedes were separated from their communities. 
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Moreover, companions were broke up. The secrecy was vanished for the 
performance of rituals.200 As mentioned by Balkız, they became unprotected due to 
the lack of their traditional communal structure.201 However, despite the changed 
structure of Alevi communities, they have been able to maintain the basics of their 
belief system under different conditions. They managed to perform their rituals; 
because, according to the Alevi perspective, Alevism is not only a set of belief, but 
also a way of life.202 As Geçmez distinguished, Alevis accept the whole life as a 
religious practice; therefore, there was not a possibility for them to leave their 
practices due to changed conditions.203 While they endeavored to maintain their 
Alevi identity, they demonstrated significant effort at adaptation to modern vision of 
city centers in order to save Alevism from dissolution.204 
 
In 1966, the first magazine dedicated to Alevism was published with the 
name of “Cem” in order to distinguish the problems of Alevis. In various issues of 
Cem, Alevis were defined as defenders of progressivism, equality, and civilization; 
fellow followers of Kemalist principles that provided a state where Alevis could live 
according to their own lifestyle; people ready to serve M.K. Atatürk’s Turkey with 
enlightened Sunnis; and people capable to adapt themselves to the necessities of 
time due to liberal understanding of Alevism.205 Among all, the last definition was a 
significant reference to Sunni based Islamic sects, such as Nurculuk and Naqshbandi 
orders that put Arab culture in a superior position, supported by the DP governments 
in 1950s and AP in 1960s, as mentioned in previous chapter. In the same magazine, 
one of the writers pointed out the the Good and Evil, in which M.K. Atatürk was 
defined as an incarnation of Good with his reforms and principles that led Turkey in 
an enlightenment process. However, within the same interpretation, the end of 
enlightenment was associated with DP governments due to its official popularization 
of and support for Nurculuk that kept on in 1960s with AP government.206 With this 
reference, Alevism started to be discussed, once again, as a component of real 
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Turkish identity with its national and enlightened characteristic as contrary to 
reactionary Islam, which was associated with and represented by Nurculuk in 
political scenes during 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, Alevism was defined within 
different perspectives either a religion, a sect or a union that was composed by Turks, 
who loved Ali and protected Turkishness from Arab-dominated Sunni culture.207  
 
In the same year, another weekly newspaper named as ‘Ehl-i Beyt’ was 
started to be published. Ehl-I Beyt and Cem had significant differences based on 
critics and references. Cem and its writers are more Turkic-center regarding the 
Alevism, while Ehl-i Beyt significantly pointed out the diversity regarding Alevi 
people, such as Kurdish origin and Turkish origin. On the other hand, Cem has 
supported equal representation on DİB, instead of a revision or a total abolishment, 
as another difference from Ehl-i Beyt.208  
 
Urbanization of Alevis, their considerable visibility and their neighbourliness 
with Sunnis not only caused curiosity for the other, but also started an era of clashes 
between these two sides. In 1966, two villages, one populated by Sunnis and the 
other by Alevis, in Ortaca/Muğla, a south-western city, had an issue, which was 
interpreted in two different versions: According to then Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel, press and to the government, it was an issue based on land problems not 
related with religious identities. On the other hand, according to Alevi people, it was 
an issue regarding their Alevi identity and it started so since the very beginning.209 
Whatever the reason was, this incident has been recorded as the first of Alevi-Sunni 
clash of the Republic. 
 
The Ortaca Event caused significant mobilization among Alevis from 
different parts of the country. Even the first issue of the Cem can be related with the 
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clash with its aim, which was to point out the problems of Alevis, as it was 
published just a month after the clash started. In addition to the magazine, the liberal 
atmosphere of political scenes led Alevis to form a political party. The Unity Party 
(Birlik Partisi - BP) was established later in the same year.210 Officially, there was 
not any Alevi reference among party members’ speeches; however, the party 
emblem was associated with the lion of Ali with 12 stars related with Twelvers.211 
The Chair of the Party, Hasan Tahsin Berkman, officially declared that the lion was 
a symbol of their desire to gain power and party’s political leaning was based on 
neither left or right wing politics; instead, it was a supporter of Kemalist principles, 
and had its doors open for everyone progressivist and reformist.212  
 
According to some parts of the society, the laic structure of the state was 
under threat, due to the existence of a political party unofficially related with a 
religious identity.213 For some parts of the society, Demirel was effective on the 
decision of establishment of the BP, as he wanted to divide the votes of CHP that it 
would have gained from Alevi population during the elections. Additionally, within 
this perspective, the emblem was reinterpreted as a way to attract the Alevi attention, 
and Berkman was a fellow of Demirel and was a Sunni politician.214 
 
The BP declared its official party programme with the basis of domination of 
Turkish language, necessity of revision for religious education, and the 
representation of Alevis within DİB’s structure.215 In 1969 General Elections, BP 
had eight MPs, and this support was decreased within two elections. In 1973 
General Elections only one MP was elected and, eventually, in 1977, BP could not 
be represented in the Assembly.  
 
BP’s position regarding the representation of Alevism in DİB was 
questionable. The party could not be sufficient to attract the attention of entire 
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Alevis and could not gain sufficient and sustainable support. The rumor concerning 
support of Demirel for the establishment of the party and ideologic diversities had 
played significant role on the lack of entire support. As stated by all the interviewees, 
considerable group of Alevis have not been in favor with the existence of DİB, that 
is to say, the origin of the problem was not the representation.216 However, there 
were some Alevi leaders and intellectuals, who demanded the representation of 
Alevis in DİB.217 (This dichotomy is still an issue that divides Alevis into two 
groups as supporters and opponents.) In 1970, some of the MPs of BP changed their 
party and became members of AP of Demirel, and that was interpreted as a proof of 
both Demirel’s support for the BP and the reason of decreasing trust in the BP.218 In 
1971 the name of the party was changed and became Turkish Unity Party (Türkiye 
Birlik Partisi - TBP); eventually, during the 1980 military intervention, TBP was 
closed as all other political parties. 
 
During the time of discussions of Alevi representation in DİB, its position 
concerning religious identities was questionable. With respect to unofficial 
governmental policies, which were carried out by DP and its successor AP as stated 
in previous chapter, favoring Nurculuk was the trend of DİB, as well.219 In adition to 
being in favor with Nurcu movement, DİB used to make several declarations with 
ignorance of Alevis with its distinctive characteristics. For instance, Alevi funeral 
services were insisted to be carried out with respect to Sunni Islamic rules in order 
to sweep away any dichotomy within religious frame and to abide the rules of Islam. 
These kinds of insistences were considered as a part of Alevi assimilation with 
obliging them to follow Sunni Islamic rules.220 
 
The 1970s witnessed the gradual political polarization of Turkish society, as 
it was mentioned with details in previous chapter. On one side, there was the 
Turkish Islamic Synthesis as a systematically growing conservative nationalist 
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identity and on the other hand, there was the socialist left-leaning ideology 
defending egalitarian, anti-imperialist and non-Islamic national identity. Alevis have 
associated with this left-leaning ideology as it was seen as the only way that 
Alevism might have survived due to the lack of Islamic-nationalist idea`s superiority. 
As Ali Murat İrat argued, instead of a Marxist approach, Turkish left ideology was 
associated with Kemalism and that association played significant role that Alevis 
took their position with favor of this ideology.221  
 
On the other hand, the decade of 1970 was the period that Turkish Islamic 
Synthesis started to be spread as a political-philosophical idea222 in order to unify all 
separated political parties, under the flag of Islamist nationalization. The decade 
faced with a different perspective of laicism, which was affected by Islamic 
implementations, as a fact of increasing Islamic trend. Laicism of Turkey was 
Islamicized during the first years of the decade.223 These two completely different 
terms were unified within the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The synthesis was 
developed by a group of conservative intellectuals within an organization known as 
Hearts of Intellectuals (Aydınlar Ocağı). The Hearts of Intellectuals were established 
on 14 May 1970 and formed as a think-tank center by conservative nationalist 
academics, politicians and businessmen, and during the 1970s it became a political 
movement, which was composed by, so-called, similarities between Islam and pre-
Islamic Turkish culture, herewith Turks were to become linked with Islam as a 
natural fact,224 in order to unify all right-wing ideas of separated political parties (AP, 
MHP, MSP).225 The idea was a synthesis of Kemalist elements, such as Kemalist 
perspective of laicism and nationalism, and Islam. Hence, according to the 
intellectuals of the Hearts, M.K. Atatürk was the most progressive nationalist of the 
Turkish political landscape.226 However, within the nationalist ideology of the 
Hearts, Islam possessed a specific role, and the ideology aimed to create a Sunni-
Muslim identity accompanied by strong Turkish nationalism.227 This ideology was 
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linked with Gökalp’s perspective of Turkishness, which was composed by Turkish 
nationalism and Islam by Yıldız Atasoy.228 
 
 During 1970s, most specifically in the last years of decade, communism was 
seen as a powerful hostile that should be stopped, and like the Menderes period, 
Islam was the only component that could mobilize people against it.229 Within this 
political atmosphere, Sunni Islam was associated with strong nationalism based on 
religious identity and Alevism was linked with socialist ideology. Hence, Alevis 
were the “natural allies” of leftist movement; therefore, “fascist and fundamentalist 
radical rightist groups” provoked significant hatred among conservative Sunnis 
against Alevis, which led to brutal attacks between fascist Sunnis and communist 
Alevis”. 230 
 
The last years of the decade became the period of said brutal attacks and 
bloody struggles between Alevi and Sunni communities. Apart from individual 
incidents, masses had been targeted between 1978 and the 1980 military intervention 
in three different heterogeneously populated cities.  
 
In 1978, Hamit Fendoğlu, then mayor of Malatya (eastern Anatolian city) 
without a political party, a former member of DP, and a former MP of AP, was 
killed with a letter-bomb sent from Ankara with a fake name belongs to his close 
friend on 18 April.231 Within a short time, Sunni communities got armed and 
attacked Alevi districts due to a rumor spread that communists were the 
responsibles; accordingly, they accused Alevis for the assassination of Fendoğlu.232 
As a result of simultaneous attacks in different districts of the city, eight people were 
dead, many were wounded, and many buildings including residential areas and 
shops, specifically the ones belonged to Alevis, were damaged.233 According to 
authorities, there were two major ideas regarding the reasons of incidents chain: it 
                                                
228 Atasoy, Islam’s Mariage, 54. 
229 Kışlalı, Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi, 200. 
230 Bruinessen. “`Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!’”, 16; 
     Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevîlik, 120. 
231 Erhan Akyıldız, “Erhan Akyıldız Malatya’dan Yazıyor,” Milliyet Daily Newspaper, 20 April 1978, 
9. Please see Appendix XV on page 315 for the said page. 
232 Başak İnce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk’s Republic to the Present Day 
(London: I.B. Tauris Co. Ltd., 2012), 131. 
233 Akyıldız, “Erhan Akyıldız Malatya’dan Yazıyor.” 
 
215 
was a clash either between leftist and rightist groups or between religious sects, 
which referred to Alevi and Sunni communities.234 As mentioned earlier in this part, 
even the polarization was based on political ideologies, the parties were clarified: 
leftist Alevis on one side and rightist Sunnis on the other. Therefore, no matter what 
the reason of polarization was, two parties of the clashes were clear, and the 
provocation among them increased the tension, successfully. 235  Besides, the 
involvement of municipality to the incident with announcements based on religious 
references, such as Quran recitals, and the slogans as “Religion is gone!” (Din elden 
gidiyor!), “Bombs are on the mosques, as well!” (Camilere de bomba konuluyor!), 
and “Victory belongs to Islam!” (Zafer İslam’ındır!) with accusation of Alevis, who 
have been assumed to be the enemies of real Islam, demonstrates that the religious 
difference played significant role.236 
 
The Malatya Incident was one of the significant points that the tension 
among political/religious groups was at its utmost ascendency until then. During the 
rest of the year, it could not be decreased. Besides, it was spread to neighborhood, to 
different cities, such as Muş, Elazığ, Erzurum, Iğdır (all, eastern Anatolian cities) 
and Sivas. For instance, during the month of Ramadan, individual attacks were 
carried out against Alevis, in Sivas.237 In December, another bomb was exploded in 
a cinema in Kahramanmaraş (southeastern Anatolian city) on 19 December 1978, 
and “Alevi communists” were pointed out as perpetrators.238 The whole incident, 
which has been called as “massacre”,239 lasted a week between 19-26 December, 
and due to several attacks carried out in various districts majorly populated by 
Alevis, more than 100 people were killed.240 Many buildings belonging to Alevis 
were burned and damaged, which were signed before the bomb to differentiate from 
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the ones belonging to Sunnis; therefore, the Kahramanmaraş Massacres have been 
doubted for being an organized crime.241 The slogans those were used and yelled in 
the streets demonstrate that the Alevis were targeted by provocations. The slogans 
were based on religious solidarity for the Sunnis against Alevis for the sake of Islam, 
as it was in Malatya Incident. For instance, during the special Friday prayer, an 
imam encouraged the community with telling “If a Muslim kills an Alevi, the 
reward will be as equal as five Hajj travels.”242 According to official reports, 1350 
people were involved in Massacre, and 752 were arrested during the first days of the 
events. The cases opened to 804 people lasted 23 years, and 29 were sentenced to 
death; seven people were life-sentenced; seven got 15-24 years, 29 got 10-15 years, 
and 259 got 5-10 years prison sentence. However, eventually, sentence reductions 
were declared for the prisoners except the ones sentenced to death and were life-
sentenced, and the executions were not carried out. 68 people, who were directly 
related with murders, could not be found.243 
 
On the way to the 1980 military intervention, these two mass targeted attacks 
played significant roles, as they were mentioned as two of the reasons. Between the 
month of May and July, another incidents chain was occurred in Çorum (northern 
Anatolian city) between leftist and rightist groups, in other words, Alevis and Sunnis 
starting from 29 May, due to a provocation.244 In fact, the reasons cannot be 
differentiated from the previous mass targeted attacks; slogans were considerably 
similar, as well. During the whole incidents, 57 people, mostly Alevis, were killed, 
more than 200 people were wounded and almost 300 building belonging to Alevis 
for residential or business usage were damaged. After the events, as happened in 
other cities, many Alevis were emigrated from Çorum.245  
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In a study that Banu Eligür carried out, ülkücü gençlik was pointed out as 
armed group of rightist ideology. During the incidents in these three cities, some 
slogans were attracting the attention, which referred as an unofficial link with MHP 
by Eligür. In addition to aforelisted slogans, “Nationalist Turkey!” (Milliyetçi 
Türkiye!), “Chieftain Türkeş!” (Başbuğ Türkeş!), and “Long live Chieftain Türkeş!” 
(Yaşasin Başbuğ Türkeş!) were yelled in Malatya, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum,246 
and party flags of MHP were used as it can be seen on Appendix XVIII on page 319 
Although, Türkeş called for “common sense”, which can be considered as a proof 
for disencouragement of violence, the slogans of rightist groups did not change. 
  
With the 1980 military intervention, leftist ideology was swept away as it 
was considered as a “communist threat”; hence, Alevism became a hidden identity. 
Furthermore, after the 1980 military intervention, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
became an unofficial basis of the new political landscape.247 As a result of the post-
military intervention MGK rule policy, Islamic values were mixed with Turkish 
nationalism, which was an escape from Arabic culture and a part of laicism with 
respect to the M.K. Atatürk`s definition, for the sake of national unity. Briefly, 
Kemalist laic nationalist idea was combined with Islamic values.248 Herewith, the 
government intended to pacify diverse ethnic and religious groups both including 
Alevis with respect to religious (based on Alevi-Sunni difference) and ethnic (based 
on Turkish-Kurdish difference) points of view.249 The involvement of government 
was pointed out as the reason why Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was considered as an 
official government policy, rather than an unofficial basis, by Kışlalı.250 
 
The post-military intervention MGK rule led by General Kenan Evren 
instituted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in state structure, and the motto of “We are 
Muslim Turks”251 was possessed by the said government. For instance, on 12 
September 1980 (the day of the intervention), General Evren made a speech in the 
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state television and on radio, in which he stated the religious component of 
nationalism with the following sentence:  
 
“The Turkish citizens sharing the same national and religious values were divided 
and turned into hostile groups those may kill the others without hesitation for the 
sake of political benefits.”252 
 
Therefore, MGK rule institutionalized the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis among 
the Turkish citizens, who share the same religious values, and in order to do so, the 
government used the Ministry of National Education and the DİB. With the new 
policy, superiority of Sunni Islam was to be intended to be embedded by with the 
help of official governmental institutions, and this process would increase the 
importance of conservative identity, which considerably excludes Alevism, among 
society. For instance, according to the Article 136, DİB was pointed out as a part of 
state responsible with the solidarity. That means, an institution that privileges a 
certain religious belief with exclusion of all others, was assigned to maintain the 
solidarity of a society, which was composed by many different religious identities 
not only including Alevism, but also Judaism and Christianity with different sects. 
 
Turkish identity was significantly associated with Islam; hence, relations 
with international Islamic organizations became visible during 1980s with the Özal 
Government. As Islam (Sunni Islam) was the main component of Turkish identity, 
the government strengthened the connections with Turkish citizens living abroad 
within base of commun Islamic identity; so that, the DİB was charged with 
assignments of teachers of religious courses to Europe, which had been carried out 
by the Ministry of National Education before, and the titles of these functionaries 
were changed into religious personnel.253 Besides, aforementioned relations with 
international Islamic organizations were used in order to provide salary of the said 
personnel. Under a dominant influence of Saudi Arabia, a foundation called as 
Rabıtat-al-Alam al İslâmi (known as Rabıta in Turkish) became an important actor 
of the relations and financial sponsor of religious services of Turkish government to 
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Turkish immigrants of Europe, such as religious instruction and provider of salaries 
of assigned religious personnel and imams.254 
 
As aforementioned, the religious education was a tool in Turkish politics and 
it was not in a fixed and sustainable policy; instead, it has been shaped regarding the 
ideology of the governments. After the 1980 military intervention, religious 
education was used in order to shape the next generations, as well, and the classes of 
religious ethics became obligatory in primary and secondary schools with the new 
constitution of 1982.255 The regulation aimed to teach Islamic rules, Islamic ethics 
and Islamic duties to the students in order to make them conscious about their 
religion, which was also a significant component of their national identity. Besides, 
as it always was, Islam was considered as one referring the Sunni Islam, and the 
content of said religious classes were composed with respect to the Sunni-Islamic 
duties. As stated by all intervewees, obligatory religious ethic classes were 
considered as the pivotal part of Alevi assimilation by Alevis. This issue has been 
pointed out in every single occasion by Alevis such as in public speeches, press 
conferences, inquiry responds, and official Alevi demands.256 
 
The religious classes were just one part of the educational implementations. 
On the other hand, the secondary schoolbooks were rewritten, and in order to 
distinguish the importance of Islam in Turkish identity, the slogan of “The best Turk 
is a Muslim Turk the best Muslim is a Turkish Muslim.”257 was written in them. 
Simultaneously, the rising numbers of schools of Imam-Hatip during the late 1960s 
and 1970s were supported during the 1980s, as well; besides, the graduates of these 
vocational schools were officially allowed to enter any faculty of universities. In 
other words, the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, who were specifically educated 
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in order to serve as imams of mosques or theologians of theology faculties of 
universities as it was mentioned in Article 32 of the Basic Law of National 
Education,258 became able to enter to any faculties without any restriction. Herewith, 
the said vocational schools became an alternate to the regular education.259 With 
this implementation, for the first time since the republic, the religious education was 
accepted far more than a vocational duty; it was normalized and spread among the 
country more than necessity. These schools financing by the government has been 
an issue that was highlighted by Alevis, as well as the increased number of new 
opening ones, which was shown in Chart V on page 149. The actual situation of 
issue will be examined in upcoming parts of this chapter. 
 
Considerable increase of the number of mosques has also been distinguished 
by Alevis as another part of assimilation policy. New mosques started to be built all 
over the country and most significantly in Alevi settlements in rural areas.260 This 
implementation has been claimed as a psychological pressure on Alevis, as they do 
not need mosques to perform their religious rituals. According to the quantitative 
study that Yusuf Ziya Özcan carried out regarding the number of mosques in Turkey 
for almost two decades between 1971-1988, after 1981, while the increase of 
population in urban areas was higher than the increase of number of mosques, this 
ratio was vice-versa in villages and suburban areas. In this study, factors affecting 
the change of mosque number between 1986-1988 were pointed out as demographic 
change, numbers of associations dedicated to mosque-building (cami yaptırma 
dernekleri), and the rate of votes of right-wing parties for the city centers; and 
demographic characteristics and numbers of said associations for the villages.261 
According to the results of this analysis, it would not be wrong to claim that 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis found base among society, who founded and financed 
associations in order to build mosques around the country that were identical as 
                                                
258 “The high schools of Imam-Hatip were educational establishments that apply vocational education, 
as well as preparation to higher education within the secondary education system of the Ministry of 
National Education in order to train personnel responsible for the fulfillment of religious services, 
such as imams, preachers, instructors of courses on Quran.” 
Source: <http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/88.html> (Author’s translation) 
259 Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, 535-536. 
260 Balkız, Sivas’tan Sydney’e Pir Sultan, 131;  
     Tol. “Ayrımcılık ve Alevilik,” 46. 
261 For more information regarding the analysis: Yusuf Ziya Özcan, “Ülkemizdeki Cami Sayıları 
Üzerine Sayısal Bir İnceleme.” İslami Araştırmalar Dergisi 4, no. 1 (1990): 5-20. 
 
221 
affecting factor both for villages and city centers. On the other hand, as another 
assumption, apart from the emigration flows from villages to city centers, the reason 
of higher increase rate of mosques than demographical increase can be associated 
with statements of Alevis, who have said that they met with mosques in their 
villages after 1980 military intervention. The foundation Rabıta was involved in 
financing mosque establishments and Islamic centers in universities (For instance, 
the mosque of Middle East Technical University and Ankara University and 
Kocatepe Mosque of Ankara were the products of that collaboration.) and in the 
TBMM. Besides, the politicians, chief of police, governors and members of 
Supreme Court were invited to pilgrimage visits by the same foundation.262 
 
On this point, there is an important difference regarding necessity of 
mosques among Alevis and Nusayris. As it was explained in previous parts, Alevis 
do not need mosques to practice, as they gather in cemevis. On the other hand, 
Nusayris practice in mosques, as they do five-time prayers as well as the special 
Friday prayers. While Alevis are completely against to the idea of having a mosque 
in their villages, Nusayris think that they have been discriminated by not having 
mosques in their cities as a result of not being considered Muslims. According to 
them, if one is Muslim, he/she needs a mosque to practice.263 In addition to this 
explanation of A. Özuğurlu, he mentioned that the most important component was 
the imams assigned by the state for the mosques those they have in their districts, 
due to common discriminative approach regarding Nusayris. Their reproof was state 
approach that gets concrete with individual events like imams’ discourses.264 Briefly, 
the mosque issue has been a problem both for Alevis and Nusayris; however, it 
occurs with different interpretations as assimilation and discrimination. This 
dichotomy, as it will be mentioned in previous parts of this chapter concerning 
probable ways of solution, has been an important issue that has been used for the 
government as an obstacle on the way to a solution. 
 
Turkish Islamic Synthesis was carried out with significant success in 
political scenes with discourses, constitutional and institutional implementations; 
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however, it was not just the political arena that has been targeted by conservatization 
process. Due to strong relations with Islamic organizations, Islamic capital, 
specifically Saudi financial institutions, entered to Turkey, such as Faisal Finance 
Corporation and Al-Baraka Financial Corporation;265 As Çetin Yetkin argued, these 
occurrences were linked with the Özal Government, which was the result of the 
1980 military intervention and the period that the reactionary movements gained its 
utmost ascendency.266 Similarly, Kongar associated Özal Government with the 
integration of political Islam into the state.267 With this period, Islam found a 
legitimate base for itself not only in Turkish politics, but also in policies regarding 
the international politics.268 
 
As this thesis strongly argues, Islamic Ottoman identity has always been in a 
clash with the laic republican one. This clash led many different periods with 
governmental efforts intenting to shape the society regarding its own position within 
this clash. With the military intervention itself, post MGK rule and Özal 
Government the society was, once again, reshaped with respect to the conservative 
idea privileging Islam in national identity. However, there is one thing that should 
be distinguished on that point: So far, the society had intended to be shaped; 
however, as Özal stated “So far, everyone desired to spread Islam among the society. 
But, the main issue was the Islamization of the state.”269 he intended to change the 
politics of the state in order to generate more conservative future for the society. 
 
Empowered conservative identity supporters started to organize their own 
market, thanks to liberal economic policies of Özal, consequently, a new kind of 
bourgeoisie was emerged. The newborn bourgeoisie became an alternate, or better to 
say, a counter to the existing elites supporting laic republican identity, due its 
characteristics, which were originated from Islamic liberalization among political 
scenes. Eventually, as stated by Yavuz, the new Islamic bourgeoisie and Islamic 
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intellectuals of the time played a pivotal role among public sphere and led the 
existing change of Turkey since the second half of 1980s, up to present. 270  
 
 The entrepreneurs of Islamic bourgeoisie were the ones, who were just out of 
their small towns and villages; however, they had not cut their ties with their origin. 
On that point, the important role of Sufi orders, such as Nurculuk and Naqshbandi 
order, should be distinguished. The mentioned entrepreneurs grew up with Islamic 
values due to the conditions of rural life since their childhood, and entered to 
university far from their towns; accordingly, they lived in dormitories, which were 
generally run by said Sufi orders. Herewith, they deepened their Islamic knowledge, 
and became “conscious Muslims”.271  These conscious Muslims were the new 
generations of society with significant Islamic identity. Besides, with their 
consciousness, they differentiated themselves from the others who were traditionally 
or just namely Muslims. 
 
 As a general perspective, Islamic values cannot be suited with capitalism; 
however, the Islamic bourgeoisie managed to introduce capitalism alongside Islam. 
For instance, due to the Islamic sensitivity272, the entrepreneurs did not want to get 
loans with high interests from the banks; instead, they asked for credits from their 
religious networks.273 That was a simultaneous process with the time that Sufi orders, 
religious groups and sects gained power in the late 1980s. Additionally, the Islamic 
banking274 models entered to Turkish markets as a necessity of the said Islamic 
sensitivity, such as the establishment of Al-Baraka Financial Cooperation. It was the 
first Islamic banking model of Turkey that works without interest.275 Instead of an 
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interest, the Islamic banks have a different system with participant shares, which is 
used to legitimize the money comes from the money. Briefly, with the help of these 
involvements, the Anatolian based and conservative originated conscious Muslims 
started to work with Islamic values and gained capital, accordingly power, and 
started to compete with laic-Westernized elite and their economic capacity. 
Eventually, the pro-Islamic business group founded Independent Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği - MÜSİAD) 
and gathered around it. 
 
 Apart from the MÜSİAD, already existing Turkish Industry and Business 
Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD), and The Union of 
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar 
Birliği, TOBB) played significant role among political scenes, and with the social, 
political and economic change they acquired significantly different characters from 
each other.276 
 
 The economic mobilization of pro-Islamic entrepreneurs was not only a 
domestic process, but also there was a significant financial support from Turkish 
immigrants to Islamic corporations with the help of Turkish pro-Islamic associations 
in Europe. The money used to be collected as cash donations in mosques and 
transferred with private couriers to companies of Turkey.277 
  
 The 1980 military intervention was aimed to “deepen Kemalist ideology” 
among the society; however, a different interpretation of Turkish nationalism and 
laicism gave birth a legitimate existence of Islam in public and economic spheres 
with support of government. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Islamic bourgeoisie, 
visible existence of Sufi orders both in political and economic scenes, educational 
regulations regarding religious education, and increased importance of DİB with 
constitutions regulations were the characteristics of the point that Turkey arrived 
after 1980 military intervention and its afterwards. Within this atmosphere, Alevis 
were not a part of any privileged order due their distinct identity. They maintained 
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their social position until the end of the decade, when Alevism awakening was 
started. During the late 1980s, with press dedicated to Alevi writings, new 
foundations and associations as centers for Alevis to gather and unify, and media 
organs for special broadcasting regarding Alevism, Alevis started to reveal and to 
protect their identity. The secrecy of Alevi identity that was maintained since the 
1950s started to be vanished with a new decade.278 With the help of foundations and 
annual cultural organizations, Alevis started to explain themselves and to be heard 
publicly; hence, after 1990s, Alevism found a new form among society. 
 
4.2.3. Re-emergence of Alevi Identity 
 
The complexity of 1990s have already been analysed with details in previous 
chapter. Among all, on one side increased visibility of Alevis, and on the other 
increased Islamization due to new political and economic conditions were the ones 
that led to mostly individual physical and psychological attitudes those have been 
considered as discriminative by Alevis. Within this part, starting from 1990s up to 
today, individual events will be taken into account within a chronological order in 
order to form a general view regarding Alevis and Alevism among society. 
 
 With the visibility of Alevis not only by their settlement in city centers, but 
also with cultural organizations, press, media and so on, Alevism started to be 
known not only by Sunnis, but also by the new Alevi generations. Due to the lack of 
written sources regarding Alevism, there had not been a systematic information 
transformation regarding Alevi identity from older generations to younger ones.279 
Besides, according to various studies carried out separately, as a result of mass 
targeted attacks, there are many young people telling that his/her Alevi identity was 
hidden from himself/herself by their parents for security reasons or fear of being 
discriminated.280 1990s are important for the vanishment of this secrecy. On the 
other hand, it would not be wrong to claim that, traumatic incidents have played 
considerable role for the consciousness of Alevism, apart from the mobilization. For 
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instance, the Sivas Massacre, which is believed as the most traumatic incident of 
republic history, brought about Alevi recognition among society. 
 
 In 1993, the fourth annual Pir Sultan Abdal Festival was organized in Sivas, 
in the city center for the first time. Before, annual meetings had been held in village 
of Sivas named Banaz, where Pir Sultan lived significant part of his life; however, 
for 1993, the city center was also included to the program. During said period, Sivas 
used to be governed by a mayor from RP. Although, local elections is not a 
sufficient source for ideological assumption for a region, as the business of 
governing a city is not supposed to possess any ideological approach; in Turkey, it 
gives a general opinion for the leaning of society for related region. Hence, it would 
not be wrong to associate majority of people of Sivas with conservative identity, as 
RP possessed the mayorship. This became a reason for critics regarding Sivas choice, 
like Alevis were claimed to provoke the people of Sivas. Besides, attendance of 
Aziz Nesin (1915-1995), a writer and a humorist known with his left-wing ideology, 
also was criticized as another reason of provocation. According to these critics, 
people of Sivas, who has had sensitivity to Islamic values, was provoked by the 
organization of Alevis and most specifically with Aziz Nesin, who was assumed to 
be disrespectful to Islam.281  
 
The annual meeting was organized with great attendance of authors, 
minstrels, poets and many people from different cities, and with official support of 
governorship and Ministry of Culture. On the other hand, since a day before the 
meeting started, a campaign had started to be carried out by radical Islamists with 
proclamations those were distributed to the public. With one of this proclamations 
distributed on 30 June, which addressed “Muslim public opinion”, people were 
provoked with a call to protect the religion that was under threat due to non-
believers, who had not hesitated to swear to Muslim people.282 Distribution of 
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proclamations was continued during the day after, on 1 July. According to the 
second proclamation, they declared that they were ready to protect their values no 
matter what it would cost, even including their life.283 In these proclamations, laic 
state structure, governor of Sivas, organizers of the meeting, Aziz Nesin, and 
participants were pointed out as culpables against Islamic values.  
 
Within this atmosphere, the first day of organization, 1 July 1993, was 
completed without any problem; however, the day after, local newspapers published 
some news regarding the organization with concrete hatred. For instance, Hakikat, 
one of these local newspapers, asked: 
 
“Were the Events of Pir Sultan Abdal organised with the purpose of promoting anti-
religious activities? If so, we would say that we have already prepared ourselves for 
these kinds of attitudes. We will not let anyone sell snails in Muslim territories. We 
will never ever allow any propaganda against our religion.”284 
 
With propagandas of proclamations and local news, many people gathered 
on the mosques for special Friday prayer, and then initiated protest march through 
the Hotel Madımak, where Alevi meetings were being carried out. During said 
protest march, many slogans were yelled against laic structure of the state and 
republican regime with yearning to Sharia. A few of the slogans were “The republic 
was established here and will be demolished here, as well!” (Cumhuriyet Sivas’ta 
kuruldu, Sivas’ta yıkılacak!), “Sivas will be the grave for laics!” (Sivas laiklere 
mezar olacak!), “Sharia will be back, and we’ll achieve relief!” (Şeriat gelecek, 
dertler bitecek!), “Military of Mohammed will be the fear for infidels!” 
(Muhammed’in ordusu kafirlerin korkusu!), and “Livelong Sharia!”, (Yaşaşın 
şeriat!).285 Until the evening, the protesters gathered around the Hotel and they set it 
fire. As a consequence of this arson attack, 33 participants of the organization and 2 
hotel staffs died by flames and smoke. Additionally, two outsider protesters died 
with the fire. Regarding the reason of death, one of the Islamic leaning newspapers 
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named Yeni Akit, published an article after 19 years, on 27 July 2012, and assumed 
that the reason of the death was not smoke or flame; instead, it was bullet. 
According to said article, Sivas Massacre was a “19-year-old Lie” as it was written 
as title of the article, with the accusation of Alevis as they would like to provoke 
people against religion with their own lifes.286 
 
The day after the attack, national newspapers printed the events with 
different interpretations. While one covered the news with the title of “Supporters of 
Sharia took the streets!”, another one wrote “Revolt against Aziz Nesin, in 
Sivas!”.287 Authorities interpreted the incident with following sentences:288 
 
Tansu Çiller, then PM: “There was no harm for our citizens who gathered 
around the Hotel.” 
 
Mehmet Gazioğlu, Minister of Interior: “The incident occurred because of 
the Statue of Pir Sultan Abdal.” 
 
Mesut Yılmaz, Chairman of ANAP: “I do not see anyone else who supports 
the freedom of thinking. However, we cannot be oblivious to usage of this freedom 
against the sacred values of our people.”  
 
 Due to lack of security forces in order to prevent the incident was criticized, 
and with aforementioned declarations, the government was accused by Alevis with 
being oblivious to the protest march and not providing security to an organization, 
which was officially supported by the Ministry of Culture. As it had happened three 
times during 1970s for mentioned mass targeted attacks, security weakness and 
neglect were pointed out once again as the reason of deaths. 
 
 2 June has been a commemoration day not only for Alevis, but also for a 
large part of the entire population supporting the laic republican identity. Due to 
association of Alevis with their considerable credence to laic state structure and the 
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slogans those were shouted against laicism, Sivas Massacre has become an 
unforgettable incident for the supporters of laicism. Since, 1993 many songs have 
been composed, books have been written, two theatrical plays have been performed 
and one movie has been shot regarding the Sivas Massacre. Çorum, and especially 
Kahramanmaraş incidents were wide-ranging events; however, Sivas Massacre had 
a wider impact than those two. Why? First of all, as Kongar mentioned, it targeted 
individuals directly. Secondly, after a long time, it was a concrete yearning to Sharia 
and hostility to laic structure.289 It was another proof of radically Islamization of 
society. Besides, this attack showed that tolerance was not a sociological concept for 
heterogeneous regions in Turkey regarding religious diversity, yet. The same 
understanding regarding Alevism had not been changed for almost four centuries 
despite the change of time, conditions and state structure. Additionally, Sivas 
Massacre was pointed out as the last part of Islamization chain starting with the 
language shift of calls for prayers by DP. According to this chain, increased 
numbers of Imam-Hatip schools and courses of Quran, visibility of veil, individual 
attacks to people not fasting during Ramadan, constitutional obligation of religious 
ethic courses, and the assassinations of journalist, authors, academics were the 
outcomes of Islamization of society.290 
 
 The lawsuit of Sivas Massacre had also been another issue. According to the 
lawsuit, 124 people were accused of intention to change the laic regime in order to 
establish a religious state, and in 2000, 33 were sentenced to death. With the change 
of law in 2002, and the abolishment of death sentence, those 33 were sentenced to 
life imprisonment, eventually in 2005 they were released with respect to a new 
regulation and 12 escaped abroad and they could not be found. On the other hand, 
seven of perpetrators could not be found since the beginning of the lawsuit.291 In 
2012, the lawsuit of those seven people dropped, and it was interpreted by PM 
Erdoğan as “May it be good for our nation for our country. There were many 
citizens in prison for many years, and some of them were runaway.”292 This 
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interpretation of PM, and drop decision have been discussed and criticized a lot,293 
even it was protested by a group of people in Ankara on 13 March 2012, and a 
lawsuit was opened for 52 of the protesters between 2 and 13 years of 
imprisonment.294 Most importantly, it demonstrated that the point of view of state 
authorities have not been changed since the incident when we compare Erdoğan`s 
sentences with the ones made by then politicians right after the incident in 1993. 
 
 Sivas Massacre has been an incident that attracted the attention of not only 
Alevis, but also wider part of Turkish society, and possessed its importance as being 
the symbol of otherization, although it is not the unique incident of Turkish history 
targeted Alevis. Additionally, it would not be wrong to claim that it significantly 
constibuted the awakening process of Alevism. After Sivas Massacre, another mass 
targeted attack took place in 1995, in Istanbul, Gazi Quarter, where is populated 
majorly by Alevis. On 12 March 1995, simultaneous attacks were carried out by 
unidentified persons on four different places in Gazi Quarter. As a result of the 
attackes, an Alevi dede was killed by gunfire and 20 people were wounded.295 On 
the same day, Alevis organized a protest march through the police station, as they 
claimed the security forces to be late to intervene. Police responded to the crowd 
with gunfire and one more person died consequently. A day after, on 13 March, 
thousands of people gathered in order to protest simultaneous attacks and police 
brutality; however, police opened fire once again to the protesters and 15 people 
died. According to autopsy report of deads, seven of 17 were killed by police 
bullets.296 Eventually, two police officers were sentenced to four years and 32 
months.297 
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 During 1990s, apart from aforementioned two mass targeted attacks, many 
individual incidents were carried out. For instance, in a TV Show in 1995, the 
presenter referred Kızılbaş people in order to ask incest during a conversation with 
hostess of the show.298  
 
 With the 21st century, as it will be discussed, there was not a significant 
change regarding the interpretation of Alevism by certain groups supporting 
conservative identity. There have been many individual cases that Alevis have felt to 
be discriminated, or claimed that they were discriminated by governmental and/or 
personal aspects.  
 
 The relation between Alevis and DİB has not possessed a stable period due 
to incompatibility regarding Alevism and a probable way of solving the problem. 
While Alevis cannot associate an institution like DİB with a laic state structure, DİB 
mostly has possessed a strategy to welcome Alevis to the mosque in order to 
practice, as they are Muslims, as well. In 2001, then President of DİB, Mehmet Nuri 
Yılmaz gave an interview to a national newspaper and declared that giving a similar 
function to cemevis as mosques would be a threat for national unity.299 He also 
added that they did not want to assimilate Alevis, they just invited them to the 
mosques to practice, as mosques were the places, where Alevis should practice, 
also.300 In fact, that was the exact explanation that Alevis have considered as a proof 
of assimilation, as they were invited to mosques to practice instead of their cemevis. 
That was the same position that DİB possessed during 1960s and 1970s, when 
authorities forced to carry out Alevi funeral services in mosques with respect to 
Sunni Islamic traditons. Additionally, as it was stated by majority of intervewees, 
invitation to mosques to practice was the reason why they started to have mosques 
in their villages and quarters one by one since 1980s.301  
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Increased number of mosques all over the country attracted the attention and 
this curiosity started to be discussed strongly. For instance, according to an analysis 
for the year 2007, while there were 67000 schools, 1220 hospitals, 6300 clinics, 
there were 85000 mosques and 100 cemevis and 270 churches all over the country. 
Obviously, the population regarding each belief plays significant role for the 
numbers; however, a comparison between hospitals and mosques demonstrates an 
unproportional distribution of state supplies. While there was one hospital for 60000 
people approximately, there was one mosque for every 350 people.302 The numbers 
were updated for the year 2012, and the discrepancy between the increase of 
mosques and hospitals has become quite considerable. In 2012, there were 1453 
hospitals and 93000 mosques.303 That means, in five years, only 233 hospitals were 
built, while 8000 new mosques were erected. Regarding the state supply, Alevis 
have pointed out that the process has been carried out unfair and unproportional for 
a laic state, and it has always been one of the demands of Alevis that the state should 
possess an egalitarian approach regarding religious identity instead of giving 
privileges to Sunni Islam in order to put it in a superior position. These demands 
will be analyzed with details in following part of this chapter. 
 
 Since 2002, governments of AKP have been in power with its conservative 
characteristic. As it was mentioned, with its liberal approach regarding internal and 
international politics, the first three AKP governments between 2002 and 2011 had 
attracted the attention of liberals and empowered itself with significant support of 
almost 50% of valid votes during 2011 Elections. The third AKP Government has 
intended to maintain more moderate approach regarding Alevism, and launched 
Alevi Opening in 2009, which finished in 2010 with its seventh meeting. This 
Initiative is significantly important for Alevi case, and it will be analyzed in 
upcoming lines of this chapter as an official government initiative. 
 
Even though AKP’s approach was moderate and liberal, individual cases 
have taken place in the meantime. Some of the discourses came from high state 
officials were considered as demonstration of official discrimination by Alevis and 
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caused questioning of sincerety of official opening. Conservative discourses with 
significant religious references, which made not only Alevis but also entire 
supporters of laic republican identity deeply concerned about AKP Government. For 
instance, in 2007, special dinners were organized due to Muharrem fasts as a result 
of personal endeavor of an MP of Istanbul from AKP,304 on the other hand, within 
the same year, Ministry of National Education published a list of recommended 
books for primary school and secondary school students, in which there were two 
sources including discriminative contents regarding Alevism. 305  Hence, the 
Muharrem dinners were responded within a suspected interpretation, and due to 
suspicions, only six of 279 Alevi Foundations attended, meanwhile it was protested 
in Tunceli as the dinner was claimed to be insincere and an intervention of AKP to 
Alevism.306 
 
The awareness of religious identity and its distinguishment have not been 
acceptable for Alevis, as they had intended to hide their religious identity in order 
not to be excluded from the society or not to be discriminated. Hence, these kinds of 
distinguishments, even they are not malicious, disturb Alevis, as they feel offended 
due to experiences.307 For instance, the President of the Republic, Gül, made a 
speech in 2010 and mentioned “We have assigned rectors to the universities from 
Alevi communities.” 308  in order to distinguish his fair approach to religious 
identities. Although the intention was to demonstrate goodwill, the reflection did not 
occurred in a way that Gül thought; instead, it brought about uneasiness among 
Alevis due to the awareness of religious identity and its usage. Additionally, 
Erdoğan, use the religious identity of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who is an Alevi and the 
chairman of CHP, as a political tool during his speech before the 2011 elections. His 
discourse caused disappointment not only among Alevis, but also among wider part 
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of society.309 As another example, the Mayor of Ankara, Gökçek used his Twitter 
account to mention his attendance to a wedding “I performed his wedding 
ceremony; although, I know that he is an Alevi and a member of CHP.”310 These 
kind of references used by state authorities brought about doubts and uneasiness 
among society due to religious awareness and fear of being discriminated. Besides, 
positive endeavors are being evaluated as insincere due to simultaneous 
discriminative discourses. The case of Muharrem dinner is a considerable example 
for this dilemma. 
 
 As a state tradition, funeral ceremonies of martyrs have been carried out with 
attendance of high-ranking TSK officers; however, in 2012, an exception occurred 
in Istanbul. In a bomb attack in Izmir, a western city, on 9 August 2012, two soldiers 
were killed, while 10 were wounded. One of the martyrs was Alevi; consequently, 
his funeral ceremony was organized in a cemevi in Istanbul, in his hometown. For 
the attendance of TSK officers, another ceremony was organized in a mosque, as 
they denied attending to the ceremony in a cemevi. Regarding the second ceremony, 
the uncle of the martyr stated that they wanted to carry out the ceremony with 
respect to their culture. The Chairperson of Hubyar Sultan Alevi Cultural 
Foundation, Ali Kenanoğlu, interpreted the situation with this sentence: “No matter 
dead or alive, if you are an Alevi, you are being discriminated!”311 
  
 The discriminative discourses can be separated into two different levels. 
Apart from the discourses of state officers, there have been individual incidents, 
which were reported in daily and business life, and in schools for primary and 
secondary students.  
 
 With the 1982 Constitution, religious ethic classes have become obligatory, 
and it has been considered as a method of assimilation of Alevis beginning from the 
early ages. The lecture was named as religious ethic; however, mostly, depending on 
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teachers’ perspectives, Sunni Islamic practices have been performed such as prayers. 
These kinds of applications during the classes brought about difficult times for Alevi 
students. With the aforementioned regulation named 4+4+4, religion lectures have 
been varied; however, as it is still being protested by Alevis, the following fieldwork 
maintains its importance. With a project named “Mobilizing Towards Equality and 
Non-Discrimination” carried out by the leadership of Alevi Cultural Associations 
(Alevi Kültür Dernekleri) and financed by The European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), a field work was progressed between 12 July-13 
August 2009, in seven geographical regions of Turkey, which were represented by 
two cities each, in order to analyze individual discriminative attitudes. According to 
the report of this project, there have been many problems that Alevi students have 
been faced due to obligatory religious ethic classes.312  
 
Regarding the same issue, then Minister of State, Faruk Çelik made a 
statement that Alevism would be included into the curriculum of the religious ethic 
classes, in 2010. 313  On 16 January 2011, an Alevi parent organized a press 
conference in Istanbul, in order to carry this problem to the public attention, and he 
stated that his daughter was told to learn how to practice prayers, as it would be the 
prerequisite of success for the end of the term by teacher of religious ethic class.314 
A day after, the obligatory religious ethic classes was protested by a group of high 
school students in Istanbul, as they want the abolishment of the class.315 With 
aforementioned 4+4+4 system, three different religious classes were included to the 
transcript apart from the obligatory one. While the obligatory class will be educated 
beginning with the fourth year until the end of 12-year-education, other three classes 
are presented as optional after the second part of education circle. Three optional 
classes have been listed as “Qur’an”, “Life of Prophet Muhammad”, and 
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“Fundamental Information of Religion”, and Alevism is said to be included to the 
curriculum of Fundamental Information of Religion as other religions, such as 
Judaism, and Christianity. 316  As it was mentioned in previous chapter, new 
educational system has been discussed strongly by many different parts of the 
society; among all, Alevis have fear for their children, who would be excluded or 
discriminated by their Sunni friends and/or teachers with respect to their choices.317 
 
Apart from religious ethic classes, there are other individual cases covered 
by newspapers regarding discriminative attitudes. On 9 April 2013, a philosophy 
teacher of a high school in Bursa insulted Alevism by referring “candless off” 
during the course of religious philosophy.318 In addition to that, according to an 
article on a national newspaper of 15 May 2013, during a campaign for a petition to 
build a mosque in a high school in Ankara, parents of students were asked to sign 
the petition; eventually, students were divided into two different sections in the 
classroom and settled accordingly. On one side, students with signed signatures 
were settled and on the other hand, students who were accused of being “communist 
Kızılbaş”. Additionally, according to the related article in the newspaper, a student, 
whose parents refused to sign the petition was threatened by other students.319 
 
According to the Mobilizing Towards Equality and Non-Discrimination 
Project and Nil Mutluer’s interviews for her article series in Milliyet Daily 
Newspaper, there are many reports claiming that Alevis are being discriminated due 
to their religious identity in their business life. There are people reporting that they 
are not being promoted or even not being accepted for the vacancy due to their Alevi 
identity. Additionally, the month of Ramadan, and especially the special Friday 
prayers have been an issue that Alevis have felt offended by the Sunni majority of 
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society. For all these reasons, keeping religious identity in secret is still a way to 
protect oneself from any of these aforementioned discriminative attitudes.320 
 
Psychological discrimination can be considered as a common way due to the 
lack of tolerance for the religious diversity; however, they have not been unique 
incidents that offended Alevis. In 2012, during the month of Ramadan, an Alevi 
family had an argument with the drummer during sahur, and as a consequence of 
this argument, house of Alevi family was attacked with stones by Sunni neighbours. 
The tension has been decreased and a lawsuit was opened; however, due to erased 
statements of defendants, which were electronically recorded, the doubts could not 
be vanished from Alevis’ mind regarding the suspicious approach that they 
possessed whether it was a deliberate attack or not.321 In December 2012, Alevis 
gathered in Kahramanmaraş in order to commemorate the Kahramanmaraş Massacre 
of 1978; however, they were not allowed to enter the city and obstructed with police 
barricades. The negotiations did not resulted positively; and eventually, police used 
tear gas and batons in order to disperse the crowd.322  
 
As Alevism has been a topic being investigated within various perspectives, 
an article series were written by Nedim Şener to be published in Posta, a daily 
newspaper, starting on 27 May 2013. The advertisement of the article series was 
sent to TV Channels in advance in order to inform the public; however, the state 
channel TRT denied covering the advertisement since it was evaluated as non-
coverable due to a sentence, in which “Alevis were silenced with massacres.” was 
said.323 
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Alevi interpretation regarding the period of Selim I was already explained in 
previous parts of this chapter. On 29 May 2013, the groundbreaking ceremony of 
third bridge of Bosphorus was carried with the attendance of President Gül and PM 
Erdoğan. During his speech, President Gül declared that the bridge will be named as 
Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in honor of Selim I.324 As it was mentioned, the name 
has been protested by many different parts of the society, Alevis pointed out another 
reason to protest. According to Alevi perspective, choice of the name was a way to 
demonstrate the state authorities’ interpretation of problems of Alevis.325 Due to the 
protests, President Gül pointed out the Alevi sensitivity regarding the name of the 
bridge, and he added that there were many different state projects, which were to be 
named after Hacı Bektaş Veli or Pir Sultan Abdal, in order to provide solidarity.326 
Nevertheless, this explanation could not be enough to make Alevis withdraw their 
complaints regarding the name, as they mentioned in their commemoration meeting 
for Sivas Massacre, on 23 June 2013. Besides, after the discussions, P.M. Erdoğan 
mentioned a new Alevi initiative, which may end up with concrete solutions 
regarding the problems of Alevis.327 With respect to the discussion about names of 
state projects, a new step was taken with the Democratization Package, as it was 
mentioned. However, it was not considered as sufficient and as a response from the 
government, Deputy PM Bekir Bozdağ stated that there was another project 
concerning Alevis and not completed yet.328 
 
Recent Gezi Parki Protests have been carried out in many different cities of 
Turkey, as it was mentioned in previous chapter, and the resistance for 
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demolishment of Gezi Park turned into a protest chain against the AKP Government 
within many different perspectives. Alevis had sided with the protests as they 
support the resistance, and due to the new characteristic of protests, Alevis have 
declared their secondary demands like each diverse group of protesters and their 
discointendness of the AKP Government.329  
 
Since the foundation of the Republic, the relation of Alevis both with state 
and governments and with the rest of the society have been analyzed with individual 
cases in order to demonstrate the general view regarding different perspectives. It is 
important to see that, no matter left wing or right wing, Alevis have become the 
others for governments. Besides, as it was mentioned, Alevis, even they have been 
under attack, as they were in Çorum, Kahramanmaras, Sivas or in Gazi quarter, they 
have possessed reasonable approach and maintained their peaceful position. When 
the protests are taken into account, a democratic perspective will attract our attention. 
This position of Alevis has played important role for preventing the struggle from 
getting worse or from getting even bloodier. For this reason, Kongar pointed out 
Alevis as guarantee of institutionalization of democracy and law abidance.330 
 
4.3. Problem and Solutions 
 
In previous parts of this chapter, the distinction of Alevism and the problems 
that they have lived since the Ottoman period have been examined. In some period 
of the history, Alevis isolated themselves, either for security reasons or for 
disconnecting themselves from the Sunni majority and state structure; however, 
since 1990s they started to ask for their demands, even since the new century, as 
Alevis are more organized and significantly mobilized, their voice is becoming more 
clear.  
 
With organized mobilization, Alevis have discussed their wills in their own 
communities in order to declare it officially and to negotiate with the government. 
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For this reason, various protest marches were organized. In Ankara (2008), in 
Istanbul (2009), in Izmir (2011), in Ankara (2012), and in Istanbul (2013) became 
the most significant protest marches carried out in order to attract the attention of the 
government. Besides, many meetings have been carried out in order to list their 
demands. One of the meetings was held on 12 April 2011, in Ankara, in which I was 
invited personally. During this meeting, many people from different origins and 
minorly different traditions discussed their problems, and declared their demands, in 
order to compose a concrete text for whole demands of all Alevis. In this part of this 
chapter, Alevi demands will be listed in order to analyze what they want, and to 
understand if they are compatible with laic structure of the state; Alevi Opening of 
AKP Government will be discussed with its format and outcomes; and suggestions 
will be made for a probable solution. 
 
4.3.1. What Do Alevis Want: Privilege or Equality? 
 
 Alevis form a significant part the society of Turkey with their distinctive 
characteristics, and with concrete mobilization since the beginning of 1990s, they 
started to demand and declare their rights clearly from the governments of Turkey. If 
their demands should be classified, there will be five different titles that would 
attract the attention, and these four titles would be official Alevi recognition, the 
situation of cemevis and other Alevi dervish lodges, the privileges that DİB has, 
problems regarding educational system, and implementations against laic struggle. 
Within this perspective, it is important to see what are these demands in detail from 
Turkish governments? Is it privilege that they ask or equality? 
 
 Alevism, with its internal heterogeneous characteristic, which was linked 
with the lack of written sources and isolated territories that had never led to 
interaction with “other” Alevi societies in order to follow a single path, and 
centuries-long-secrecy have brought about significant curiosity towards Alevi 
identity. Consequently, Alevism started to be discussed by state authorities in order 
to define the identity for different intentions including otherization, assimilation, 
exclusion, or inclusion. As it was mentioned by Geçmez, Alevis do not want to be 
defined in order to be standardized; because, according to Alevi belief, the 
heterogeneity is the richness of Alevi culture, as it is visible in various religious 
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cultures. However, this variety may cause dilemma within Alevism itself. On this 
point, two dominant perspectives occur:331 Political Alevism and Islamic Alevism. 
 
 Political Alevism is the definition that has been distinguished in first part of 
this chapter. It has its significant references to Islam; however, does not put it in the 
center of Alevism. Instead, it is the humanity in the center of Alevism. Within this 
perspective, Islam is just one of the components that have affected Alevism among 
all aforelisted others. For instance, aforementioned different characteristic of God is 
a part of syncretic structure of Alevism. On the other hand, there is the Islamic 
Alevism, which claims that it is purely Islam with a different perspective on 
practices as contrary to Arabic Islam.  
 
The most important difference between two different approaches of Alevism 
is the characteristic of demands of their adherents. Regarding the difference between 
the demands, it would not be wrong to claim that while syncretic identity is being 
represented by Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, Alevi-Bektaşi 
Federation and Alevi Cultural Association, the Islamic one is being represented by 
Cem Foundation. When the demands are considered, the difference will be visible. 
According to Cem Foundation, with respect to its chairman İzzettin Doğan’s 
declarations, recognition of Alevism within state level includes shareholding from 
public purse including recognition of dedes with monthly salaries as the imams are 
provided and representation of Alevism in official and administrative structure of 
DİB. However, these suggestions were strongly criticized by chairpersons of Haci 
Bektas Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, Geçmez and Alevi Cultural Association, 
Tekin Özdil. Besides, similar criticism was made by dedes themselves.332 According 
to written declarations, discourses and personal interviews with Representative of 
Mersin Cemevi, Chairperson of Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation and 
ex-Chairperson of Alevi-Bektashi Federation, recognition of Alevism does not 
include any demand regarding salaries of dedes or representation of Alevism in DİB. 
With respect to listed sources, Alevis, majorly, are against financiation of any 
                                                
331 Uğraş Ulaş Tol, “The Sustainability Crisis of Alevis” (Ph.D. diss., METU, 2009). 
332 “Alevi Dedeleri Devletten Maaş İstemiyor,” CNN Türk, 06 December 2012, 
<http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/12/06/alevi.dedeleri.devletten.maas.istemiyor/503789.0/inde
x.html> (2 May 2013). 
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religious identity, including theirs; hence, financial assistance is not an issue to 
negotiate.333 Besides, in addition to understanding of monetary issues as a way to 
assimilate Alevism under state control, as their representative would serve as state 
officers; financiation of specific religious identities is not considered compatible 
with laic state structure. 
 
 On the other hand, there is a specific distinguishment that was used by 
Geçmez during the personal interview. He mentioned, “Alevis are bored with being 
defined by Sunni majority”.334 Alevism, in itself, has specific diversity and being 
standardized by the control of state is not referred as an acceptable approach. Within 
this perspective, Alevis do not want to be defined; instead, they want to be 
recognized by the state officially with simple regulations, which would refer every 
single diverse culture of Alevism. Following three demands will be more specialized 
regarding exact characteristics of Alevism. 
 
 Cemevis have been an important part of Alevism as they have gather in order 
to deal with both religious and social issues before and during cem ceremonies. As it 
was mentioned earlier, during the Ottoman Empire and until the second half of 20th 
century, Alevis had lived in their villages with their own communities under isolated 
conditions. The new Republic was a new hope for their recognition after the 
Ottoman period under the rule of Islamic Caliph; however, new structure could not 
respond specific necessities of Alevis including the status of cemevis. The law 
regarding the closure of dervish lodges and shrines has been pointed out as the main 
issue that should be gotten over, for a probable solution in the way that Alevis 
demand. Although the relation between the law and Alevis as the target is still being 
discussed, the same law is being interpreted as the most pivotal obstacle for the 
recognition of cemevis as official places of worship. Kemalist implementations were 
totally welcomed, as they were compatible with Alevi belief and cultural 
components and meant to be an escape from Arab dominance. On the other hand, as 
Erik Jan Zürcher and Harry van der Linden stated, Alevis, also, responded positively 
                                                
333 Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Alevi Çalıştayı, 45; 
     Balkız, interview; 
     Geçmez, interview; 
     Kaya, interview. 
334 Geçmez, interview. 
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to exclusions of Alevism, unless the Republic would deny any religious identities in 
public sphere.335 This is to say that for the sake of the state and to maintain its laic 
structure, Alevis would have been in favor with being denied as a religious identity; 
unless, the same policy applied to all religious identities. However, within time, 
Sunni Islam was started to be favored; even further, the escape from Arab 
dominance was interpreted as Turkification of Sunni Islam. 
 
 With domestic immigration flows starting from 1960s, city centers had 
became a challenge for Alevism, due to lack of cemevis and Alevi communities. 
This absence has started to be vanished with cultural foundations and associations, 
including cemevis in their central buildings as a part of cultural foundation. This is 
the issue that Alevis are against. They ask the recognition of cemevis as other places 
of worship, such as mosques, synagogues and churches, and the withdrawn of 
assigned imams to the mosques built in Alevi villages, which have been considered 
as a part of assimilation.336 This demand is being declared as one of the most 
important issues, as it has been stated many times by several attendees of the 
meeting that I attended in 2011.  
 
 On the other hand, the status of Hacı Bektaş Veli Dervish Lodge has been 
discussed widely. Since 1964, Dervish Lodge is maintained opened as a museum 
only for cultural visits; however, Alevis ask for the right to practice. In 2009, with 
personal endeavor of then Minister of Culture Ertuğrul Günay, the Dervish Lodge 
was opened for once in order to host a cem ceremony.337 This has been considered 
as a positive approach regarding the issue for the future; however, since then, no 
further attempt has been done. 
 
 DİB, since its foundation, has been the basis of the discussions regarding its 
questioned compatibility with laic state structure, not only by Alevis but also entire 
supporters of laic republican identity. DİB has always been considered as a way to 
                                                
335 Erik Jan Zürcher and Harry van der Linden, The European Union, Turkey and Islam (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 127. 
336  Abdurrahman Küçük, and Mehmet Alparslan Küçük, Türkistan’dan Türkiye’ye Alevilik – 
Bektaşilik (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2009), 214-216. 
337 Pınar Ecevitoğlu, Ali Murat İrat, and Ayhan Yalçınkaya, foreword to Hacı Bektaş Veli: Güneşte 
Zerresinden. Deryada Katresinden, eds. Pınar Ecevitoğlu, Ali Murat İrat and Ayhan Yalçınkaya 
(Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2010), 19. 
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privilege Sunni Islam. For instance, according to “The Family Imam” project of the 
AKP Government, which is started to be carried out in March 2011, the imams are 
assigned to take care of the problems of individuals, beside of serving in the 
mosques.338 This intention has been considered as an involvement in social life of 
individuals with usage of religion. 
 
The financial support that DİB has been given by the state has a considerable 
portion in total budget of state, with significant increase over years. For instance, in 
1997, the budget of DİB was 66 million Turkish Liras339, and it became 4.6 billion 
Turkish Liras in 2013, which was more than 13 Turkish ministries including 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Health. 340 
Accordingly, the budget of DİB is being criticized by Alevis in addition to its 
existence. Not only the financiation of a specific religion by a laic state, but also its 
increased budget has been an issue that Alevis mention.  
 
Additionally, with supportive laws the role of DİB has been empowered and 
it was assigned to maintain the national unity and solidarity with the Article 136 of 
1982 Constitution. Furthermore, according to the Article 89 of the Law of Political 
Parties mentions  
 
“None of the political parties can act against the Article 136 of the 
Constitution, which is related to the Presidency of Religious Affairs and its 
functioning in the general administration.”341  
 
With this law, DİB’s subra-political structure was intended to be protected; 
however, it gave significant exterritoriality to its organizational structure. 
 
                                                
338 “‘Aile İmami’ Ziyaret Edecek,” 9 March 2011, Milliyet Daily Newspaper, 
<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/-aile-imami-ziyaret-
edecek/gundem/gundemdetay/09.03.2011/1362120/default.htm> (9 March 2011). 
339 The currency has been modified to the New Turkish Liras. 
340 “Diyanet Bütçesi 11 Bakanlığı Geride Bıraktı; Savunmada da Yüksek Artış Var,” T24 Online 
Newspaper, 23 October 2012, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/diyanetin-butcesi-11-bakanligi-geride-
birakti/215871> (23 October 2012). 
341 Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Alevi Çalıştayı, 34-35. 
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The demand regarding the closure of DİB is one of the most concrete 
demands of Alevis with respect to official declaration of Alevi Cultural Foundation, 
Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, discourses of every single 
attendees of the meeting and all the personal interviews those were carried out. 
 
Education system has been a political tool during the whole history, not 
only in Turkish case, but also in French one as it was mentioned in second and third 
chapters of this thesis. With significant changes in Turkish educational system, 
religion has been a component that has gained more and more power within time. As 
the final step, with 4+4+4, secondary parts of Imam-Hatip schools were re-opened 
and three more religious classes have been added to the curriculum of the last two 
parts of three-step-education system, while the already existing one was being 
discussed.  
 
Obligatory religious ethic classes have brought about many individual issues 
during the early ages of Alevis as it was mentioned earlier. Regarding these classes, 
three different perspectives are being discussed.342 First of all, the class should be 
taken out of the curriculum. Secondly, its obligation should be lifted, and it should 
be given as an optional class. Lastly, it should include Alevism. Regarding these 
three options, aforelisted two different representatives interpret the issue with 
distinctive distinguishments. For instance, Islamic Alevism supports the inclusion of 
Alevism into the index of classes, Political Alevism points out the first two options 
for a concrete solution.343 With the new educational system, Alevism was added to 
the curriculum of one of the optional classes; however, neither the obligatory class 
was removed, nor its obligation was vanished. On the other hand, the Imam-Hatip 
schools, which were strongly discussed by the Alevis as it is a state financed 
alternative education on contrary to regular high schools, regained their importance 
with new-opening secondary parts. Due to these reasons, new education system has 
been considered as a political tool, once again, to conservatize the new generations 
from early ages, and in terms of Alevism, various religious courses, even they are 
                                                
342 İlyas Üzüm, Günümüz Aleviliği (İstanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2000), 137-138. 
343 Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Alevi Çalıştayı, 34-35; 
    “Aleviliğin Ders Kitaplarına Girmesi,” Yakın Plan, NTV - Public TV Channel. (Ankara, 10 
February 2004). 
 
246 
optional, and Imam-Hatip schools have still been the tools to assimilate their 
distinctive identity.  
 
The critics regarding 4+4+4 education system has been made since it was 
started to be discussed, and continued after the first educational year of system’s 
application, this is to mention educational year of 2012-2013. In March 2012, 
various Alevi associations and foundations gathered in order to protest the judicial 
decision regarding Sivas Massacre and made several declarations about their 
problems. Apart from slogans those referred “racist” and “unprogressive” 
characteristics, the chairpersons of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Foundation Hüseyin 
Güzelgül, Haci Bektas Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation Geçmez, Confederation 
of European Alevi Unions Turgut Öker, Alevi-Bektashi Federation Selahattin Özer, 
and vice chairperson of Alevi Cultural Foundations Engün Gündüz pointed out the 
4+4+4 education system, which aimed to conservatize the new generations in the 
point of view of not only Alevis, but also wider part of society.344 
 
Besides, Chairpersons of many different Alevi Foundations have made 
official declarations in order to protest it and to criticize its conservative approach 
regarding the new generations. On 17 September 2012, in Antalya, a southern city, 
the Chairperson of Antalya branch of Hacı Bektaş Cultural Foundation Hakverdi 
Çelik made a declaration after the protest meeting and stated: 
 
“We, Alevis, will not let 4+4+4 education system, which is based on 
AKP’s racist, unprogressive and assimilative Turkish-Islamic approach. We will 
keep on our struggle against the AKP fascism.”345 
 
In Mersin, a southern city, 4+4+4 was protested, as well. On 17 September, 
as in Antalya, a group of Alevis gathered, and the protest speech was made by 
Chairperson of Mersin branch of Alevi Cultural Foundation, Suat Yıldız. He stated; 
 
                                                
344 “Sivas Kararına Karşı On Binler Kadıköy’de,” Emek Hareketinin Gündemi, 31 March 2012, 
<http://www.sendika.org/2012/03/sivas-kararina-karsi-on-binler-kadikoyde/> (31 March 2012). 
345 “Antalya’da 4+4+4′e Alevi Tepkisi,” Emek Hareketinin Gündemi, 18 September 2012, 
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“Alevis have been denied so far, have lived under oppression, cruelty and 
massacres, and have faced with assimilative and denier education systems. With 
4+4+4 education system of AKP Government, assimilative policies have been 
concreted in order to create ‘one religion’ and ‘one society’.”346 
 
 With respect to official declaration regarding Alevi demands for the Alevi 
Opening, Alevi foundations stated that, apart from the Imam-Hatip schools, state 
financed courses of Quran and theology faculties, which are, majorly, 
professionalize on Islamic issues, such as fiqh, sharia and so on, are not compatible 
with laic structure. According to Alevi perspective, a laic state should keep its 
distance to all religious identities, instead of financing any of them.347 That is the 
reason why supporters of Political Alevism mention that they are against the idea of 
salaries for dedes, or inclusion of Alevism to the structure of DİB, or financiation of 
monthly bills of cemevis instead of official recognition.348  
 
Implementations against laic state structure has been mentioned above 
within first four classifications; however, apart from those, there are some other 
legal issues pointing out the superiority of Sunni Islam among all other religious 
identities or denial of Alevism.  
 
Laicism was constitutionally approved in 1937; nevertheless, many different 
articles regarding various issues should have been taken into account for the 
functioning of laicism. Some of the examples about the superiority of mosques, 
which was referred as a prerequisite of recognition of a place as an urban area, or 
acceptance of mosques as the representatives of all places of worship were given in 
previous parts of this chapter. Hence, Alevis ask for regulation of related articles 
that bring about dichotomy for the religious recognition of state. For instance, the 
aforementioned Village Law of 1924, Article 91; the Forest of Law of 1956, Article 
                                                
346 “Mersin'de Zorunlu Din Dersi Protesto Edildi,” Vatan Daily Newspaper, 17 September 2012, 
national edition, <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/alevilerden-tepki-geldi/481528/7/yasam> (18 
September 2012). 
347 Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Alevi Çalıştayı, 50-52. 
348 Place of worships in Turkey are excluded from monthly bills infrastructural services. For the 
demand of official recognition of cemevis, exemption from monthly bills was offered by AKP 
Government. 
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31;349 and the Law of Cadastral Survey of 1987, Article 16350 should be revised, in 
order to change the word “mosque” with “places of worship” to mention not only 
Islamic places of worship, but also to include different religious systems, such as 
synagogues, churches and cemevis after its official recognition.351  
 
State awareness about religious preferences as a result of Turkish ID Cards 
should be distinguished, as well. In Turkish ID Cards, there is a section, in which the 
religion is written.352 According to Alevis, this implementation is not compatible 
with laicism, as religious issues should be kept in personal and state is not supposed 
to intervene in this kind of personal issues. On this point, there is one thing that 
should be highlighted. Regarding the religion section of ID Cards, there are two 
different interpretations, as there were in previous demands of Alevis. While some 
of the groups claim that the section should be removed and the identities should be 
swept away from any religious component including Confederation of European 
Alevi Unions, and Alevi-Bektashi Federation,353 some other groups ask for the 
change of Islam with Alevi, as Islam is meant to be Sunni Islam for centuries.354 
 
Alevis refer laic state structure as the basis of their demands; however, the 
question is what they ask for among this laic structure, privilege or egalitarian 
approach. When aforementioned demands are taken into account, the references to 
the laic state structure can be considered legitimate, as their description of laicism is 
fully understandable with the consideration of its theoretical meaning. Laicism 
means that maintaining equal distance to every single religious identity with strict 
state control as contrary to secularism. Hence, regarding this description, 
constitutionally guaranteed obligatory religious classes with significant issues 
                                                
349 Within villages that include abundant state forest territories are allowed to be handed over for the 
purpose of construction of common necessities of villagers, such as mosques, sanatoriums, roads, 
bridges and houses. 
350 Among the all places those are possessed by the state for public usage and those are unowned 
privately: A) the ones that are separated for the usage of official buildings and facilities (open-air 
prayer place, mosques or similar) are determined with by State Revenue, public offices, 
administration of villages, cities or local governments with respect to related regulations. 
351  Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Alevi Çalıştayı, 41-47. 
352 Please see Appendix XXIV on page 339 for a sample of a male ID Card. 
353 Selahattin Özel, and Turgut Öker, “Din Hanesi Cüzdanlardan Kaldırılsın” (press release, Ankara, 
18 March 2006), Alevilik Hakkında Ayrıntılı Bilgi ve Bilinmeyenler, 
<http://www.guvencabdal.com/abfaabf_din_hanesi_cuzdanlardan_kaldirilsin-t14310.0.html>. 
354 Mutluer, “Türkiye'de Alevilik - ‘Alevileri Destekledim Diye Terfim Engellendi’.” 
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regarding Sunni Islamic practices, financement of Imam-Hatip schools not only to 
educate religious officers but also forming it as an alternate education tool, 
significant references to Imam-Hatip schools to point out its superiority than regular 
laic education system, the usage of mosques as a common necessity for the society 
instead of place of worship, existence of DİB with its increased responsibilities 
among society such as being responsible of national solidarity, and DİB´s role in 
linking with Turkish immigrants living in abroad as Turkishness is strongly 
associated with Muslimhood are the implementations that gives privilege to Sunni 
Islam among all other religious identities including Judaism, Greek and Armenian 
Churches. On the other hand, their demands regarding recognition of cemevis should 
be seen as a respectful and egalitarian approach regarding their distinctive identity; 
so that, it cannot be associated with asking for privilege, as well. Regarding the 
opening of Hacı Bektaş Veli Dervish Lodge, like many other small dervish lodges 
should be analyzed within the Law N.677 and other legal regulations. 
 
Hacı Bektaş Veli has been considered as one of the most important 
influencer of Alevism and the founder of Bektashism, as it was mentioned. Hence, 
the Dervish Lodge is the most important place of worship for Alevism. For this 
reason, it is questionable whether the law has the right to intervene to such a 
religious issue, while the freedom of conscience as one of the basic human rights has 
been guaranteed with the Constitution. Therefore, apart from a judicial approach, 
this issue should be taken into account as a problem of limitation of religious 
freedom. Briefly, demands should be seen within the perspective of egalitarian basis. 
 
With respect to the definition of laicism, existence of DİB should be focused 
with much more attention. Laicism differs from secularism with its control 
mechanism over the religion; hence, DİB was founded in order to fulfill this duty for 
the sake of laic state structure. Responsibilities of assignments of imams and 
preachers, and controls of weekly sermons were the duties of DİB. However, the 
things that should be criticized within its structure should be its annual budgets, 
which have been composed by the tax of not only Muslim citizens but also entire 
population of Turkey, included responsibilities as the ones aforementioned, and as 
its recent activities comments on social events. Its total abolishment would be a shift 
from French laïcité to Anglosaxon secularism, which causes a significant shift form 
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the purpose of this thesis. This probable shift will be referred to conclude this 
research study, and to put the question on the table to lead future studies.  
 
Apart from all aforementioned demands, Alevis ask for transformation of 
Madımak Hotel into a museum; however, this demand was responded with a special 
corner inside the Hotel, in which the names of the whole death people, both 33 
attendees and two hotel staff and two outsider protesters were written.355 The 
Governor of Sivas stated that they interpreted the event within a humanistic 
perspective; so that, they included two protesters’ names in the corner. However, the 
response could not be considered sufficient for Alevi perspective. First of all, they 
asked for a museum, but were given a corner instead, and names of the victims were 
written with their murderers`. These two issues were criticized strongly by Alevis.356 
These critics have started to be made in 2011, after the report of Alevi Initiative, and 
in the meantime, new projects were declared regarding transformation of the Hotel 
building into Special Provincial Administration Center of Science, Culture and Art 
(İl Özel İdaresi Bilim Kültür ve Sanat Merkezi), 357  and the expropriation was 
completed in 2012.358  
 
Among all, only the demand of Madımak Museum can be considered as a 
privilege; however, regarding the incident’s importance and trauma, a museum 
cannot be seen unreasonable. Besides, when the slogans are taken into account, it 
was not an attack targeting only Alevis; instead, it was an attack to the laic structure 
of the state, which has been associated with unbelief and consequently Alevism. 
Therefore, demand for a museum should be seen as a demand of a wider group of 
people supporting the laic republican identity with significant tolerance. Briefly, 
                                                
355 “33 Aydınla 2 Gösterici Aynı Panoda,” NTVMSNBC, 30 June 2011, 
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Alevi demands should be paid attention in order to provide egalitarian atmosphere 
regarding religious diversity of Turkey. 
 
4.3.2. What Can Be Done? 
 
Problems of Alevis with their distinct characteristics have been examined 
with details above. These problems have been shouted out loud since the 1990s, 
however, concrete steps have started to be taken recently.  
 
With the AKP Governments, a new era stated in Turkish politics, after many 
years of unstable coalition governments. With respect to implementations regarding 
EU negotiations, approved candidateship, and domestic progressive steps, the first 
three AKP Governments attracted the attention of liberals. During this time, an 
initiative was started for the problems of Alevis as a part of AKP’s democracy 
understanding. 
 
The Alevi Openning of 60th Government possesses significant importance 
with being the first official step that has been taken with specific concern on 
problems of Alevis.359 The demands were started to be declared after the awakening 
of identity within a concrete perspective; however, apart from individual examples, 
an organized initiative has been carried out for the first time. This is the most 
important and the only supported side of the Openning. Why? 
 
The Initiative was composed of seven workshops those were carried out 
between 2009 and 2011 with different parts of the society including Alevi and Sunni 
ones. The first workshop was done on 3-4 June 2009 with attendance of Minister of 
State Faruk Çelik, and 35 Alevi-Bektashi representatives, and five basic issues were 
discussed. These five issues were a) official recognition of cemevis, b) abolishment 
of obligatory religious ethic classes, c) transformation of Madımak Hotel into a 
museum, d) stopping the construction process of mosques in Alevi villages, e) 
handing the sacred places of Alevi faith over Alevi Foundations.360 Since then, the 
rest of the workshops were carried out with attendance of academics (second 
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252 
workshop), professors of theology faculties and DİB (third workshop), artists and 
representatives of NGOs (fourth workshop), journalists (fifth workshop), with 
heterogeneous profiles of attendees (for the last two workshops).  
 
During these seven workshops, the problems of Alevis were discussed within 
different perspectives by various parts of societies. This has been one of the critics 
that was made regarding the methodology, which was totally disputed due to several 
issues. Regarding the discussions of workshops, it was defined as a pedagogic 
process, with not being in-depth. 361  Besides, the attendance of theology professors 
and considerable intervention of DİB in the workshops became one of the most 
controversial issues that has been discussed negatively. Regarding the 
representatives of Alevis those were invited to the workshops, the lack of 
representation of Arab Alevism was emphasized as a negative issue, as they also 
have been part of discrimination regarding their distinctive religious identity. As 
stated by Alevi Cultural Foundation and Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural 
Foundation, Alevism should be taken into account as a complete identity regardless 
from any ethnic origin, or diverse practices.362  
 
The critics were not only about the representatives or the attendees of 
workshop series. The perspective that has been possessed regarding the problems 
was discussed, as well. With respect to the discourses of the workshops, Geçmez 
and Şen evaluated the process as a way of labeling Alevis and to assimilate them 
into Sunni Islamic culture.363 
 
After seven workshops with different attendees and discuting different topics, 
the official report was published on 31 March 2011. The aim was to solve the 
problems of Alevis within a systematic approach, which would not be against the 
laic structure. However, the result could not be enough to satisfy Alevis, as caused 
them to define the whole process as a total disappointment.364  
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362 Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Alevi Çalıştayı, 9-10. 
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Within a general perspective, Alevi demands were generally based on 
democratic, humanistic and laicist approaches in order to finalize the process that 
excludes Alevis from social and political structure and assimilates them. As a 
response, the suggestions are classified as below:365 
 
1) Alevis should be unified in order to be defined in a concrete way as a prerequisite 
of implementation of state responsibilities. After that, as its proper responsibilities, 
the state should take precautions in order to cease the so-called discriminations that 
Alevis claim that they have faced with. 
2) Solidarity regarding the brotherhood should play significant role within this 
process, and the problems should be solved with respect to laic state structure under 
the rule of law. 
 
3) It is important to pay attention to the inconvenience that might occur if an identity 
distinction regarding Alevism would be pointed out. 
 
4) Alevis, under the common values of Islam, are welcome to DİB in order to 
benefit as much as Sunni citizens. Hence, the administrative structure of DİB should 
be revised in order to be compatible with Alevi demands. Within this perspective, a 
moderative way should be composed for Alevis, who do not want to be linked with 
DİB, with respect to the necessities of societies and laic state structure. In the 
meantime, laicism should be understood as a wider, liberal base instead of a way to 
limit and obstruct the religious freedom. 
 
5) A constitutional regulation is a necessity regarding the problems of practices. 
With the Minister of National Education, related workshops should be started to be 
carried out. Besides, the index of religious ethic classes should be revised and 
information about different religious systems should be introduced, as well. 
 
6) The Madimak Hotel should be expropriated and the new form should be 
constructed with respect to the wills of people of Sivas. For the memory of incident, 
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a special place should be prepared, with respect to the solidarity in order to prevent 
from any probable problem.  
 
7) Cemevis should be gained an official status, and their necessities should be 
provided by the state. 
 
 These responses were considered as insufficient and insincere by Alevis, as 
they claimed that the government did not understand what Alevis ask for. For 
instance, invitation to DİB, while they were against its existence and actual structure 
was considered as inappropriate. On the other hand, the necessity of unification of 
Alevis for a concrete definition that was pointed out by the state was seen as 
insincere, as Alevis support their internal diversity as a richness of Alevi culture.  
 
 According to the report, cemevis were distinguished, as they should be given 
an official status; however, recognition of cemevis as places of worships was pointed 
as a probable threat for mosques, as they would be seen as an alternative place of 
worship for Muslims. However, this discourse was responded with a concrete 
negativeness by Alevis, and they claimed that the AKP Government behaved as 
Vatican, as it intended to decide whether cemevis were places of worship, or not.366 
 
 Briefly, the Alevi Opening could not be a concrete solution for any of the 
Alevi demands. The only thing that should be seen as a significant within this 
process, was its being the first official step has been taken for the purpose to solve 
the problems. Within this perspective, there are two important issues that ought to be 
emphasized. Firstly, no matter what the aim was, the Opening was carried out by a 
conservative government. In 2002, when AKP came into power, supporters of laic 
republican identity maintained their distance with significant doubts regarding 
party`s and its members` support to Ottoman Islamic identity. It is a fact that the 
doubts have never been vanished; however, for the history of the Republic, Alevis 
have been taken into account for the first time by a government. Most interestingly, 
this government has caused one of the most significant periods of polarization 
between the supporters of two different identity of Turkishness. This polarization 
                                                
366 “Alevi'lerden Sert Tepki,” Hürriyet Daily Newspaper, 1 April 2011, 
<http://www.hurriyet.de/haberler/gundem/872967/alevilerden-sert-tepki> (1 April 2011). 
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and increased tension caused a social movement with Gezi Protests all over the 
country not around these two identity groups but around supporters and non-
supporters of AKP Government. On the other hand, secondly, the issue of religious 
freedom for a certain religious group should not be questioned in a state, where 
laicism was guaranteed by the Constitution for more than three quarters of a century. 
Laicism was constitutionally guaranteed; however, as it is visible for the case of 
Alevis, there are dichotomies regarding the limits of freedom for maintaining a 
certain identity.  
 
 The issue regarding the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge has been examined in 
previous chapter. As a response to Alevi discontentment, a university in Nevşehir 
was changed into Hacı Bektaş Veli Üniversitesi. The Democracy Package was 
expected to solve many problems of Alevis at least to touch more important one, 
which is the recognition of the cemevis. However, the only outcome has been the 
change of said university name. As stated by Bozdağ, the government is working on 
a new series of regulations dedicated to the problems of religious groups. According 
to newspaper articles, this package is said to be completed before March 2014 (the 
time of upcoming Local Elections) and to refer following issues concerning 
Alevis:367 
 
- Cemevis will be granted with an official status. However, so far, the status 
has not been clarified yet. While Alevis ask for “place of worship”, the 
government insists on “belief center”. 
- Dedes and one more person from cemevi staff will be granted with monthly 
salary. 
- Government will cover significant costs of belief centers. 
- Municipalities will allocate landed territories to belief centers. 
- State Channel TRT will do broadcasting regarding different belief systems 
including Alevism. 
- Actual structure of DİB will be revised in order to facilitate the 
communication with different belief systems. 
 
                                                
367 Hakkı Kurban, “Seçimden Önce İnanç Paketi,” Akşam Daily Newspaper, 4 October 2013, 
<http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/secimden-once-inanc-c2paketi/haber-250015> (4 October 2013). 
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 As it can be seen on articles of a probable content, financiation has formed 
the main idea: salaries, financial aids, and landed territories. The most salient article 
among all is the reorganization of DİB`s structure. The solution referred here might 
be to form various sub-offices for different belief systems to facilitate the 
communication. As the articles have not been officially declared yet, it will be early 
to say that it whether would suit with Alevi demands or not; however, it is certain 
that if aforelisted articles form the regulation, supporters of Islamic Alevism will be 
content, while supporters of Political Alevism will be excluded. As it was mentioned 
above, adherents of Political Alevism are unified around unsuitability between 
financiation of any belief system and laic state structure; hence the financial 
references will not satisfy them. Additionally, representation in DİB will be another 
disagreement theme as it has always been for these two groups of Alevis.  
 
 There is another issue that has brought about divergence between these two 
groups: co-location of a mosque and a cemevi as a belief complex. This project has 
been declared as a peace-building project by Prof. Doğan.368 On the other hand, 
there have been many critics for this project. The project has been the target of 
critics, since its prime mover was Gülen, and it was a project that was associated 
with Doğan and with Cem Foundation those have been referred many times with 
close relationship with AKP Government. In addition to critics, Balkız referred this 
project as a betrayal to Alevis.369 This project, once again, has put two different 
ideas from different Alevi groups and demonstrated significant divergence between 
them. 
  
 The issue of freedom of conscience with its limitations has been emphasized 
by EU in Progress Reports of Turkey with significant references to Alevism. Since 
2000, the Progress Reports have contained distinguishments regarding the lack of 
any progress for providing freedom of maintaining Alevi identity. Sometimes the 
issue focused on financiation of Sunni identity, sometimes laicism was pointed out 
                                                
368 “İzzettin Doğan: Cami-cemevi projesini protesto edenlerin Alevi olması mümkün değil,” T24 
Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi, 10 September 2013, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/izzettin-dogan-bunu-
yapanlarin-alevi-olmasi-mumkun-degil/239164> (15 September 2013). 
369 “Aleviler neden kendilerini dışlanmış hissediyor?,” Aykırı Sorular, CNN Türk (Istanbul, 30 
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as the guarantee of religious freedom.370 Within different points of views, official 
un-recognition of Alevism has been pointed out in every year’s Progress Report, as 
a lack of real progress in terms of freedom of conscience. In the Report of 2013, the 
official fast-breaking dinner, the revisation of religious classes, co-location of a 
mosque and a cemevi, and inclusion of Alevi faith into the books were pointed out 
as positive approach; however, the same report underlined that there has been no 
concrete step regarding recognition of cemevis, DİB`s insists on mosques as the 
unique worship places of entire Muslims and the insufficiency of Alevi information 
in revised religious culture and ethics textbook as negativeness of an ongoing 
process regarding the limits of religious freedom of Alevism.371 
 
As internal and external critics demonstrate, Ottoman heritage of Sunni 
Islamic culture has, somehow, been maintained in terms of exclusions of Alevis 
from social structure. Under these conditions, state should have possessed 
significant role for providing religious freedom without giving privileges to any 
religious identity. On this point, AKP Governments` endeavours should be 
considered significant; however, the role given to DİB regarding the discussions of 
Alevi problems, unification calls and frequent Islamic Ottoman references made by 
party members cause suspicions among Alevis and questions to these steps` 
sincerety. 
 
Regarding legal issues, the problems should be taken into account with 
respect to laic state structure. While the existing laws and constitutional requirement 
should be taken into account, they should also be revised in case of necessity. 
Recent discourses concerning laicism are considerable within this point. Both 
Deputy PM Ali Babacan and President Gül distinguished a necessity to shift into an 
Anglo-Saxon understanding of laicism, that is to say secularism, for Turkey.372 
                                                
370 “Avrupa Birliği İlerleme Raporları,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 10 December 
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These statements possessing significant importance referring obstacles those have 
been occurred against religious freedom due to the laic structure of state; however, it 
is important to understand which obstacles are being referred. As it has always been 
in the history of the republic, when the limits of religious freedom are taken into 
account by state authorities, it has always referred Sunni Islamic culture and 
obstacles that limited Sunni Islamic necessities; such as veiling issue. 
 
Necessary regulations should be done in order to form an equal base for 
religious requirements of Alevism. Official recognition of cemevis is the most 
important one. The state, the government and DİB should withdraw themselves from 
the discourses whether it is a regular place of worship or not. This definition has 
already been made by its adherents, as Alevis practice their religious necessities, 
such as cem ceremonies and funerals, in these places. Hence, this should be the first 
implementation that the government should carry out in order to attract the attention 
of Alevis and to gain their support with their sincerety. Existence of DİB, Imam-
Hatip schools and religious classes are the issues those should be solved with legal 
regulations in order to reduce their privileges and consequent superiority of Sunni 
Islam. Within the national identity of Turkishness, Sunni Islamic belief is just one of 
the religious components. Hence, the state should maintain its equal limits, without 
privileging any of the religious identities.  
 
For a total religious freedom for everyone, including Alevis, legal 
regulations form only the primary step. Apart from them, which were implemented 
by states, the role of society has significant importance, as well. Alevis believe that 
necessary legal regulations would not be sufficient to solve their problems as they 
have faced with discriminative attitudes among society in daily life. According to 
the results of “Mobilizing Towards Equality and Non-Discrimination” project, 
Alevis believe that it is possible to resolve discrimination problem with the help of 
social communities (80%) and NGOs (75%) by awakening social awareness and 
with the help of the state (71.1%).373  
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As one can see, majority of Alevis see the solution inside the society itself. It 
is obvious that state policies are essential for a solution for legal problems; however, 
the problem in general can be solved by embedding the idea of equality in society 
with official discourses based on egalitarian approach, not pointing out one of the 
religion`s superiority, and support of state policies, not only for Alevis, but also for 
all religious and ethnic richness. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Religion and state affairs, with recent Arab Uprisings, has become an issue 
on international agenda with references to secularism`s importance for 
democratization, especially for Muslim societies. Within western values, it has been 
a component in the frame of political and/or social system. The progress did not 
occur as an instant change, of course. As the laic/secular idea has a long history in 
western politics, it has been integrated in and possessed by the society, no matter 
which concept is taken into account, whether French laicism or Anglo-Saxon 
secularism. On the other hand, while it has been an issue to discuss for Muslim 
societies, the Republic of Turkey adopted this western concept over its traditional 
eastern heritage almost eighty years ago.  
 
The Republic of Turkey took French laïcité - laiklik as a part, or better to say 
as a prerequisite of its modernization process. Application of laicism to a majorly 
Muslim society over political and social heritage of the Ottoman Empire, which was 
based on absolute power of the Sultan-Caliph not only in political but also in 
religious orders, created a dichotomy among society on understanding of the new 
identity. Consequently, Turkish political and social structures have witnessed a 
clash between supporters and opponents of laicism up until to present time.  
 
What was laicism in Turkish experience? It was the privatization of religion 
and reducing its importance to individual level. Within this perspective, religion was 
necessary for private life; however, its separation from state affairs was 
considerably important in order to provide a stable political structure free from 
religion based dogmas and consequents obstacles, as Voltaire argued. The 
abolishment of Caliphate is the most salient implementation within this perspective. 
However, the establishment of Presidency of Religious Affairs demonstrates that the 
Turkish laicism desired to take religion under state’s control, in order to intervene 
Islamic issues. The source of sovereignty was also an important part of Turkish 
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laicization process. As stated by Rousseau, it should have been possessed by people; 
hence, it was taken from Islam and handed over the society with legislative power 
thanks to various legal and constitutional regulations. The most salient and original 
characteristic of Turkish laicism was the escape from Arab culture. As the Ottoman 
Empire accepted Sunni Islamic doctrine and welcomed Arab culture, that was a 
necessity in order to cut the ties with Islamic past and to embed a new identity 
entirely different from the previous one.  
 
With aforementioned characteristics of Turkish laicism, it created its own 
supporters and opponents gathered around two dominant antagonist groups: 
supporters of new laic republican identity and the supporters of old Islamic Ottoman 
identity. This polarization brought about significant conflicts, and instable history 
regarding the limits of religious freedom. Religious freedom issue has been tangled 
around Sunni Islamic perspective: (according to this perspective) Sunni Muslim 
society was kept from their religious necessities due to implementations based on 
laicism; consequently, when governments take the subject of religious freedom into 
account it was the extension of limits concerning Sunni Islamic necessities. 
However, the Muslim society of Turkey is not homogeneous and they are not the 
adherents of just Sunni Islamic doctrine. As already stated, Alevis are members of 
Turkey’s Muslim society, and their ratio in entire population of Turkey forms a 
significant part that should be taken into account concerning religious freedom.  
 
Alevis, as adherents of a syncretic religious identity, have considered the 
history as a centuries-old-process based on oppression for themselves that has been 
the reason of the secrecy they maintained during their rural life starting from the 
Ottoman Empire up until 1960s under the rule of the Republic of Turkey. The 
foundation of the republic and laicization process with its aforelisted components 
were welcomed, and became a new hope for Alevis. Most importantly, for them it 
was an escape from Arab based cultural components. From the foundation of 
Republic of Turkey, Alevis have supported the idea of living under a new state with 
a new identity. While old Islamic Ottoman Identity supporters have never given up 
the Arabic components of Turkish culture, and considered the creation of a new 
identity as denial of history, the idea of escape attracted the attention of Alevis as a 
most salient characteristic of Turkish laicism.  
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Within this clash of identities, Alevis took their position favoring the new 
laic republican identity, and they consider themselves not only supporters, but also 
as constituents of newborn Republic of Turkey, and one of the guarantees of laic 
state structure. In fact, this was not just a self-definition; even republican minded 
Sunni supporters of new laic identity have also accepted Alevis as defenders of state 
structure of Republic of Turkey. This evaluation caused significant political results 
concerning their misrepresentation in political scene.  
 
As Alevis have been certain supporters of new laic republican identity, they 
have not associated very well with right wing political parties. Besides, left wing 
political parties have not paid significant attention to Alevi demands. Support of 
Alevis has always been taken for granted and they have been considered as definite 
electorates. On the other hand, as an outcome of laic state structure, forming a 
political party dedicated to Alevis in terms of religious identity cannot be considered 
as acceptable. Besides, due to divergence among Alevis of Turkey, a single political 
party would not be effective in representation of Alevi demands as they differ from 
one group to another. (Turkish) Unity Party is an important example of Turkish 
political history regarding being the representative of Alevis. On one side it was 
criticized strongly for being a threat to laic state structure as it targeted a religious 
group (even unofficially); and on the other hand, it was not reflecting entire Alevi 
demands. Eventually, Unity Party was recorded as a failure in Turkish political 
history due to critics on its incompatibility with laicism, insufficiency in 
representation of Alevi demands and rumors regarding its association with other 
political parties not for interests of Alevis but for the purpose of political goals. 
 
The lack of representation forced Alevis to reconsider their position at 
concrete turning point of political history of Turkey. As the election of 1950 started 
a new period in Turkish democracy, their support shifted into Democrat Party from 
Republican People`s Party, which could not respond their demands. Their support to 
Democrat Party lasted in a short period, and they supported the 1960 Military 
Intervention; and they ended with Republican People`s Party again; although, it was 
not efficient for Alevi representation in the Assembly. As (Turkish) Unity Party was 
a failure, it would not be wrong to claim that Alevis were lost in terms of political 
representation.  
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Limits of religious freedom have been taken into account by right leaning 
political parties those have frequently referred to Islamic Ottoman identity; however, 
within their point of view, they have been the Sunnis, who were hindered in terms 
of religious freedom. Accordingly, the implementations of these governments, 
starting from Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes, Justice Party of Süleyman 
Demirel, until Welfare Party and many others of Necmettin Erbakan, and Justice 
and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have focused on Sunni Islamic 
demands. The limits of religious freedom have been changed, narrowed or expanded 
with respect to then governments` leanings; however, demands of Alevis and their 
religious necessities have never been taken into account on discussions regarding 
religious freedom in Turkey. While political parties considered being in power as a 
tool to change the limits of religious freedom, and have put its own rules over the 
society (as it has been referred in French experience), Alevis were not taken into 
account as one of the players of game of democracy. Briefly, the game was not fair 
for Alevis. On this point, there is one thing that should be distinguished. As it was 
mentioned in related part, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the chairman of the Republican 
People’s Party - main opposition party of the current political structure - is an Alevi 
politician. This fact may be a chance for Alevi representation in the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey; however, he has not used his religious origin in political scene 
as a tool to attract Alevi attention. 
 
In addition to laicization process, the industrialization process also brought 
about significant social changes in Turkey. For Alevis, the most specific result was 
the urbanization. With the urbanization, Alevis started to have many difficulties in 
terms of religious freedom, many social problems regarding their distinctive identity 
including curiosity, fear and insult, security within Sunni majority. As their limit of 
religious freedom was narrowed eventually, they felt to hide their religious identity 
from their neighbor, even from their own children. It was not just an outcome of any 
political implementation, but also a result of neighborliness of two distinct religious 
identities those have prejudgments to the other for centuries as an old habit, which is 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire.   
 
All the prejudgments and consequent pejorative discourses caused 
unfortunate social problems regarding religious differences between Sunnis and 
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Alevis. As Sunni Islam has been frequently pointed out as superior, other belief 
systems have been considered as secondary. Due to prejudgments other belief 
systems often have been insulted, and Alevism has become a target of these kinds of 
prejudgments not only in the Ottoman period but also today. Certain groups of 
supporters of Islamic Ottoman identity consider Alevis as perverted Muslims, 
infidels and even enemies of religion. These prejudgments have been the reasons of 
mass targeted attacks, for instance in late 1970s and most recently, in Sivas. Of 
course, there had been security deficiencies; however, as they were discussed in 
detail, prejudicial discourses played significant role for the mobilization of Sunni 
groups. Apart from mass targeted attacks, these kinds of pejorative discourses and 
prejudgments also caused discrimination against Alevis at individual level. In terms 
of pejorative discourses, legislative regulations will be pivotal for the process of 
providing religious freedom; however, legislative regulations should be supported 
with egalitarian discourses of state officials, spiritual and opinion leaders.  
 
As discussed earlier, polarization of society has caused bloody attacks during 
1970s within political groups those were concretely associated with religious 
preferences. Hence, it would not be wrong to claim that these groups were driven by 
not only political goals, but also religious ones. Within tensed political and 
sociological atmosphere, Alevis associated themselves with socialist ideology as it 
denies any religious component and possessed egalitarian structure; on the other 
hand, nationalist ideology in Turkey had been re-defined with Sunni Islam in its 
core. With respect to Sunni Islam centric nationalist ideology, communist Alevis 
were enemies both to religion and national unity of the state. When the mass 
targeted attacks are taken into account and the re-awakening of Sunni Islamic 
identity as a component of nationalism, it is possible to see the simultaneity. 
Increased awareness of religious identity caused more discussions, and with the 
interaction between the Alevis and the Sunni majority as a result of urbanization, the 
problem scaled up with the attacks in the cities where religious diversities are more 
significant. 
 
Since the 1980 Military Intervention, state-religion affairs were carried to a 
different level. As the hostility among political groups was often associated with 
religion, Presidency of Religious Affairs was pointed out as responsible institution 
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among state’s institutions for solidarity of the nation by military government. 
Pointing out Presidency of Religious Affairs could be accepted as military 
government’s effort to establish collaboration between institutions of state, which is 
similar to Montesquieu’s reference on necessity of harmony between state 
institutions and religious institutions. However, one can see that while Montesquieu 
was talking about the collaboration of two distinct sets of institutions, military 
government was talking about the collaboration of institutions of same state. At that 
point, it is important to discuss the actual responsibility of the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs. According to Alevis, its existence is not compatible with laic state 
structure. However, its existence can be legitimized with the Turkish understanding 
of laicism, which aims to control the religion by the hands of state. On today’s 
structure, the Presidency of Religious Affairs functions around Sunni Islamic centric 
policies, which does not provide any space for the representation of other religious 
groups including Alevis. In order to have religious freedom for everyone in Turkey, 
the Presidency of Religious affairs should be re-structured and should cut its ties 
from the state to become a totally independent institution in the structure of Turkey. 
By doing so, the Presidency would be an institution in which every member of 
distinctive religious groups can be represented.  
  
 Increased conservatization among society forced Alevis to mobilize for 
many different reasons. First of all, it was a necessity that resulted with urbanization. 
They lost both their companions (müsahip) and their communities, which are two 
important elements of Alevism. The city life was a threat for their religious identity, 
which may weaken their ties to Alevism. In order to maintain their religious identity, 
they have formed new communities with respect to urban conditions and established 
foundations to gather and to practice. And secondly, there was the security issue. 
Under the conditions of rural life, they were practicing with the help of watchmen; 
however, in city life, it changed. Far from their communities, they felt lonely and 
insecure. Besides, the collective memory of recent past with mass targeted attacks 
deepened their concerns. With mobilization in city centers, they felt secure, started 
to make themselves heard despite lack of political representation. Additionally, 
gathering around their foundations facilitated the adaptation to new life style in 
urban areas, without loosing their ties with Alevism.  
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 When it comes to the question that whether laic Turkish state has provided 
religious freedom to Alevis, or not, it would not be wrong to claim that it has failed 
so far. A laic structure was a concrete necessity for the modernization period of 
Turkey. Its control mechanisms can be understood as well, with respect to the 
conditions of transformation process. However, giving privileges a specific religious 
identity, not only with implementations and sponsorships but also with political 
discourses pointing out the superiority of one of the belief systems those are 
composing the entire society, cannot be associated with laic state structure. The state 
should maintain itself equally far from any religious belief system. Within this 
perspective, as also pointed out by Alevis, Imam-Hatip schools, religious lectures, 
financing establishment of mosques, assignments of imams as state officers are not 
compatible with ideal laicism. Hence, on going discussions (at the writing time of 
this thesis) about series of regulations in order to finance cemevis and to pay 
monthly salaries to dedes and cemevi staff cannot be considered as a solution for the 
problems of Alevis, either.  
 
 The Alevi Opening of Justice and Development Party was a considerably 
positive step that has been taken by a government, most importantly by a 
government, which frequently referred as pro-Islamist one. The entire process have 
been criticized a lot, and it is not possible to claim that these critics were unfair; 
nevertheless, it has been the first time that any state initiative has been carried out in 
order to contact directly with Alevis. Among all, the most salient critic that Alevis 
claimed was they were not well represented during the workshops. As there is 
divergence among Alevis, positions of Alevi representatives is another issue that 
haven been discussed; attendance of Islamic scholars and representatives of 
Presidency of Religious Affairs puts the question on the table: Would Sunni Islamic 
scholars decide, whether Alevis should be granted with significant regulations 
concerning their problems? The issue should be discussed not only by the 
representatives of Sunni majority, but also by every side, and common consensus 
would be achieved. Like the whole process, its final report has been criticized as 
well. The final report made a call for unification of Alevis and stated that Alevis 
could benefit the services of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which were heavily 
criticized by Alevis. As all communities, Alevis possess different approaches to the 
life with their religious identity and political ideology. It would not be correct to 
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expect all of them to think and to move in one direction. Additionally, due to its 
syncretic structure and lack of systematic information transfer, Alevism differs from 
one group to another. Hence, I do not see a necessity of unification as the 
Government called them to. There are certain issues that all Alevis are agreed on, 
such as the recognition of cemevis. Salary issues or their financing should be further 
steps that have to be considered with respect to definition of ideal laicism with its 
theoretical and practical status. Briefly, it is right to take a step in order to provide 
more religious freedom to Alevis with Alevi Opening and recent regulations; 
however, the methodology that has taken to solve the problems are not carefully 
considered. Therefore, it is possible to say that despite positives sites, Justice and 
Development Party’s way of dealing with the problem of Alevis is not completely 
right. As the problem cannot be solved in a day or two, Turkey needs more than 
government policies and initiatives and should build state policies, which would not 
be changed depending party in power. Moreover, it is evident that Turkish 
understanding of laicism caused problems during the time, therefore it should be 
defined clearly within the frame of religious freedom. Briefly, instead of series of 
regulations like patches to existing system, the entire structure should be revised. In 
addition to revised state structure, the political leaders and opinion leaders should 
also revise their discourses regarding the issue and adopt more positive tone. While 
inappropriate or discriminative speeches damages the trust of public opinion, 
positive tone will improve the support of the society, which eventually pave the way 
for the common consensus. 
 
To conclude, the state of Turkey has failed in terms of providing religious 
freedom to diverse religious identities so far, as it should have been an outcome of 
laic state structure. This failure brought about oppression among society, and with 
the identity dichotomy, political scene of Turkey have witnessed significant 
competitions, while polarization have occurred among the society. Even recently, 
the Gezi Park Protests can be evaluated within the same framework of this 
competition. 
 
In terms of identity clash, Alevis have been excluded and not been provided 
complete religious freedom by none of the aforementioned identities, new laic 
republican and old Islamic Ottoman. Turkish understanding of laicism was to 
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control the religion and to ignore its diverse components; hence, it excluded 
Alevism as many other religious identities. On the other hand, traditional old 
Ottoman Islamic identity have not respected to distinctive components of Alevism 
and excluded it, unless Alevis would ignore their differences and accept the values 
of Sunni Islam as the unique values of Islam, such as the issue of worship places, 
structure and privileges of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Consequently, 
neither the laic republican identity, nor the Islamic Ottoman identity representatives 
could take sufficient steps to expand the limits of religious freedom for everyone. 
Accordingly, problems of Alevis will keep on taking its place on the agenda of 
Turkey, which should been evaluated within basic human rights in terms of 
religious freedom, until they arrive at certain limits of religious freedom that let 
them to live and practice freely and properly. If the actual situation needs to be 
summarized, the sentence that Ercan Geçmez, the Chairperson of Hacı Bektaş Veli 
Anatolian Foundation, stated during our interview will be significant to point it out: 
“Although, we have been otherized, we have been attacked physically and 
psychologically, even we were murdered, we have never otherized other identities 
and we will keep this position.” 
 
In an ideal laic state structure every religious group should be threated 
equally by state and should have total religious freedom in terms of human rights. 
For the case of Alevis this thesis argues that Alevis have not religious freedom to 
practice freely and properly. As this thesis takes the case of Alevis in order to 
understand the limits of religious freedom in laic state structure, it would not be 
wrong to say that even in laic state structure arriving to the point of total religious 
freedom for everyone is a long process. The process should be carried out not only 
by state but also by the society. While the state is providing more freedom and space 
for diverse religious groups, the society should embed the idea of religious freedom 
for all regardless of any religion as the pivotal part of the process. It is sure that it 
will take time to suppress discriminative behaviors among the individuals in order to 
expand religious freedom within the society. As a general perspective, people of 
Turkey should pay more attention to understand the other, in other words, to have 
empathy, and deepen the tolerance to ones, who are different in a way or another. 
The most important duty on this process will be the role of state officials. As 
selected leaders of society, egalitarian approach should be possessed by them first, 
! 270!
so that, they would be able to embed the idea to the individuals with respective 
discourses not with discriminative ones. Ideal society should accept every single 
citizen as he/she is regardless of religious, ethnic, or sexual identities. The common 
element should be the total understanding that they live in the same country, under 
the same flag and in the same world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 271!
 
 
 
CONCLUSIÓN 
 
La iglesia y el estado, con los alzamientos árabes, se ha convertido en un tema 
en la agenda internacional, con referencias a la importancia de la laicidad en el 
proceso de democratización, sobre todo en las sociedades musulmanas. Dentro de 
los valores occidentales, ha sido un componente en el marco del sistema político y/o 
social. El progreso no fue producido como un cambio instantáneo, por supuesto. Ya 
que la idea laica / secular tiene una larga historia en la política occidental, se ha 
integrado en la sociedad, sin importar qué concepto se tiene en cuenta, ya sea el 
laicismo francés o el secularismo anglosajón. Por otro lado, si bien ha sido objeto de 
discusión en las sociedades musulmanas, la República de Turquía adaptó este 
concepto político occidental sobre su herencia oriental tradicional hace casi ochenta 
años. 
 
La República de Turquía adaptó la laïcité (francesa) - laiklik como una parte, o 
mejor dicho, como requisito previo a su proceso de modernización. La aplicación de 
la laicidad en una sociedad mayoritariamente musulmana sobre la herencia política y 
social del Imperio Otomano, que se basaba en el poder absoluto del sultán-califa no 
sólo en las órdenes políticas sino también en las órdenes religiosas, crea una 
dicotomía entre la sociedad en la comprensión de la nueva identidad. En 
consecuencia, las estructuras políticas y sociales turcas han sido testigos de un 
choque entre partidarios y opositores del laicismo hasta la actualidad.  
 
¿Qué significó el laicismo en la experiencia de Turquía? Fue la privatización 
de la religión y la reducción de su importancia a nivel individual. Dentro de esta 
perspectiva, la religión era necesaria en la vida privada; sin embargo, su separación 
de los asuntos del Estado fue bastante importante, con el fin de proporcionar una 
estructura política estable y libre de dogmas basados en la religión y los obstáculos 
consecuentes, como argumentó Voltaire. La abolición del califato es la aplicación 
más relevante dentro de esta perspectiva. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de la 
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Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos demuestra que el laicismo turco desea tener la 
religión bajo el control del Estado, con el fin de intervenir en asuntos islámicos. La 
fuente de la soberanía fue también una parte importante del proceso de laicismo 
turco. Como dijo Rousseau, la soberanía debería haber residido en la gente, por lo 
que se tomó del Islam y fue entregado a la sociedad con poder legislativo gracias a 
diversas disposiciones legales y constitucionales. La característica más destacada y 
original del laicismo turco fue el escape de la cultura árabe. Como el Imperio 
Otomano aceptó la doctrina islámica sunita y dio la bienvenida a la cultura árabe, el 
escape era una necesidad con el fin de cortar los lazos con el pasado islámico y para 
poder integrar una nueva identidad completamente distinta de la anterior. 
 
Con las características antes mencionadas del laicismo turco, surgieron sus 
propios partidarios y opositores, los que se reunieron en torno a dos grupos 
antagonistas dominantes: los partidarios de la nueva identidad republicana laica y 
los partidarios de la vieja identidad del otomano islámico. Esta polarización provocó 
conflictos importantes y una historia inestable con respecto a los límites de la 
libertad religiosa. El tema de la libertad religiosa se ha enredado en torno a la 
perspectiva islámica sunita: (de acuerdo con esta perspectiva) la sociedad Sunni 
musulmana se mantuvo fuera de sus necesidades religiosas, según las 
implementaciones basadas en la laicidad y en consecuencia, los gobiernos toman el 
tema de la libertad religiosa en cuenta con la expansión de los límites con referencia 
a las necesidades de los sunitas islámicos. Sin embargo, la sociedad musulmana de 
Turquía no es homogénea ya que no están sólo los seguidores de la doctrina sunita 
islámica. Como se ha mencionado, los alevís son miembros de la sociedad 
musulmana de Turquía, la proporción suya en toda la población de Turquía es una 
parte importante que debe ser tomada en cuenta en relación con la libertad religiosa. 
 
Los alevís, como partidarios de una identidad religiosa sincrética, han 
considerado la historia como un proceso centenario basado en la opresión por sí 
mismos, que ha sido la razón del secreto que mantuvieron durante la vida rural desde 
el Imperio Otomano hasta 1960, bajo el Estado de la República de Turquía. La 
fundación de la república y el proceso de laicismo con sus componentes 
anteriormente citados fueron recibidos y se convirtieron en una nueva esperanza 
para los alevís. Lo más importante para ellos es que fue un modo de escape de 
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componentes culturales basados en los árabes. Desde la fundación de la República 
de Turquía, los alevís han apoyado la idea de vivir bajo un estado nuevo con una 
nueva identidad. Por otro lado, los partidarios de la vieja identidad del otomano 
islámico nunca han renunciado a los componentes árabes de la cultura turca, y han 
considerado la creación de una nueva identidad como la negación de la historia, 
mientras que la idea de escape fue la característica más sobresaliente de la laicidad 
turca que llamó la atención de los alevís. 
 
En este choque de identidades, los alevís tomaron su posición a favor de la 
nueva identidad republicana laica, y se consideran a sí mismo no solo como los 
partidarios, sino también como los constituyentes de la recién nacida república y una 
de las garantías de la estructura del Estado laico. De hecho, esto ha sido algo más 
que una autodefinición, los partidarios sunitas de la nueva identidad laica con una 
mentalidad republicana también han aceptado los alevís como los defensores de la 
estructura estatal de la Republica de Turquía. Esta evaluación ha causado resultados 
políticos importantes en cuanto a la desfiguración de los alevís en la escena política. 
 
Como los alevís han sido partidarios determinados de la nueva identidad 
republicana laica, ellos no han asociado bien con los partidos políticos de derecha. 
Además, los partidos políticos de izquierda no han prestado mucha atención a las 
demandas de los alevís. El apoyo de los alevís siempre se ha dado por sentado y 
ellos han sido considerados como electorados determinados. Por otro lado, como 
resultado de la estructura del Estado laico, la formación de un partido político 
dedicado a los alevís no puede ser considerado como aceptable en términos de 
identidad religiosa. Además, debido a la divergencia entre los alevís de Turquía, 
sólo un partido político no sería eficaz para representar las demandas de los alevís, 
puesto que varían de un grupo a otro. El Partido de la Unidad (de Turquía) es un 
ejemplo importante de la historia política turca porque ha representado a los alevís. 
Por un lado, fue criticado fuertemente por ser una amenaza a la estructura del Estado 
laico, ya que lo dirige un grupo religioso (aunque no oficialmente), y por otro lado, 
no estaba reflejando las necesidades enteras de los alevís. Con el tiempo, el Partido 
de la Unidad se ha registrado como un fracaso en la historia política turca debido a 
los críticos de su incompatibilidad con el laicismo, la insuficiencia de la 
representación de las demandas de los alevís y los rumores acerca de su asociación 
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con otros partidos políticos con el propósito de intereses políticos que no están 
relacionados con los intereses de los alevís. 
 
La falta de representación de los alevís ha obligado a reconsiderar su posición 
en el punto de inflexión concreto de la historia política turca. Las elecciones de 1950 
iniciaron una nueva etapa en la democracia turca cambiando el apoyo de los alevís 
del Partido Republicano del Pueblo hacia el Partido Demócrata, por dejar de 
responder a sus demandas. A continuación, su apoyo al Partido Demócrata se 
prolongó en un corto período, y apoyaron la intervención militar de 1960, que 
terminó con el Partido Republicano del Pueblo de nuevo; aunque no fue eficiente 
para la representación de los alevís en la Asamblea. Como el Partido de la Unidad 
(de Turquía) fue un fracaso, no sería erróneo afirmar que los alevís estuvieron 
perdidos en términos de la representación política. 
 
Los límites de la libertad religiosa han sido tenidos en cuenta por los partidos 
políticos de la derecha, los que se han referido, con frecuencia, a la identidad 
islámica otomana. Sin embargo, desde su punto de vista, los sunitas fueron la gente 
reprimida en términos de la libertad religiosa. En consecuencia, las 
implementaciones de estos gobiernos, a partir del Partido Demócrata de Adnan 
Menderes, el Partido de la Justicia de Süleyman Demirel, hasta el Partido del 
Bienestar, y muchos otros de Necmettin Erbakan, y el Partido de Justicia y 
Desarrollo de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, se han centrado en las demandas de los 
sunitas islámicos. Los límites de la libertad religiosa se han modificado, reducido o 
ampliado con respecto a los gobiernos; sin embargo, las demandas de los alevís y 
sus necesidades religiosas no se han tenido en cuenta con los debates relacionados 
con la libertad religiosa en Turquía. Los partidos políticos consideraron estar en el 
poder como una herramienta para cambiar los límites de la libertad religiosa, y 
pusieron sus propias reglas sobre la sociedad (tal y como se ha mencionado en la 
experiencia francesa); los alevís no han sido tenidos en cuenta como uno de los 
jugadores del juego de la democracia. En pocas palabras, el juego no ha sido justo 
para los alevís. En este punto, hay una cosa que debe ser distinguida. Como se 
mencionó en la parte relacionada, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, el presidente del Partido 
Republicano del Pueblo - principal partido de la oposición de la estructura política 
real - es un político aleví. Este hecho puede ser una oportunidad para que la 
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representación aleví en la Gran Asamblea Nacional de Turquía; sin embargo, él no 
ha utilizado su origen religioso en la escena política como una herramienta para 
llamar la atención aleví. 
 
Además del proceso de laicismo, el proceso de industrialización trajo consigo 
importantes cambios sociales en Turquía. Para los alevís, el resultado más concreto 
fue la urbanización. Con la urbanización, los alevís comenzaron a tener muchas 
dificultades en cuanto a la libertad religiosa y otros problemas sociales en cuanto a 
su identidad distintiva como la curiosidad, el miedo, el insulto, y la seguridad en la 
mayoría sunita. Sus límites de libertad religiosa se redujeron con el tiempo, de modo 
que sentían la necesidad de ocultar su identidad religiosa de sus vecinos, incluso de 
sus hijos. No era sólo el resultado de cualquier implementación de política, sino 
también el resultado de la vecindad de dos identidades religiosas distintas que tienen 
los prejuicios entre sí durante siglos como un hábito viejo que se ha heradado del 
Imperio Otomano. 
 
Todos los prejuicios y discursos peyorativos consiguientes causaron 
problemas sociales desafortunados sobre las diferencias religiosas entre sunitas y 
alevís. Así como el Islam sunita fue señalado como superior frecuentemente, los 
otros sistemas de creencias fueron considerados como secundarios. Debido a los 
prejuicios, otros sistemas de creencias a menudo fueron insultados y el alevismo se 
ha convertido en objetivo de este tipo de prejuicios no sólo en la época otomana, 
sino también en la actualidad. Ciertos grupos de partidarios de la identidad islámica 
otomana consideran a los alevís como musulmanes pervertidos, infieles e incluso 
enemigos de la religión. Estos prejuicios han sido las razones de los ataques 
dirigidos en masa, por ejemplo en la década de 1970 y, más recientemente, en Sivas. 
Por supuesto, ha habido deficiencias en la seguridad, sin embargo, como se discutió 
en detalle, los discursos perjudiciales jugaron un papel importante para la 
movilización de los grupos sunitas contra los alevís. Por un lado los ataques 
dirigidos en masa, y por otro lado este tipo de discursos peyorativos y los prejuicios 
han causado discriminación contra los alevís a nivel individual. En cuanto a los 
discursos peyorativos, las normas legislativas serán fundamentales para el proceso 
de la libertad religiosa, sin embargo, las regulaciones legislativas deben ser apoyadas 
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con los discursos igualitarios de los funcionarios estatales, líderes espirituales y de 
opinión. 
 
Como se señaló anteriormente, la polarización de la sociedad ha provocado los 
ataques sangrientos durante los años de setenta dentro de los grupos políticos, sobre 
todo contra los que concretamente se asociaban con preferencias religiosas. Por lo 
tanto, no sería erróneo afirmar que estos grupos fueron impulsados no sólo por 
objetivos políticos, sino también los religiosos. Dentro de esta tensa atmósfera 
política y sociológica, los alevís se asociaban a sí mismos con la ideología socialista, 
ya que esta ideología negaba cualquier componente religioso y poseía una estructura 
igualitaria. Por otro lado, la ideología nacionalista había sido redefinida con el Islam 
sunita en el centro, en Turquía. Con respecto a la ideología nacionalista centrada en 
el Islam, los alevís comunistas eran enemigos tanto de la religión como de la unidad 
nacional del Estado. Cuando se toman en cuenta los ataques y el re-despertar de la 
identidad islámica otomana como un componente de nacionalismo, es posible ver la 
simultaneidad. Una mayor conciencia de la identidad religiosa causó más 
discusiones y la interacción entre los alevís y la mayoría sunita como resultado de la 
urbanización, el problema aumentó a su punto máximo con los ataques en las 
ciudades donde las diversidades religiosas son más significativas. 
 
Desde la intervención militar de 1980, los asuntos de Estado-religión pasaron 
a un nivel diferente. Como la hostilidad entre los grupos políticos se asoció a 
menudo con la religión, la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos fue señalada como la 
institución responsable de la solidaridad de la nación entre las instituciones del 
Estado por el gobierno militar. Señalando la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos 
podría aceptarse como el esfuerzo del gobierno militar para establecer la 
colaboración entre las instituciones del Estado, que es similar a la referencia de 
Montesquieu sobre la necesidad de la armonía entre las instituciones del Estado y las 
instituciones religiosas. Sin embargo, se puede observar que mientras Montesquieu 
hablaba de la colaboración de dos grupos de instituciones distintas, el gobierno 
militar estaba hablando de la colaboración de las instituciones de un mismo Estado. 
 
En este punto, es importante hablar de la responsabilidad actual de la 
Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos. Según los alevís, su existencia no es compatible 
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con la estructura del Estado laico. Sin embargo, su existencia puede legitimarse con 
la comprensión turca de la laicidad que pretende controlar la religión por las manos 
del Estado. En la estructura actual, la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos funciona 
alrededor de las políticas céntricas islámicas suníes, lo que no proporciona ningún 
espacio para la representación de otros grupos religiosos, incluyendo los alevís. Con 
el fin de tener la libertad religiosa para todos en Turquía, la Presidencia de Asuntos 
Religiosos debe ser re-estructurada y debe cortar sus lazos con el Estado para 
convertirse en una institución totalmente independiente en la estructura de Turquía. 
Al hacerlo, la Presidencia sería una institución en la que todos los miembros de 
grupos religiosos distintos se pueden representar.  
 
El aumento del conservadurismo entre la sociedad ha obligado a los alevís a 
movilizarse, por muchas razones diferentes. En primer lugar, era una necesidad que 
resultada de la urbanización. Los alevís perdieron sus compañeros (müsahip) y sus 
comunidades, dos elementos importantes del alevismo. La vida de la ciudad fue una 
amenaza para su identidad religiosa, lo cual puede debilitar sus vínculos con el 
alevismo. A fin de mantener su identidad religiosa, han formado nuevas 
comunidades con respecto a las condiciones urbanas y fundaciones establecidas para 
reunirse y practicar juntos. Y en segundo lugar, estaba el problema de la seguridad. 
En las condiciones de la vida rural, estaban practicando con la ayuda de los 
vigilantes; sin embargo, esto cambió en condiciones de la vida de la ciudad. Lejos de 
sus comunidades, se sentían solos e inseguros. Además, la memoria colectiva del 
pasado reciente con ataques dirigidos a las masas profundizó sus preocupaciones. 
Con la movilización en los centros urbanos se sintieron seguros y comenzaron a 
hacerse oír a pesar de la falta de representación política. Además, reuniéndose en 
torno a sus bases se facilitó la adaptación al nuevo estilo de vida en centros urbanos, 
sin perder sus vínculos con el alevismo. 
 
Cuando se trata de la cuestión de si el Estado turco laico ha proporcionado la 
libertad religiosa a los alevís o no, no sería erróneo afirmar que ha fallado hasta 
ahora. Una estructura laica era una necesidad concreta para el período de 
modernización de Turquía. Su mecanismo de control puede ser entendido, también, 
con respecto a las condiciones del proceso de transformación. Sin embargo, dando 
privilegios a una identidad religiosa específica, no sólo con las implementaciones y 
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patrocinios, sino también con discursos políticos señalando la superioridad de uno 
de los sistemas de creencias que están componiendo la sociedad, no se puede asociar 
a la estructura del Estado laico. El Estado debe mantenerse igualmente lejos de 
cualquier sistema de creencias religiosas. Desde esta perspectiva, como se ha 
señalado por los alevís también, las escuelas de Imam-Hatip, los discursos religiosos, 
la financiación del establecimiento de mezquitas, las asignaciones de los imanes 
como funcionarios estatales, no son compatibles con el laicismo ideal. Por lo tanto, 
debates en curso (en el momento de escritura de esta tesis) sobre la serie de las 
regulaciones con el fin de financiar cemevis y para pagar los sueldos mensuales de 
dedes y el personal de cemevi tampoco podrían ser considerados como una solución 
para los problemas de la comunidad aleví.  
 
La Apertura Aleví del Partido Justicia y Desarrollo fue un importante paso 
positivo que ha sido tomado por un gobierno, sobre todo por un gobierno, que se 
refiere a menudo como un pro-islamista. Todo el proceso se ha criticado mucho, y 
no es posible afirmar que estas críticas eran injustas; sin embargo, ha sido la primera 
vez que una iniciativa estatal se ha llevado a cabo con el fin de ponerse en contacto 
directamente con los alevís. Entre todas, la crítica más importante que los alevís 
alegaron es que no estaban bien representados en los talleres. Como existe 
divergencia entre los alevís, las posiciones de los representantes alevís han sido otro 
tema que se ha discutido. La asistencia de académicos islámicos y representantes de 
la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos pone la cuestión sobre la mesa: ¿decidirían 
estos académicos sunitas islámicos, si los alevís deben consederse con los 
reglamentos importantes relativos a sus problemas? El tema debe ser discutido no 
sólo por los representantes de la mayoría sunita, sino también por todos lados, y 
finalmente, un consenso común se llevaría a cabo. Al igual que todo el proceso, el 
informe final ha sido criticada también. El informe final hizo una llamada a la 
unificación de los alevís y afirmó que alevís podrían beneficiarse de los servicios de 
la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos. Estas dos partes fueron criticidas por los 
alevís. Como todas las comunidades, los alevís poseen diferentes enfoques para la 
vida con la identidad religiosa y la ideología política. No sería correcto esperar que 
todos ellos piensen y se muevan de una manera. Además, debido a su estructura 
sincrética y a la falta de transferencia de información sistemática, el alevismo difiere 
de un grupo a otro. Por lo tanto, no se puede ver la necesidad de unificación a la que 
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el Gobierno llama. Hay ciertas cuestiones en las que todos los alevís están de 
acuerdo, tales como el reconocimiento de los cemevis. Las cuestiones salariales o su 
financiación deberían tener medidas adicionales que se deberían tener en cuenta con 
respecto a la definición de la laicidad ideal con su estatus teórico y práctico. En 
pocas palabras, es correcto dar un paso con el fin de proporcionar una mayor libertad 
religiosa a los alevís con la Apertura Aleví y las regulaciones recientes; sin embargo, 
la metodología con la que se han de resolver los problemas no es considerada 
cuidadosamente. Por lo tanto, se puede decir que a pesar de las partes positivas, la 
forma de lidiar del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo con los problemas de los 
alevís no es del todo correcta. Como el problema no se puede resolver en un día o 
dos, Turquía necesita más de las políticas y las iniciativas del gobierno, y debe 
construir políticas de Estado, las que no se pueden cambiar en función del partido en 
el poder. Además, es evidente que la comprensión de la laicidad turca causó 
problemas durante el tiempo, por lo que debe definirse claramente en el marco de la 
libertad religiosa. En pocas palabras, en lugar de una serie de reglamentos, tales 
como parches al sistema actual, toda la estructura se debe revisar. Además de la 
estructura estatal revisada, los líderes políticos y líderes de opinión también deben 
revisar sus discursos con respecto al problema y adaptar el tono más positivo. 
Mientras los discursos inapropiados o discriminativos daña la confianza de la 
opinión pública, el tono positivo mejorará el apoyo de la sociedad, que con el tiempo 
preparará el terreno para el consenso común. 
 
Para concluir, el estado de Turquía ha fracasado en términos de proporcionar 
la libertad religiosa a las diversas identidades religiosas hasta ahora, como debería 
haber sido el resultado de la estructura del Estado laico. Este fracaso provocó la 
opresión en la sociedad, y con la dicotomía de la identidad, los escenarios políticos 
de Turquía han sido testigos de las importantes competiciones, mientras que la 
polarización se ha producido entre la sociedad. Incluso recientemente, las protestas 
del Parque Gezi pueden ser evaluadas dentro del mismo marco de este concurso. 
 
En términos de choque de identidad, los alevís han sido excluidos y no se ha 
proporcionado la libertad religiosa completa por ninguna de las identidades 
anteriores, la nueva republicana laica y la vieja islámica otomana. La comprensión 
turca de la laicidad funcionaba para controlar la religión e ignorar la diversidad de 
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sus componentes, por lo que se excluye el alevismo, así como otras identidades 
religiosas. Por otro lado, la vieja identidad otomano islámica no respetó los 
componentes distintivos del alevismo y lo excluyó, a menos que los alevís pasaran 
por alto sus diferencias y aceptaran los valores del Islam sunita como los valores 
únicos del Islam, como la cuestión de los lugares de culto, estructura y atribuciones 
de la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos. En consecuencia, ni la identidad 
republicana laica, ni los representantes de la identidad islámica otomana podrían 
tomar suficientes medidas para ampliar los límites de la libertad religiosa. Los 
problemas de los alevís seguirán teniendo lugar en la agenda de Turquía, que 
deberían ser evaluados dentro de los derechos humanos fundamentales en materia de 
libertad religiosa, hasta llegar a los límites exactos de la libertad religiosa que les 
permitan vivir y practicar libre y correctamente. Si la situación actual se pudiera 
resumir, la frase que Ercan Geçmez, el Presidente de Hacı Bektaş Veli Fundación de 
Anatolia, dijo durante la entrevista habría que tenerse en cuenta: "A pesar de que 
hemos quedado como los otros, hemos sido atacados física y psicológicamente y 
nosotros también hemos sido asesinados, nunca hemos considerado a nadie como 
los otros y mantendremos esta posición". 
 
En una estructura de Estado laico ideal cada grupo religioso debe ser tratado 
igualmente por el estado y debe tener la libertad religiosa total en términos de 
derechos humanos. Por el caso de los alevís, esta tesis sostiene que los alevís no 
tienen la libertad religiosa para practicar libremente y adecuadamente. Como esta 
tesis lleva el caso de los alevís el fin de comprender los límites de la libertad 
religiosa en la estructura del Estado laico, no sería erróneo decir que incluso en la 
estructura del Estado laico llegando hasta el punto de la libertad religiosa total para 
todo el mundo es un proceso largo. El proceso debe llevarse a cabo no sólo por el 
Estado, sino también por la sociedad. Mientras que el estado está proporcionando 
más libertad y espacio para grupos religiosos diversos, la sociedad debe integrar la 
idea de la libertad religiosa para todos, independientemente de cualquier religión 
como la parte fundamental del proceso. Es seguro que se necesitará tiempo para 
reprimir las conductas discriminatorias entre los individuos con el fin de ampliar la 
libertad religiosa dentro de la sociedad. En una perspectiva general, el pueblo de 
Turquía debería prestar más atención a comprender al otro, en otras palabras, tener 
empatía, y profundizar la tolerancia a los, que son diferentes de una manera u otra. 
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El deber más importante de este proceso lo llevarán a cabo los funcionarios estatales. 
Como seleccionados líderes de la sociedad, el enfoque igualitario debe ser poseido 
por ellos primero, de modo que sean capaces de integrar la idea de los individuos 
con los respectivos discursos, no con los discriminativos. La sociedad ideal debe 
aceptar cada uno de los ciudadanos ya que él / ella es ciudadano/a 
independientemente de las identidades religiosas, étnicas o sexuales. El elemento 
común debe ser la total comprensión de vivir en el mismo país, bajo la misma 
bandera y en el mismo mundo. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Opening ceremony of the first Assembly 
 
 
Source:  Emre Gül, “TBMM Dualarla Açılmıştı,” Dünya Bülteni, 3 November 2013,  
<http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=207130> (3 November 
2013). 
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APPENDIX II 
 
TREATY OF PEACE WITH TURKEY SIGNED AT LAUSANNE JULY 24, 1923 
THE CONVENTION RESPECTING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS AND 
OTHER INSTRUMENTS SIGNED AT LAUSANNE 
 
 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, GREECE, ROUMANIA and 
the SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE, 
of the one part, 
and TURKEY, 
of the other part; Being united in the desire to bring to a final close the state of war 
which has existed in the East since 1914, 
 
Being anxious to re-establish the relations of friendship and commerce which are 
essential to the mutual well-being of their respective peoples, 
 
And considering that these relations must be based on respect for the independence 
and sovereignty of States, 
 
Have decided to conclude a Treaty for this purpose, and have appointed as their 
Plenipotentiaries: 
 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, 
EMPEROR OF INDIA: 
The Right Honourable Sir Horace George Montagu Rumbold, Baronet, G.C.M.G., 
High Commissioner at Constantinople; 
 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: 
General Maurice Pelle, Ambassador of France, High Com missioner of the Republic 
in the East, Grand Officer of the National Order of the Legion of Honour; 
 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY: 
The Honourable Marquis Camillo Garroni, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of 
Italy, High Commissioner at Constantinople, Grand Cross of the Orders of Saints 
Maurice and Lazarus, and of the Crown of Italy; 
 
M. Giulio Cesare Montagna, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at 
Athens, Commander of the Orders of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, Grand Officer of 
the Crown of Italy; 
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HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: 
Mr. Kentaro Otchiai, Jusammi, First Class of the Order of the Rising Sun, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome; 
 
 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES: 
M. Eleftherios K. Veniselos, formerly President of the Council of Ministers, Grand 
Cross of the Order of the Saviour; 
 
M. Demetrios Caclamanos, Minister Plenipotentiary at London, Commander of the 
Order of the Saviour; 
 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA: 
M. Constantine I. Diamandy, Minister Plenipotentiary; 
 
M. Constantine Contzesco, Minister Plenipotentiary; 
 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, THE CROATS AND THE 
SLOVENES: 
Dr. Miloutine Yovanovitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at 
Berne; 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY: 
Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy for Adrianople; Dr. Riza Nour 
Bey, Minister for Health and for Public Assistance, Deputy for Sinope;Hassan Bey, 
formerly Minister, Deputy for Trebizond; 
 
Who, having produced their full powers, found in good and due orm, have agreed as 
follows: 
 
PART I. 
POLITICAL CLAUSES. 
(...) 
 
SECTION III. 
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. 
ARTICLE 37. 
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be 
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action 
shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor 
official action prevail over them. 
 
ARTICLE 38. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life 
and liberty to ali inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, 
language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or 
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be 
incompatible with public order and good morals. 
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Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, 
subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all 
Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national 
defence, or for the maintenance of public order. 
 
ARTICLE 39. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and 
political rights as Moslems. 
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before 
the law. 
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national 
in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, 
admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of 
professions and industries. 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any 
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be 
given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own 
language before the Courts. 
 
ARTICLE 40. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, 
they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, 
any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments 
for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to 
exercise their own religion freely therein. 
 
ARTICLE 41. 
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and 
districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, 
adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be 
given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own 
language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the 
teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals 
belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable 
share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of 
public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, 
or charitable purposes. 
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned. 
 
ARTICLE 42. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in 
so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the 
settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. 
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of 
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the 
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minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish 
Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an 
umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, 
synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned 
minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, 
and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present 
existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of 
new religious and charitable institu- tions, any of the necessary facilities which are 
guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature. 
 
ARTICLE 43. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to 
perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, 
and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend 
Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest. 
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such 
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation 
of public order. 
 
ARTICLE 44. 
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-
Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international 
concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They 
shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League 
of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold 
their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by 
a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. 
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have 
the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of 
infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such 
action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the 
circumstances. 
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact 
arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the 
other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League 
of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 
14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby 
consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court 
shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 
of the Covenant. 
 
ARTICLE 45. 
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem 
minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority 
in her territory. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Milliyet Daily Newspaper (7 December 1952, p.1) 
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Milliyet Daily Newspaper (7 December 1952, p.7) 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (17 June 1950, p.1) 
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APPENDIX V 
 
Vakit Daily Newspaper (14 June 1950, p.1) 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
Milliyet Daily Newspaper (6 July 1950, p.1) 
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APPENDIX VII 
 
Proclamation of 1960 
"Sevgili Vatandaşlar, Bugün demokrasimizin içine düştüğü buhran ve son müessif 
hadiseler dolayısıyla kardeş kavgasına meydan vermemek maksadıyla Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetleri, memleketin idaresini ele almıştır. Bu harekâta Silahlı Kuvvetlerimiz; 
partileri içine düştükleri uzlaşmaz durumdan kurtarmak ve partiler üstü tarafsız bir 
idarenin nezaret ve hakemliği altında, en kısa zamanda adil ve serbest seçimler 
yaptırarak idareyi, hangi tarafa mensup olursa olsun, seçimi kazananlara devir ve 
teslim etmek üzere girişmiş bulunmaktadır. 
 
Girişilmiş olan bu teşebbüs, hiçbir şahsa veya zümreye karşı değildir. İdaremiz, hiç 
kimse hakkında şahsiyata müteallik tecavüzkâr bir fiile müsaade etmeyeceği gibi, 
edilmesine de asla müsamaha etmeyecektir. Kim olursa olsun ve hangi partiye 
mensup bulunursa bulunsun, her vatandaş; kanunlar ve hukuk prensipleri esaslarına 
göre muamele görecektir. Bütün vatandaşların, partilerin üstünde aynı milletin, aynı 
soydan gelmiş evlatları olduklarını hatırlayarak ve kin gütmeden birbirlerine karşı 
hürmetle ve anlayışla muamele etmeleri, ıstıraplarımızın dinmesi ve milli 
varlığımızın selameti için zaruri görülmektedir. 
 
Kabineye mensup şahsiyetlerin, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ne sığınmalarını rica ederiz. 
Şahsi emniyetleri kanunun teminatı altındadır. 
 
Müttefiklerimize, komşularımıza ve bütün dünyaya hitap ediyoruz. Gayemiz, 
Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasası'na ve insan hakları prensiplerine tamamen riayettir. 
Büyük Atatürk'ün 'Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh' prensibi bayrağımızdır. 
 
Bütün ittifaklarımıza ve taahhütlerimize sadığız. NATO ve CENTO'ya inanıyoruz ve 
bağlıyız. Düşüncemiz 'Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh'tur." 
 
Milletimizin bir zarara uğramayacığı delaletinde sabır ve ihkamla tebessür etmeleri 
beklentilerimiz arasındadır. 
 
(T.S.K,Albay Alparslan Türkeş) 
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APPENDIX VIII 
 
Milliyet Daily Newspaper (25 September 1997, p.15) 
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APPENDIX IX 
 
MGK Proposal (28 February 1997) 
 
1) Demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devleti olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni hedef alan 
rejim aleyhtarı faaliyetler karsisinda ödün verilmemelidir.  
2) Anayasa'nın 174. maddesinde koruma altina alınan Devrim Kanunlari'nın ödün 
verilmeden uygulanmasi esastır. Hükümet, icraatında Devrim Yasalari'na uygunluğu 
sağlamakla görevlidir.  
3) Savcılar, Devrim Yasalari'nin ihlalini oluşturan davranışlar karşısinda harekete 
geçmelidirler. Yasaları ihlal eden dergahlar kapatılmalıdır  
4) Sarık vecüppeli giyim şeklinin özendirildiği görülmektedir.Kılık ve kıyafetleri bu 
yasaya ters düşen kişilerin onurlandırilmamalari gerekir.  
5) Anayasa'nin163. maddesinin kaldirilmasinin yarattigi hukuki bosluklar, irticai 
akimlarin ve laiklige aykiri tutumlarin güçlenmesine yol açmistir. Bu bosluklari 
telafi edecek yasal düzenlemeler getirilmelidir.  
6) Egitim politikalarinda yeniden Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu ruhuna uygun bir çizgiye 
gelinmelidir.  
7) Temel eğitim 8 yila çıkartılmalıdır.  
8) Imam-Hatip okulları toplumdaki bir ihtiyacı karşılamak üzere kurulmuşlardır. Bu 
ihtiyacın fazlasi olan Imam-Hatip okulları, meslek okullarina dönüştürülmelidir.  
9) Ayrıca köktendincilerin kontrolünde olan Kuran Kursları kapatılarak Milli Eğitim 
Bakanligi'na bağlı okullarda düzenlenmelidir.  
10) Devlet dairelerinde ve belediyelerde köktendinci bir kadrolaşma hareketi 
sürdürülmektedir. Hükümet, bu kadrolaşmanın önüne geçmelidir.  
11) Cami yapımı gibi dini konuları siyasi amaçlar için istismar etmeye dönük olan 
her türlü davramşlara son verilmelidir.  
12) Pompalı tüfekler kontrol altina alınmalı ve gerekirse pompalı tüfek satışları 
yasaklanmalıdır. Ayrıca, pompalı tüfek sahiplerinin dökümü çıkartılmalıdır.  
13) Iran'ın Türkiye'deki rejimi istikrarsızlığa itmeyi amaçlayan çabaları yakın takibe 
alınmalıdır, Iran'ın Türkiye'nin içişlerine kanşmasmı önleyici politikalar 
uygulanmalıdır.  
14) Yargı mekanizmasinin daha etkin çalışmasinı sağlayacak ve yargı bağımsızlığıni 
güvence altina alacak, hükümetin tasarruflarindan koruyacak düzenlemeler bir an 
önce getirilmelidir.  
15) Son dönemde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler mensuplarıni hedef alan tahriklerde büyük 
artış gözlenmektedir. Bu sataşmalar TSK içinde rahatsızlığa yol açmaktadır.  
16) Irticaî faaliyetlere karıştıkları için TSK'daki görevlerine son verilen subay ve 
astsubayların belediyelerde istihdam edilmelerinin önüne geçilmelidir.  
17) Partilerin belediye başkanları ve il, ilçe yöneticilerinin konuşma ve davranışlari 
da Siyasî Partiler Yasasi'nin sorumluluk alanina sokulmalıdır.  
18) Tarikatların, denetimlerindeki fınans kuruluşları ve vakıflar aracıligıyla 
ekonomik güç haline gelmeleri dikkatle izlenmelidir.  
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19) Laiklik aleyhtarı yayın çizgisi olan TV kanalları ve özellikle radyo kanallarinin 
verdikleri mesajlar dikkatle izlenmeli ve bu yayınların Anayasa'ya uygunluğu 
sağlanmalıdır.  
20) Millî Görüş Teşkilatı'nın bazı belediyelere yaptığı usulsüz para transferleri 
durdurulmalıdır.  
 
Source: Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000`li Yıllarda Türkiye’nin Toplumsal 
Yapısı (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2006) 285. 
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APPENDIX X 
 
Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (28 April 2007, p.1) 
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Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (28 April 2007, p.4) 
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APPENDIX XI 
 
FIGURE I: ALEVI POPULATION IN TURKEY  
 
Source: “Türkiye`de Yasayan Aleviler.” Alevi Forum, 26 December 2007 
<http://www.aleviforum.com/showthread.php?t=38304> (17 December 2010). 
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APPENDIX XII 
 
Photos of Semah. 
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Source: UNESCO, Semah, Alevi-Bektaşi Ritual, 00384 (N.p., UNESCO, November 2010), 
<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/download.php?versionID=07301> (6 May 2011). 
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APPENDIX XIII 
 
TEKKE VE ZAVİYELERLE TÜRBELERİN SEDDİNE VE  
TÜRBEDARLIKLAR İLE BİR TAKIM UNVANLARIN  
MEN VE İLGASINA DAİR KANUN* 
 
Kanun Numarası                   : 677 
Kabul Tarihi                          : 30/11/1925 
Yayımlandığı R. Gazete        : Tarih: 13/12/1925 Sayı: 243 
Yayımlandığı Düstur             : Tertip: 3 Cilt: 7 Sayfa: 113 
 
 
Madde 1 – Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dahilinde gerek vakıf suretiyle gerek mülk olarak 
şeyhının tahtı tasarrufunda gerek suveri aharla tesis edilmiş bulunan bilümum 
tekkeler ve zaviyeler sahiplerinin diğer şekilde hakkı temellük ve tasarrufları baki 
kalmak üzere kamilen seddedilmiştir. Bunlardan usulü mevzuası dairesinde filhal 
cami veya mescit olarak istimal edilenler ipka edilir. 
Alelümum tarikatlerle şehlik, dervişlik, müritlik, dedelik, seyitlik, çelebilik, babalık, 
emirlik, nakiplik, halifelik, falcılık, büyücülük, üfürükçülük ve gayıptan haber 
vermek ve murada kavuşturmak maksadiyle nüshacılık gibi unvan ve sıfatların 
istimaliyle bu unvan ve sıfatlara ait hizmet ifa ve kisve iktisası memnudur. Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti dahilinde salatine ait veya bir tarika veyahut cerri menfaate müstenit 
olanlarla bilümum sair türbeler mesdut ve türbedarlıklar mülgadır. Seddedilmiş olan 
tekke veya zaviyeleri veya türbeleri açanlar veyahut bunları yeniden ihdas edenler 
veya ayını tarikat icrasına mahsus olarak velev muvakkaten olsa bile yer verenler ve 
yukarıdaki unvanları taşıyanlar veya bunlara mahsus hidematı ifa veya kıyafet iktisa 
eyleyen kimseler üç aydan eksik olmamak üzere hapis ve elli liradan aşağı olmamak 
üzere cezayı nakdiile cezalandırılır. 
(Ek: 10/6/1949 - 5438/1 md.) Şeyhlik, Babalık ve Halifelik gibi mensupları arasında 
baş mevkiinde bulunanlar altı aydan az olmamak üzere hapis ve 500 liradan aşağı 
olmamak üzere ağır para cezasından başka bir yıldan aşağı olmamak üzere sürgün 
cezası ile cezalandırılırlar (1). 
(Ek: 1/3/1950 - 5566/1 md.; Değişik: 7/2/1990 - 3612/5 md.) Türbelerden Türk 
büyüklerine ait olanlarla büyük sanat değeri bulunanlar Kültür Bakanlığınca umuma 
açılabilir. Bunlara bakım için gerekli memur ve hizmetliler tayin edilir. 
Madde 2 – İşbu kanun neşri tarihinden muteberdir.  
Madde 3 – İşbu kanunun icrasına İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur. 
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677 SAYILI KANUNA EK VE DEĞİŞİKLİK GETİREN MEVZUATIN 
YÜRÜRLÜĞE GİRİŞ TARİHİNİ GÖSTERİR LİSTE 
Kanun No  Farklı tarihte Yürürlüğe Giren Maddeler   Yürürlüğe Giriş Tarihi 
______________________________________________________________ 
3612                                                —                                     16/2/1990 
5438                                                —                                     16/6/1949 
5566                                                —                                      4/3/1950 
 
 
 
 
* (1) 13/7/1965 tarih ve 647 sayılı Cezaların İnfazı Hakkında Kanunun geçici 2 nci 
maddesiyle sürgün cezası kaldırılmıştır. 
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APPENDIX XIV 
 
Amblem of the Unity Party 
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APPENDIX XV 
 
Milliyet Daily Newspaper (20 April 1978, p.9) 
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APPENDIX XVI 
 
Milliyet Daily Newspaper (19 April 1978, p.8) 
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APPENDIX XVII 
 
Milliyet Daily Newspaper (27 December 1978, p.1) 
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APPENDIX XVIII 
 
Photos of Kahramanmaraş!Massacres'
 
Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (25 December 1978) 
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Milliyet Daily Newspaper (27 December 1978) 
 
 
Source: “Maraş Katliamı (24 Aralık 1978),” Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associaton Branch 
Office of Antalya, n.d., <http://www.psakd.org/maras_katliami.html> (20 April 2011). 
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APPENDIX XIX 
 
Speech of General Evren on 12 September 1980 
 
“Yüce Türk Milleti, 
30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı dolayısıyla sizlere radyo ve televizyondan hitap etmek 
imkanını bulmuş ve ayrılan kısıtlı süre içerisinde mümkün olduğu kadar, 
yurdumuzun içinde bulunduğu siyasi ve ekonomik durumu ile anarşik ve bölücü 
eylemleri; alınması gereken tedbirleri çok kısa olarak izah etmeye çalışmıştım. Yine 
çok iyi hatırlayacaksınız ki, iki yıldır her fırsattan istifade ile muhtelif defalar 
verdiğim beyanat ve radyo-televizyon konuşmalarımda da bu hayati önemi olan 
konuları dile getirmiştim. 
Kalbi bu vatan ve millet için atan sağduyu sahibi vatandaşlarım kabul edeceklerdir 
ki; ülkemizin halen içinde bulunduğu hayati önemi haiz siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal 
sorunlar, devlet ve milletimizin bekasını tehdit eder boyutlara ulaşmış ve bu hal 
devletimizi, Cumhuriyet tarihinin en ağır buhranına sürüklemiştir. 
Yine hepinizin bildiği gibi; anarşi, terör ve bölücülük, her gün 20 civarında 
vatandaşımızın hayatını söndürmektedir. Aynı dini ve milli değerleri paylaşan Türk 
Vatandaşları siyasi çıkarlar uğruna, çeşitli suni ayrılıklar yaratılmak suretiyle 
muhtelif kamplara bölünmüş ve birbirlerinin kanlarını çekinmeden akıtacak kadar 
gözleri döndürülerek, adeta birbirlerine düşman edilmişlerdir. 
Atatürk ilkelerini esas alarak kurulan Cumhuriyetimizin bu duruma 
düşürülebileceğini, bundan 10 sene evvel tasavvur dahi etmek mümkün değildi. 
Bugüne kadar iktidara gelen çeşitli hükümetlerin, her yıl artan bir hız ile yaygınlaşan 
ve dünya tarihinde sayısız örnekleri görülen özel harbin sızma ve çökertme 
harekatına karşı iç güvenliği sağlayacak kararları ve tedbirleri birinci öncelikle 
alacaklarını vadetmelerine rağmen; sonuç alacak teşebbüsleri, siyasi çıkar 
çatışmaları ve basit parti hesapları, kaprisler, hayaller, gerçek dışı talepler ve Türk 
Devleti'nin niteliklerine ters düşen gizli ve açık emeller arasında kaybolup gitmiştir. 
Düşmanın amaç ve yöntemleri, anarşi, terör ve bölücülüğün ulaştığı düzey; özel 
hukuki tedbirlere, idari düzenlemelere, sosyal koşulların geliştirilmesine milli eğitim 
ve iş hayatının düzenlenmesine ihtiyaç göstermekteyken; milletin vekaletini taşıyan 
milletvekilleri ve senatörler Meclislerde aylardan beri, hiçbir sorumluluk duymadan 
yalnız parti menfaat ve disiplini uğruna bu olaylara seyirci kalabilmişlerdir. 
İktidarların başarı ümit ederek aldıkları her tedbir, muhalefetler tarafından kınanarak 
ve hatta memleket yararına da olsa baltalanmıştır. Milli birlik ve beraberliğe en fazla 
muhtaç olduğumuz dönemlerde bile kutuplaşmalar ve bölünmeler adeta teşvik 
edilmiş; yangını beraberce söndürmek yerine, üzerine benzin dökülerek memleket 
bilerek veya siyasi çıkarlar uğruna, sırf iktidara gelebilmek pahasına bir yangın 
yerine çevrilmek istenmiştir. 
Ağızlarından düşürmedikleri hukuk devleti kavramı, bir kısım anayasal kuruluşlarca, 
devletin parçalanması pahasına da olsa yalnız kişilerin müdafaası olarak 
yorumlanmış, devletin ve milletin savunulması ise sahipsiz kalmıştır. 
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Anayasanın kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesinin birlikte getirdiği sorumluluk, uygulamada 
kuvvetler çatışmasına dönüştürülmüştür. 
Düşüncelerimiz, dinimiz üzerinde ve akla gelebilen her konuda dış ve iç kaynaklı 
bölücü ve yıkıcı faaliyetler bütün şiddetiyle sürdürülürken ne hazindir ki; bir kısım 
gerçeğe uymayan özerklik, dar görüşlü, sahibinden başkasının inanmadığı 
bilimsellik ve koşulları dikkate almayan salt hukuk savunucuları, yıkılacak devletin 
enkazı altında kalacaklarının, yok olup gideceklerinin idraki içinde olamadıkları 
görünümünü vermişlerdir. Bu acı hakikatleri görüp çare arayanların veya Türk 
Ulusunu uyaran ve milleti bütünleşmeye davet edenlerin ise seslerini duymak 
mümkün olamamıştır. (Bir kısım kıymetli Türk basınının bu konuda zaman zaman 
yaptıkları uyarıları burada şükranla belirtmek isterim.) 
Siyasi partiler, bu kritik dönemde milletin özlemle beklediği önlemleri almak yerine; 
iç gerilimi devamlı olarak arttırarak, yıkıcı ve bölücü mihrakları büsbütün 
kışkırtarak, onlara cüret ve cesaret verecek beyan ve eylemleri ile adeta yarışırcasına 
seçim yatırımları için zemin yaratma yollarını tercih etmişlerdir. 
İktidara gelen siyasi partiler, devlet teşkilatının bütün kademelerini kendi görüşleri 
doğrultusundaki kişilerle doldurarak, kamu görevlilerinin ve vatandaşlarımızın bir 
tarafa girerek kamplara bölünmesini zorunlu hale getirmişler, giderek anarşi ve 
bölücülüğü destekleyen kaynakların şekillenmesine ve kamu kuruluşlarında 
çalışanlarla, polis ve öğretmenlerin dahi birbirine düşman kamplara ayrılmalarına 
neden olan partizan tutum ve davranışlardan vazgeçmemişlerdir. Böylece tarafsız 
halkımız, devletten beklediklerini parti kapılarında aramaya mecbur bırakılarak 
devlet otoritesi yok olmaya, vatandaşların hak ve hukukunu korumak ve ona tarafsız 
hizmet götürmek yerine, devletin saygınlığı yavaş yavaş erimeğe mahkum olmuş ve 
dolayısıyla ülkemizde tam otorite boşluğu teşekkül etmiştir. 
Bir kısım bedbahtlar Türk Milletinin bağımsızlığını, birlik ve beraberliğini temsil 
eden İstiklal Marşımıza, koyu taassup veya sapık ideolojik amaçlarla protesto 
maksadıyla oturarak veya İstiklal Marşı yerine Enternasyoneli söyleyerek açıkça 
saygısızlık gösterebilmişler ve buna doğrudan sorumlu kişiler tevil yoluna sapmak 
suretiyle savunmalarını yapabilmişlerdir. 
Uzun zamandan beri bu fevkalade üzücü olayları yakından takip eden Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetleri hatırlayacağınız gibi; milletin kendisine verdiği yetkileri kullanamayan 
ve bu korkunç gidişi acz içinde seyreden anayasal kuruluşların tümünü 
Cumhurbaşkanımız aracılığıyla uyararak, alınması gereken tedbirlere de yer vermek 
suretiyle büyük Türk Milletine karşı yüklendiği sorumluluğu dile getirmiştir. Aradan 
geçen 8 aylık süre içerisinde yaptığımız sayısız uyarmalara rağmen hemen hemen bu 
tedbirlerin hiç birine yasama ve yürütme organları ile diğer anayasal kuruluşlardan 
yeterli bir cevap alınamamış ve bu konuda müspet faaliyetleri de izlenememiştir. Bu 
uyarı mektubundan sonra bir kısım yasaları etkisiz hale getirerek çıkaran 
Meclislerimiz 22 Mart 1980 tarihinden beri siyasi çıkar hesapları ile çıkmaza 
sürüklenen Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminden dolayı içinde bulunduğumuz buhran ile 
mücadelede en kıymetli unsur olan zamanı fütursuzca harcamışlardır. Dünyanın 
hiçbir ülkesinde Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamı ve seçimi bu kadar hafife alınmamış ve 
bu kadar zaman boşa harcanmamıştır. 
Asayiş ve ekonomik bunalıma çareler getirmesi ve kanunlar yapması beklenen 
yasama organlarımız, memleket üzerine çöken bu kabusa karşı kayıtsız kalmışlardır. 
Anayasamız, Türk Vatandaşlarının dini inançlarından ötürü kınanamayacağını, 
açıkça belirtmiş olmasına rağmen, tek bir oyun peşinde koşan siyasi partilerimiz, 
yüce Atatürk’ün Cumhuriyeti Döneminde unutulmuş mezhep ayrılıklarını 
kışkırtmakta faydalar görerek Erzincan, Sivas, Kahramanmaraş, Tunceli ve Çorum 
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illerinde siyasi çıkarlar uğruna vatandaşlarımızın birbirini katletmelerine neden 
olmuşlardır. 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti sınırları içerisinde yaşayan ve kendini Türk Vatandaşı kabul 
eden herkesin tek bir vücut halinde Türk Milleti'ni oluşturduğu unutulmuş ve değişik 
mezheplere bağlı vatandaşlarımızın tam bir kardeşlik bağı ile kaynaşmalarını 
engellemek isteyen kışkırtıcılar siyasi destek görmüşlerdir. 
Bir kısım anayasal kuruluşlar muhtelif etkiler altında anarşi, terör ve bölücülük 
karşısında tarafsız, adil ve ortak bir yol izlemek yerine, bizzat Anayasanın ihlali 
karşısında dahi sesiz kalmayı tercih etmişlerdir. 
Bütün bu şartlara rağmen; hukuk devletinin temel ilkelerini savunmakla görevli 
anayasal kuruluşlarımız, devletin en üst kademesindeki anarşizmin yarattığı 
tehlikenin büyüklüğünü idrak edemediklerinden veya terör odaklarının tehdidinden 
çekindiklerinden, devletin temellerine konan dinamitle her an parçalanma tehlikesi 
karşısında olduğunu gözlerden kaçırmaya çalışmışlardır. Devlet çökertildiği zaman 
Anayasanın kanatları altına sığınan tüm hukuk kurumları ile özerk, bilim ve 
müessese ve derneklerinin bu enkaz altında yok olacağı unutulmuştur. 
Son iki yıllık süre içinde terör 5.241 can almış, 14.152 kişinin yaralanmasına veya 
sakat kalmasına sebep olmuştur. İstiklal Harbinde, Sakarya Savaşındaki şehit 
miktarı 5.713, yaralı miktarımız 18.480’dir. Bu basit mukayese dahi Türkiye’de 
hiçbir insanlık duygusuna değer vermeyen bir örtülü harbin uygulandığını açıkça 
ortaya koymaktadır. 
 Sevgili Vatandaşlarım, 
İşte bütün bunlar ve buna benzer sayılabilecek ve hepiniz tarafından yakinen bilinen 
daha birçok sebeplerden dolayı Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ülkenin ve milletin 
bütünlüğünü, milletin hak, hukuk ve hürriyetini korumak, can ve mal güvenliğini 
sağlayarak korkudan kurtarmak, refah ve mutluluğunu sağlamak, kanun ve nizam 
hakimiyetini, diğer bir deyimle devlet otoritesini tarafsız olarak yeniden tesis ve 
idame etmek gayesiyle devlet yönetimine el koymak zorunda kalmıştır. Bugünden 
itibaren yeni hükümet ve yasama organı kuruluncaya kadar muvakkat bir zaman için 
yasama ve yürütme yetkileri benim başkanlığımda, Kara, Deniz, Hava Kuvveti 
Komutanları ile Jandarma Genel Komutanı’ndan oluşan Milli Güvenlik Konseyi 
tarafından kullanılacaktır. 
Büyük Atatürk’ün deyimiyle "Ulusal kültürümüzü, çağdaş uygarlık düzeyinin 
üstüne çıkarmak yurdumuzu dünyanın en mamur ve en uygar araç ve kaynaklarına 
sahip kılmak" hedefine yönelik hızlı bir kalkınma döneminin en kısa zamanda 
gerçekleştirilmesi zaruretine inanıyoruz. Bu inancımızın gerçekleşmesi için yüce 
ulusumuzun, bağrından çıkardığı ve yurdumuzdaki kutuplaşmada hiçbir tarafı 
tutmayan, sadece Atatürk ilkeleri doğrultusunda yürüyen Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 
yönetimine güveneceğinden kuşkumuz yoktur. İçinde bulunduğumuz buhrandan 
çıkmamız için ulusça arzu edildiğine inandığımız, disiplinli ve her türlü tasarrufa 
ağırlık veren bir yaşam ve dayanışma ortamına girilmesini ve milletçe gücümüzün 
tümünü ortaya koyacak bir çalışma hızını bekliyor ve yüce Türk Milleti'ne 
güveniyoruz. 
Vatandaşlarımızı kaderde, kıvançta ve tasada ortak bir bütün halinde milli şuur ve 
ülküler etrafında birleştirmenin iç barış ve huzurun sağlanmasında vazgeçilmez 
faktör olduğu düşüncesiyle, Atatürk Milliyetçiliğinden hız ve ilham almanın, 
politikada "Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" ilkesine bağlı kalmanın, milli mücadele 
ruhunun, millet egemenliğine Atatürk ilke ve devrimlerine olan bağlılığın tam 
şuurunu yerleştirmek ve geliştirmekle ülkemize yönelik tehditlerin ulusça 
göğüsleneceğine inanıyoruz. 
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Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, NATO dahil tüm ittifak ve anlaşmalara bağlı kalarak, başta 
komşularımız olmak üzere bütün ülkelerle kar-şılıklı bağımsızlık ve saygı esasına 
dayalı, birbirlerinin iç işlerine karışmamak kaydıyla eşit şartlar altında ekonomik, 
sosyal ve kültürel ilişkilerini geliştirme kararındadır. 
Uluslararası sorunların barışçı yollarla çözümlenmesinden yana bir dış politika 
izlenmesine devam edilecektir. 
Birçok tutum ve davranışlarıyla demokratik özgürlükçü parlamenter sisteme inancını 
defalarca kanıtlayan Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, en kısa zamanda Bakanlar Kurulu’nu 
kurarak, yürütme sorumluluğunu bu Kurula bırakacak ve hür demokratik 
parlamenter sistemin şimdi olduğu gibi dejenere edilmesine ve tıkanmasına mani 
olucu ve Türk toplumuna yaraşır bir Anayasa ve Seçim Kanunu ile Partiler 
Kanununu hazırlamayı ve bunlara paralel düzenlemeleri yapmayı müteakip insan 
hak ve hürriyetlerine saygılı, milli dayanışmayı ön plana alan, sosyal adaleti 
gerçekleştirecek, ferdin ve toplumun huzur, güven ve refahına önem veren 
özgürlükçü demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk kurallarına dayalı bir yönetime ülke 
idaresini devredecektir. 
Sayılan bu hazırlıklar tamamlanıncaya kadar Yurdumuzda her türlü siyasi faaliyetler 
her kademede durdurulmuştur. Zorunlu olarak faaliyetleri durdurulan siyasi 
partilerin yeniden hazırlanacak Anayasadaki düzenlemelere ve yeni Seçim ve 
Partiler Kanununa göre zamanı, koşulları ilan edilecek seçimlerden yeterince önce 
faaliyete geçmesine müsaade edilecektir. 
Parlamento üyeleri, siyasi faaliyetlerden dolayı suçlanmayacak ve yeni yönetime 
karşı suç teşkil edecek tutum ve davranışlarda bulunmadıkları sürece haklarında 
herhangi bir işlem yapılmayacaktır. 
Ancak, kanunların suç kabul ettiği fiilleri vaktiyle işlediği saptanan parlamenterler 
hakkında gerekli kovuşturma yapılacaktır. Adalet Partisi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
Milli Selamet Partisi ve Milliyetçi Hareket Partilerinin parti başkanları şimdilik can 
güvenliklerinin sağlanması amacı ile Silahlı Kuvvetlerin koruma ve gözetiminde 
belirli yerlerde ikamete tabi tutulmuşlardır. Durum müsait olunca serbest 
bırakılacaklardır. 
Memlekette idarenin tam bir tarafsızlık içinde vatandaşın hizmetine koşması 
sağlanacaktır. Devlet hizmetinde bulunanların siyasi etkiler dışında çalışmaları 
kanun hakimiyeti altına alınacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yönetime el koyduğu 
şu anda devletin yanında tarafsız ve adil hizmet görecek yöneticiler, eski zamanın 
siyasi davranışlarına yönelmedikçe hizmet ve görevlerine devam edeceklerdir. 
Kanun ve nizam hakimiyetini sağlamada tecrübeli ve yetenekli kişilerden oluşan 
mahkemelerin süratle ve doğru kararlar vermelerini ve bunları korkusuzca 
uygulayabilmelerini sağlayacak yasal ve idari tedbirler alınacaktır. 
Memleketin ekonomik koşullarını kendi gücümüzle iyileştirmek için her alanda 
elden gelen gayret sarfedilecektir. Çalışkan ve vatanperver Türk işçisinin mevcut 
ekonomik koşullar çerçevesinde her türlü hakları korunacaktır. 
Ancak temiz Türk işçisini sömüren, onları kendi ideolojik görüşleri istikametinde 
kullanmak için her türlü baskı oyunlarına başvuran, işçinin hakkı yerine kendi 
menfaatlerini ön planda tutan bazı ağaların bu faaliyetlerine asla müsaade 
edilmeyecektir. 
Tüm işverenlerin iş barışının koşullarını sağlayacak esaslardan ayrılmadan üretimin 
arttırılması ve ihracata yönelik gayretlerin gelişmesine yardımcı olmaları için her 
türlü tedbir alınacaktır. 
Köylünün, milletimizin efendisi olduğu inancını, kuvveden fii-len çıkarmak için 
tarım alanında üretimi artıracak bir tarım seferberliği ve fiyat politikası ile gerekli 
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diğer önlemlerin alınmasına, bilhassa önem verilecektir. Türk köylüsünün 
tarlasından ayrılıp şehir-lere göç etmesini zorlayan ekonomik ve sosyal nedenlere 
çare aranacaktır. 
Eğitim ve öğretimde Atatürk Milliyetçiliğini yeniden yurdun en ücra köşelerine 
kadar yaygınlaştıracak tedbirler en kısa zamanda alınacaktır. 
Yarının teminatı olan evlatlarımızın Atatürk ilkeleri yerine yabancı ideolojilerle 
yetişerek sonunda birer anarşist olmasını önleyecek tedbirler alınacaktır. Bu 
maksatla hepimizin tek tek saygıyla andığımız öğretmenlerimizin Der’li, Bir’li 
derneklere üye olarak bölünmelerine müsaade edilmeyecektir. Her düzeyde 
öğrencinin amacı Atatürk ilkeleri ve milliyetçiliği ile pekişmiş ve üretime yönelik 
bilgi ve becerisini kazanmak olacaktır. 
En kıdemsiz erinden, en üst komutanına kadar Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin tüm 
personeli, bu amaçlara ulaşmada devletin iç ve dış tehditlere karşı kollayıcı ve 
koruyucu gücü olarak siyasetin dışında kalacaktır. 
 Aziz Yurttaşlarım; 
Bir defa daha belirtiyorum ki; Silahlı Kuvvetler aziz Türk Milletinin hakkı olan 
refah ve mutluluğu, vatan ve milletin bütünlüğü ve gittikçe etkisi (azalmaya) 
azaltılmaya çalışılan Atatürk ilkelerine yeniden güç ve işlerlik kazandırmak, kendi 
kendini kontrol edemeyen demokrasiyi sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmak, kaybolan 
Devlet otoritesini yeniden tesis etmek için yönetime el koymak zorunda kalmıştır. 
Komutan, subay, astsubay ve erler olarak hepimiz vatan ve. milletin refah ve 
mutluluğu uğruna her şeyimizi, bu arada hayatımızı dahi seve seve feda etmeye 
hazırız. Memlekette her zaman bulunabilen ve özellikle son zamanlarda çoğalan 
kötü niyetli birçok kişi ve kuruluşlar sizlere yalanlar düzerek, bunun aksini 
söyleyebilecekler ve menfi propagandalara başvurabileceklerdir. Bunlara asla 
inanmayınız. Bütün uygulamalar milletin gözü önünde yapılacaktır. 
 Kıymetli Vatandaşlarım; 
Her zaman milletiyle bir bütün ve Türk milletinin emrinde olan Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetlerine ve yeni yönetime karşı yapılacak her türlü direniş, gösteri ve tutum 
anında en sert şekilde kırılarak cezalandırılacaktır. 
Yurtta kan dökülmemesi için bütün vatandaşlarımın tahriklere kapılmaksızın 
sükunet içinde yayınlanacak bildiriler doğrultusunda hareket etmelerini ve ikinci bir 
bildiriye kadar sokağa çıkmamalarını rica ederim. 
Vatandaşlarımın birbirlerinin hak ve hukukuna saygılı olmalarını, sevgi içinde 
kırgınlıklarını unutmalarını, hepimizin bu mübarek topraklar üzerinde aynı haklara 
sahip bir Türk vatandaşı olduğumuzun idraki içerisinde olarak yeni yönetime 
yardımcı olmalarını vatanperverlik ve asil karakterlerinden bekler, mutlu ve aydınlık 
yarınlar dilerim.” 
 
 
 
Source: “Kenan Evren'in Radyo ve Televizyon Konuşması,” VikiKaynak, 20 April 
2009,<http://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Kenan_Evren'in_radyo_ve_televizyon_konuşması> (10 
April 2011). 
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APPENDIX XX 
 
Proclamation of Sivas (30 June 1993) 
 
“MÜSLÜMAN KAMUOYUNA, 
Bismillâhirrahmânirrahim  
‘Peygamber, mü’minlere kendi canlarından ileridir. Onun hanımları da mü’minlerin 
analarıdır.’ (Ahzâb:6) 
Mü’minlere öz canlarından daha ileri olan Allah Resûlü (S.A.V.)’ne ve O’nun temiz 
zevcelerine, Allah’ın beytine (Kâbe’ye) ve kitab’ı Kur’an’a alçakça küfredilmekte 
ve mü’minlerin izzet ve namuslarına saldırılmaktadır. 
Dünyanın bazı bölgelerinde şeytan ve onun yandaşları olan emperyalist kâfirler, 
dinimize ve mukaddes değerlerimize dil uzatmaktadırlar. Bunun başını ise satılmış, 
mürted Salman Rüşdi köpeği çekmektedir. 
Bu şeytanî oyunlara karşı, izzetli ve duyarlı Müslümanlar yiğitçe mücadele ortaya 
koyarak, bu uğurda canlarını feda etmekten çekinmemişlerdir. 
Bu iğrenç oyunların bir uzantısı olarak ülkemizde de; AYDINLIK gazetesi denilen 
bir paçavrada, mel’un Rüşdi’nin figüranlığına soyunan, dünya emperyalizminin 
gönüllü uşağı Aziz Nesin, aynı şekilde, Kur’an’ın korunmuşluğuna dil uzatmış, 
Hazret-i Peygamber (S.A.V.)’in aile hayatını (hâşâ) bir genelev ortamına benzetmiş 
ve ümmetin anaları olan hanımlarına (hâşâ) fahişe deme cür’etinde bulunmuştur. Bu 
olay, dünyanın değişik yerlerinde kâfir devletler tarafından dahi kabul görmezken, 
basımına müsaade edilmezken, ne yazık ki laik ve ikiyüzlü T.C. Devleti tarafından 
yayımlanmasına izin verilmiş, ayrıca bunu kabullenmeyip protesto eden izzetli 
Müslümanlar, devletin polis ve jandarması tarafından coplanmış, kurşunlanmış, bir 
kısmı da hapishanelere atılmıştır. 
Salman Rüşdi köpeği Müslümanlar’ın çok az olduğu kâfir bir ülkede korkudan 
sokağa çıkmaya bile cesaret edemezken, onun yerli uşağı Aziz Nesin köpeği, 
yanında kendisiyle beraber bir ekiple birlikte, şehrimiz Valisi tarafından davet 
edilip, şehirde adeta Müslümanlar’la alay edercesine gezebilmektedir 
Kâfirler şunu iyi bilmeli ki: 
İslâmın Peygamberi’ni ve kitab’ın izzetini korumak için, bu uğurda verilecek 
canlarımız vardır. 
Gün, Müslümanlığımızın gereğini yerine getirme günüdür. 
Gün, Allah (C.C.)’ın vahyi Kur’an-ı Kerim’e, Allah’ın meleklerine, Allah’ın Resûlü 
Hz. Muhammed (S.A.V.)’e, O’nun ailesine ve ashabına yöneltilen çirkin küfürlerin 
hesabının sorulması günüdür. 
‘İman edenler, Allah yolunda savaşırlar. Kâfirler de tağut yolunda savaşırlar. O 
halde şeytanın dostlarıyla savaşın. Çünkü şeytanın hilesi zayıftır.’ ( Nisa:76) 
Galip gelecek olanlar, şüphesiz ki Allah taraftarı olanlardır. 
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Source: Attila Aşut, Sivas Kitabı: Bir Toplu Öldürümün Öyküsü. (Ankara: 
Edebiyatçılar Derneği, 1994), 319. 
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APPENDIX XXI 
 
Proclamation of Sivas (1 July 1993) 
 
“ Halkımıza Çağrı; 
Müslüman halkın yaşadığı bu ülkede, İslam için binlerce şehit verilmiş bu 
topraklarda, bir kesim tarafından, ‘basın özgürlüğü, düşünce hürriyeti’ adı altında, 
Müslümanlar’ın kutsal değerlerine sözlü veya yazılı olarak kimse saldıramaz. 
Biz Müslümanlar, canımız pahasına da olsa, bu değerlerimizi korumakta kararlıyız. 
Müslüman halkımızdan bu konularda duyarlı olup, İslam’ın değer yargılarını alaya 
alanlara izin vermemelerini, ne pahasına olursa olsun bunu engellemeyi dini bir 
görev olarak bilmelerini, bu alçaklar karşısında susulduğunda, yarın mahşerde 
Allah’a nasıl hesap vereceğimizi düşünmelerini istiyoruz. 
‘Müminlerin, Peygamberi kendi nefislerinden çok sevmeyi gerekir. O’nun eşleri, 
onların anneleridir...’ ( Ahzâb Suresi, Ayet: 6) 
‘Ve kâfirlerin hesapları varsa, Allah’ın da bir hesabı vardır. Allah hesabı çabuk 
görendir.’ ( Enfal Suresi, Ayet : 30) 
‘Kâfirler istemese de, Allah nurunu tamamlayacaktır.’ (Saff Suresi , Ayet:8) 
Not: Bu yazıyı okuyan, Allah rızası için çoğaltarak dağıtsın.” 
 
 
 
 
Source: Attila Aşut, Sivas Kitabı: Bir Toplu Öldürümün Öyküsü (Ankara: 
Edebiyatçılar Derneği, 1994), 323. 
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APPENDIX XXII 
 
Akit Daily Newspaper (27 July 2012, p.1) 
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APPENDIX XXIII 
 
Sivas Massacre on press 
 
Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (3 July 1993) 
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Milliyet Daily Newspaper (3 July 1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 337!
 
 
 
 
Hürriyet Daily Newspaper (3 July 1993) 
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Sabah Daily Newspaper (3 July 1993) 
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APPENDIX XXIV 
 
Sample Turkish ID Card (male) 
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APPENDIX XXV 
 
Personal interviews:  
 
Questions: 
Sayın …………………………………. ile görüşme.  
Tarih:  
 
– Anadolu Aleviliği’nin, Orta Asya’dan göç sırasında Zerdüştlük ve Şamanizm gibi 
İrani dinlerin, Şii İslam ile sentezin bir sonucu olduğu söylenmektedir. Nasıl bir 
sentezdir bu?  
Aleviliği ne şekilde tanımlarsınız, bu açıklama doğru mudur? 
 
– Bu bağlamda Alevilik bir din midir, bir inanç mı? 
 
– 1 Ekim 2010 tarihinde gazetelerde okuduk. Aleviler demokratik yollarla haklarını 
aramak, seslerini duyurmak adına İzmir Konak Meydanı’nda bir oturma eylemi 
gerçekleştirdiler ve 24 saat süren bu eylemin sonunda Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu 
Eski Genel Başkanı Sayın Ali Balkız, Alevilerin taleplerini dile getirdiği 
konuşmasında,  
 
“…Ancak bizim gibi her etnik grubun “Artik Yeter!” diyeceği bir nokta vardır. O 
noktada biz de alacağız Pir Sultan’ın sazını davamızı göreceğiz…” demiştir. 
Alevilik bir inanış olmanın ötesinde ayni zamanda etnik bir bağ da sağlamakta 
mıdır? Alevi halkın kendi arasındaki bu kuvvetli bağ ne şekilde tanımlanabilir? 
 
– Aleviliğin aynı zamanda bir felsefe, bir yaşam tarzı olduğu da söylenebilir mi? 
 
– 14 Aralık 2010 tarihinde Avusturya Anayasa Mahkemesi, Aleviler lehinde bir 
karar açıkladı. Aleviliğin İslam dini içerisinde bir inanç olduğunu yasallaştıran bu 
karar Avrupa’da yaşayan Alevi kesim tarafından oldukça olumlu bir gelişme olarak 
değerlendirilmiştir. Sizin bu konudaki düşünceniz nedir? 
 
– Aleviliğin, Allah-Muhammed-Ali üçlemesine dayalı bir din/inanç olduğu 
söylenmekte. Ancak “bazı kaynaklarda” Aleviliğin başlı başına bir felsefe olduğu, 
İslam ile kuvvetli bağlarının bulunmadığı görüsüne de rastlanmaktadır. Türkiye’de 
yasayan Alevi halkın bu konudaki düşüncesi nedir? 
 
– Haritada Aleviler 4 gruba ayrılmıştır. Arap Alevilerinin (Nusayrilerin) farklı bir 
kökenden geldiklerini, en basitinden Türkmen olmadıklarını biliyoruz. Peki, 
Anadolu Alevilerini, Büyükşehir Alevilerini ve Tahtacıları birbirinden ayıran 
özellikler nelerdir? 
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– Bu grupların dışında, Zazalar, Bektaşi Aleviler de var. İbadetler ve inanış biçimleri 
arasında farklılıklar var midir? 
 
– Alevilerin ibadetlerinden bahsedecek olursak; 4 Kapı 40 Makam, cem, musahiplik, 
Muharrem ve Hızır Oruçları gibi kavramları açıklayabilir misiniz? (ayrıca kitaplar 
dışında, Aleviliğin 4 kaynağı daha kullandığı söylenmekte: Hadisler, Buyruklar ve 
Öğretiler, Neclül Belaga ve Vilayetnameler ile Menakibnameler.) 
 
– John Shindeldecker, “Turkish Alevis Today” isimli makalesinde bazı Alevi 
gruplarının İsa’nın dünyaya yeniden geleceği öğretisinden haberdar olduklarını ve 
inandıklarını, ayrıca İsa’nın 12. İmam Mehdi ile ayni kişi olacağına inandıklarını 
yazmıştır. Yaygın bir inanış mıdır? Zira konu ile ilgili olarak birbirinden çok farklı 
bilgiler mevcut, açıklama yapabilir misiniz? 
 
– Son dönemlerde Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye’de inanç özgürlüğü ile ilgili olarak atılan 
adımları çok yakından takip ediyor. (örneğin, Avusturya Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin 
kararı büyük yankı uyandırmıştır.) Konu ile ilgili olarak 2009 ve 2010 yılları 
İlerleme Raporlarında kapsamlı açıklamalara yer verilmiştir. Bu konuda genel kanı, 
olumlu adımların atıldığı ancak yeterli olmadığı yönündedir. Son olarak AKP 
hükümeti tarafından yayınlanan Alevi Çalıştayı Raporu’nu da göz önünde 
bulundurursak, sizce bir ilerleme kaydedilmiş midir? Ortada somut bir adım olduğu 
söylenebilir mi, şu anki durumu değerlendirebilir misiniz? 
 
– Cem evlerinin kapalı olması ve Aleviliğin inanç önderleri olan “dede”lerin 
tanınmaması ile ilgili olarak haklı talepler söz konusudur. Ancak bunun önünde 
hukuki bir engel olarak 30 Kasım 1925 tarihinde kabul edilmiş olan “Tekke, Zaviye 
ve Türbelerin Kapatılması Kanunu”nun bulunduğu belirtilmektedir. Sizce nasıl bir 
çözüm yolu geliştirebilir? 
 
– Alevi halkın toplum içerisinde maruz kaldığı olumsuz durumlar mevcut mudur? 
Var ise nelerdir, birkaç örnek verebilir misiniz? 
 
– Alevi halkın hükümetten daha doğrusu devletten beklentileri nelerdir? 
 
– Türkiye nüfusunun yüksek oranda Sünni inanışa sahip olduğu bilinmekte ve bu 
Suni kesimde Alevilik ile ilgili olarak eksik bilgiler, yanlış anlamalar söz konusu, 
yeterli bilgiye sahip olunduğunu düşünmüyorum. Sizce Alevi halkın taleplerinin 
yerine getirilmesi, Sünni kesimde var olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz önyargının 
kırılması için yeterli olacak mıdır? Olmayacak ise neler yapılmalıdır? 
 
Teşekkürler… 
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Transcript of interview with Ercan Geçmez (12 April 2011) 
 
Didem Doğanyılmaz: Evet en son Alevileri tanıyorduk. Kamil insan demiştik zaten. 
Erhan Geçmez: Ya Alevilik o anlamıyla var olan inançlardan kendisini farklı yani 
ya da kişiler bir sana bakışını bir doğaya bakışını daha farklı bir yere koyuyor ama 
eninde sonunda kendisini İslam’ın mensubu olarak görüyor. 
DD: İslam’ın bir kolu olarak görüyor, bu önemli evet. 
EG: Evet ve muhalif bir kolu olarak görüyor ve var olan İslami uygulamaların 
çoğunun sonradan değiştiğine inanıyor ve onun için dört kitabı da hak biliyor. Aynı 
zamanda Pagan inanışlardan çok etkilenen çok da içerisinde yaşatan bir inançtır 
bana göre. Özellikle tapınma şekillerine baktığımızda çok ciddi bir Pagan kültürünü 
görebiliriz. Yaşamı sonsuzluk olarak görüyor. Yani baya Pagan dinlerden 
etkilenmişlerdir ve bunu tapınma şekillerinde; insana, hayata ve doğaya bakış 
açılarında görebilirsiniz. Hayatın sonsuzluğuna inanıyor, ölüme inanmayan bir 
inanış. Bir devir daime inanan… İnsanın mutlak tekrar doğada canlı olacağına 
inanan bir inanış. Bazen bir hayvanda, bazen bir insanda bazen, bir ağaçta… Böyle 
kutsallıklara inanan ve her şeyden önce Tanrı’yı sorgulayabilen bir inanış. 
DD: Daha özgür olduğunu söyleyebiliriz bu bağlamda değil mi? 
EG: Tabi ki. Tanrı ile kendi arasında asla sınır koymuyor. Tanrı’da görmüş olduğu 
yanlışlıkları Tanrı'nın yüzüne söyleyebilecek kadar cesareti vardır. ‘Kıldan ince, 
kılıçtan keskin köprü yapmışsın; erkeksen sen geç’ diyebiliyor. Benim, bir Alevi 
olarak, Alevilik'in en çok hoşuma giden yanı; insanların dillerine, dinlerine ve 
ırklarına karşı kesin bir söylemi olmasıdır. Yani hiçbir insanı ayıplamayınız ve ayıp 
yapmayınız demesi ve o anlamda insanlar arasındaki o çeşitliliği çok iyi koruması, 
dışlamaması ve onu saygın bir yerde koruması asıl olan insana saygının, doğaya 
saygının çok iyi fark edilmesi ve o kadar çok ötekileştirilmesine rağmen, Alevilik 
aslında kimseyi ötekileştirmeden kendisine hayat bulmaya çalışmıştır. 
DD: Pagan inanışlar dedik ve bunlar Zerdüşlük ve Şamanizm olarak adlandırılıyor. 
Direk olarak bu iki dinle, İrani dinler olarak geçiyor zaten, etkileşimi vardır, bunun 
zaten İslam ile daha doğrusu Şii İslam ile bir sentezidir şeklinde kaynaklar yer alıyor. 
En azından yabancı basında bu şekilde tanımlanıyor Alevilik. Böyle midir peki 
Pagan din dedik ama Zerdüşlük ve Şamanizm midir? 
EG: Yani aslında Alevilik'in Şii bir İslam olarak görülmesi çok yanlış bir şeydir.  
DD: Yanlış tabi ki. 
EG: Alevilik'in Şiilik ile ortak tek yönü vardır, Ehl’i Beyt sevgisidir, başka hiçbir 
şey değil. Şiilik sonuçta var olan İslami anlayıştan çok farklı bir anlayış değil. Onlar 
da namaz ve niyaz kılan, oruç tutan bir din; fakat Alevilik, Ramazan'a inanan bir 
inanış değil. Namaza da inanan bir inanış değil. İbadetin şekline şemailine karşı 
çıkar o anlamda. Evet, Zerdüşlükten ve diğer inanışlardan haliyle çok etkilenmiştir 
ama sonuçta Alevilik'i Hindistan'daki o tek tanrılı dinlerden, çok tanrılı dinlere kendi 
içerisindeki çoğunluğun içerisinde de görebilirsiniz. Örneğin; suyun içerisinde 
bağdaş kurup oturabilmeleri, Alevi dedelerin ateşin içinde oturmaları gibi yani. O 
anlamda çok etkilenmişler. Çok etkilemiştir Alevilik'i. Zerdüşlükten, Türklerin ilk 
inanışından çok etkilenmiştir, ama Alevilik bir etnik yapı değildir. Mesela yaygın ve 
yanlış olan şey; Alevilerin Türk olduklarıyla ilgilidir. Bu çok yanlış bir şey. Alevilik 
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etnik yapıyı reddediyor. Yani onu zenginlik ve çeşitlilik olarak kabul ediyor ama 
kendisini bir etnik yapıya bağlamayı reddediyor. İnsanı kutsuyor ve insanın doğduğu 
yerin, dili, dini ve ırkının değerli olduğunu söylüyor ve bu Alevilik'in belirleyici 
olmadığına da kesin bir hüküm koyuyor. Türkiye'de Kürt Aleviler var yaygın bir 
şekilde, Arap Aleviler var, ondan sonra Türk Aleviler var, Bulgaristan'da Bektaşiler 
var, Bulgarlar var, Amerika'da var. Yani bir sürü yerde Alevilik var, Arnavutluk 
Alevileri var. Alevilik onun için çok çeşitli olmuştur. Bence önümüzdeki yüzyılda 
Alevilik Dünya'da çok yaygın bir inanış olacaktır. Benim gördüğüm kadarıyla, 
çünkü insanı rahatlatan bir inanış. Bu tabi ki benim kişisel görüşüm ve sonuçta tek 
tanrılı dinlerin çoğu şu anda insanı çok ciddi bir şekilde sıkıştıran, baskı altına alan 
bir noktada ve insanoğlunu bu kadar çok baskı altına alan inanışların eninde sonunda 
patlayacağına inanıyorum ben. 
DD: Çünkü daha özgür bir yapıya sahip olan Alevilik'te bir sorgulama ve eşitlik söz 
konusu. Örneğin; cemlerin, cem ayinlerinin, hem kadınlar hem de erkekler 
tarafından birlikte yapılıyor olması İslam açısından, belirli ilişkileri olan bir yapı 
olduğunu düşünürsek çok özgür bir inanış olduğunu gösteriyor bize. 
EG: Tabi Alevilikte öyle sonsuz özgürlük diye bir şey yok. Kendi içerisinde kontrol 
mekanizması olan bir inanış, ama kontrol mekanizması farklı inanış. Var olan 
dinlerden farklı bir inanış. İnsanın cinsiyetinden ve renginden ötürü ayırmaz tam 
tersine insanın değerlerine yani ne varsa yoksa bu hayatta var olduğuna inanır. 
Cennetin ve cehennemin de aslında insanın içinde var olduğunu ve insanın isterse 
cehennemi de isterse cenneti de yaşayabileceğini savunur. Karşısındakine de aynı 
şeyi yaşatabileceğine inanır. Bu bağlamda insanın kendisini sürekli donatması lazım, 
yani Tanrı'nın bir parçasının insanda var olduğuna inanıyor Alevilik. Kendi farkına 
vardıktan sonra cehennem denen bir şey kalmayacaktır onun için. Yoksa bana itaat 
edin, benim sözlerimi dinleyin size cenneti vaat edeceğim denen bir inanış değil 
Alevilik. Nasıl ki Haçlı Seferleri'nde doğuya gidin size cennetten arsa satacağım 
diyen Papazlar varsa, şu anda da İslam’ın içerisinde Allah için gidin bir tane Alevi'yi 
ya da bir Hristiyan’ı öldürün, size cenneti vaat ederim diyen Sünni Islam 
anlayışından çok farklı bir anlayış. 
DD: Peki az önce de bahsettik Kürt Aleviler dedik, Arap Aleviler dedik, Zazalar, 
Nusayriler olarak geçiyor. Bunların arasında ibadet anlamında veya inanış 
farklılıkları gibi çeşitlilikler söz konusu mudur yoksa yalnızca köklerinden dolayı mı 
farklı olduklarını söyleyebiliriz? 
EG: Alevilikte bir söz vardır: Yol bir, sürek binbir. Hepsi Alevidir o anlamda hepsi 
yoldadır, yolun içerisindedir; ama hepsinin sürekleri farklıdır ve Alevilik de zaten 
bunun için çok çeşitlidir ve bunun için çok zengindir. O anlamıyla Alevilerin bir 
olmalarının yani hani niye Aleviler bir değildir diye soranların Alevilik'i 
bilmediğindendir yani Alevilerin içerisindeki o çeşitliliği öldürmektir. Alevilik'i bir 
nehir olarak düşünün ve o nehri besleyen dereleri kuruttuğunuz anda Alevilik biter. 
Ben Kürt Alevilerin kendi içerisindeki yaptıkları inanışların Aleviliğin bir kolu 
olarak ve içerisindeki bir zenginlik, çeşitlilik olarak görüyorum ve böyledir bu. 
Farklılıklar vardır, kesinlikle vardır ama sonuçta şu noktaya hepsi gelebiliyor: En-el 
Hak diye bir görev. Önemli bir şey yani hepsi zaten Pir Sultan'ı, Hallaç'ı, Hacı 
Bektaş'ı, Yunus’u, hepsi bu bağlamda Alevi uygarlığı, cemlerinde gülbenklerini 
okuyorlar ama kimi Kürtçe okuyor, kimi Arapça okuyor, kimi Türkçe okuyor, kimi 
Farsça okuyor. Örneğin; İran'da, Irak'ta çok ciddi bir Alevi topluluğu var. Oradakiler 
farklı; bir kısmı Kürt, bir kısmı Türklerdir. 
DD: Zaten ilk etapta, bu çerçevede yani en azından bizim projemizin içerisindeki 
Aleviler, Türkmen Aleviler olarak bizim bölüm koordinatörümüz iletmiştir ancak 
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daha sonra 'hayır Türkmen-Aleviler diyemeyiz çünkü Alevilerin içerisinde Kürtler 
vardır, Araplar vardır' diyerek bir çeşitlilik getirdik 'Anadolu Alevileri' dedik. 
EG: Ben 'Anadolu Alevileri' adlandırmasına karşıyım. Çok sınırlandırılmış. Yani 
Alevilik öyle sınırlandırılmış bir şey değil. Anadolu Alevisi dediğinizde o zaman 
Anadolu dışındaki Aleviler de var. Anadolu ama hangi Anadolu? Osmanlı 
dönemindeki Anadolu mu, Türkiye dönemindeki Anadolu mu yoksa, Selçuklu 
dönemindeki Anadolu mu? Osmanlı dönemini ele alırsak çok farklı bir yerdeyiz o 
zaman. Alevilik benim için daha önemli yani üst başlıktır. Onu görüyorum. Bunun 
adı dönem dönem değişmiştir. Kimi zaman Rafizi olmuştur, kimi zaman Kızılbaş 
olmuştur. Ama bu sonuçta bugün kendisini Alevilik olarak akseder belki yüzyıl 
sonra başka bir isimle kendisini var edecektir ama asıl olan o değerlerin bütünüdür. 
Mesela Irak'a gidin, Kakailer vardir, Kürt Alevilerdir ve çok ciddi Alevilik yaşarlar. 
İran'a gidin Ali Allahçılar vardır. Ali'nin Allah olduğuna inananlar vardır ve 
bunların bir kısmı Türklerdir. Ama bir sorunları yok. Onlar da Hacı Bektaşi'den, Pir 
Sultan'dan ve kendi bölgelerindeki pirlerden etkileniyorlar, onlar da cinsiyete 
karşılar, onlar da insanın rengine ve dinine karşılar. Yani karşılar derken onu 
ayıranlari ayıplıyorlar. Bu anlamıyla Alevilik olarak baktığımızda daha önemli. 
Örneğin: Hacı Bektaş Orta Asya’dan, Horasan’dan Türkiye'ye geldiğinde kendisini 
karşılayan Kürt Alevilerdir. Hacı Bektaşi'den önce bu topraklarda ciddi bir Alevi 
topluluğu yaşıyordu. Onlar karşılıyordu ve bunların çoğu da Kürt’tür. Örneğin Dede 
Kardu vardır, çok önemli bir şahsiyet, bu toprakların en eskileridir. 
DD: Ben de bu kavramları soruyorum çünkü aynı zamanda biz bu çalışmanın bir de 
konferansını yapacağız ve orda ben yanlış terimler kullanmak istemiyorum. Sonuç 
olarak çok farklı. Örneğin; Anadolu Alevileri dediğimiz zaman aslında herkesi 
kapsayabileceğini düşünüyorduk, ancak değilmiş. İnançlar veya ibadetler konusunda 
örneğin, dört kapı kırk makam var, müsaiplik kavramı var, Muharrem orucu ve Hızır 
oruçları var. Kısaca bahsedebilir misiniz tam olarak ne şekilde ibadet türleridir? 
Çünkü genel olarak bizim tek bildiğimiz cem ayinleridir. Aleviler dediğimiz zaman 
cem evleri ve cem ayinleri şeklinde yer etmiştir bizim aklımızda, genel olarak 
baktığımızda. Akademisyenler olarak örneğin yurtdışında; Aleviler dendiği zaman, 
cem ayini akla gelir. Tabi ki bu kadar değil. Bu konuda daha bir çeşitlilik söz 
konusu yine. 
EG: Lafımın başında söyledim bir hayat biçimidir, yaşam biçimidir diye. Aslında 
onu bilerek söyledim. Bir Alevi gerçekten, Alevi olarak yaşamak isterse hayatının 
her anında sorumludur ve onu uygulamakla mükelleftir. Örneğin: Alevilerin 
sabahleyin kalktığında Güneş'e tapmaları gerekiyor normal olarak. Alevilerin 
Kabe'si Güneş'tir. Mezarlarına bakın mezarlarının taşları Güneş'in doğduğu yere 
dönüktür ve bu bir sırdır Alevilikte. Çok önce konuşmazlardı bunu, çünkü bir baskı 
içerisindelerdi. Osmanlı'nın baskıları vardı. Örneğin: Aleviler durağan suda yüzlerini 
yıkamazlardı, akan suda yıkarlardı, çünkü akan suyun kirlilik barındırmadığına 
inanıyorlardı. Ve yine Aleviler, sabahleyin kendisi için istediklerini kendi komşuları 
ve insanlık için de isterlerdi. Ama bu şimdi şehirde var mı? Belki yok ama bu 
şehirde yoktur diye Alevilikte de yoktur diyemeyiz. Bunu yaşayanlar var hala. Dört 
kapı kırk makam, Alevilerin hayatla ilgili duruşlarını sergiliyor aslında. Birinci kapı 
şeriattır, insan safına varılan sınıftır. Diğer canlılarla tek farkımız düşünebilen, 
konuşabilen olmamızdır. Kendinizi geliştirmezseniz orada gider gelirsiniz sürekli. 
Aleviler insanken farkına varmazsa bu hayatın ızdırap olduğuna inanıyorlar. Bunun 
için onlara göre her kapı önemlidir. Birinci kapıdan ikinci kapıya geçtiğinizde, 
birinci kapının ne kadar girilen bir kapı olduğunu anlar. Çünkü çok geri bir kapıdır 
aslında. Bahsedilen şeriat da, Sünni inanışta bahsedilen şeriat değildir aslında. Asla 
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öyle bir şey değildir. İşte oradan ikinci kapıya geldiğinizde burada biraz daha kendi 
farkınıza varabiliyorsunuz. Kendi farkınızın dışında hala seninki sana benimki bana 
mantığı devam ediyor, hala benciller o konuda. Ama üçüncü kapıya geldiğinizde, 
seninki benimki değil hepimizinki diye bir kavram var. Dördüncü kapıya 
geldiğinizde, hepimizin değil bütün varlığın aslında bir olduğuna karar veriyorsunuz 
ki aslında dördüncü kapıya varabilmek de çok zor bir şeydir. Zaten gelenler de 
uludurlar, onlar gelirler ve insanlığa sürekli yol gösterirler. Onun için kapıları bu 
şekilde açıklarsak daha iyi olur. Yani birinci kapı sen sensin, ben benim çok bencil, 
ikinci kapı biraz daha seninki sana benimki bana senin benim ilişkisi olan bir kapı. 
Üçüncü kapı 'hayır seninki benimki yok sen ve ben yok biz diye bir kavram var'. 
Dördüncü kapı bizi de reddediyor bütün alem var diyor. Doğayı da katıyor içerisine. 
Aleviler kendi içlerinde çocuklarına geleneklerini yaşatıyorlar, öğretiyorlar ama ne 
kadar yaşıyorlar dört kapı anlamında tabi bilmiyorum. Muharrem orucu, tabi 
Aleviler için önemli bir oruç. Sadece Hz. Hüseyin'le ilgili bir oruç değil. Çok 
eskiden gelen bir gelenektir Alevilik ve zaten Muharrem orucu Alevilikle ilgili ya da 
sadece Alevilerin inandığı bir oruç değildir. Tek tanrılı inançlarda da, çok tanrılı 
inançlarda da Muharrem orucuna inananlar var. Bunu Nuh'un Gemisi'nden tutun, 
insanların kurtuluşuna kadar var olan şeyleri kapsıyor. Alevilerin burada Muharrem 
orucuyla ilgili önemli gördükleri şey Hz. Hüseyin ile ilgilidir. Aslında on Muharrem 
olarak anıyorlar. On gün olarak. Son iki gün de, Hz. Hüseyin'in sülalesinden 
birilerinin kurtuluşunun, kurtuldukları için ve o soyun devam ettiği için ona şükran 
orucu olarak tutuyorlar son iki günü ve Hz. Hüseyin'e acımaktan ziyade, Hz. 
Hüseyin'in o duruşuna olan saygılarından ötürü Muharrem orucunda O'nu yaşamak, 
O'nun gibi davranabilmek için yani daha doğrusu arınmak için. Bu arınmak derken, 
gıdayla ilgili bir şey değildir. Muharrem orucu tamamen vicdanlarını yeniden 
sorgulamalarıyla ilgilidir. Çünkü Hüseyin'in insanın vicdanında yaşadığını… 
İsteseydi Hüseyin Bağdat valisi olurdu, isteseydi Hüseyin oradaki insanları 
katledebilirdi ve bir hükümdar olarak hayatını devam ettirebilirdi işte bugünki 
diktatörler gibi. 
DD: Zalim bir hükümdar portresi çizebilirdi. 
EG: Evet tam tersini yaptı Hüseyin. İnsanlığın öldürüldüğü bir yerde, kendi 
bedeninin ve güçsüzlüğünün bir şey ifade etmediğini yani varlığının, saraylarının bir 
şey ifade etmediğini, insanın kutsal olduğuna ve bu kutsalın da Tanrı tarafindan 
insana emanet edildiğine inandıklarına ve bu insanların dilleri, dinleri ve ırklarından 
ötürü değil insan olduklarından ötürü değerli olduklarına inanıyordu. Hüseyin 
paylaşımcı olduğu için, o insanlar Hüseyin'i yaşamak istiyorlar, yani gönüllerindeki 
Hüseyin'i yaşamak istiyorlar ve çok hassaslardır şöyle hassaslardır bunu kimselere 
söylemezler yani o kişinin samimiyeti olsun baskıcı yapmazlar. Çünkü Hüseyin'e 
inanıyorsan bunu yaparsın, O'nu gönlünde hissedebiliyorsan bunu yapabilirsin. O 
anlamda, Muharrem orucu Alevilerde çok farklı bir oruçtur. Aşure zaten yaygındır 
ve sadece Aleviler bunu yapmıyor ama Aleviler yaygınlaştırmışlardır bu topraklarda, 
diğerleri unutmuşlardı. Aleviler hiç unutmadılar. Aşureye ilgi olarak zaten sadece 
Hüseyin'i katmıyorlar, insanın kurtuluşunu anarak geçiyorlar. Ta oradan getiriyorlar, 
bu öyle bir şeydir. Hızır orucu çok farklı bir şeydir. Hızır orucu, yardımın yani darda 
olanların, muradına ermek isteyenlerin talihlen birleşebilmeleri, onunla sohbet 
edebilmeleri anlamında kullandıkları bir şeydir. Cemlere gelince, Alevilerin 
cemlerini sadece ibadet olarak algılamak çok yanlış bir şey. Aleviler zaten oturmayı, 
kalkmayı, sohbeti ibadet olarak algılıyorlar. Çünkü genelde İslamsa gidip namaz 
kılmak, diğer dinlerse kutsal mekanlarına gidip orada ibadet etmek olarak 
algılıyorlar. Alevilik öyle bakmıyor ise. Örneğin; çalışmayı da bir ibadet olarak 
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algılıyor, insana saygıyı da ibadet olarak algılıyor, kendisine saygıyı da ibadet olarak 
algılıyor. Çünkü bir Alevi kendisiyle barışık değilse, başkasına hiçbir şey sunamaz. 
Cem o anlamıyla yeniden insanın kendisini sorgulama yeridir. Cemler üç bölümden 
oluşuyor. Birinci bölüm rızalıktır. Bu da dedenin ceme girenlerden rızalık 
istemesidir. Şayet ceme girenler rızalık vermezse, dede ve gelenlerin birbirlerinden 
rızalık almasıdır. 
DD: Küslük olmaması için. 
EG: Evet küslük olmaması için. İkinci bölümü tamamen sorgulama bölümüdür ve 
en uzun bölümüdür. Yani orada mevki, makam, para pul hiçbir şeyin önemi yoktur. 
İnsan çıplaktır ve bizzat kendisiyle yüzleştiği bir yerdir ve orada çaresiz dışarıda 
kendi gücünüzü kullanarak güçsüz birisine karşı bir haksızlık yaptıysanız ve o 
meydanda bulunuyorsanız ciddi bir sorgulama vardır, öğreti vardır. Gelen çocuklara 
yönelik, genç çocuklara yönelik cemle ilgili, Alevilikle ilgili öğretiler başlar çünkü 
cemler de farklıdır. Dört-beş çeşit cem vardır ve bunların değişik amaçları vardır ve 
bu bağlamda ikinci bölüm çok önemlidir ve geneli en uzun bölümdür. Sorgulamanın 
en fazla yapıldığı ve öğretinin en fazla verildiği yerdir. Üçüncü bölüm tamamen işte 
bedenin artık bir şey ifade etmediği ruhun var olduğu bir dönemdir. Onun için yalın 
ayak ve başı açık semaha dönülür ve insan bütün duygularından arınarak orada 
Tanrıyla bütünleşmenin yolunu arar. Bu üçüncü bölümdür. Böyle bir ibadet vardır 
yani işte söylemlerinden birisi ise insanların coşkuya gelmesi ve semaha durmasıdır 
ve en sonda kurbanlarin dağıtıldığı ve cemin bittiği bölümdür. 
DD: Bunun dışında Nehcül Belağa gibi bir kitap, Ali'nin sözlerinden genel olarak 
oluştuğunu söylüyorlar. Bu da sanırım takip edilen bir kavramdır, değil mi? 
EG: Tabi ki. Aslında yazılı belgeleri var ama Alevilerin yazılı belgeleri ne yazık ki 
ortaya çıkartılmıyor yani özgürlükleri bir yerlerde kapatılıyor. Çok fazla kitap var. 
Örneğin: yani bizim özellikle Osmanlı ve Selçuklu dönemlerinde çok ciddi Alevi 
dergileri yok edildi, bir kısmına el konuldu ve hala onların nerede oldukları, bir 
kısmın devlette olduğunu biliyoruz, bir kısmın çalındığı ve bunların açığa 
çıkartılmamasıyla ilgili çok ciddi bir direnç var. Bu bağlamda Alevilerin yazılı 
belgesi yoktur diyenler aslında onu çok fazla bilmediklerinden. Örneğin: Hacı 
Bektaş Dergahı talan edildiğinde Nursiler tarafindan, oraya cami kurulduğu zaman 
Osmanlı kurdu ama çok ciddi Alevi dergileri yok oldu. Amasya'da yine Alevi 
dergahları talan edildi, Dersim’de talan edildiginde, ilk saldırdıkları yer Alevilerin 
yazılı belgeleri. O belgeler yok edildi yani çıktığında çok şey değişecekti. Hz. 
Ali'nin sözlerine gelince, Aleviler şu anki İslamiyet’e inanmazlar. Osman'ın yazdığı 
yazılara inanmazlardı ve taraflı olduğuna yani Kur-an'ı Kerim'i değiştirdiğine 
inanıyorlardı. Birçok belgesinin, Kur-an'ın birçok bölümünün değiştirildiğine, var 
olan Kuran'ın gerçek Kuran olmadığını ve aslında gerçek Kuran'ın Osman tarafından 
farklılaştırıldığını ve ondan sonra yazıldığını ve Hz Ali'nin sözünü Kuran olarak 
kabul ederler. Bunu da şundan aldılar. Hz. Ali bir savaşta kendisine karşı Kuran 
takıp gelen askerlerin mızraklarından Kur-an'ın sayfaları toplanarak kendi askerleri 
Kur-an'a karşı savaş yapmadıklarından Hz. Ali dönüp kendilerine sunu söylüyor: 
Kurani Samit’e inanmayacaksınız, benim sözüm Kurani Natik’tir. Bu anlamda Hz. 
Ali'nin sözlerini çok önemli ve değerli buluyorlar. 
DD: Bir de zaten ruhun varlığına inanıldığını, bedenin çok önemli olmadığını 
söylemiştiniz. Bu bağlamda, örneğin İsa'nın yeniden doğacağına olan inancın 
Alevilerde de yaygın olduğuna dair bir söylem söz konusu mu? 
EG: Bence Hristiyanlık Alevilikten etkilenmiş bu anlamda. 
DD: Öyle mi diyorsunuz? 
EG: Evet çok net söylüyorum. 
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DD: Çünkü bu zaten ruhun dolaşması, farklı canlılarda, farklı bedenlerde can 
bulması kavramı daha eskidir diye düşünüyorum. 
EG: Tabi, yani tek tanrılı dinlerin tarihi çok eski değil. Aleviliğin tarihi tek tanrılı 
din inanışlarından çok çok eskidir.. Örneğin: 3ler, 5ler, 7ler, 12ler Hristiyanlık'ın da 
kutsal saydığı sayılar. Örneğin, Hristiyanlık'ın kutsal saydığı hayvanlar var 
Alevilik'in de kutsal saydığı hayvanlar var. Bunlar tamamen tek tanrılı dinlerin 
Alevilik'ten etkilenmesi sonucudur. Bize tam tersi olduğunu söylüyorlar da işte 
bunlar acaba Hristiyanlık'tan mı etkilendiler diye. Hayır, bence Hristiyanlık değil 
çünkü bu topraklarda çok ciddi bir Hristiyan kültürü de vardı eskiden ve bunlar 
Alevilerle ortak yaşamışlardır. İlk bu Mezopotamya özellikle Alevilerin en yaygın 
olduğu yerdi. Aleviler kadim topluluğudur bu toprakların. Mezopotamya'nın 
özellikle çok eski en eski topluluklardan birisidir Alevilik. Ta ki ne zaman tek tanrılı 
dinler ciddi bir şekilde insanları yok ederek, zorla kendi birimleri altına aldılarsa 
ondan sonra Pagan inanışlar geriye çekilip kendilerine o inançların içerisinde bir yer 
edinerek var etmeye çalıştılar. Alevilik de aslında İslam’ın içerisinde kendine bu 
şekilde var ediyor. Sırlarını gizleyerek ve kelimeler üzerinde farklaştırmalar yaparak 
kendisini mecburiyetten orda var ediyor. Tabi şimdi artık hani İslam’ın içine mi 
dışına mı tartışması çok mantıksız bana göre çünkü 1400 yıldır İslam’la aynı yatakta 
yatıp kalkıyor ve aynı coğrafyayı paylaşıyor. Yani İslam’ın içindedir ama İslam’ın 
muhalif bir gücüdür, heteredoksi bir inanıştır. Hatta heteredoksinin ötesinde bir 
inanıştır, bana göre. Heterodoksi de kendi içinde problemleri olan bir inanıştır ama 
Alevilik'in onu aşan bir yönü de vardır. Bu nedenle de çok değerlidir Alevilik'e 
bakış açısı bizim için çünkü daha cihan yok iken biz Tanrı'yı var ettik, niha eyledik 
diyor Farabi. Daha cihan yok iken Tanrı'yı aldık var ettik adını Ali koyduk diyor. Bu 
kadar net söylüyor yani. Bunu böyle görmek gerekiyor. 
DD: Bu yakınlarda Alevi Çalıştayı raporu yayınlandı. Çok açıkçası tepki topladı en 
azından basında okuduklarımızla. Tatmin edici yönleri var mıdır bu yani somut 
adımlar atılmış mıdır? Çünkü iki yıllık bir çalışma olduğunu biliyorum en azından. 
Avrupa açısından çok demokratik bir açılımdır gözüyle bakıldı ancak buna ben hep 
söylüyorum Avrupa’da da söylüyorum dışa yansıyanla içeride yaşadıklarımız 
kesinlikle bir değil. Bu bağlamda da var mı sizin söyleyeceğiniz bir şey? 
EG: Ya buna en iyi cevap nedir biliyor musun? Bu hükümet özellikle, başkasının 
gözündeki kıymığı görür ama kendisinin gözündeki başkasının gözüne batırdığı 
koca ağacı görmez hiçbir zaman. Bu Alevi çalıştayları, Kürt çalıştayları, Roman 
çalıştayları, tamamen var olan hakimiyetin yeniden ve adamlar bunu uygulamakta 
çok başarılılar. Yani Başbakan, Avrupa'da Almanya Başbakanı'nın sözünden ötürü 
siz Alman vekili yurttaşları aksine ama Türkiye'deki Kürt yurttaşların Alevilerin ve 
Romanların ne yaptıklarını hiç görmüyorsunuz. Yani bir laf söyleyeceksen, önce 
kendi içindeki problemleri göreceksin, kendi kapını temizleyeceksin önce. Sen kendi 
kapını temizlemeden nasıl başkasının kapısına kirlisin diyebiliyorsun? O anlamda bu 
bir hüsrandır, Alevileri asimile edebilmektir, Türkiye'nin önündeki ileri 
demokrasiden bahsediyorlar ya hani, bu ileri demokrasinin önünü kapatmaktır. 
Çünkü siz Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığını yok edemezseniz, Ne Alevi çalıştayı 
yaparsınız, ne de Sünnileri özgürleştirebilirsiniz. Asıl sorun Aleviler değildir bu 
memlekette, sorun hükümetle, devletle birleşmiştir. Devleti yönlendiren, 
şekillendiren sosyal, kültürel, politik yani şekilen bir Diyanet İsleri Başkanlığı vardır 
ve sadece Sünnilerin bir kolu vardır. Herhalde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti anayasasının 
laik olduğunu söylüyor, sosyal bir devlet olduğunu söylüyor ve paylaşımcı olduğunu 
söylüyor. Tam tersi aslında. Yani Alevi çalıştaylarının sonucunun her noktasını 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’ndan görüş alarak yönlendirdiler ve siz Türkíye'de 
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insanların giyim şekillerine bakarak yaygara kopartacağınıza, laik bir devlet olmak 
için önce anayasanızı düzeltmeye çalışın. Yani bir insanın kapalı veya açık olması, 
onun o şekilde üniversiteye girip girememesi insan haklarına ciddi bir saygısızlık 
olarak gören birisiyim ve edepsizlik olarak görüyorum. Bir insanın türbanlı olduğu 
için üniversiteye girememesi benim için bir edepsizliktir yani. O, onun yaşam 
şeklidir ve buna saygı gösterilmelidir ve bu eğitim hakkı olmalıdır. Diğer taraftan 
bunu söyleyenlerin yapmadığı bir şey vardır. Örneğin beş yaşındaki bir çocuğu Ku-
ran kursuna göndermesi vardır ama imam hatip liseleri duruyor, Kuran kursları 
duruyor, ilahiyat fakülteler duruyor ve siz buraları kapatmıyorsunuz. Bu çocuğun 
bütün dini duygularını tek taraflı besliyorsunuz, üniversiteye getiriyorsunuz sonra 
hayır ben seni almam türbanlısın. Bu ahlaksızlıktır yani bu çocuklara zorla din 
dersleri veriyorsunuz. Avrupa İnsan Hakları mahkemesi kararı olmasına rağmen, 
gidiyorsunuz Avrupa'ya 'ben din derslerini değiştirdim' diyorsunuz. En büyük 
ahlaksızlık da budur zaten. Üniversiteliler ne yaptılar? Tekrar Alevileri asimile 
etmeye çalıştılar. Bizim talebimiz neydi? Din derslerini zorunlu olmaktan çıkartın 
müfredatını değiştirin dinler tarihi dersini koyun. 
DD: Gerçekten 'din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi' olsun. 
EG: Evet. Yani Türkiye'de şöyle bir durum var devletin, insanların tamamının 
ahlaksız olduğunu inaniyorlar yani kendi, kendi ahlakının dışındaki ahlaklara 
inanmayan bir devlet. O anlamda Türkiye'de çok ciddi bir şekilde anayasa 
değişikliği lazımdır ama onun bu parlementonun yapacağına inanmıyorum. Hele 
AKP’nin hiç yapacağına inanmıyorum, çünkü AKP kendisine demokrattır. AKP 
aynı zamanda kendi sermayesine ya da işte bir anayasa değişikliği oldu, anayasa 
değişikliğinde kıyamet kopardılar özgürlükleri geri getireceğiz diye. Hiçbir özgürlük 
gelmediği gibi, Başbakanın anayasa değişikliğini bir mitingde yaptığı konuşmalar 
utanç vericiydi ve Aleviler için çok tehlikeli bir devlet. Çorum’da yaptığı konuşma 
hem de Alevilerin katledildiği bir şehirde ve gidip Alevileri katleden, katliamlarıyla 
ilgili ferman veren bir şeyhülislamı kahraman ilan etti. Sincan'da bir dedeler 
dönemini kapatıyor ki, HSYK’dan bahsetti bir tane Alevi vardı şimdi hiçbirisi Alevi 
değildir. Hani siz ileri demokrasiden bahsediyordunuz? Bu mudur yani? Sonra ciddi 
bir Alevilerin devletin sesine sorunu vardır. Örneğin en son Ankara'nın Büyükşehir 
Belediye Başkanı çok çirkin bir açıklama yaptı. 'CHP'li ve üstelik Alevi olduğunu 
bildiğim halde gidip nikahlarını kıydım.' dedi. Bunla ilgili hiçbir şey, hiçbir 
mahkeme, hiçbir savcı harekete geçmedi. Çünkü Türkiye'de nefret suçu denen 
kavram henüz anayasada yer bulmamıştır. Herkes Alevilere küfreder ve herkes 
kalkar sonra der ki Aleviler bizim dostumuz biz kardeşiz. Böyle bir kardeşlik olmaz. 
Dostluk dediğimiz şey, insanın omzundaki yükü alan bir şeydir ama artık kimsenin 
de kardeşi değiliz yani bu topraklarda. 
DD: Onun dışında ben de zaten bunu soracaktım. Az önceki konuşmalarınızda 
ötekileştirildiğimiz halde Alevilikte ötekileştirme yoktur dediniz. Bu bahsettiğiniz 
ötekileştirilme sanırım anlattığınız şeyler yani bu çeşitli açıklamalar, Aleviliğe karşı 
bilinen, var olan yanlış bilgiler. Bu konuda daha farklı örnekler sayabilir misiniz? 
Örneğin cem evlerinin açılmıyor olması, dedelerin aynı şekilde sizin inanç 
liderleriniz olduğuna karşı bir yasal yaptırım olmaması. Bu konuda talepler nelerdir? 
EG: Tabi Aleviler aslında bunu açarsak yani Alevilerin bu topraklardaki geçmişine 
baktığımızda katliamlarla anılan bir topluluk. Kahramanmaraş'ta, Çorum'da, Sivas'ta 
her yerde ciddi Alevi katliamlarının yaşandığı ve aslında sadece Alevilere değil 
öteki topluluklara da Ermenilerden tutun, Rumlara, gayrimüslimlere yönelik çok 
ciddi katliamlar yaşanmıştır bu topraklarda ve bu katliamların yaşandığı yerlerde 
Aleviler tüm ötekilerle birlikte ortak yaşamı geliştirebilmiş. Örneğin bu topraklarda 
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Ermeniler katledilirken, Aleviler Ermenilere sahip çıkmışlardır. Rumlar katledilirken, 
Rumlara sahip çıkmışlardır. Bu anlamda Aleviler katledilirken mesela Sünnilerle 
sorun yaşamamışlardır. Bizde yani kısasa kısas mantığını geliştirmemişlerdir. Hiçbir 
Sünni’nin burnunu kanatmamışlardır, tersine karşı çıkmışlardır. Örneğin bizim cem 
evlerimiz bizim ibadetlerimiz dersem bunu cami ya da kilise alternatifi olarak 
söylemediler. Biz böyle inanıyoruz, bunu böyle görüyoruz. Sonuçta devletin 
yapması gereken budur ve bunu söylerken de bizim elektriğimizi, suyumuzu, 
dedemizin maaşını karşılayın anlamında söylemediler. Devlet laik olsun, dinlerden 
elini çeksin, topluluklar kendi inançlarını kendi ve kendileri tarif etsin. Yani bunu 
istediler Aleviler. Bir Sünni yurttaş benim inanç yerim camidir, mescittir diyorsa 
devlet buna 'hayır sen buna camidir, mescittir diyemezsin' hakkına sahip olamaz. Bir 
Hristiyan yurttaş kendi dini liderlerinin eğitimini Türkiye'de yapmak istiyorsa ve 
kendi geleneğine göre yapmak istiyorsa devlet 'sen yapamazsın önce benden izin al' 
dememeli veya Aleviler 'bir cem evi bizim hakkımızdır' diyor ama devlet 'yok hayır 
sizin hakkınız olamaz. O hakkı biz kültür merkezi için kullandık' diyor. Yani şundan 
herkes vazgeçmeli. Aleviliği tariften vazgeçmeli. Alevilik, Aleviler sorunu teolojik 
bir sorun değildir bu topraklarda. Aleviler kendi teolojisiyle barışıklardır zaten. 
Sorun siyasal bir sorundur, parlamentoda çözülecek bir sorundur. Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti'nin anayasasındaki var olan kendisiyle çelişen maddelerin değişmesiyle 
çözülebilecek bir sorundur. Yoksa kalkıp da Alevi çalıştaylarında yaptıkları sey bir 
işi veya işte Alevilik Hak, Muhammed, Ali'dir biz Hak, Muhammed, Ali diyenlerle 
bu işi götüreceğiz diğerleri bizi ilgilendirmiyor. Hani sen tahrik etmeyecektin. 
Bakan kalkıp televizyonlarda olan televizyon programlarında 'Ercan Bey on gündür 
aynı şeyleri söylüyor'. Evet on gündür aynı şeyleri söylüyorum ben çünkü ortada 
değişen bir şey yok ki ve 'biz tahrik yapmadık' diyor ve bakan bunu söylediğinde 
Alevi çalıştayların sonuç bildirgesinde yayınladıkları raporlarda 'Biz Alevilik'i Hak, 
Muhammed, Ali yolunu bilenlerle birlikte yürüttük bu çalışmayı'. Yani çelişiyor 
kendi içerisinde. Çok ağır olacak ama, sahtekar davranıyorlar. Türkiye'de yüzleri 
başka, Avrupa'da yüzleri başka. Ne yazık ki Avrupa da bunlara inanıyor. Bunların 
arka gömleğinin ne olduğunu bilmiyor yani Türkiye'de var olan Alevi sorununun 
çözümüyle ilgili var olan partiler, özellikle parlamentodaki partilerden 
bahsediyorum diğerlerini kastetmiyorum, çözeceklerine inanmıyorum çünkü hepsi 
riyakardır ve hep inkardan geçiniyorlar. Hepsinin kafatası Diyanetin belirlediği bir 
noktaya kadardır ve Diyanet'ten korkmayan partiler ancak Alevi sorununu 
çözebilirler, Diyanet'ten korkanlar Alevi sorununu çözemezler. Parlamentodaki 
partilerin hiçbirisi Diyanet'in dışında hareket edemez, buna Alevilerin en çok oy 
verdiği CHP dahil, AKP dahil, MHP dahil. Bir tek şu anda bu konuda en düzgün 
duran Kürtlerin partisidir. En azından Alevi örgütlerinin söylemlerini 'bunlar 
söylüyorsa doğrusu budur' diyebiliyor. 
DD: Çok teşekkür ediyorum. 
EG: Ben tesekkür ediyorum. 
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Transcript of interview with Ali Balkız (12 April 2011) 
 
Didem Doğanyılmaz: Sizce Alevilik nedir? 
Ali Balkız: Alevilik çok zengin bir yelpazedir. 4 ana bakış var (kendilerini tarif 
ettikleri): 1.kimisine göre İslamiyet'in özü; 2. kimisine göre İslamiyet'in 
Anadolu'daki yorumu; 3. kimilerine göre yalnız başına kendisi bir din 4. 
Şamanizm'den başlayarak, Horasan'dan başlayarak, sonrasında İran'da, sonrasında 
Mezopotamya'da ve sonrasında Anadolu’da binlerce yıldır Türklerin yaşadıkları 
yerlerdeki inançlardan beslenen, onlardan öğeler taşıyan (Hristiyanlık, Hinduizm, 
İslamiyet), Anadolu'ya geldiğinde Anadolu'daki yerli kültürden ve inançtan beslenen, 
bunların her birinden birşeyler alan, ama hiçbirine benzemeyen, bir yol bir felsefe, 
bir yaşam tarzı, doğayı toplumu ve insanı algılamayı amaçlayan bir felsefedir, bir 
yaşam biçimi (bence de budur) aşureye benzer, yepyeni bir tat yepyeni bir aroma, 
yepyeni bir fizik ve kimya. Önerdiğim kaynaklar, daha çok bu dördüncüyü 
doğrulayan kaynaklardır. 
Bir de Sünnilerin Alevileri tanımlamaları, onların bakış açısı var. Kökten dinci 
Sünniler, Alevilik'i İslamiyet'in bir alt grubu bir yorumu olarak görmezler, tam 
tersine, İslamiyeti'n dışında sapkın sıfatıyla tanımlarlar. Başka bir grup tasavufi 
anlamda, Alevilik'in İslam dairesi içinde, Mevlevilik gb Nakşilik gb bir alt grubu 
oldugunu söylerler. 
Bir de devletin bakışı vardır. Selçuklulardan bu yana, hep dışlanmış, İslam dışı 
sayılmış katl-i vacip görülmüş (fetvalarda yeri vardır) ve o anlamda yok sayılmış bir 
bakıstır. Bugün gelinen noktada Alevilerin kente goçetmeleri ile birlikte, Aleviler 
kendilerini merak ettikleri kadar Sünniler de merak etmislerdir bunlar kimdir diye. 
Devletin bakışını bu anlamda değerlendirecek olursak, Selçuklu, Osmanlı ve 
cumhuriyet (maalesef) yok sayan, dışlamakla yetinmeyen, sürgün etmekle 
yetinmeyen, aynı zamanda katleden politikaları oldu hep. Ama 60lardan bu yana, 
devlet politikasında bir değişiklik oldu. Hem katliamlara devam (Çorum, Sivas, 
Kahramanmaraş, Malatya), devlet dairelerinden dışlama, devletin, ordunun, 
emniyetin, siyasetin önemli kademelerine getirmeme, bunun yanında da bir de 
asimile çalışmaları olmuştur. Böylece onlardan kurtulma, yok ederek kurtulma 
mantığının yanına bir de asimilasyon politikası eklenmiştir. Türkiye'de en çok 
misyonerlik konuşulur. Hristiyanlar gelip misyonerlik yapar denilir, Zirve Yayınları 
basılır, katledilir. Ama asil misyoner olan devlettir, Türkiye'de, Alevilere karşı. Bir 
de kent koşulları, kapitalizmdir. Uygarlıktır ama aynı zamanda içe geçmişliktir. 
Köylerde Aleviler çok kendi başlarına yaşıyorlardı, homojen yapıları vardı, devletle 
ilişkileri sınırlıydı, askere giderken ve vergi verirkendi sadece. Karşıda bir Sünni 
köy vardı, onlarla bayramlarda, düğünlerde ve cenazelerde buluşurlardı. Halk 
birbirine kötü nazarla bakmazdı. Ama kent, aynı apartmanda, aynı okulda, aynı 
çarşıda, aynı sokakta aynı kahvede yaşıyor olmanın getirdiği bir içiçe geçmişliktir. 
Alevilerin kendilerini gizleme ihtiyaçları, bizde Müslümanız diyerek kendilerini 
koruma ihtiyacı hissetmişlerdir. Aslında özüne baktığımız zaman, yine o 
tanımlardan farklı bir biçimde değerlendireceğiz. İslamiyetin şartlarını biliyoruz. Bir 
Alevi'ye dönüp sorduğunuz zaman evet uyuyoruz diyemeyecek. Evet Hakka 
inanıyorum, dua ediyorum, ibadet ediyorum, mabede gidiyorum, peki nereye 
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gidiyorsun cemevine, neden cami değil? Biz Aleviyiz dendiği zaman farklılık ortaya 
çıkıyor. Türkiye'deki bütün dedeler, kendilerinin peygamber soyundan geldiklerini, 
seyit olduklarını (Muhammed, 4 halife, Ali ve 12 imamın ailesinden olan) söylerler. 
Ama onlar Araplardı, sen Arap mısın, haşa : )) bu sorular işlerine gelmez. O dedeler 
ya Türk'tür, ya Kürt'tür, ya Arnavut'tur, ya Bulgardır ya da Macar'dır. Ama Arap 
değildir, eğer soyunun oraya dayandığını söyluyorsun, bu soruya cevap vereceksin. 
Böylece biz seyitiz diyerek, doğuştan kendilerine bir saygı sevgi beslenmesini 
(varlığına) bir hürmet edilmesini isterler. Halbuki biz kent koşullarında Aleviler, bu 
insan dede olmak icin, ana olmak icin (kadin-erkek ayrımı yoktur) doğustan gelen 
özellikler yetmez, işi ne kadar iyi yapabileceğini de merak ederiz. Yaşamıyla 
gercekten eline, beline, diline sahip mi, bunlar da aranır. Mükemmele ulaşılamaz. 
Kent koşulları Alevileri ve Sünnileri birbirine yaklaştırdı. Bu çalıştayların bu 
anlamda katkıları oldu, kimiler için tabiî ki de ama önyargılar kırılmaya başlandı, 
farklılıklar bilinerek birlikte yaşama duygusu gelişti, kısmen de olsa. Kent aynı 
zamanda birbirleriyle kaynasmasını sağladı bu iki farklı kesimin. Ama yeterince 
aşılamadı. 
Köylerde Aleviler kendi inançlarınca, istediğince yaşayabiliyordu. Her grubun bağlı 
bulunduğu bir ocak vardı, dedeler gelirler, ibadetlerini yapar döner giderlerdi. 
Aleviler genelde kışın, zaten yollar kar kaplı, jandarma gelmez, Sünniler gelmez, 
gizlice yaparlardı ibadetlerini. Köylerin girişlerine çıkışlarına, tepelere gözcüler 
konurdu. İbadetlerini yaparlardı. Hangi ocağa bağlı iseniz, hangi dede gelip sizi 
görecek ise (görgü anlamında) o gelirdi, müsahiplik olurdu. Nedir müsahiplik? Alevi 
anne babadan doğmak yetmez, bir koşuldur ama yetersizdir. Genç evliler, iki çift, 
birbirleriyle kardeş olurlar, yol kardeşliğidir bu. 4 kişi, tek beden olur. Törende 
bunların üzerine büyük beyaz çarşaf örtülür, 4 kişi bir kişi olmuştur. Onların 
çocukları da kardeş olmuşlardır, evlilik düşmez. Bu dört kişi birbirlerinden hayat 
boyu sorumludurlar. 
DD: Büyükşehir Alevileri ve Anadolu Alevileri farkı belki de buradan gelmektedir.  
AB: Bunu su sebeple anlattım, kentte bunu yaşayamayacaklardır. Dedelerini nerede 
bulacaklar? Cem yapılan cemaat ayrıldı, müsahip kardeşler ayrıldı. Artık bulunan 
kişilerle cem yapılmaktadır. İşin kaynağında olan olay artık uygulanamamaktadır. 
Kent koşullarında nasıl yaşayabilirizi bulmaya çalışmışlardır. Artık daha açık 
durumdadırlar. Köyde korunuyorlardi, birliklerdi. Daha sonrada 12 Eylül Anayasası 
geldi ve zorunlu din dersleri başladı. Asimilasyonun en büyük araçlarından bir tanesi 
budur. Bu anlamda bu eşitsizliği gidermek adına çağdaş normlarda örgütlenme 
ihtiyacı hissetti Aleviler. Köylerde bu vardı, inanç temelli dergahlar vardı, pir mürşit 
gibi bir örgütlenme vardı. Bu benzetme yapılabilir. Kültürü devam ettirme ihtiyacı 
modern anlamda örgütlerin doğmasına sebep oldu. Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği 
1988 yılında kuruldu. Diğer örgütler kuruldu, sonra federasyonlar kuruldu. Böyle bir 
dönem yaşıyoruz, artık Aleviler sokaktalar. Eylem vakti geldiğinde demokratik 
eylemler yapıyorlar Aleviler. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 353!
 
 
 
Alevi Meeting - Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation (12 April 2011). 
 
İnanç dolayısıyla cemlerimiz değişti, unuttuk cemlerimizi. Müsahiplik gibi bir 
kurum neredeyse kalmadı. Bunun yanında gençlerimiz inançlarını bilemez oldular. 
Onları ilgilendirmiyor fakat bu arada çok önemli bir şey oldu o da, örgütlenmeye 
başladık. Yakın da olsa tarihi, bu örgütlenme Avrupa'da da oldu. Onu bizzat 
yaşadım. Burada da oldu ve çok kısa sürede gerçekten çok büyük işler başardılar, bu 
örgütlerimiz. İster Avrupa'da olsun ister burada olsun. Hem sosyal mitingler hem de 
işte bugün içinde bulunduğumuz bu güzel toplantı bu çalışmanın bir ürünü. Fakat 
eksiğimiz şuydu: İnançsal boyutta bir şeyler eksikti bunu hepimiz fark ettik. İşte 
bunun için yollara düştük. İnançsal boyutta acaba bir birlik sağlayabilir miyiz diye 
ve Türkiye'ye geldik. Önümüzdeki günlerde de Avrupa'ya gidilecek. Bunlar bittikten 
sonra Hacı Bektaş'de bir toplantı olacak ve orada nasıl bir araya geliriz o tartışılıp bir 
karara bağlanacak ve ne kadar başarılı olduğumuzu orada göreceğiz dostlar. Size 
tekrar teşekkür ediyorum geldiğiniz için sağ olun. Bu konuda söz almak isteyen 
arkadaşlarımız için de mikrofonu uzatacağız. Düşünceleriniz bizim için çok önemli. 
İnanışsal boyutta tekrar bir örgütlenme konumuzun adı Hacı Bektaşi etrafında bu 
konuda düşüncelerinizi dinlemek bizim için çok önemli çok teşekkür ediyorum 
tekrar size sağ olun. 
EMEL SUNGUR: Aslında ilk açılması gereken konu ama hiç kimsenin sesi 
çıkmayınca mecbur kaldım. Yeni bir araştırma var Dumlupınar Üniversitesi'nde 
Şehriban Şahinkaya adında bir yardımcı doçentin yapmış olduğu bir araştırmadır. 
Kadınsız Alevilikler. 20 yıllık demokratik Alevi örgütlenme sürecinde gelinen 
bugünki noktada altını biraz daha kalın çizerek tekrarlamak istiyorum ve çok 
önemsediğim için. Bunun bir yansıması olarak da inançsal boyutuyla şu an bir 
değineceğim de kadın ve erkeklerin uzun zamandır görmemiştim ayrı yerlere 
oturtma süreci başladığını sizinle paylaşmak istiyordum ve korkum şu: Alevi erkeği 
Sünnileşiyor ve Alevilik Sünnileşiyor. Söyleyeceğim bu kadar. Saygılarımla. 
MUSTAFA ÖZCİVAN: Hacı Bektaşi'den önceki belediye başkanı ve Hacı Bektaşi 
Veli Kültür Derneği ikinci başkanıyım. Ankara'dan geçiyorduk eşim ve çocuklarla 
toplum için böyle Dernek olarak düşüncemizi çok kısa özetleyeceğim. Hepinize 
saygılarımı sunuyorum. Hacı Bektaşi Veli Kültür Derneği 1964'ten beri devam eden 
1980'de kapatılıp 1992'de tekrar açılan ve 2006'da aktif hale gelen Hacı Bektaşi 
Kültür Derneği'nin yönetimindeyim. 1980 öncesi belediye başkanımız dernek 
başkanı 1980 sonrası belediye başkanı 2. başkan ve yönetiminde bu şekilde 
çalışmalarımız oldu. Öncelikle sevgili gördüğü için der ki zamanı uydun değil ama 
siyaseten de Alevilerin işinin müftü kadar olmadığını da burada söyleyeyim. Çünkü 
CHP'den en son listeleri görünce gerçekten üzüldüm. Alevi örgütlülüğünün hiçe 
sayıldığı, Alevi örgütlülüğünün yok sayıldığı kendi insanımızın dahi öyle gördüğü 
bir ortamdayız. Sevgili dostlar Hacı Bektaşi Veli Kültür Derneği olarak 2011 yani 
Ağustos'un 25-26’sında Hacı Bektaşi’de, 2. uluslararası 'Hacı Bektaşi Ozanlar 
Buluşması'nı organize ediyoruz. Önemli ve geniş bir toplantı burada önce 
duyurusunu yapayım daha sonra Alevi örgütleri için, sizler için, Hacı Bektaşi'nin 
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dışından olan ve Hacı Bektaşi'ye gelen insanlar için Hacı Bektaşi'ye bir ayak, 
barınacak bir yer ya da gözü kulağı olacak bir örgüt var Hacı Bektaşi Veli Kültür 
Derneği. Geçmişte 1964'ten yani törenlerin başladığı tarihten 2004'e kadar olan 
süreçte, 40 yıllık süreçte, belki yerel yöneticiler Alevi topluluğunun düşüncesi, 
sosyal ve siyasal düşüncesiyle, inançsal anlamında bir bütünleşme sağladığı için 
belki bir ayrışma yoktu ama 2004'ten sonra biliyorsunuz orada bir yerel yönetimle 
Alevi örgütleri arasında bir kopukluk var, yok sayılma var. Dolayısıyla siyasetten 
oraya gelen, hizmete gelen hizmet için seçilen insanlar gerektiğinde 
değişebiliyorlarmış. Yani Hacı Bektaşlı de olsa. Dolayısıyla orada oluşacak ve orada 
var olan bir siyasal, inançsal bir sivil toplum kuruluşunun sizler için de Hacı 
Bektaşi'nin dışındaki insanlar için de yerinin çok önemli olduğunun altını bir kez 
daha çizmemiz gerekiyor. Bu yüzden oradaki Hacı Bektaşí Veli Kültür Derneği'ne 
sevgili postnişinimiz Veliyettin Ulusoy Beyefendi'nin de desteği ve katkısıyla, 
sizlerin de desteğiyle çok önemli bir yer edinmesi gerekiyor Alevi örgütlülüğü için 
çünkü inançsal boyutu bir tarafa kültürel ve örgütsel anlamda Hacı Bektaş biraz 
önce söylediğimiz gibi bu toplumun inançsal başkanı ise orada güçlü bir örgütün 
bulunmasının da kaçınılmaz olması gerekir. Ve son olarak şunları söylemek 
istiyorum: Biraz önce Divani Baba’nın söylediği en son yapılacak toplantının Hacı 
Bektaşi'de olacağını söylediler. Biz de Hacı Bektaşi Veli Kültür Derneği olarak 
Eylül sonu Ekimin başında daha önce Ercan arkadaşımızla da bir istişarede 
bulunmuştuk. Geniş katılımlı Alevi örgütlerinin katılabileceği bir toplantı, kurultay 
anlamında ya da Alevi topluluğunun en son sözü söyleyeceği sayın Veliyettin 
Ulusoy’un da himayelerinde de böyle bir organizasyonun yapılacağını buradan 
duyurmak istiyorum. Hepinize saygı ve sevgilerimi sunuyorum. Toplantının başarılı 
geçmesini diliyorum.  
A: Değerli arkadaşlar, hepinizi sevgiyle selamlıyorum. Ben aslen Adana'da 
yaşıyorum Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür derneklerinin genel merkezi yöneticisiyim. 20-25 
yıla yakın bir zamandır Alevi örgütlerindeyim. Pir Sultan Abdal Derneği'ndeyim. 
Gördüğüm bir eksiklik vardı ve bu eksikliği bu toplantıların gidereceğini 
düşünüyorum. O eksiklik şudur: Meşhur bir Cemal Bardakçı varmış bizi ziyareti 
gelmiş bir kitap varmış diye ayırmışlar. Orada der ki 'her Alevi köyü bir devlet gibi 
yönetiliyordu Osmanlı'yı kendi devletleri varsayıyorlardı, kendi vergilerini 
topluyorlardı, kendi yasama organları vardı ve bunu kendileri yürütüyorlardı'. Orada 
Aleviliğini yaşayan insanlar şehirlere göç ettikleri zaman, kendilerini gizliyorlar, 
saklıyorlar. Ben 70li yıllarda Adana'ya geldiğimde, aman Aleviliğimi söylemeyeyim 
derlerdi. Alevilerin sorunları ile Aleviliğin sorunları ayrışmaya başladı. Ben bu 
toplantıları bu anlamda çok anlamlı buluyorum. Alevilerin sorunlarını tartışacağı bir 
mekana bir platforma ihtiyacı vardır ben bunu Rumların karşılayacağına inanıyorum. 
Beni dinlediğiniz için hepinize saygılar sunuyorum umarım başarılı oluruz sağ olun. 
CEMAL ŞAHİN: Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Birliği Genel Müdürlüğündenim. 
Konuşmasının başında da söylediği gibi burada cemlerde de rahatsızlık duyuyorlar 
yani tabiri caizse. Cemlerin de ne durumda olduğunu hepimiz biliyoruz, bir kısım 
dedelerin nasıl cem yönettiklerini de biliyoruz. Bundan öncekilerde tebliğler 
alınsaydı, bu tebliğler bir yerde toplansaydı, burada bilim adamları, psikologlar işte 
dedelerden bir komisyon oluşturup bu komisyon o tebliğlere, sonra Hacı Bektaşi'de 
olacak o toplantıya sunacak bir taslak hazırlasalardı son noktaya kadar ulaşılırdı o 
taslaklar üzerinde tartışılsaydı daha iyi olurdu. O nedenle ben buraya gelmiştim ve 
konuda öneriler hazırlamıştım. Bu önerileri veriyorum lobiye ve bundan sonraki 
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konuşmacıların da böyle bir taslakları varsa yada önerileri varsa yazılı bir anlatım 
verirlerse daha iyi olur bu toplantılar daha faydalı olur diye düşünüyorum. Teşekkür 
ederim. 
A: Merhaba arkadaşlar. Hepinizi selamlıyorum. Galiba 1988'de Pir Sultan Abdal 
Kültür Derneği'nin kuruluşuna imza atmıştık arkadaşlarımla birlikte. Bugün 
geldiğimiz yer bütün bu geçmişin deneyimlerinin sonucunda geldiğimiz bir yerdir. 
Eksiklerimiz, hatalarımız, kusurlarımız çok yakıcı bir biçimde ortaya çıktı. 
Değinmek istemem ama şöyle bir cümleyle değinerek geçeyim. Bu seçimlerde bu 
dağınıklığın ve bu organize olamamanın aslında bir bakıma da özümüzden kopmuş 
olmamızın bir sonucu olarak bakmak gerekir. Çünkü geçmişe baktığımızda bu 
topluluk Alevi Bektaşi toplumu sevgili Rıza Can’ın da söylediği gibi çok önemli bir 
hatırlatma yaptığı gibi batı aleminin padişahı hünkarı önde tuttuğumuz için, hünkarı 
dikkate aldığımız için geçmişte Osmanlı'nın, Selçuklunun bütün zulmüne karşı Alevi 
Bektaşiler ayakta kalmayı, inançlarıyla, kültürleriyle, gelenekleriyle birlikte hayatta 
kalıp bugüne kadar taşınmayı başarmış ender topluluklardan biridir. Buna da 
hünkarı öne almamız, hünkarı değerlendirmemiz, oraya uygun hareket etmemiz, 
sürekli oraya dönük olarak yaşamamızdan kaynaklanan bir sonuç idi. Ama son 
yıllarda bu da kentleşmeyle alakalı bir şey köyümüzden koptuk kentlere geldik. 
Öncelikle dürtülerimiz barınma, giyinme dürtülerimiz öne çıktı çok doğal olarak çok 
insani bir biçimde ama daha sonra bütün bu bir bakıma gereksinimlerimizi 
karşılamamızdan sonra baktık ki bizi var eden başka değerlerimiz var başka 
yaşamsal değerlerimiz var. Onu anımsadığımızda da bir miktar gelenek ve kültürün 
uğradığını gördük. Yeniden sarıldığımızda da birçok şeyi kaybetmiş olduğumuzu da 
içimiz bir bakıma yanarak fark ettik. Aslında tabi bu siyasal süreç 1950-60'ın ve 
sonrasındaki siyasal süreci de katmak isteyerek bir değerlendirme yapmak gerekir 
ama onu geçelim zamanın dolduğu nedeniyle. Bugün gelinen yerden bu dağınıklığın, 
bu perişanlığımızın, bu yok sayılmamızın bütün bunların nedeni bence fakire 
güvenmemek gerekir yoruma uygun olarak geçmişten kopmuş olmamızla ben izah 
edebiliyorum kendimi ancak böyle izah edebiliyorum ama çok daha zaman 
kaybetmeden geleneğimizi, cem insan ilişkilerimizi, edep ve erkanımızı daha fazla 
kaybetmeden, daha fazla dejenere olmasına izin vermeden bir an önce aklımıza gelip 
yeniden yaşatmamız gerekir. Kuşkusuz demokratik Alevi örgütlenmesi ya da 
herkesin kendince örgütlenmesi bir bakıma devam edecek ancak manevi yanı, baki 
yanı, geleneksel yanı, inançsal yanını da yaşatmak gerekiyor. Çok önemsemek ve 
önem vermek gerekiyor. Önem vermezsek dediğim gibi hiçbir sahada hiçbir alanda 
başarı şansımızın olmadığını görüyoruz. Cemlerimiz dejenere oldu. Cemlerimiz 
muhabbet tadını vermekten uzaklaştı, statikleşti, dedelerimizin erkanden, yoldan 
uzaklaştığını içimiz acıyarak görüyoruz. Hakirlerimizin geleneğini önemli ölçüde 
kaybettiğini, oturup kalkmaktan bile kaynaklı olarak canlar oradaki çocukluğumdaki 
katıldığım cemleri anımsayarak bugünki girdiğim cemleri karşılaştırdığımda 
hakikaten içimin acıdığını ne büyük, ne muazzam bir kültürü kaybetmekte 
olduğumuzu acıyarak görmek mümkün oluyor. Bu bakımdan efendimizin yola çıkıp 
bizi yeniden, geleneği yeniden canlandırmaya çalışmasını, zahmete katlanmasını, 
hizmeti göze almasını, dört bir yanı dolaşmayı göze almasını minnetle karşılamak 
gerekiyor. Minnetle karşılıyorum, kendisini yad ediyorum, ellerinden öpüyorum 
efendimizin. Bir talip olarak, bir insan olarak, kişi olarak kurulumuzun da aynı 
niyette olduğunu söylemek isterim. Her türlü hizmette, ne görev verilirse, hangi 
hizmet verilirse elimizden geldiğince, gücümüz yettiğince bu yola devam 
edeceğimizi saygıyla, sevgiyle sizlere sunmak istiyorum. Çok teşekkür ediyorum. 
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A: Merhabalar, hoş geldiniz. Aleviliğin aslında katmanlaşmış, büyük sorunları yok 
da imkan sorunu var. Niteliği nasıl yükselteceğiz sorunu var. Bu nedenle öncelikle 
sahip olduğu birikimi bırakıp sorunlarının olduğunu görüyorum. Örneğin Hacı 
Bektaşi'nin kim olduğu, Hacı Bektaşi'nin niteliği nedir, onun etrafını saran 
söylenceler, anlatılar nedir? İslam ile, İslam’ın tanımıyla nasıl karışmış? Örneğin 
Hacı Bektaşi'nin açısından biz bunu çözebilirsek Hacı Bektaşi'yi çözmüş olacağız, 
Karacaahmet açısından biz bu sorunu çözmüş olursak yine Aleviliğe sonucu zaten 
kendi özgürlüğümüzü yaratmış olacağız. Önce temel değerlerin nerede biriktiğini 
yani nerede şekillendiğini daha iyi çözmüş olacağız. Kalan çalışmalarımız kalan 
çalışmalarda en çok gördüğümüz şey Aleviliğin kendisine ait söylentilerin hem 
karışması hem de Alevi yolunu yürüten olduğu kadar, yürütenler olduğu kadar, 
insanlar ceme katılanlar da Aleviliği hep ezbere bir nokta olarak görüyorlar. Değer 
yargılarının değişmez, bitmez ve hep ataların anlattığı olarak görüyorlar. Halbuki 
Alevilik düşünen kişidir. Düşünen insan kendisini ifade edebilmek, kendi 
özgürlüğünü yaratabilme hissine sahiptir. Bu hisler tabi kalıp olarak, gittikçe 
dayatmaya, kültürel bozulma yaşandığı, dayatmaya gittiği için de alanda da sorunlar 
karşımıza çıkıyor. Belki bunun çok görmüştür. Alana gidiyor insanlar hep yani 
O'nun gözlerinin içine bakıyor, kendi kafasında bir düşünce olmadığı için bireysel 
sorunla karşı karşıya. İşte Aleviliği tekrarlatan sorun da bu ezberi çok sevmeye 
başladı. Düşünemeyen bir Alevi direk yanındakine sormaya başlar ve inancın nedir 
sorusuna dönüştürürse zaten büyük bir hegomonya çıkıyor karşımıza. Böyle 
zamanlarda bize 'inanma nedir?' sorusunu yanıtlamak düşer. Alevilerin yüzde 
yüzüne kadarını gerçekten ciddi bir biçimde sorarsanız inanma nedir sorusunu 
yanıtlayamaz. Neye inanıyorsun ve nasıl inanıyorsun sorusunu size söyleyemez. En 
fazla yapacağı dört kapı kırk makamı sizlere ifade edebilmesidir. Bu çok kötü bir 
şey. Kendini bilmemek işte burada başlar. Muhammed'i taşıması yan peygamber 
olarak o dört kapı kırk makam ifadesinin içine O'nu koyabilmesi. Ondan sonra 
kırklar birliği büyük mitoloji kurgusundaki yeri nedir gibi sorulara yanıt 
veremeyeceği için inanmaya da yanıt veremeyecektir. Çünkü inanma sorununu 
çözememiştir. İnanmak için önce gerçek bir anlamda sanat anlamda Alevilikte 
düşünmeyi bilmek gerekir. Sentezlerken bunları koymanız gerekiyor. Yoksa 
okuyarak ve aynı zamanda başka kültürlere başka inançlara ait kurguları taşıyarak 
bunu sürdüremezsin. Temel bir kurgu var, inanma dersin Alevilikte öyle ki 
anlaşılmalı. Dört kapı kırk makam. Bunun gibi farklı birçok öğreti de var dünyada. 
Örneğin Budist veya Tao inançlarının bu tür öğretileri var. Zaten Alevilik de bu tarz 
bir şeydir. Yoksa peygamberlerin sadece kurguları büyük sorunlar taşıyor. İşte bu 
nitelikleri öğrenmek için Alevi bireylerine gerçekten sormak lazım 'neye 
inanıyorsun?' ve 'nasıl inanıyorsun?'. Bu sorunların kurgu noktası da yine Aleviliğin 
işte bu okulu geleneğinin olduğu kadar şu anda da bir sorun var. Hep bir Alevi 
okuduğunu iddia ediyor. Ama okumakla olmuyor ki bu iş. Alevilikte rehber sorunu 
var, onların insan sorunu var. Sorunu evet çok büyük ama dede önemli değil. 
Önemli olan topluma Alevilikle ilgili felsefe, tarih, sanat vb. bilgileri sunacak 
kimliğin olması bunun çabasındayız ama asıl sorun rehber, öğretici kişi ve de belli 
bir adalet duygusunu topluma verebilecek ve cemlerde bunu insanlara taşıyacak kişi 
ama dedeye yeterli bir olmuyor ki dedeyi yetiştirecek olan da bir rehber. Bu tür 
sorunlarımızı artık daha akılcı ve aynı zamanda kendimizi hiç çekinmeden ifade 
ederek görmeliyiz. Bir sorun değil önemli olan bunun önüne geçmemek. Bütün 
sorumluluk burada kilitlenmeye başlamıştır. Bir başka şey bu çok dışında bir 
önerimizdir. Ben dünyası büyük bir ufka sahip, biz buna dördüncü dünya diyoruz 
artık. Kralların, aşiretlerin ve Alevilik gibi öğretilerin kendi bağımsızlığı içinde düne 
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kadar yaşarken birden bire uluslararası sistemler karşısında kaldıkları noktada hiçbir 
şekilde kendilerini sürdürememeleri. Bu sürdürememelerinin sorunu da dördüncü 
dünya içerisinde kendini ifade edememeleridir. Makedonya'ya kendini 
taşıyamamaktır, Irak'a, İran'a kendini taşıyamamaktır. Oradaki dergahlarına gidip 
görüşememektir. Hiçbir şekilde bağ kuramamaktır. Bunun dışında birkaç kuralla 
uluslararası koşullardan yararlanacağımız şeyler var. Örneğin Türkiye'deki ve 
Aleviliğin, Hacı Bektaşi’nin, çok geniş olduğu ülkeler ve göç olarak Avrupa'ya 
giden insanlarımızın yaşadığı yerlerdeki onların inanç merkezlerini bizzat 
protokol… Örneğin Türkiye'de Ortodoks patriğinden bizzat alıp gidip onlarla 
görüşmektir. Çünkü düne kadar bunlar çok önemliydi ve davetlerde bunlar 
yapılıyordu. Ortodokslar davet ediliyordu hiç düşünmeden çünkü siz uluslararası bir 
niteliğe sahipsiniz. Yaşadığınız yer onlarla ortak ve onlarla eşit olmakla ilgilidir, 
öyle değil. Herkes talep ediyor ama istenmeli bu. Bu istenirse bu sorun uluslararası 
duruma dönüşür. Örneğin Alevi Bektaşilik orayı ziyaret etmeyi ve oradan ziyaretçi 
almayı önemsemeli ve oraya yönelmeli. Bunlar bizim sistemimizin göstergeleri. 
Örneğin resmi bir ziyaret için talepte bulunmalı Irak'tan veya Türkiye üzerinden 
dışişleri bakanlığı üzerinden. Bu tür şeyleri yürütebilmeli. Örneğin Girit'te bulunan 
Bektaşi tepkisi için uluslararası gírişim ve Türkiye üzerinden girişimde bulunulmalı. 
Böyle servisler yapılmak durumunda. Bu servisler gerçekleştiğinde sorunların 
bireylerle ilgili olmadığını, toplumsal algılayış olduğunu, örgütlerle ilgili olduğunu 
bu tür noktaların belirlenmesi gerekiyor. Örneğin ve çok büyük sorunları olan bir 
aileye bırakılmış ve devlet orayı veya hiçbir şekilde işlemselleşmemiş bir noktaya 
taşımış. Orasıyla ilgili bir girişimde bulunabilir, oranın düzenlenmesini, oraya bir 
atama yapılmasını papa olabilir, dede olabilir. Yani bununla ilgili altyapılı bir 
çalışma yapılması gerekiyor. Türkiye'de durum böyle. Girişim yapılırsa, örnekleri 
çoğalır. Bir başka şey de artık kanamış bir sorun. Dedelerimizin bir kısmında ben bir 
bakış açısı bir örgütlenmesi. Aleviliğe yakışmayan örgütlenmeler bunlar aslında. 
Evet bir hak talebi çerçevesinde olabilir bir sorun yok fakat Aleviliğin kurallarının 
dışında, yeni bir sistemmiş gibi orada olması bir kirliliktir. Dedelerimiz bu kirliliğin 
başında özellikle. Orada yaklaşık 200 kadar dede din yürütme pozisyonundadır ve 
bunlar konuşulmalı çünkü bize en çok dayattıkları bu. Bize diyorlar 200 dede burada 
var 200 orada 200 daha. Çünkü böyle görüyorlar. Sistem böyle oturuyor zaten. Siz 
bunlarla görüşmeyi yükseltmek zorundasınız. Onlarla bu sorunu çözmek için bir 
adım atmak zorundasınız ve bu adımın atılabilmesi için de bu toplantıların 
birçoğunda da gördüğüm gibi bizim örgütlerimizin buna çok sıcak baktığını 
görüyorum çünkü çerçevesinde bugüne kadar hiç yapılmayan çerçevede bir çalışma 
var. Örgütlerimiz dernek ve vakıfsal olarak bir çaba harcadılar, yolun bir noktasına 
taşıdılar ama artık bu yasal bir şeydir. Bu nedenle de biz Alevi Hareketi diye 
algılatıyoruz bunu, böyle söyletiyoruz. Hareketin bir sonraki adımı partileşmedir 
ama Alevi dernek vakıflarında var mı böyle bir çaba? Yok, söz konusu bile değil. 
Öyleyse doğru tanımların beklendiği veya doğru adımların beklendiği noktada 
adımlarımızı daha sert ve güçlü atmak durumundayız. Herkesin beklentisi olduğu 
yerde konuşmak hiçbir şeye çözüm değildir. Teşekkür ederim. 
CEVDET SARAÇ: Değerli arkadaşlar hepinizi selamlıyorum. Ben daha çok 
sonuçlarla ilgili konuşacağım. Şimdi birkaç tespit yapmakta yarar olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. Alevi hareketinin en bilinen, en muhattap alınan bir döneminde bir 
kaos yaşanıyor. Bir yandan en görünür hal deyip diğer yandan siyaseten en 
altlardayız. Bu tabi insanın işin doğrusu canını acıtan bir nokta. Hareketin inanılmaz 
kitleselleşmiş binler, on binler, yüz binlerle ifade edebileceğimiz bir noktaya gelmiş 
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ama siz ona uygun sonuçlar olamıyorsunuz. Bu işin doğrusu son derece can acıtıcı 
bir durum ama bir diğer boyutuyla da doğal yani çok fazla kendimizi de 
yormamamız gerekiyor. Kendimize de çok fazla haksızlık yapmamamız gerekiyor. 
Çünkü tarih aslında bir biçimde ifade ediyor. Bunun nedenlerinin birincisi, tarih 
boyunca hiç iktidarda bulunmamışız. İktidara yakın olduğumuz dönemler var, 
iktidarın kurumsallaştırıldığı her dönemde ilk darbe yiyenler bizler olmuşuz. Hiçbir 
iktidarla ilgimiz yok. Türkiye coğrafyasına bakın Kürtlerle, Aleviler arasında 
kırılmalar var. Kürtlerde iktidarlık deneyimi var. Alevilerde Dersim coğrafyası hariç 
hiçbir iktidar deneyimi yok. Buna Hacı Bektaşi de dahil. Yani Hacı Bektaşi Dergahı 
da dahil. İlk dönemlerini bir tarafa bıraktığımızda Hacı Bektaşi Dergahı'nda da 
iktidarlık deneyimi yok. Bu son derece önemli bir nokta diye düşünüyorum. Bu 
deneyimin olmadığı sürece siz dergah yönetmekle devlet yönetmeyi sürekli 
karıştırmak durumuyla karşı karşıya kalıyorsunuz. İkincisi, örgütlenme geleneğidir. 
Kalender Çelebi'den sonra çok ciddi bir kırılma var ve 400 yıldır Alevilerin 
örgütlenmesi yok ortada. Hacı Bektaşi Dergahı en iyi iki başlı olmuş. 1826 sonrası 
güçlü bir iktidar var ortada. Çelebiler var, Bektaşiler var. Güçlü bir iktidar var ortada. 
Şimdi o anlamıyla birbirimize yanlış söz etmeyeceğiz. Ortada örgütlenme yok. Alevi 
dünyasının doğruluğu en önemli aslında ayaklanma değildir ama iktidarı Çelebi 
ayaklanmasıdır. Kalender Çelebi yenildikten sonra 400 yıl boyunca tarih 1963'te 
diyanette Alevi yazısı kurulsun denene kadar ortak bir Aleviler gününde söz etmek 
mümkün değil. İstisnalar var, 1826 savunması bir istisnadır. Bir diğer geçici istisna 
da 2. meşrutiyetin ilanında dergahı istiyoruz. Başka yoktur. Hani hep söyleriz ya 
birbirimize biz şu kadar örgütlüyüz falan diye yok böyle bir gelenek. Çok net bir şey 
söyleyeyim. O şimdi burada Alevi ocakları, Hacı Bektaşi Dergahı da dahil olmak 
üzere, aslında hepsi özellikle yazıyor, çalışmışlar. Orada da aslında bir gelenek yok 
yani. Her yıl gelip dergahta görülmüşler ama hepsi aslında başlı başına bir örgüt, 
başlı başına bir devlet, başlı başına bağımsız yani böyle bir ortak bir kulvarda ortak 
bir koşu söz konusu değil. O da önemli bir teşhistir diye düşünüyorum. Bunlar yan 
yana gelince şöyle bir şey oluşmuş. Sen hep ikinci adam pozisyonunda olmuşsun. 
Aslında dördüncü, beşinci adam pozisyonu sürer. Hiçbir dönem kendini çoğunlukla 
eşit görmemişsin. İktidardan uzaksın ve arada var. Şimdi 400 yıllık sessizlik bunun 
üzerine gelince ortaya doğal bir tablo çıkıyor. Şu an son 20 yılda ne yaptık tüm 
misyonu son 20 yıla vermişiz. 1960-70 dönemleri önemlidir ama asıl Alevi 
dünyasının örgütlenmesi tekrar dünyayla buluşması doğrusu 1988 Pir Sultan Abdal 
ile başlamıştır. Başlayan süreçle 20 yılda bütün misyonlara vermişiz. İnancı, kültürü, 
sosyal hizmetleri, siyaseti bu derneklere vermişiz. Sonuç vasat. O yüzden kendimize 
eziyet etmeyelim. Kendimize de çok fazla kızmayalım. Çok fazla yandık yıkıldık 
edebiyatı yapmaya gerek yok. Dünyada iletişim müthiş arttı. Aleviliğin denk 
düştüğü semboller yok. Semboller olmayınca Aleviliğe demek kolay bir iş değil. 
Yani sonuçta semboller var. Hacı Bektaşi Dergahı ile Dergahı kenarda bırakın Şimdi 
geldiğimiz noktaya mimari olarak bile apartman daireleri var ortada. Mesela 
Dikmendeki bu bina özel olarak yapılmış bir bina ama... Yani karşılaşıyorsunuz. 
Camiye girdiğinizde bir başka atmosferi yakalıyorsunuz ya da işte hepimizin bildiği 
Hacı Bektaşi Dergahı'nda başka bir atmosfer var. Bir var, bir arka plan var ama 
bizim buralar apartman dairesi. İşin doğrusu o. Dede profili, sonuçta insanlar inanç 
özgür dediğinde kılık kıyafeti olan şey var işte o profil şimdi burada kravatlı, son 
derece düzgün bir beyefendi. İşte profil var ortada ama benim düşüncem açısından 
hiç böyle bir şey yok. Yani sonuçta inanç önderi deyince insan başka bir şey arıyor 
orada. Senin iki tane önderin var, Zülfikar’ı var, Pir Sultan'ı var o anlamıyla doğru ki 
o da zorlama yani tarih konuşacaksak Pir Sultan ile karşılaştırdığımızda Kalender 
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tarihinde çok önemli bir köşe taşı. Yani Pir Sultan'ı yapmıştır ama kıyaslamamız 
mümkün değil. Şimdi değerli arkadaşlar imam deyince gözümüzün önünde bir resim 
vardır, sultan deyince bir resim vardır, papaz deyince bir resim vardır. Cami deyince 
bir şey şekilleniyor. Cem evi dediğimizde ne şekilleniyor? O yüzden Hacı Bektaşi 
Dergahı ile Şah Kulu'nu örnek gösterdim. Burada çok önemli bir bina ama mesela 
bu profil şekillenmiyor yani gözünüzü kapatın bu anlamıyla söyledim bu son derece 
önemli. Yani bu semboller tabi kurumsallaşmanın getirdiği başka sıkıntılar olacaktır. 
O yüzden bu semboller önemli. Çünkü dernek örgütlenmesi bu ülkede cevap 
vermiyor. Bunun yeri yurdu da yok. Ankara'daki Pir Sultan Örgütü de Ankara'daki 
Alevi Kültür Derneği de, Alevi Kültür Merkezi de işte efendim cevap vermiyor. Şu 
anda ayakta duran, güçlenen yapılanmalardaki kriterler, kendi binaları olan yerler 
ayakta niye çünkü sosyal etkinliğe cevap veriyor. Şimdi ben Ankara Pir Sultan 
Abdal Derneği ile ilgili ne yapabileceğim? Yapabileceğim hiçbir şey yok. Sonra 
Alevi Kültür Merkezi'ni arayacağım. Kendine ait, yani sonuçta inançlar benim 
kültürel ve sosyal ihtiyaçlarımı karşılayabilecek bir yapı etkileşimi var. Bu 
anlamıyla da dergah örgütlenmeleri dahil bilimi çok rahat aşıyor olmamız lazım. 
Ama burada gerekiyor. Yani buraya kadar yanlış yaptık ama bu da inançtan 
uzaklaştığımız için böyleydi. Yok öyle bir şey. Bu dernekler olmasaydı Aleviliğe ait 
bir Alevi dünyası buraya kadar gelmezdi. O yüzden buradakilerin muhtemeldir ki 
önemli ölçüde Alevilik için insanlardır. Eğer bunlar olmasaydı bu kadar 
konuşulmazdı. Bu dernekler olmasaydı, Alevi inançları da bu kadar gündemde 
olmazdı çünkü tarih bunu gösteriyor. Bu nedenle orada bir sorgulamaya da ben itiraz 
ediyorum. Sorun şu; mevcut örgütlenmeler ihtiyaca cevap vermiyor. Bunları 
yeniden yapılandırmamız lazım. Dergah örgütlenmeleri dahil, kaynaşabilmemiz 
lazım. Birilerimiz Avrupa'da tartıştık. Yani Avrupa'yı da sürece dahil ediyorum. İşte 
Avrupa belki de Alevi dünyasında şu anda en rahat dönemini yaşıyor ama 
hareketliliği durumda. Motivasyon yok. Yöneleceği bir şey yok. Yani yeni kadro 
üretimi yok. Ankara'daki Alevilerle konuşamıyorum. Mesela diyorum ki bir bu 
derneğin yönetimine düştükten sonra ne hale gelir burada. Yapabileceğim hiçbir 
şeyim yok. Bir araştırma yapıp ne yapacağız bu derneklerde. Karşılığı yok. işledik 
ee bitti. Sonuçta telaffuzlarını o kadar kolay yapabiliyoruz ki. merkezi olmaktan 
çıktı. İki boyutu var; bir örgütleme olayı, dergah dahil olmak üzere tartışacağız ama 
dergahı tartışırken ya biz burada büyük hatalar yaptık, aslında inançtan 
uzaklaşmasaydık şöyle olurdu demeyeceğiz. Bu ihtiyaca diyeceğiz ki 'evet böyle bir 
ihtiyaç var'. Sen sonuçta hayata dahil değilsen, söylediğinin dışına düşüyorsun. 
İkincisi, yani o anlamıyla da belki biraz daha gözünüzü kapadığınızda 
şekillenebilecek ilk örgütlenme olayıdır örgütlenmelerinde inanç var. O anlamıyla 
da aslında biraz inanç örgütlenmesi ama ona paralel hastanesi var, kreşi var, okulu 
var, kütüphanesi var, araştırmacılığı var en önemlisi dernekleri var. Yani bu 
söylediklerim, dernekleri kapatalım falan değil. Dernekler birlikte devam edecektir 
ama sizin yukarıda başka bir yapılanma yaratmanız lazım. Bu da dergah 
örgütlenmesi olacaktır diye düşünüyorum. Bu tartışmalarda biliyorum ki ben o 
anlamıyla karamsar değilim işin doğrusu bu tartışmalar bizi etnik bir noktaya 
götürecek. O yüzden CHP yerine Alevilerin olmamasından dolayı ya da 
seçilemeyeceğinden dolayı. Ya aslında bir iki arkadaşımız var işin doğrusu yani 
gelip de Alevi derneklerine girmiş bir tek arkadaşımız var: Necati Yılmaz 
arkadaşımız için. Bu da mesela bizim canımızı acıtıyor ama bundan dolayı da şöyle 
bir psikolojiye girmeye gerek görmüyorum. Yani bu işte yandık yıkıldık deyip ben 
önümüzdeki dönemde bir biçimde bu işi yapılandıracağız diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü 
bunu yapılandıramadığımız sürece ama yapılandırdığımız sürece ben sıkıntıların 
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hallolacağını düşünüyorum. Teşekkür ederim. 
A: Sevgili canlar merhabalar. Böylesine anlamlı bir toplantıda bir arada 
bulunduğumuz için ben Alevilik tarihi açısından çok önemli buluyorum. Devamını 
daha da zenginleşmiş bir biçimde diliyorum. Sevgili Cevdet arkadaşımız gerçekten 
bana söyleyecek çok fazla söz bırakmadı ama O'na ilave edeceğim birkaç cümle 
olacak. Emel Hanım biraz önce bir yazıdan bahsetti. O yazı kadınsız Alevilikti. 
Radikal gazetesinde okuduğumda içimin çok acıdığını hatırlıyorum. Hatta öyle bir 
etki yarattı ki yani böyle bir travma desem o ruh halini sanırım en iyi şekilde 
anlatmış olurum diye düşünüyorum. Evet kadınlar açısından durum böyle de, kadını 
olmayan Alevilik. Peki sosyologu olmayan Alevilik var mı? Tarihçisi olan bir 
Alevilik var mı? Gerçekten kabul görmüş, saygı gören, başkan olmanın ötesinde 
lider olan kadroları var mı Aleviliğin? O da yok. Siyasetçisi var mı? O da yok. Yani 
Alevilik bir bütün olarak baktığımızda aslında çok zavallı, biraz perişan, biraz 
acınacak halde diye düşünüyorum. Küçük bir anım var çok içimi acıtan. Bir Alevi 
aile çocuğunu Fethullah Gülen'in kolejlerinden birisine verdiğini söyledi. Niye böyle 
bir ihtiyaç duyduğunu da belki bizim yüzümüzde tokat etkisi yaratacak bir cümle 
kullandı. 'Çünkü artık çocuğuma bazı değerleri aktaramıyorum en azından daha 
ahlaklı olacağını düşünerek böyle bir mekanizmanın olduğunu varsayarak bu 
cemaatin okullarından birisine verdim' dedi. Sanıyorum bu cümleden çıkaracağımız 
çok dersler vardır. Geleneksel ilişkileri bozulmuş, geleneksel otoritenin 
şehirleşmeyle birlikte parçalanmış bir Alevilik var. Aleviler yolunu bulmaya 
çalışıyor. Aleviliğin yolunu bulması sanıyorum Alevilerin yolunu bulmasından daha 
zor, daha meşakkatli bir emek istiyor. Çünkü Alevilik artık dağ başlarında yaşayan 
homojen birbirini tanıyan, gören, bilen, kontrol eden bir topluluk olmanın ötesinde 
her türlü etkiye açık, korunmasız, savunmasız bir durumda görünüyor. Bunu sadece 
devlet baskısı, devlet asimilasyonu şeklinde ifade edersek bence sorunu 
görmemezlikten geliriz. Sonuçta devlete karşı mücadele Alevileri bir araya getiriyor 
ama mülkiyet ilişkileri, kültürel hegomonya, bizim dışımızda üretilen hegomonya, 
bizim dışımızda kurulan inançsal hegomonya sanırım devlet baskısından daha fazla 
etkili oluyor. Bunu şuradan anlayabiliyorum; biraz önce anlattığım örnek aslında 
devletten besleniyor ama aynı zamanda bir cemaatin çok uzun perspektifine 100 
yıllık, 500 yıllık planlarına dayalı, düşüncelerine dayalı bir toplum düzeninin aslında 
bir ürünü ama bizim gibi gündelik düşünen, gündelik yaşayan Alevilere sanıyorum 
çok yabancı böyle uzun ömürlü planlar. Kaymakamlarının bugünün ziyaretçilerinin 
bugünün televizyonlardaki o İslamcı anlayışı çok yüceleştiren İslamcı anlayışın 
insanların 80lı yıllarda oturan gençler olduğunu, çocuklar olduğunu unutmamak 
lazım. Burada sevgili Cevdet gerçekten çok iyi anlattı. Ben o sözcükleri 
kullanmayacağım. Büzüm derneklerimiz karınca kararınca kendi imkanları 
ölçüsünde bu mücadeleye bir katkı koydu. Yeterli mi? Elbette ki değil. Belki 
yaptığımız tahribatlar da var, Aleviliği yozlaştırma anlamında. Bu noktada biz 
önemli bir işlev gördüğümüzü düşünüyorum ama artık gelinen durumda dernekler 
bazı ihtiyaçları göremiyor. Bunu da görmemiz lazım ve gereğini yapmak gerekiyor. 
Bu genel olarak inanç alanıyla ilgili. Bu alanın düzeltilmesi ve nüfuz ettirilmesi 
konusunda gerçekten bir otoriteye ihtiyaç olduğunu düşünüyoruz ve bu ihtiyaçlar 
her geçen gün kendini daha fazla hissettiriyor. Benim bir örgüt yöneticisi olarak 
gittiğim yerlerde en temel sorulardan birisi şu oluyor: cenazenin kaldırılması için 
bana dedeyi nasıl, ne zaman gönderebilirsin? Tabi başka ihtiyaçlar da var ama onları 
anlatmayacağım ben. Burada şu anda bir devletin Alevilikle ilgili düşüncesi var. 
Bunun karşısında dergahın kesinlikle, bu ifadeyi kullanmak istemiyorum ama başka 
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bir sözcük bulamadığım için söyleyeceğim, sivil bir Aleviliğin sivil bir Aleviliği 
örgütlemesi gerekiyor. Çünkü yakın zamanlarda sanıyorum karşımıza devlet ve 
hükümet Aleviliği daha fazla çıkacak. Devlet bu noktada öncelikle her kendisine 
Alevi diyen veya Alevi duyarlılığını taşıyan insanlara şu bilinci vermeli: biz 
vermeye çalışıyoruz ama bizim örnek alınmışlığı aynı kanaatte değil. Sonuçta birisi 
daha insanın manevi tarafına hitap ediyor ve daha fazla inandırıcılığı oluyor diye 
düşünüyorum. Biz siyasal mücadele verdiğimiz için ister istemez bir tartışmanın 
içerisinde yer alıyoruz. Öncelikle benim çok hassas olduğum bir konu var. Çünkü 
bunun çok acısının olduğunu düşünüyorum. Aleviliğin bir inanç olduğunu, bir 
felsefe, bir kültür böyle tanınmamaları, tanınmaların yapılmasına imkan 
vermemesini gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Bu konuda taşıdığımız belli çünkü az çok 
siyasal hareketlerden geliyoruz. O siyasal düşüncelerimle Aleviliği eşitlemeye 
çalışıyoruz ve kalkınma olmadan ne yazık ki Aleviliğe çok büyük kötülükler 
yapıyoruz. Son 40-50 yılın en büyük tahribatı budur ve aslında sorunların büyük bir 
kısmı da bu bakış açısından dolayı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü ona göre insanlar 
pozisyon almaktadırlar. Aleviliğe ve Alevilere ona göre muamele yapmaktadır. 
Kültür dediğimiz zaman bunu bir zamanla çok kullanırdık ne yazık ki aklıma geldi 
ve cem evlerinin bir kültür merkezi olarak kabul edilebileceğini söylüyor ama biz 
diyoruz ki buralar bir ibadet yeridir. Dolayısıyla ağzımızdan çıkan sözcüklerin bir 10 
yıl sonra, 20 yıl sonra bizim karşımıza nasıl bir siyasal proje olarak geleceğini 
kestirebilecek yetenekte, bilgide insanlara ihtiyaç var. Devlet bu anlamda gerçekten 
insanları bilinçlendirmeli. Ayrıca Alevilik bir inançtır. Utanmaya, mahcup olmaya 
hiç gerek yoktur. İnanan inanır, inanmayan da inanmaz. Saygı duyarsa duyar 
duymazsa bizim de buna bir saygımız olur. Bizim çünkü hoşgörü sınırlarımız çok 
geniş nedense. Dolayısıyla dergahın en temel görevinin ben bu olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. Eğer bunu biz aşarsak, bu bilinci insanlara verebilirsek sanırım birçok 
sorunu da kendi içimizde halledeceğiz diye düşünüyorum. Bir de temel bir sorun var. 
O da samimiyet sorunudur. Yani bu hareketin içerisinde olanların elbette ki herkese 
saygımız, sevgimiz var ama konuya başlarken söylediğim gibi kadınsız Alevilik, 
sosyologsuz, tarihçisiz Alevilik gibi bizim içimizde ne yazık ki Aleviliğe inanan 
hakikaten farklı disiplinlerde çalışan, bizim önümüzü açacak insan yok. Belki 
derneklerin başarısızlığıdır diyebiliriz ama ben ondan öte bu çok modernist 
kuşakların, çok pozitivist değerlerin de insanları buralardan uzak tuttuğuna 
inanıyorum. Aslında söylenecek çok şey var. Bu toplantıların daha dar ölçülerde, 
daha zihin açıcı biçimde devam ettirmek gerekiyor. Bizim derneğimiz Pir Sultan 
Abdal Kültür Derneği'nin bu çalışmaları gerçekten önemsiyor ve bir ihtiyaç olarak 
görüyor. Her türlü örgütsel desteği de vermeye hazırız. Beni dinlediğiniz için 
teşekkür ediyorum. 
A: Öncelikle hepinizi selamlayarak başlamak istiyorum konuşmama. Ben bu tür 
konuşmaları yakinen takip eden ve destekleyen bir kurumun üyesiyim. Çok anlamlı 
buluyorum bu çalışmaları. Gerek Cevdet, gerekse diğer arkadaş Alevi 
örgütlenmeleri ve Alevilerle ilgili sorunları dile getirdiler ama bizim kendimize 
yönelik bir özgüven sorunumuz var Aleviler olarak. Ben şunu hep ısrarla 
söylüyorum sorun Alevilik değildir, sorun Aleviler ve Alevileri konuşanlar ve 
insanların Alevilere bakış açısıdır. Sadece Alevilere değil devletin bizzat dine, 
sosyal hayata, laikliğe bakış açısıyla alakalıdır ve Alevilerin tarihleriyle ilgili barışık 
yaşamamasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bana Alevilik öğretir misiniz diyen 70 
yaşındaki insanlar, bana Alevilik öğretir misiniz diyen 20 yaşındaki insanlarla karşı 
karşıya geliyoruz. Sanki hiç Aleviliğimizi bilmiyormuşuz, sanki Alevilik diye bir 
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inanç yokmuş ve sanki bu devirler bu inancı yaşamamışlar ve sanki bunu hiç 
görmemişler gibi çok tuhaf bir algılamanın, hareketin içerisinde bulunuyorlar. Bu 
beni hep şaşırtmıştır. Ben vakıf başkanı olduktan sonra Türkiye'deki çok fazla gezen 
insanlardan birisiyim ve hep kendime bir özgüvenim olduğunu orada çok net 
görmüştüm. Bu özgüvenle ilgili daima her konuşmamda bahsetmiştim. Kimse bize 
Aleviliği öğretemez. Bizzat biz kendimiz Aleviliği yaşatıyoruz ve yaşatmak 
zorundayız. Devletten medet uman Alevilerin bizim çocuklarımıza din derslerinde 
Alevilik öğretilsin diyen Alevilerin tarihini çok iyi okumaları lazım. Başkalarının 
öğrettiği Alevilik ve başkalarının yetiştirdiği Aleviler tarihte hep düşmanımız olarak 
karşımıza çıkmıştır. Hem din olarak düşmanımız olmuşlardır hem de yolumuza ve 
öğretimize düşman olarak karşımıza çıkmışlardır. Tabi ki çağımızın değişmesiyle 
birlikte modernleşmeyle birlikte Aleviler kendi inançlarını sıkıştırıp yaşamaya 
çalışıyorlar ve utanç verici davranıyorlar. Yani bir Aleviliğin ben ceme gidiyorum 
demesi toplum da veya bir komşusuna ben Aleviyim demesiyle ilgili hala sıkıntılar 
yaşadığımızın farkındayım. ve her şeyi örgütlerden beklemek gibi bir keyfiyet, bir 
rahatlığın içerisindeler. Alevi örgütlerine gelmekten çekinirler, mücadeleye destek 
vermekten sakınırlar, onların sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik sıkıntılarıyla ilgili olarak 
dedikodu üretmeyi çok iyi becerirler. Tamamını kastetmiyorum ama büyük bir kısmı 
bu nitelikte. Gerçekten çok fedakar olanları da vardır. Onlara zaten hiçbir sözümüz 
yoktur. Bunu aşmak zorundayız arkadaşlar. Birilerini örnek alarak bunu götüremeyiz. 
Yolumuzu feryat ve figan üzerine acılar üzerinde şekillendirip de götüremeyiz. O 
acılardan aldığımız dersle yola devam etmek zorundayız. Bunlarda bir sıkıntı yok, 
sıkıntı bizlerde. Bunu böyle yürütmeye çalışanlarda. Tabi köyde yaşadığımız sosyal, 
kültürel, ekonomik davranışların şehirde farklılaştığının artık farkına varmak 
zorundayız. Köydeki o kapalı ilişkilerin şehirde yaşanmayacağını, farklı olacağını 
görmek zorundayız. Üretim ve tüketim şekillerinin orda çok farklı olduğunu görmek 
zorundayız. Bunla ilgili yeni davranış şekilleri üretmeliyiz. Köyde bir gelenek 
yaşıyor arkadaşlar. Köyde dedeyi bilerek yaşıyorsun. Köyde camiye de ihtiyaç 
yoktur. Kendiliğinden gelişen ve devam eden bir süreçtir ve devam ediyor ama 
burada her şey çok farklı. Burada her şeyi yeniden inşa etmek zorundayız. Mekansal 
bakımdan inşa etmek zorundayız. İnancın söylemlerini yeniden inşa etmekten 
bahsetmiyorum. O söylemleri cesaretle burada söylemek zorundayız. Her şeyi 
derneklerden beklemek de haksızlık olduğuna inanıyorum. Evet Alevi dedeler 
arasındaki sorun ve Alevilerin şu anda yaşadığı en büyük sıkıntılardan bir tanesidir. 
Dergahın ve toplumun hareketi çok değerli ve önemlidir. Bu süreçte buraya bir el 
atmalıdır. Bunu ele almak zorundadır. Alevi dedeleri kavramından veya ben senden 
önceydim söylemlerinden artık vazgeçmeli. Alevi tarihini direk asimile etmeye 
yönelik bir hareketti ve ilk adımı attılar. Her durumda olduğu gibi bu onlarla birlikte 
çalışanlar var. Bunlar kaygıları farklı olan insanların Alevilikle ilgili söylemleri de 
farklı olur. Alevi sonucunda çıkan bizim en başından beri bildiğimiz oralarda 
birlikte olmak veya yıldızlı otellerde onlarla birlikte bir şeyler paylaşmanın Alevi 
dünyasına bir şey katacağını sandılar. Bir şey katmayacağı açıktır bu ülkede. 
Türbanı konuşanlar boşa konuşuyorlar arkadaşlar. Türbanı konuşanlar fakültelerini 
ve diyanetin bilmeden konuşurlarsa hayal peşindeler, sadece bazı siyasi partilerin 
sosyal ilgili olarak yapanlar ve tarih içerisinde kullanıldıklarını çok geç 
göreceklerdir. Bunu çok net söylemek gerekiyor. Alevilerin kendilerinden 
istediklerini başkaları için de isteme cesaretini göstermek zorundalar. Aleviler eşit 
yurttaşlıktan samimi bir şekilde bahsetmiyorlarsa, Alevilerin kendi etnik yapısından 
samimi bir şekilde bahsetmiyorlarsa ve Aleviler bu ülkede samimi konuşmuyorlarsa 
Aleviler daha çok bekleyeceklerdir. Aleviler kendilerini sorgulamazlarsa, siyasal 
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mevkilerini sorgulamazlarsa ve cesaretli davranıp kendi eylemlerini 
geliştiremezlerse bugün yaşadıkları hayal kırıklığı ilk olmayacaktır. Son da 
olmayacak bunu bilesiniz. Bize yıllarca söylettiler Türkiye laiktir, laik kalacaktır 
diye. Türkiye'nin laik olmadığını söyleyen arkadaşlarınızı kendi içinizde temizleyin. 
Geçici hiçbir çözüm, hiçbir yarayı iyileştirmemiştir. Onları geçici bir şekilde 
kandırmıştır ve o yaranın sahipleriyle o uyruğu birbirine yabancılaştırmıştır ama iş 
işten geçmiştir. Çözüm bulamamıştır. Şayet biz, Aleviler, Türkiye'de ortak yaşamın 
faydalarını gerçekleştirebileceksek o zaman Aleviliği de kendimiz yeniden 
şekillendireceğiz, o zaman tarihimizdeki o çoğulcu, çeşitli yapıyı yeniden kurmuş 
olacağız. Sorunlarımızın birinci elden çözülmesi lazım. Alevi dedeleri dergahta 
tekrar toplamak cemlerimiz artık cumaları okunacak şekle gelmiştir. Aleviler 
dağılmış durumdalar ve onları tekrardan bir arada toplamak gerekiyor. Bu bizim 
birinci görevimiz. Biz insanlarımızı, cem evlerimizi buradaki etkinliklerimize davet 
etme cesareti ve davet etme yöntemleri bulamazsak dışarıda başka bir Alevilik 
üretiliyor ve çok güçlü üretiliyor ve bizi görmeyeceklerdir. Bunlar ayrı bir toplum 
arkadaşlar. Dergahın hareketine hiç kimsenin bencillik göstermeden destek vermesi 
lazım. Hiç kimsenin sorgulamadan, bu olayı bu işin bir tarafında tutması lazım. 
Bunun sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik yönünü hepimizin karşılaması lazım. Dergah 
kendi sosyal köşkümüzde oturmanın onursuzluk olduğuna inanıyorum. Orada gelen 
sözleri süreçte dikkate almalıyız ve elimizden gelen çabayı sarf edebilmeliyiz. Yola 
işin bir tarafını çözerek devam ettiğimizde başarılı olacağımıza inanıyorum. Bize şu 
anda en acil gerekli olan şey dedelerimizin birleşmesi, Alevi dilini kullanması. 
Uzaklaştık Alevi dilinden. Bu dili dedeler kullandığı andan itibaren biz bunu 
kullanabiliriz, topluma yayabiliriz. Ve cenaze… Bir şekilde Alevi diliyle bu 
cenazeleri kaldırmalıyız. Çok cesaretli davranmalıyız. Hiç çekinmeden. Bu açıdan 
utanılacak hiçbir hareketimiz yok arkadaşlar. Asıl öbürleri utansınlar. Siz kimsiniz? 
Ne söz geçirmedik, laf geçirmedik, kimsenin kanını toprağa dökmedik. Ama bizim 
kanımızı toprağa dökenler var, bizim canımızı, malımızı ve ırzımızı helal görenler 
var. 16. yüzyılda Kanuni döneminde 21. yüzyılda bu ülkeyi yöneten başbakan aynı 
sözü söyleme cesaretinle bulunabiliyor tekrardan. Kendimizi sorgulamalıyız. Evet 
biz işin pozitif yönüne bakıyoruz, işin biraz da derlenip, toplanıp ama işin her 
alandaki sahipleri taşın altına ellerini koymak zorundalar. Bugün dedelerimize çok 
büyük bir sorumluluk düşüyor. Hiçbir dedemizin sorgulamadan etrafına toplanması 
gerekiyor. Varsa bir sorun orada konuşulması lazım. Dışarıda dedikodu üretmenin 
hiçbir şeye çözüm olmayacağını herkesin bilmesi lazım. Evet Cevdet arkadaş 
simgelerimizden bahsetti. Ben Alevilerin simgelerinin değerli olduğuna inanıyorum 
ve bütün kültür merkezlerinde mutlaka o simgelerden var olmasına gerektiğine 
inanıyorum ama Alevilerin dedelerinin ve inanç işlerini yürütenlerin, cenaze işlerini 
yürütenlerin bir papaz, bir imam gibi belli bir simgeye bürünmesini asla doğru 
bulmuyorum. Alevilik içerisinde bir Bektaşilik ama unutmamak lazımdır ki asıl olan 
'kızılbaşlılık'tır. Hacı Bektaşi de bizzat Kızılbaş’tı. Belki de Bektaşi kardeşlerimiz 
bazı simgeleri kullanabilirler ama yolun kendisi o değildir. Yolun kendisi, 
kızılbaşlıktır ve biz bunun nasıl doğduğunu da biliyoruz. Sevgili dostlar siyaseten 
geldiğimiz nokta beni yanıltan bir nokta değildir. Alevilere bir kez daha söylüyorum, 
hiç kimse sorgulanamaz diye bir şey yoktur ki Alevilik inancı bunu çok net söyler. 
Tarihi yargılayan bir inanış, devletin kurallarını da yargılayabiliyor, yanlışlarını 
görebiliyor. Aleviler eğer konuşamazlarsa şehit bir şehit olduğunu göremezlerse 
Aleviler katlanmalı. Hala daha farklı dillerle konuşup onları sorguluyorlarsa 
Kürtlerin gösterdiği kadar cesaret gösteremezlerse daha çok ağır bir uğrayacaklardır. 
Hepinize saygılarımı sunuyorum. 
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A: Özellikle ben dede ocaklarıyla ilgilenen, bu konuda kitaplar yazan, konuşan, 
çocukluktan beri de bu konuyu merak eden biriyim. Bu anlamıyla baktığımızda, tabi 
ki dede ocaklarının tarihiyle de ilgileniyorum, bazı söylemlere çok dikkat etmek 
gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Örneğin Hacı Bektaşi ocağına bir kısım Aleviler ama 
ocağına da bir kısım Aleviler diyor. Bu bizim dışımızda yani keşke Alevilikte 
söylemi olsaydı. Ben burada olmamalıdır gibi bir şey söylemiyorum ama bizim 
dışımızda böyle problemler var. Yani Türkiye'deki Alevilerin bir ocaktır, büyük bir 
bölümünü barındırır. Kendi diyorlar. Kendi ocağımdan örnek verecek olursam. Ben 
Ali Seyit ocağının talibiyim benim mürşidim dede ocağıdır. Dolayısıyla serçeşmem 
dede Tabi Hacı Bektaşi ocağı da Alevilerin bir bölümünün serçeşmesidir gibi bir 
algılama var son derece saygılıyım. Peki bunlardan kolayca vazgeçebilir miyiz? Ben 
vazgeçsem bile Alevi toplumu vazgeçer mi? Bu algıyı kırabilir miyiz? Bunlar çok 
ince ayrıntılarına kadar düşünülmeli ve konuşulmalı. Bir de ocak denildiğinde bir 
tekke, türbe, dergah aklınıza gelmeyecek. Ocak dedelerin ve taliplerin oluşturduğu 
sosyal bir yapıdır. Bir dede grubuyla o dede grubuna bağlı olan taliplerin 
topluluğuna biz dede ocağı diyoruz. Ziyarete, tekkeye, türbeye demiyoruz. Bir de 
diyelim ki Türkiye'deki ocakları tek bir yapıda topladık acaba Arapça konuşan 
Alevileri hiç düşünüyor muyuz? Arap şeyhlerini onların ocaklarını düşünüyor 
muyuz? Çünkü yarım milyon civarında da bir Arap-Alevi var. Demek ki bu işe 
kalkışmadan önce iyi düşünmek lazım. Sahadaki bilgileri iyi değerlendirmek lazım. 
En azından mürşit olarak görülen ocakları, Hacı Bektaşi dışında, bunlar çok 
tartışmalı olmakla beraber. Bunlarla gerekirse en yetkin dedemiz bir araya gelip 
görüşmelidir diyorum. Saygılar sunuyorum. 
NURCAN ÖZTÜRK: Merhabalar. Genel konuşmalarımda 10 yıldır Alevilikle ilgili 
araştırmalar yapıyorum. Öncelikle yaşta ve yolda büyüklerime hürmetlerimle, 
akranlarıma ve küçüklerime sevgiyle başlamak istiyorum. Aleviliğin yaşı çok büyük 
aslında. Türkiye'de Alevilik hala 10 yaşında çocuk konumunda bırakılmış. Bunda 
bizim, Alevi vakıf, dernek ayrıca federasyonlarının da suçu var. Bir söz var çok 
sensen sorumlu sensin. Şimdi efendim bizim de hatalarımız var. Toplumsal barış 
yüzleşerek sağlanır. Utanarak, unutarak, görmezden gelerek, üstünü örterek, 
unutturarak değil. Birisi damgalarıyla bizim yıkıyoruz. Ulusal değerlere bağlı 
kalarak, kişiye değil toplumların özgür düşünme ve özgür hareket etme hakları 
vardır. Hiç kimsenin bu hakları kötüye kullanmak gibi bir hakkı yoktur. Herkes 
kendi adına yaşar. Herkes kendi adına yürür. Az önce çok güzel bir şey söyledi. 
Bununla ilgili çok değer verdiğim bir şeyi okumak istiyorum. “Okuduk Kur'an-ı 
sazlar çalarak, Yemedik haramı insan soyarak, Günah işlemedik insan yakarak, 
Kimseye verecek borcumuz yoktur. Kıldık namazları insan severek, Kullanmadık 
insanı din diyerek, Kıymadık bir cana Allah diyerek, Kimseye verecek borcumuz 
yoktur. Yaptık şartımızı hizmet ederek, Kötülere karşı göğüs gererek, Gittik 
doğruların izini sürerek, Kimseye verecek borcumuz yoktur.” Aslında biz Alevilerin 
çok önemli bir sorunu var. Alevilik hiçbir zaman bir inanç değildir. Ancak üzülerek 
söylüyorum ki yatılı öğretmen lisesi sınavını kazanmıştım 11 yaşında fark etmişler 
ki okulda toplam 15 tane yatılı okulda, devlet okulunda Alevi çocuk var. Kızlı, 
erkekli çocuklar var. Eski yurt binası akşam ısınmak için. Ben de 11 yaşındayım orta 
birdeyim. Bizi topladılar kantine. Benim köyümde olmadığını öğrenmişler düşerleri 
gibi ve bir de ben inançların kaynağını bilmiyorum. Dedemden öğrendiğim birkaç 
şeyi biliyorum ama inançlarımın kaynağını bilmiyorum. Ben bilmiyorum ve bizi 
devletin olanaklarından faydalanmayalım diye döverek ve yıldırarak okuldan 
uzaklaştırmaya çalışıyorlardı ve ben, 11 yaşındayım yani diğerlerinden küçüktüm, 
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yüzüme atılan yumrukla hala hiçbir zaman yaptıramayacağım ön dişimi kırdılar. Ben 
izahını vermiştim ve ben o okulu 2500 kişilik yatılı okulu birinci olarak bitirdim. Biz 
zavallılar arasında kaldık. Ancak bizim de yanlışlarımız var. Oturup kendi 
yanlışlarımızı düşünmenin zamanı çoktan geçti. Biz hem inançsal hem de siyasal 
inançta da her yerde hala tutunmaktayız. Ellerinden ancak sağlam oluşturamama ve 
kendi yapılandırmamızın olabilir. Siyasal gücümüzü dağıttığımızda etkilerimiz yok 
oluyor ve devre dışı kalmaktayız. Genel siyasal bir partide ağırlık, etkinlik 
oluşturamama, yön bulamama yıllardır bu anlamda örgütlü davranmakmış. Ve ben 
hep hayal de gör düş de gör. Paranıza sahip olun yarın darda kalırsanız lazım olur. 
Hayal de gör düş de gör hele bir yol düş de gör. Her anlamda söylüyordu ama ünlü 
olmadığı için. 
HÜSNÜ İYİDOĞAN: Halk Ozanları Kültür Derneği genel sekreteriyim. Aleviliğin 
bir kere kurtarılması lazım diye düşünüyorum. Belki 10000 yıldır var olan Alevilik 
günümüze kadar dedelerin ve ozanların sayesinde bu şekliyle bize ulaştırılmış ama 
tabi üretim biçiminin değişmesi, tüketim biçiminin değişmesi, sosyal olayların 
değişmesi Aleviliğe de yeni bir vizyonun yolunu açmıştır.  Fakat biz bu 
gerçeklerden uzak hala kulaktan dolma, okumadan, gelecek dünyayı görmeden, 
insanlarımızı daha aydın bir geleceğe hazırlamadan o geçmişteki hurafeleri 
anlatmışız cemlerimizde. Dolayısıyla Alevi çocukları da artık kapalı toplumdan daha 
çağdaş bir topluma ulaşmışlardır üniversite okumuşlardır, akademi okumuşlardır. 
Cemlere dönüldüğünde çok büyük çelişkilerle karşılaştıkları için cemlere gereken 
önemi vermemeye başlamışlardır. Bir akademisyenin kafasındaki Alevilik cemdeki 
gördüğü manzara onu hayal kırıklığına uğratmıştır. Oysa biz Aleviler olarak 
günümüzde yaşanan ortodoks kimliğin 1-0 önünde başlıyoruz, Alevi genci olarak. 
Onun için sayı, konuşmacı arkadaşlara da çok teşekkür ediyorum güzel konuşmalar 
yaptılar. Bizim önerilerimiz şu: 1)Aleviliğin hurafelerden kurtarılması lazım. 2) 
Aleviliğin belli bir sisteme oturtulması lazım. Yani inanç-din konuşmalarından 
uzaklaşmamız lazım. Ankara'daki Aleviliğin gidişatı neyse, semahı neyse, Kars'taki 
Alevinin de aynı olmalı. Bunu bir yazılı metin haline getirmeliyiz ve Türkiye 
genelinde, Avrupa genelinde yayınlamalıyız. Benim düşüncelerim bu hepinize 
saygılar sunuyorum. 
A: Saygılarımı sunarım. Arkadaşlar ben evvelki konuşmasını bitiren Nurcan 
kardeşime gerçekten teşekkür ederim. Diğer konuşmacı arkadaşlarım da çok güzel 
konuştu ama O özden konuştu. O'nun yaşamının yakınından geçen benim yaşamım 
da olduğu için bana dokundu. Ben bütün hayatımı akademi, mastırla harcayıp bir 
insan olarak hep çalışarak ilkokul hariç öyle geçirdim, öyle çalıştım, öyle okudum. 
Şimdi bu hareketine saygılarımla, hürmetlerimle kendilerine bir şeyler arz edeceğim. 
Geç kalınmış bir şey değil. Zaman geçmiş değil, insanlar düşüncelerini tekemmül 
ettiği zamana kadar faaliyete geçirdiği zamandan attığı adımdan itibaren bence kara 
geçmiş olur. Yani bu daha evvel geçen zaman geçmiş olur. İnşallah bu da Aleviliğin 
içindeki bu kargaşayı sadeleştirip sosyal, siyasal hayattan taşırken inançsal 
durumunu tamamen değiştirip bir süreçte ve bir kademe kademe sonuç talimat alıp 
tabana kadar, tabandan işlenen olaylar dergaha intikal etmek. Hep yüzeysel 
açıklıyorlar, tam anlamıyla açıklamıyorlar. Zaten Alevilik budur. Bunun dışında ne 
tarif edebilirsiniz ki? Yani yazılmış, çizilmiş onca şey dışında tarif edemeyiz. 
A: Bundan iki üç ay önce yine burada aynı şekilde böyle bir toplantı yaptık. Orada 
da ben söz alıp konuştum fakat kısaca dile getireyim biraz onları dinlemedeki gibi 
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olacak ama. Burada benden önceki kimi konuşmacı arkadaşlarıma katkı anlamında 
daha doğrusu ekleme anlamında bir konuşma olacak. Bildiğiniz gibi Alevilik 
yüzyıllardan buraya kadar gelebilmişse ve hala da yaşayabiliyorsa bunlardaki bu iki 
görevi üstlenen kişilerden biri dedelerimiz diğerleri de zakirlerimiz. Fakat 
dedelerimiz ne zaman ki bu yolu, yöntemi, kurallarını kentleşmeyle birlikte biraz. 
Bu sefer o bizim yüzyıllardır köylerde yaptığımız otantik anlamıyla 
değerlendirdiğimiz Cemlerimiz kentleşmeyle beraber şekil değiştirmeye başladı. 
Cemlerimiz artık bir gösteriden başka bir şey değildir. Yani bizim gerçekten hayal 
ettiğimiz görmüyoruz görüyoruz kişileri de görüyoruz. Orada büyük bir hoşgörü 
çerçevesi nitelendiriliyor ama bu aslında kendi içimize kendi değerlerimizi bozmak, 
onları asimile etmekten başka bir işe yaramıyor. Fakat günümüze dedelerimiz 
gerçekten kendilerine yüzyıllardır yüklenen yükü taşıyamadılar. Gerçekten dedelik 
hizmetini yapanları ayrı tutuyorum onun dışında kendine dedeyim dedirten bir sürü 
dedeler çıktı. Kimisi daha çok hurafelerden anlatılanlarla yola çıkıyor. Bu anlamda. 
Yani insanları bu yönüyle anlatıp, aydınlatmak isteyen dedelerimiz var. Gerçekten 
dedelerimiz bu anlamda Alevilik olsun, Bektaşilik olsun diğer cemin getirdiği 
konular olsun kendilerini yeterince geliştirmiyorlar, okumuyorlar, araştırmıyorlar. 
Çünkü ağ gün geçtikçe genişliyor. Artık bilişim çağındayız, uzay çağındayız. Tutup 
da eskisi kadar çocuklarınıza kılıcı anlatamazsınız, inandıramazsınız. Bunlar 
bitmiştir. Bu yüzden çağa ayak uydurmak zorundasınız. Dedelerimiz bu anlamda 
çağın koşullarına göre okumak zorunda. Sosyoloji okumalı, felsefe okumalı, 
tasavvuf okumalı. Yani toplumu aydınlatacak şekilde kendini bilgilendirmeli. Böyle 
bir eksiklikleri var. Bunu tamamlamalı. Şimdi gelelim örgütlenme alanına. Benden 
önce arkadaş bir örnek verdi, kilise modeli, tabi bu bize ne kadar uyar ya da biz 
ondan ne derece kopya çekebiliyoruz o ayrıca tartışılabilir. Gerçekten arkadaşın da 
belirttiği gibi bugün bizim Anadolu'da bu Alevi Bektaşiliği yayan ocaklarımız var ve 
örgütsel anlamda bunlar bir araya gelmişler. Bunları kabul edip diğer ocakları da 
bunların etrafında örgütleyip yaptığımız zaman sanırım tam anlamıyla inançsal 
örgütlenmeyi tamamlamış oluruz. Görüldüğü gibi işte 1990lardan sonra bu vakıflar, 
dernekler çoğaldı. Onların tabi kendi görevleri sosyal anlamda, kültürel anlamda 
birtakım görevleri yerine getirmektir. Yani Alevilerin ihtiyaç duyduğu işte cenaze 
kaldırma, gibi birtakım kursları vermektir ama onun dışında inançla ilgili hala bugün 
bir cenazemizin kaldırılacağının telaşına düşüyoruz orada imamın karşısına 
duruyoruz. Nerede o zaman bizim erkanımız? En azından bir sürü dernekler kurduk, 
belediyeden gidip oradan kendimiz için bir arsa alıp cenazemizi kendimiz kaldırma 
gibi bir işlem başaramadık. Bu ayrıca bizim bir ayıbımız. Şimdi dedelerimiz ne 
yapmalı? Günümüz koşullarına baktığınız zaman dedelerimiz gerçekten bunlara 
hizmet amacıyla yola çıkmalı. Kendine diyanetten maaş alacak gibi bir işe yatıp da 
acaba benim karım var mı gibi bir kaygı taşımamalı ama tarih bunu kabul edecek 
mi? Etmeyecektir. Tarih ayrıca kendi ocağına bağlı dedenin orada kendilerini 
gördüler. Onun dışında hiçbir yere kolay kolay kendisini çekmez yani. Bu anlamda 
görüyoruz sonuçsuz kaldı eğer dedelerimiz gerçekten iyi bir örgütlenme sağlamış 
olsalardı konusunda olsun, diyanete karşı tutumunda olsun hatta bir siyasi tavrını 
ortaya koyabilmeliydi. En azından Türkiye gündeminde bazı konular gündeme 
geliyor kendi aralarında işte böyle ocak temsilcileri bunların bir araya gelip onların 
yapacağı bir basın açıklaması iki üç basın açıklamasından daha etkili olacaktır. 
Çünkü devletlerin ancak kendi üye katmanı içerisinde güce sahiptir beyin yapacağı 
bir açıklamayı bütün Alevi ama bir başkanın yapacağı bir açıklama çok kalacaktır. O 
da ya duyulacaktır ya da duyulmayacaktır için bundan sonra bu çerçevede ciddi 
anlamda bir örgütlenme yaratmak zorundayız. Bundan sonraki çalışmalarda bir 
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atölye çalışmaları yapılmasını öneriyorum. Her konuda nasıl yaşama geçirmeliyiz 
bundan sonra nasıl yürütmeliyiz nasıl olmalı az önce bir arkadaşımızın önerdiği gibi 
cemlerimiz nasıl olmalı, iç hizmetler nasıl yapılmalı bunları belli bir sistematiğe 
oturtursak sanırım bundan sonraki inancımız, düşüncemiz, felsefemiz devam 
edecektir diyorum. Bir de bir ricam olacak. Bunu ister bir eleştiri kabul etsin, isterse 
başka bir şey. Çünkü Hacı Bektaşi'den aldık diyoruz. Sanmıyorum ben bu işin böyle 
kolay kolay icazet verildiğini. Yani gerçekten hizmeti yapmayı bilen dedeler 
hizmetle ilgili iki tane ezberlerim varsa yaparsınız ama bu öyle olmamalı. Bu kadar 
da kolay değil. Çünkü önce bir kere aşık olmak gerekiyor, gerekiyor sahip olmak 
gerekiyor. Ancak bu özelliklere sahipseniz siz bu yoksa onun dışında Hani her 
gördüğünüz sakallıyı da dede, papaz sanmamak lazım. 
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Transcript of interview with Mustafa Şen (14 April 2011) 
 
Didem Doğanyılmaz: Alevilik size ne şekilde öğretildi?  
Mustafa Şen: Bilgi aktarımı çok sistematik olmadı. Ali-Hasan-Hüseyin figürleri 
vardır. Horasan geçiş noktası olmuştur. Köken ile ilgli bir tartişmayı çok verimli 
bulmuyorum. Son zamanlarda da aynı şekilde çalışmalar oldukça arttı. Bu iş ile ilgili 
bir sonuca varmak zor çünkü, tarihsel bir çalişma yapmak zor. Teolojik olarak 
çalışmak zor. Ana nedeni de Alevilik'in kaynaklarının düşünülenden daha kompleks 
olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Cumhuriyet döneminde de ciddi bir baskının 
yaşanmış olması. Hacı Bektaş ailelerinin, Bektaşi dedelerinin ülkeyi terk etmek 
zorunda kalmaları, bilgi kaynağı konusunda sıkıntılara sebep olmuştur. Alevilik 
İran'dan hatta belki de Kazakistan'dan eski Yugoslavya'ya, Irak'tan başlayıp 
Bulgaristan'a, hatta Polonya'ya, Rusya'ya gidebilecek bir coğrafyadan söz edebiliriz. 
1950lere kadar zorluklarla mücadele ediliyor ve 50lerden sonra göçler başlıyor. Bu 
da sistemin bozulmasına sebep oluyor. Devlet desteği diye birşeyden söz etmek 
biraz zor, daha çok devlet kösteği var... 90larda yeniden bir “baslangıç” dönemi. 
Alevi örgütlerinin gelişmesiyle birlikte, köken üzerine gitmek daha popüler hale 
geldi. Alevilik'te, formal bir yaklaşım yok. Alevilik, Bektaşilik'ten daha geniştir. 
Bektaşilik tarikat örgütlenmesidir. Alevilik doğum ile birlikte gelir ancak, Bektaşilik 
sonradan edinilebilir bir kimliktir. Farklılık heryerde, İslamiyette de benzer durum 
söz konusudur. Endonezya'dan Fas’a çeşitlilik görülebilir. Biz kabaca Alevilik ve 
Sünnilik diyoruz ancak onlar da kendi içlerinde farklılıklar 
gösterebiliyorlar. Sünnileştirilen gruplar mevcut ve bu da asimilasyon politikasının 
bir sonucudur. Cumhuriyet döneminde daha güçlü bir asimilasyon politikası mevcut. 
Diyanetin de etkisinin olduğunu belirtebiliriz. Laik Sünnilerle, Aleviler arasında çok 
da büyük bir fark yok. Birçok laik sünni de kendini Alevilik'e daha yakın görüyor. 
Daha eşitlikçi olması (kadın-erkek), ibadetin Türkçe olması, deyişlerin Türkçe 
kullanılmasi gb durumlar laik Sünniler açısından dikkat çekicidir. Belirli noktalarda 
olay teolojiden ayrılarak siyasi farklılıklara da gitmektedir. Örneğin iki solcu Sünni 
ve Alevi arasında çok büyük bir fark bulamazsınız. Evet yakın dönemde, sol görüş 
daha baskın durumdadir Alevilikte. Zorunlu din dersleri, kurumsal ayrımcılıktır. 
Diyanet işleri asimilasyon politikasının başını çekmektedir. Her yerde asimilasyona 
maruz kalınabiliyor. Büyük şehirlerde kaçmak kaybolmak çok daha kolay. Ancak 
küçük yerlerde bu şekilde değildir. 
 
DD: Alevi çalıştayı raporu ile ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz?  
MŞ: Evet daha rahat konuşuluyor şuanda ancak sadece konuşuluyor, somut bir adım 
yoktur. (Son 10 yılda konuşulabiliyor olması). Dağ fare doğurdu. Bakan iyi niyetli 
idi ancak... ilahiyatçılarla hazırlanan bir çalışma. Zaten bir şekilde İslami geçmişi 
olan kişilerle yazılıp tartışılıyor. Örneğin başörtüsü ile ilgili olarak bir dede 
çağrılmıyor, bu sebeple Aleviler icin neden ilahiyatçılar çağrıldı. Kimi zaman, 
çalıştay olmanın dışında, yaftalama, yer yer aşağılama şeklindedir. Çalıştaylar genel 
olarak hep problemli geçti. Bakış açısında bir problem var. İlahiyat, Diyanet her 
adımda işin içinde olmak istemişlerdir. Olmazsa da İslami yazarlar el atmışlardır, 
tanımlamaya çalışmışlardır. Ancak kimsenin, hukuki olarak da, böyle bir hakkı 
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yoktur. İlginç bir stratejileri vardır, örneğin bir kez devrim kanunları Alevilerin 
önüne konmuştur. Birkez dendi ki, eğer biz size hak verirsek, Nakşilere de 
vermemiz gerekir, dendi, bu nasıl bir mantıktır. Alevileri bir tarikat düzeyine 
indirmek istemişlerdir. Çocuk kandırma gb pedagojik bir işlem dönüyor. Aleviler 
eğitilecek güdülecek bir grup gibi görülüyor. Çalıştayın yürütülmesi yanlış gitti. Bir 
açıdan küçümsememek lazım, ancak ciddi bir hayal kırıklığıdır. Bazı konularda 
mesela hiçbir tartışma yoktur. 
Madımak’ın müze yapılması, bu kimseye zarar vermeyecek birşeydir, kültür 
merkezi bile olabilir. Zorunlu din dersleri, bütün partilerin katılabileceği birşey, çok 
zor değil. Büyük büyük düzenlemelere gerek yok, içeriği değiştireceksin. Zaman 
zaman deniyor ki, eğer biz oraya Alevilik'i sokarsak, bir de seçmeli Sünnilik olsun, 
pratik dersleri olsun, okulda namaz kılınsın. Zaten anayasaya aykırı olduğu halde 
namaz öğretiliyor, açıkça din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi deniyor ama pratik öğretiliyor. 
Tüm dini gruplar açıklanmalıdır. AB müktesebatı açısından da uyulması gereken bir 
konu. 
Hacı Bektaş Dergahı'nın statüsünün değiştirilmesi. Para verip giriyor Aleviler 
dergahlarına. Birkaç küçük ciddi düzenleme ile halledilebilir. Aleviler için 
Serçeşmedir. Ziyaretin dini anlamı vardır. Aslında bir iki çok basit çözüm önerileri 
var. Cemevlerinin statüsü. Kimse cemevlerine para verilsin demiyor. Anayasamıza 
göre, dini bir mekanın tanımlama yetkisi yoktur ve buna gerek de yoktur. İbadethane 
denmesi yeterli. Cemevi icin Diyanet görüş bildiriyor, mantık bu. Çözmek çok kolay 
bir iştir. Cemevi kabul edilirse, camiye alternatif olur deniliyor. 
 
DD: Avusturya'daki kararı nasıl yorumluyorsunuz? 
MŞ: Avrupa biraz daha karışık. Hatta Avusturya'da farklı bir sistem var. Örneğin 
Almanya Alevilik'i okutuyor. Aleviler hiçbir yerde, devlet ile çatışma içine 
girmemiştir. Avrupa'nın raporlarında bunlardan bahsedilmesi, hükümeti de harekete 
geçirmekte etkili olmuştur. Referans demokrasi, insan hakları ve 
kardeşliktir. Gerçekten önemli bir adımdır, Avursturya'daki karar. 
 
DD: Kanuni haklar verilse bile, Sünni-Alevi arasındakı önyargı kalkar mı?  
MŞ: Zaman gerekir. Kamu otoritesi gerekmektedir. Örneğin, ABD'de ırkçılığın 
kaldırılması 50li yıllar, ama 50 yıl sonra bir siyahi başkan oldu. 
 
DD: Örneğin, Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül bir açıklama yaptı, rektorler atadım.  
MŞ: Evet 1 tane.  
DD: Bu ayrımcılık değil midir?  
MŞ: Aslında bu gayri ihtiyari söylemdir. Ama dindar toplumlarda bu böyledir. 
Örneğin ben kendimi bu ülkeye din bağı ile bağlı görmüyorum, vatandaşlık bağı ile 
bağlı görüyorum. Etnik olarak da bağlı hissetmiyorum, tek bağım vatandaşlık 
bağıdır. Modern cumhuriyette bu böyledir. "Ben Alevi bir rektör atadım." demek, 
aslında ben rektörlerin dini kimliklerini biliyorum ve önemsiyorum demektir. Gayri 
ihtiyaridir ama, kamu yöneticisinin sıkıntısı olduğunu gösteriyor. Çalıştaylarda 
sorun Alevilik sorunu değil, vatandaşlık sorunudur. Bu ülkenin Sünni kesime karşı 
dini konuları var, devlet yapıyor. Avrupa'da laiklik uygulamaları ile de çok bir 
bağdaşma yok. Bizde Diyanet devletin bir parçası. İlahiyatlar var, imam hatipler var, 
zorunlu din dersleri var ve bunların hiç birinin Alevilik ile alakası yok. Aleviler 
zaten bu kurumlar yoluyla baskıya uğradıklarını ve asimile edildiklerini 
düşünüyorlar. Biz sadece vatandaşlık haklarımı bana geri ver. Zorunlu din 
derslerindeki asimilasyon politikasından vazgeç, ibadethanemi tanı ve bir iki küçük 
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şey daha var (Serçeşme’yi Alevilere iade et). Üç dört tane konu, çok uzatmaya gerek 
de yok. Diyanetin bütçesi problemdir, son yılda %40 artış var bütçesinde. Bu sadece 
Alevilerin değil Sünnilerin de sıkıntıları vardır. Devlet bu kadar dinle içiçe olmalı 
mıdır? 
Sadece Diyanet ile de sınırlı değil, aile imami diye bir şey var. Hayatın her alanına 
nüfuz etmek istiyorlar. Sünniliği de tek forma indirmek istiyorlar. Türkiye 'strictly 
secular' denir, ama katısı bu ise... Sanki hala 20lerde 30larda yaşıyormuşuz gb 
bakılıyor. Ama hiçbir şey aynı değil. Türkiye ciddi dönüşümler geçirdi. Sadece bu 
konu üzerine eğilmek yeterli olmayacaktır. Yavaş yavaş laikleşme var o dönemde, 
ama aynı zamanda ilahiyatlar da kuruluyor Diyanet de kuruluyor. Şuanki Türkiye'de 
ilahiyatlar, azınlık dışında, olması gereken teolojik yapıya ait değildir. Yalnızca 
Sünni İslam, yine. 
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Transcript of interview with Ahmet Özuğurlu (18 April 2011) 
 
Didem Doğanyılmaz: Nusayri olarak biliniyor Arap Aleviler, bu şekilde 
tanımlayabilir miyiz?  
Ahmet Özuğurlu: Hayır, bu şekilde tanımlanamaz. Bu başkalarının tanımlamasıdır. 
Osmanlı döneminde ortaya çıkan bir kavram. Osmanlı bu isme sahip çıktı, negatif 
ayrıştırma için kullanıldı. Yoksa bizim adımız Alevi’dir. Nusayri ismini, bizim 
insanlarımızdan da benimseyenler vardır, tabi ki. Çünkü yıllar içinde bu şekilde 
tanımlanagelmiştir bu halk. 
 
DD: Ne demek peki, Nusayri?  
AÖ: Muhammed ibn-i Nusayr isminde, yaklaşık 1100 yıl önce yaşamış bir din 
bilgini, bir kişiden geliyor. Saygımız çok büyük ancak, onun kurmuş olduğu bir 
mezhepmiş gibi isimlendirilmiştir, ancak doğru değil. 11. imamın kalem müdürü 
gibi bir konumda olan kişi. Zaman içinde İslam'a aykırı inançlar soktuğunu 
düşündüler ve o dönemde de bizi İslam'ın dışına itebilmek için bu isim kullanıldı. 
Biz Hz. Ali’ye tabi olan Alevi ismini taşıyoruz, başka da bir isme gerek yoktur. 
 
DD: Türkmen Alevilerinin yaşadiği Alevilik ile Arap Alevilerinin yaşadığı Alevilik 
arasında bir farklılık var mıdır?  
AÖ: Çok ciddi bir farklılık vardır. Yemen kökenliyiz biz. Zaman içerisinde göçler 
oldu. İki sebepten göç olur, ya ekonomik sıkıntı vardır, ya da politik baskı. Bizimki 
biraz can korkusu sebebiyle olanlardır, diğer etki de vardır tabiki de. En sonunda 
Irak, Suriye ve Lübnan dolaylarında kalınmıştır. 
 
DD: Alevilik'i ne şekilde tanımlarsınız?  
AÖ: Alevilik İslam'ın özüdür. Hz. Muhammed benden sonrası için size iki emanet 
bırakıyorum diyor: birincisi Ehl’i Beyt’im ikincisi de Kuran’ı Kerim. Alevilik işte 
bu iki emanate sahip çıkan gruptur. Kuran’ı Kerim’i yorumlarken, Ehl'i Beyt’ten 
aldıklarımızla yaparız bunu. Bizde Kuran tefsir etmek yasaktır. Ehl'i Beyt yapar 
bunu. Ehl'i Beyt ile birlikte yürüyün diyor, Hz. Muhammed. Bizim ayrım noktamız 
budur. Anadolu Alevilik'i çok sonradan ortaya çıkan bir inançtır. Tasavvuf 
akımından ortaya çıkan bir sonuç diyebiliriz. Onların adına konuşmak istemem 
tabiki de. Bu akımın sebebi, Sünnilik'in şekilciliğinden doğan rahatsızlıktan ortaya 
çıkıyor. Biz de “En-el Hak” yoktur. Allah’ı tüm bu somutlaştırmalardan ayrı tutarız. 
Biz deriz ki, “Ne Aleviyiz, ne Sünni, hem Aleviyiz, hem Sünni”. Biz Kuran’ı yüzde 
yüz kabul ederiz. Namaz, oruç, hac, zekat... Bektaşilerden çok büyük farkımız vardır. 
Kuran’da yazan her harf, kelime bizim için farklıdır. Sünnilikten farkımız da 
halifelik makamı ile alakalıdır. Biz tamamen Ehl'i Beyt’ci ve 12 İmamcı'yızdır. 
Sanki, Şiiler ile birleşiyoruz gibi görünüyoruz ama aslında onlarla da farklılıklarımız 
vardır, ancak çok da büyük değil. Zaman içinde yaşanılan coğrafyadan dolayı ortaya 
çıkan farklılıklar vardır. Mesela Türkiye’de biz birçok fiziksel koşuldan 
ayrışmışızdır. Sünnilerin namazına benzerdir bizim namazlarımız, mesela. Ama 
camilerden uzaklastırıldık biz, bu sebeple çok da yaygın olmayabilir.) Sünni 
Müslümanlarla ayrışmada ikinci noktamız da: Usüller vardır, değiştirilemezdir, 
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temel uygulamalardır, bir de furünler vardır, tamamlayıcıdır. Sünnilikte namaz, oruç, 
Hac usüldur ama bizde tamamlayıcıdır. Sünnilik'de olduğu gibi, her türlü günahı 
işleyeceksin sonra Hacca gideceksin ki, affola, biz de öyle değil. Önce temiz insan 
olacaksın. Allah’ın haram ettiklerinden uzak kalacaksın. Allah’a inanan her insanı, 
diğer insanlardan üstün tutup onun canını verebileceksin. Bunları yaptıktan sonra, 
namaz oruç kavramları da tamamlayıcı oluyor. 
 
DD: Cem ayini gibi ayinler var mıdır?  
AÖ: Bir araya geliriz, Ehl'i Beyt’i anarız, kurbanlar keseriz, ama buna cem demeyiz. 
Aslında bir nevi cem ayinidir bu, ama adına cem demeyiz. Saz söz vardır cem 
ayininde, ama bizde yöntem farklı. Biz Kuran okuruz. Muharrem orucu gibi 
kavramlar asla bizde yoktur. 30 günlük ramazan orucu vardır bizde. Ehl'i Beyt’ten, 
Kuran'ı Kerim den sonra çıkmış hiçbirşeyi kabul etmiyoruz. Bektaşiler ile aramızda 
çok büyük farklılıklar vardır. Tek ortak noktamız, 12 İmamlar, başka yoktur. 
 
DD: İsa, 12. imam mıdır?  
AÖ: Önce 4 kitaptan başlayalım. Kuran'ın emridir zaten bu, ama Kuran'da 
emredilen, kitapların orjinalleridir. Diğerlerine de iman ediyoruz, çünkü Bakara 
suresi bunu emretmiştir, ama mevcutlarının değiştiğine inanıyoruz. Hz. İsa’ya 
gelince, bu sadece Alevilere yüklenecek birşey değildir, başka gruplar da vardır 
buna inanan. Bu konuda Ehl'i Beyt’in sözleri de vardır. Kıyametten önce “Mehdi” 
isimli bir önder gelecektir. 
DD: Peki “Mehdi” İsa ile aynı kişi midir?  
AÖ: Yok. Mehdi inanci, İslam'da ne ise bizdeki de odur. Bizdeki inanç Mehdi 
inancıdır, İsa inancı değildir. 
 
DD: Eğer namaz, zekat, oruç Arap Aleviliğinde de var ise, zorunlu din dersleri yine 
de bir problem midir, sizler için?  
AÖ: Bizi rahatsız eden kısım, namaz oruç kısmı değil. Bizi rahatsız eden iki kısım 
vardır. Fıkhi bilgiler veriliyorsa bir kitapta, tamamiyle Sünni-Hanefi bilgileri vardır. 
Sadece bize değil, Şafilere de sorundur bu. Bir din öğretmeni, bu olayın tamamen 
politik olduğunu sadece Hanefilikteki anlaşmazlıktan ortya çıktığını söylüyor, yanlış. 
Bence Diyanet de kalkmalı, Diyanet kalkacak, her cemaat kendi vakfını kuracak, 
ama kontrol olacak. Bu böyle olmalıdır. Çünkü devletin bekası herşeyin üstündedir. 
Şunu da belirtmeliyim: kontrol hükümetin kontrolu değil, devletin kontrolu 
olmalıdır. Biz devletimize bağlıyız. Birlikten yanayız. Cemaatlere inanç özgürlüğü 
gelecek ve birlik bozulmayacak. Böylelikle de kimse demeyecek, ben vergi 
veriyorum, benim vergimle devlet cami yapacak ve orada bana küfür edilecek! 
Sünni olmayan herkese. Diyanet'in bütçesi de daha mantıklı olarak kullabilabilir bu 
şekilde. 
DD: Sadece din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi verilmelidir yani, değil mi?  
AÖ: Tabi burada ahlak bilgisi de görecelidir. Eğer ahlak, Hanefi ahlak ise buna da 
karşıyız. 
DD: Bunların dışında var mıdır, başka talepler?  
AÖ: Biz şuana kadar, cumhuriyet döneminden bahsediyoruz, biz ibadetlerimizde 
özgürüz.mAtatürk’e olan bağlılığımızı belirtmeye gerek yoktur). Yeter ki, bizim 
ibadetlerimize karışılmasın, kurcalanmasın. Sadece inanç özgürlüğü olsun istiyorum. 
Kültürümü muhafaza etmek istediğimiz zaman bana karışmasınlar, ben finanse de 
ederim. 
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DD: Sıkıntılarınız var mıdır? 
AÖ: Devlet bazında yoktur, ancak bireysel olarak vardır. Örneğin, bir makama 
getirilmiş bir Aleviyi, bireysel olarak birileri izlemesin, onu kontrol etmesinler. 
 
DD: İbadetlerde kadın-erkek eşitliği var mıdır? Kadının yeri nedir, sizler için?  
AÖ: İkiye ayırmamız gerekecek. Biz Kuran'a bağlıyız. Cemaat namazını sadece 
erkekler kılar. Ama adak vardır, Kuran okunur bayanlarla yapılır. Bu İslam'ın genel 
kavramıdır. Cenazelerde Sünni İslam’da olduğu gibi kadınlar arkalardadır. 
 
DD: Cenazeler camilerden mi kalkar?   
AÖ: Hayır, bir defa biz camilerde hiçbirşey yapmayız. İmam önemlidir. Alevi imam 
varsa olabilir. Ama onun dışında... İmama çok önem veririz. Örneğin bir kez 
Mersin’de bir camiye, Aleviler tarafından yapılmıs bir camiye, devlet imam atadı. 
İmam namazdan önce “Ey kafirler sizin dininiz size, benim dinim bana” dualarını 
okuyarak başlardı. Bu şekilde bizler namaz kılamayız. Eğer imam konusunda 
anlaşamıyorsak, biz evimizde namazımızı kılarız. Camiye düşman değiliz ama imam 
konusunda seçiciyiz. Bu sebeple cenazelerimiz camilerden kaldırılmaz. Cenaze 
namazımız bizde 5 tekbirdir, Sünnilerde 4 tekbirdir ve eller önde bağlıdır, ve eller 
yanda bırakılır. Muhammed döneminde de böyle kılınmıştır, birinci halife 
döneminde de böyle kılınmıştır. İkinci halife döneminde değiştirilmiştir. Neden 5 
tekbirdir, çünkü 5 vakit namaz vardır ve her vakit için bir tekbir verilir. 
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Transcript of interview with Tamer Kaya (19 April 2011) 
 
Didem Doğanyılmaz: O zaman azönce de konuştuk ama Anadolu Aleviliği 
dediğiniz gibi bir sentez. Bu sentezin kaynaklarını açıklayabilir misiniz? Yani 
Zerdüş dedik, şamanizm dedik.. 
Tamer Kaya: Bunun kaynakları işte demin de bahsettiğiniz gibi esas kültür 
şamanizme dayanır. Orta Asya kültürüdür. Orta Asya'dan bizim atalarımız geldikleri 
zaman, yani orda atın sırtına binip de Anadolu'da inmemişler. Bugün İran'ın kuzeyi, 
Afganistan'ın kuzeyi, Horosan dediğimiz bölgeye yerleşmişler. Kıyılarda 400 yıl 
yurt tutmuşlar, göçebe olarak yaşamışlar, işte 1071'den daha önce Anadolu'ya çeşitli 
vesileler ile gelmişler gitmişler ve en son Anadolu'yu yurt tutmuşlar ve burda 
gelirken de her kültürden her dinden etkilenmişler. Onların içerisinde aldıkları 
olmuş, benimsedikleri olmuş, benimsemedikleri olmuş. Ama benimsediği güzel 
şeylerin diyelim, almışlar ve getirmişler Anadolu'ya. Ordaki kültürlerin, dinlerin, 
yaşam biçimlerinden aldıklarını Anadolu'da kendi kültürlerinden harmanlamışlar, 
Anadolu Aleviliği, Bektaşi dediğimiz kültürü meydana getirmişler. Bunların yani 
maddi temelleri bunlar, buralardan geliyor. 
DD: Anadolu Aleviliği dediğiniz direk olarak Bektaşi Aleviliği midir? Bunun 
dışında farklıllar var mıdır yoksa Anadolu Aleviliği demek kapsayıcı mıdır, örneğin 
ben bu konu ile ilgili sunumumu da hazırlayacağım, hani Avrupa'dan gelen bir çok 
profesöre yapacağım bu sunumu, orda hangi kimliği kullanmam sizin için daha 
doğrudur?  
TK: Anadolu Aleviliğidir. Şöyle söyleyeyim; bizim üst çatımız Anadolu 
Aleviliğidir. Bektaşilik, onu da şöyle açıklayayım size, Alevilik, Alevi anne ve 
babadan doğanlar Alevi olabiliyor bizim düşüncemize göre. Fakat Bektaşilikte yol 
gardaşlığı var. Yani siz Sünnisiniz örneğin, bizim görgüç evlerimiz olur, o görgüç 
evinde, ben Aleviliği kabul ediyorum, Alevi olmak istiyorum dediğiniz zaman, yol 
gardaşlığı olarak yola girersiniz, Bektaşilik budur. Özde bir yanlışlığı yoktur, özde 
bir sapması yoktur, aynı bizim gibi alevilidirler. Fakat Alevilier ana-babadan gelir, 
Bektaşilerde yola girenlerden oluşur. Örneğin Bektaşiler içinde çok Sırp vardır, 
Hırvat vardır. Örneğin Bektaşiliğin kurucusu Balat sultan Sırp’tır. Dimi? onu da 
biliyorsunuz, bunun gibi. Kavram Anadolu Aleviliğidir yani. 
DD: Az önce de söyledik, aynı zamanda Alevilik bir inanç, bir din olmanın ötesinde, 
Alevilik bir yaşam felsefesi bir yaşam tarzıdır diyebiliriz değil mi? 
TK: Kesinlikle, kesinlikle.  
DD: Peki Alevi grubunu nasıl tanımlayabiliriz? Örneğin, etnik grup demek 
açıklayacı bir terim midir? Çünkü benim ilgimi çekti, 1 Ekim 2010 tarihinde İzmir 
Konak Meydanı'nda bir gösteri düzenlendi, oturma eylemi yapıldı. Orada Ali Balkız 
Bey, her etnik grubun artık yeter diyeceği bir nokta vardır dedi. Etnik grup olarak 
tanımlayabilir miyiz Aleviliği? 
TK: Hayır. Biz etnik grup olarak kendimizi tanımlamıyoruz, biz asıl unsuruz. Bizim 
kültürümüzün kökenleri esasında Türk kültürüdür. Türkmen kültürüdür. Fakat bu 
kültür ile etkileşen bir sürü kavimler vardır. Örneğin işte Kafkaslarda vardır 
Balkanlarda vardır, Orta Doğu'da vardır, Orta Asya'da vardır. Yani bu bizim 
kültürümüzden etkilenmişlerdir ama kavim olarak farklıdırlar. Fakat esas olarak 
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Alevilik bir Türk kültürüdür.  
DD: Örneğin bir kaynakta da, şimdi aklıma geldi, ilk olarak Türkmen Aleviliği 
olarak geçiyor, bu coğrafyada yaşanan Alevilik kavramı için. Fakat daha sonra Kürt 
Alevilerin, Zazaların varlığından yola çıkaraktan Anadolu Aleviliği söyleminin daha 
doğru olduğu geçiyor. Bunu da bu şekilde açıklayabiliriz değil mi? Doğrudur? 
TK: Aynen. Kesinlikle. 
DD: Bir sorun daha var. Örneğin, Balkanlarda veya Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde de 
fazlaca Alevi halk mevcut. Genelde Bektaşiler zaten ve bu konu ile ilgili Avusturya 
anayasa mahkemesinin çok tarihsel bir kararı var, Aralık 2010 tarihinde aldılar. İlk 
olarak oradaki İslami birliklerin başkanı dedi ki, "Hayır Alevilik diye birşey yoktur. 
İslamdır, İslam da Sünni İslam'dır" gibi bir açıklaması oldu. Bunun üzerine Anayasa 
mahkemesi Aleviliğin İslam içerisinde farklı inanışlara sahip olduğunu söyleyerek, 
Avrupa'da Aleviliğin kendi cem evlerinin, dedelerinin tanınması gibi şeylerin önünü 
açtığı söylendi. Bu sizde nasıl bir adımdır? Yani Avrupa'da başarılı olacak, somut 
sonuçlar getirecek bir adımlar olarak değerlendirilebilir mi? 
TK: Yani kesinlikle. O insanların da gerçekleri görmesi güzel bir şey. Şimdi 
Balkanlarda aslında İslamiyet'ten önce, Selçuklularda olsun, Osmanlılarda olsun, 
bizim misyonerler, yani Osmanlılardan önce Bektaşi babaları geldiler oraya. Ve 
bugün Balkanlarda Bektaşi yerleşimi çok fazladır. Arnavutluk'un hemen hemen 
yüzde doksanı Bektaşidir. 
DD: Hatta geçtiğimiz günlerde bir toplantı yapıldı orada, devlet bakanımızın da 
gittiği. Bir Bektaşi dedesiyle birlikte yapılan bir toplantı vardı. O konuda da baya bir 
nufüsun olduğunu söylemişlerdir.  
TK: Kesinlikle vardır. Hatta Türkiye'de yapılan bir çok toplantı ve konferanslara 
Balkanlardan çok sayıda Bektaşi babası da katılır. Yani bu da onların varlığını 
gösteriyor zaten. Dediğimiz gibi Arnavutluk bir devlet, Arnavutluğun yüzde doksanı 
Bektaşidir. Nereden kaynaklanıyor bu? İşte biz Anadolu ve Rum erenleri diyoruz ya, 
o erenlerin evliyaların, bizim öncülerin, ya da şimdiki tabirle misyonerlerin gidip o 
halkı savaştan önce o halkı bu görüşe bu felsefeye inandırmalarıdır. Tabi Osmanlı 
Balkanlara girerken bir kılıç dahi çekmemiştir, çünkü herkes artık bu işe razı 
olmuştu.  
DD: Peki örneğin benim elimde bir harita var. Bu haritada Anadolu Alevileri, Arap 
Alevileri, Tahtacılar ve Büyükşehir Alevileri olarak dörde ayrılmış bir grup var. 
Buradan Arap Alevilerinin farklı olduğunu biliyoruz ancak benim Tahtacılar 
konusunda, bilgi konusunda birşeye ulaşamadım. Nedir farklılıklar veya büyük 
şehirde bulunan Alevilerin, Anadolu Alevilerinden farklılıkları var mıdır? Yoksa 
modernizasyon denilen süreç içerisinde mi kendilerini şehir hayatına adapte 
etmişlerdir? Bu konuda ne çeşit bir farklılıktan bahsedebiliriz? 
TK: Bizler hakkaten yüzyıllarca çok büyük şeylere katlandık. Yani, hakaret 
derecesine varan söylemlerle bizle nolduk kabuğumuza çekildik. Kapalı bir toplum 
olarak yaşadık, köylerde yaşadık. Dört köyümüz varken, aramızda bir Sünni köyü 
olduğu için, korkumuzdan üç köy ile irtibat kuramadık. Mesela cemlerimizi, 
ibadetlerimizi biz gizli yaptık. 
DD: Bazen köy girişlerine gözcüler dikildi. Haber verdiler. 
TK: Cem yaptığımız, ibadet yaptığımız yerin tepesine insanlar konuldu aman 
birileri gelirse. Bir örnek vereyim size, bizim köyde benden önce olmuştur, ben çok 
küçüktüm. Ben Elbistanlıyım. Bizim köyde bir tane Sünni ev var diye, bekliyorlar o 
ışık sönsün, o ev yatsın ki bizimkiler ibadet yapabilsin. Bakın bir köyün içerisinde 
bir ev. Yani bu korkunç bir şey. Şimdi biz bunları yaşadığımız için kapalı 
toplumlarda kalmışız, daha sonra biz şehirlere geldik, varoşlara geldik. Bunu da 
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keyfimizden gelmedik. Hepimiz gibi işte ekmek davasına. Ve burada yaşam 
biçimimiz değişti. Sizinle tanıştık, siz bizi tanıdınız, önyargılar yok oldu, etkileşim 
oldu. Mesela benim iş yerinde arkadaşlarım oldu, komşularım oldu. Konuşurken 
yani sen Alevi misin? Evet. Allah Allah sanki bir şey varmış gibi. Şimdi bunları 
yıktık çok şükür. Bu Anadolu için bir kazanımdır. Çünkü bakın, Sünniler de aynı 
biziz, biz de onlarız. Değişen bir şey yok. Onun içinde büyükşehirlerde olan 
Alevilerin bu tür bir etkileşimlerden doğan farklılıkları var. Birde bizim 
geleneklerimizde, örneğin Hristiyanlıkta da var, toplum içerisinde yüz kızartıcı bir 
suç işleyen varsa aforoz ediliyor onlarda değil mi? Bizde de yol düşkünü sayılıyor. 
Köylerde, ben bir hata yapmışsam, ben bir komşumun tarlasına girmişsem, veya ben 
birinin tavuğunun bir yumurtasını kümesinden almışsam, dede beni dara çeker. 
Bizim dar da halk mahkemesidir. Yanlış anlaşılmasın bizim kendi içimizde halk 
mahkemesidir. Halkın hepsi orada hazırdır. Dede sorar buna, der ki bu böyle böyle 
yapmış, buna şu ceza vermek istiyoruz, ne diyorsunuz, hepsi razı olursa o cezayı 
verir.  Bakın bugün Amerika’daki sistem aynı bizim sistemdir. Beni de yol düşkünü 
sayarlar. Kimse bana selam vermez, kimse beni evine koymaz, misafirim gelse, 
Tamer'in evi neresi dese kimse evimi göstermez. Sürüm, koyunum kuzum varsa 
kimse köyün sürüsüne katılmaz. Toplumdan tamamen dışlanırım. Onun dışında çok 
dikkat ederiz, davranışlarımıza. Ben kendi yöremizden bahsedeyim. Bizim orda her 
türlü kavgalar olur. İşte elma koparma, armut koparma, ufak tefek şeyler ama bizim 
oralarda hiçbir zaman cinayet olmaz. Cana kıymayız, bir. İki, namus meselesi olmaz. 
Biri birinin gözüne yan gözle bakmış, ondan dolayı da kavga çıkmış, mahkum olmuş, 
böyle bir şey bizim tabirimizde asla yer almaz. Bunun için, mesela, oradaki o aforoz 
dediğimiz, ya da yol düşkünü dediğimiz örneğin şehre geldik, cem yapıyoruz. 
Burada hangimizin dürüst olduğunu kimse bilmez. Dede beni dara çekse, dese ki 
senin şu yanlışın varmış, abim beni ihbar etse, ben de evet var desem. Seni artık 
aforoz ediyorum toplumdan dese ben güler geçerim, çünkü beni almasalar da gider 
kahvede otururum. Onun için biz hep şunu savunuyoruz. Alevi gelenek görenekleri 
artık modernize edilmek zorundadır. Yani bakın, en ufak saydığım bir şey artık 
tedavülden kalkmış. Geçerliliği kalmamış. İşte büyükşehir Alevileri bu tür 
değişimlere ve dönüşümlere uğradılar. Özlerini kaybetmemekle beraber farklılıklar 
oluştu. Belki ona farklılık diyoruz. Arap alevileri bizim Nusayri dediğimiz 
alevilerdir. Onların İran Şiasıyla veya Ortadoğu Şiileri ile pek farkları yoktur. Tek 
fark olan, Hz. Ali’ye çok büyük bir hayranlık duymalarıdır. Yani haşa Allah’tan 
sonra gelen hatta bazı bazı Allah olarak düşünülen bir yapıları vardır. Fakat gelenek, 
görenek, töre, adet olarak da bize hiçbir zaman benzemezler. Bizim tek onlarla 
buluştuğumuz şey nedir, Hz. Ali ve Ehl'i Beyt sevgisi. Onun dışında başka birşey 
yoktur. Gelelim Tahtacılara. Tahtacılar öz ve öz Türkmendir. Bunlar daha çok 
Toroslarda, Ege kıyılarında, Marmara'ya varan o bir yay şeklinde olan kıyı şeridine 
yerleşmişlerdir. Onların iki tane büyük ocakları vardır. Biri Ahmedi Saniye ocağı, 
biri Yan Yatır ocağıdır. Ve bunların Tahtacı denmesinin sebebi de aslında, Osmanlı 
döneminde Osmanlı donanmasını yapmak için bunların buralarda odun kesip, saraya 
odun göndermelerinden kaynaklanır. Yoksa Türkmen’dirler, Alevidirler. Çok bakir 
bir yaşamları vardır, daha çok araştırma yapılmamıştır. Daha çok derinlemesine 
işlenmemiştir. Keşke haberim olsaydı da, Tahtacılar Derneği'nin Başkanı Mehmet 
Şahin abimiz var, onunla da görüşebilirdiniz. Onun bürosu vardır, kendisi mali 
müşavirdir, bizim derneğimizin de denetleme kurulu başkanıdır. Aynı zamanda 
bizim genel merkezin de yönetim kurulu üyesidir. Çok yetkindir bu konuda. Onun 
için haddimi aşmak istemiyorum. Şimdi köylerde zaten köy şeyi farkı çok kalmadı. 
İnanın buradaki görüşmelerimiz ne ise benim köyümde de aynı şey oluyor. 
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Komşuluk ilişkileri aynı oranda gelişiyor. Onun için bu farklıların çok bariz 
olduğunu söyleyemeyiz yani. 
DD: Tabi etkileşim çağında, iletişim çağında yaşıyoruz zaten. Kopukluk 
soyutlanmak gibi bir şey sözkonusu değil. 
TK: Kesinlikle. Ayrıca şu var, Alevi toplumu, inanın Anadolu'daki Alevilerin yüzde 
yetmişi şuan dünyanın çeşitli ülkelerinde yaşıyor. Bugün Avrupa’da, İngiltere’de, 
Avustralya’da, Kanada’da. Ve şuna inanabiliyor musunuz, Kanada hükümeti sadece 
Alevi olduğu için oturma ve çalışma izni veriyor. Yani bir çok insanımız orada, 
onun içinde etkileşim olmaması mümkün değil. 
DD: Peki ibadetlerden bahsedecek olursak, benim ismen duyduğum, hakkında çok 
bilgi sahibi olmadığım, örneğin dört kapı kırk makam var, müsaiplik kavramı var, 
işte cem ayini ve oruçlar var, muharrem oruçları, bunların dışında dört kitabın 
kaynak olarak kullanıldığı bilgisine ulaştım ben. Ve bunlar dışında hadisler, 
buyruklar, nechülbelaga ve melakip nameler diye bir kaynağa ulaştım. Bunlar 
hakkında kısaca bilgi verebilir misiniz? 
TK: Tabii ki. Şimdi bizim ibadet şeklimiz tamamen Şaman kökenli olduğunu 
söyledik. Yani müzik ve raks şeklinde ibadet yaparız. Onun da kökeni şudur, bizim 
fikrimize göre evrende durağan statik hiçbirşey yoktur. Herşey hareket halindedir. 
Bakın, gökyüzündeki cisimlere bakın, uydulara bakın, hepsi hareket. Yani biz onu 
şöyle söylüyoruz; bütün evren semah döner. Anlatabiliyor muyum? Bütün evren 
semah dönüyor. Onun için semah bizim ibadetimizin son noktasıdır. Tanrı ile 
bütünleşmek için, cemlerimizi yaparız. Cemlerimiz sadece ibadet de değildir. Onu 
da belki açmam lazım bu konuda. Cemlerden önce biz muhabbet meclisleri açarız. 
Bunun anlamı şudur; halkın bir problemi bir sorunu varsa, orada halka arz edilir. 
Halk onun sorunu konusunda bir çözüm üretir ve onun sorununu çözer. Eğer yoksa, 
şikayetler varsa şikayetler çözülür orada, istekler varsa, arzular varsa onlar orada 
dile getirilir. Muhabbet meydanından sonra bizim ibadetimizin ikinci kısmıda, bu 
kerbela olayından daha çok etkilenmiştir. Kerbela olayı ile ilgili deyişler çalınır. 
Dede dualarını okur. Ve ondan sonrada semah dediğimiz, raks dediğimiz semah 
döneriz en son. Oradada tanrı ile bütünleşiriz. Yani şöyle ki, tabii biz onu folklorik 
olarak yapıyoruz. Öyle birşey vardı ki ben gözümle gördüm, yetmiş yaşında bir 
insan, yüz yaşında bir insan, yetmişbeş kiloluk bir adam yüz kiloluk bir adamı elinde 
alıp böyle semah döndüğünü biliyorum. Buda nerden geliyor, manevi bir şey, yani 
trans durumuna geçme, tanrı ile bütünleşme. Artık orada kendi değil, başka birşey 
oluyor orada. Yani böyle bir ibadet şeklimiz var. Dört kapı kırk makam. Bizim dört 
tane kapı var. Bizim amacımız şu; kamil insan olmak. Kamil insan olmanın da dört 
tane basamağı vardır. İlki şeriat kapısıdır. Şeriat kapısında şeriata gireriz. Tarikat 
kapısında tarikata gireriz. Tarikatta yol, yöntem, edep, erkan öğreniriz. Marifete 
geçeriz. Marifette de tanrının verdiği o güzellikleri kavramak, onları paylaşmak, 
onları bütün dünyayı bütün yaratınları, işte bu on sekiz bin alem diyoruz ya, Rabbül 
Alemin diyorlar ya, işte on sekiz bin alemin yaratıcısının o olduğunu ve ona hürmet, 
sadık kalmak gerektiğini biz o kapıdan öğreniriz. Zaten burada da bunları geçtikten 
sonrada sır-ı hakikat dediğimiz, tanrı ile bütünleşme, kamil insan olma basamağına 
erişiriz. Onun içinde her kapımızın on tane maddesi vardır. Anayasa maddesi vardır. 
İşte şeriatta on tane maddesini yerine getireceksiniz. Tarikatın on maddesi var onu 
yerine getireceksiniz. Efendim marifetin on tanesi var ve en sonda sır-ı hakikatin. 
Zaten o basağımı çıktıktan sonrada siz insan olmuyorsunuz, melek oluyorsunuz.  
DD: Kamil insan denilen olguya o dördüncü kapıdan sonra mı eriliyor? 
TK: Evet. En son kapı dördüncü kapıdır, ondan sonra kamil insansınız demektir. 
Eğer o kırk maddeyi başarı ile geçmiş olduktan sonra artık üniversiteden mezun 
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oluyorsunuz. En üst aşamaya geliyorsunuz, kamil insan oluyorsunuz. İnsan-ı kamil 
diyoruz. Yani güzel insan olmakta, dünyayı tek gözle görmek. Dünyanın bütün 
canlıların bir yurdu olduğunu bilmek, bütün canlılara, börtü böcek çiçeğe bile saygı 
duymak demektir. 
DD: Peki Tanrı anlayışı nedir? Ben buraya gelmeden önce bir çok makaleye 
ulaşmaya çalıştım konuyla ilgili, orada örneğin Sünni inancındaki gibi günahtır gibi, 
asık suratlı bir tanrı kavramının olmadığına inanılıyor. Hatta şiirlerden bir tanesinde, 
kılıçtan ince köprü yaptık, erkeksen sen geç gibi bir şey olduğunuda söylemişlerdi 
bana, Ercan Bey anlatmıştı bunu da bana.  
TK: Umarım doğru anlatmışlardır. Ben onu tekrar anlatabilirim size. Şimdi bizim 
tanrı kavramımız, bir ailenin reisi kimdir; babadır. Eğer babaya siz nasıl gözle 
bakarsınız. Ya baba sizin her şeyinizdir. Rızkınızı getirir, sizi korur, sizi kollar, 
giydirir, evinizi çatınızı yapar, ekmeğinizi...baba anne bunların hepsidir. Yaratıcıdır. 
Şimdi ben babamdan ben bir hata yaptığım zaman beni bir kazana koyup 
haşlayacağını düşünebilir misiniz? Böyle bir şey olabilir mi? Biz onun için diyoruz 
ki biz tanrıdan korkmayız, niye korkalım. Biz seviyoruz çünkü onun da bizi 
sevdiğini biliyoruz. Sevgi ile yaklaşıyoruz, bu çok önemli. İkincisi, biz herşeye 
hakkaten eleştirel gözle bakarız. Bu inandığımız veya inanmadığımızdan değildir. 
Bizim kafamıza bir şey takıldığında biz onu eleştirmekten geri kalmayız. Bakın bir 
imam, cemaatten bin kişiye namaz kıldırır. Hutbe verir. Bazısı da ne derse desin o 
toplum amin der. Çünkü orada bir şey vardır. Yani biat kültürü vardır. Bizde biat 
kültürü yoktur. Biz sorgulayıcıyız. Bilimin de gelişmesinde esas meselelerde oradan, 
çünkü korkulan adam. Mesela bir Alman bilim adamı diyor, insan hayatını iki şey 
etkiler diyor; biri merak, biri korku. Korku dinleri doğurur, merak bilimi doğurur. 
Şuna da inanıyoruz; Kuran’ın ilk ayeti "Oku!". Hazreti Muhammed’e bakıyoruz 
diyor ki, "Bana bir harf öğretenin kırk yıl kölesi olurum" diyor. Hazreti Ali’ye 
bakıyoruz, diyor ki "İlim Çin de ise git öğren". Hacı Bektaş’a bakıyoruz, diyor ki, 
"İlimden gidilmeyen yol karanlıktır." En son Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ümüze 
bakıyoruz, diyor ki; "Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir." Mürşit Alevilikte en üst 
kademe, yani en üst yol göstericidir, hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir, fendir diyor. 
Burada öğrendiğimiz; bir, ilimden bilimden gideceğiz. İki, şuna da inanıyoruz 
belirteyim, Allah bizi o kadar güzel yaratmış ki, herşeyi vermiş bize, vicdan vermiş, 
duygu vermiş düşünce koymuş, mahkeme koymuş buraya hakimi var savcısı var. 
Örnek, ben bir kötülük yapacağım, vicdan diyor ki yahu sen bu kızcağıza niye 
kötülük yapıyorsun kardeşim. Ne yaptı bu kızcağız sana? Ben yapacağım o beni 
engelliyor. Şimdi biz Allah’ın bize lütfettiği o makinayı akıllıca kullanırsak bizim 
hiç kimseye ihtiyacımız yoktur. Ne hacıya, ne hocaya, ne dedeye, ne Şıh’a. Ama biz 
onu eğer doğru bir yöntemle kullanamazsak birilerine ihtiyaç duyuyoruz. İşte bizim 
Alevilikte Allah’ın verdiği o lütfu o makinayı doğru kullanmak gibi bir düşüncemiz 
var. Sorgularız onun için. Bundan hiçbir zamanda yılmayız. Mesela İslamiyet’in 
içerisinde gördüğümüz eksiklikleri tarih boyunca, o Bektaşi fıkraları boşuna çıkmadı. 
Benim size gücüm yetmiyor, siz üç kişisiniz ben bir kişiyim. Siz bana bir şey 
diyorsunuz, bende size, hem sizi kırmadan, hem dökmeden, hem de düşüncenizin 
yanlış olduğunu size belirterek fıkra olarak sunuyorum. Bir de tanrı kavramında çok 
hassas davranıyoruz. Tanrının insanlara böyle bir şey yapacağına asla inanmıyoruz. 
Mesela sırat köprüsünü kabul etmez. Diyor ki, ya tanrı böyle bir şey yapamaz, böyle 
bir şey olmaz çünkü hem bilime akla aykırıdır, hem de Allah’ın bütün alemlerin 
yaratıcısı olan Allah beni niye sınasın. Benim her şeyimi bilen, kaderimi yazan biri 
beni niye bir de köprüden geçirsin değil mi? Onun için diyor ki, kıldan köprü 
yaptırmışsın gelsin kullar geçsin diye, hele bir şöyle duralım yiğit isen geç aslanım 
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diyor. Yani bir şöyle duralım, erkeksen sen geç diyor. Bunu tanrıya diyor. Bakın bu 
felsefe, bu düşünce o çok önemlidir. Yani orda bir Allah’a hakaret falan söz konusu 
değil. Orada Allah’ı yüceltiyor. Allah’ın kendi yarattığı kullara böyle bir şey 
yapmayacağı inancı hakim. Bilmiyorum dağıttık konuyu biraz ama. 
DD: Ben dinliyorum daha detaylı bilgiye ulaşıyorum. Dönem içerinde Ömer 
Hayyam’ında rubailerinden bir tanesinde ‘beni benim gibi cezalandıracaksan senin 
benden farkın ne?’ diye yazılmış bir şeyi var. 
TK: Evet, çok doğru. Günah konusunda da Ömer Hayyam’ın şeyi var, diyor ki; 
‘demişler Hayyam bilmez haram ile helali’, ben haram ile helali diyor hiç 
karıştırmam. Dost ile içilen şarap helaldir, puşt ile içilen su bile haram. Şimdi 
felsefenin içine girdiğiniz zaman, ama biz yüzeysel bilgilerimizle maalesef 
toplumumuzu takip ediyoruz. Birbirimizi yargılıyoruz, bilmeden etmeden, kalp 
kırıyoruz ama işin içine girmek lazım. Yani önce bilgi sahibi olacağız, sonra fikir 
üreteceğiz. Ama biz hiçbir bilgimiz yokken, toplumda fikir üretmeye kalkıyoruz o 
da maalesef böyle toplumsal facialara sebep oluyor. 
DD: Son dönemlerde artık Alevilik kimliği, veya genel olarak Türkiye’de kimlikler 
konusunda bir ön plana çıkma sözkonusu. Bununla ilgili Avrupa Birliği ilerleme 
raporlarındaki durum göz önünde bulunduruluyor, örneğin 2009, 2010 yıllarında 
Alevilik üzerine çok geniş bir araştırmaya yer verdi Avrupa Birliği’de, bunun 
dışında hükümet tarafından yürütülen bir alevi çalıştayı vardı,  2 yıllık bir 
çalışmaydı ve bununla ilgili bir rapor yayınlandı. Bu son dönemde atılan adımlar 
sizce somut adımlar mıdır? Gerçekten bir sonuca varacağına inanıyor musunuz? 
Veya bu çalıştay raporu tatmin edici bir sonuç mudur? Bu konudaki fikirleriniz? 
TK: Biz kesinlikle bunların tatmin edici olduklarına kesinlikle inanmıyoruz. Çünkü 
neden inanmıyoruz? Yani biz somut olan şeye bakarız. Yani Alevi çalıştayları var 
yapılıyor, kimler çağrılıyor, kimler nasıl konuşturuluyor. İşte Alevilik müfredata 
girecekmiş, yok efendim Diyanet de size pay ayrılacakmış. Biz böyle bir şeyin 
derdinde bile değiliz. Biz buna yüzyıllarca karşı çıkmışız. Bir sürü bedel ödemişiz. 
Biz şunu söylüyoruz, biz devletten beş kuruş istemiyoruz. Biz kendi grubumuzun, 
ekibimizin, düşüncemizin finansmanını kendimiz yaparız. Bizde bir lokma bir hırka 
kriteri vardır. Yani bizim dünya malında çok gözümüz de yok. Efendim kendileri en 
güzel Müslümanlar oğluna gemicik alıyor. Bu Müslüman olacak cennete gidecek, 
benim gibi gariban bir dikili ağacı olmayan ben de cehenneme gideceğim. Niye? 
Düşüncemden dolayı. Böyle bir şeyi kabul etmemiz mümkün değil. İkincisi, Avrupa 
Birliği'nin de Türkiye konusunda çok ikili oynadığı kanaatindeyim. Yani ben hep 
şuna inandım. Biz bu devleti kurarken onlarla savaşarak kurduk. Onların bizlere iyi 
gözle bakması, Alevileri korumak gibi bir şeyin içine girmesine ben kesinlikle 
inanmam. Hatta bizi azınlıklar statüsüne koymak istediler, azınlık haklarından 
faydalanalım diye. İyi de biz azınlık olsak, kimsenin yüzüne bakamayız. Biz onu 
kabul etmiyoruz. Biz bu ülkenin kurucu unsurlarıyız, asli unsurlarız çünkü bu 
devleti kuran da biziz. Biz Türk halkıyız. Onun için bana çok inandırıcı gelmiyor. 
Özür dilerim. 
DD: Genel olarak aldığım cevap hep zaten bu konuda, hatta ilk açıklamalardan bir 
tanesi; devlet Vatikan değildir şeklinde açıklamalar yapıldı, bazı bölgesel dernek 
başkanları tarafından, bununla ilgili olarak sormak istedim ben. Tam buraya 
geleceğim vakit bu çalıştay raporu hazırlandı. Çok somut bir adım olarak 
görülmediğini söylediler genel olarak. Hatta şey söylediler, bunu tartışırken bile 
Aleviliği tanımlamak istediler, Alevilik bir başkasının tanımlayacağı bir şey değildir 
dediler. Bunu yaparken de yine ilahiyat profesörlerinin çağrıldığını, Sünni 
düşüncenin hakim olduğu profesörlerin bu çalıştayı hazırladığını söylediler. Bu da 
! 380!
tepki toplayan durumlardan bir tanesi.  
TK: Tabii yani, benim gözümle, ben nasıl düşünüyorsam öyle Alevi olun derseniz 
biz zaten bunu olmayız. Yüzyıllarca olmamışız. Yani bize birilerinin lütfetmesine 
gerek yok. Biz bu ülkenin vatandaşıyız, istediğimiz gibi yaşayabiliyoruz. Cem 
evlerimiz kabul edilmiyor, valla çok da umurumuzda değil. Kabul edilse de 
yaşıyoruz, edilmese de yaşıyoruz. Devlet desin ki yetmiş milyon vatandaşımızın 
yirmi yirmi beş milyonu Alevidir desin. Ama yirmibeş milyon insanın, benim 
verdiğim vergi ile sen beş tane bakanlığın bütçesine eşit olan bir diyanete para 
veriyorsun, ben haram ediyorum onu sana, ve sen orada, örneğin ben bir cemevi 
yapacağım. Bakın iki tane cemevi yaptırsın ben karşı çıkarım. Niye? Çünkü 
saygınlığı biter. Ama sen her mahalleye yirmi tane cami yapıyorsun. İran Islam 
Cumhuriyeti 24.000 cami var, benim ülkem sosyal hukuk devletidir, laiktir, 86.000 
cami var. Bizim dediğimiz şu, yani bu kadar, Alevi yaşıyor benim ülkemde, bunlar 
vatandaşlarım, bunların ibadet haneside örneğin bir arsanın planlaması yapılırken, 
cami yeri, okul, sağlık ocağı...e niye cami kardeşim? Biz de diyoruz ki, cemevi, 
cami, okul sağlık ocağı. Biz en azından her şehirde bir tane olmalı diyoruz. Bizim 
bütün ibadetlerimiz Türkçedir. Arzumuz şudur devletimizden, bizim cemevimiz 
herşehirde mümkünse bir tane, Alevilerin yaşadıkları yerlerde bir tane olsun, kendi 
ibadetimizi kendi içimizde yaşayalım. Yani biz bağırıp çağırıp gürültü kirliliği de 
yapmıyoruz, sabah beşte ezan okutup da bütün bebeleri yataklarını da hoplatmıyoruz. 
Buna da şimdi devletimiz çok birşeyler söylüyor işte, şöyledir böyledir. Biz onu da 
istemiyoruz.  
DD: Şimdi zaten devletten taleplerinizden bahsettik. Diyanet dedik, diyanete 
eleştirel bir bakış açısı.... 
TK: Eleştiriyoruz, kaldırılsın diyemiyoruz çünkü gücümüz yetmez. Devletin varlığı 
diyanettir, Diyanet ortadan kalkarsa bu iktidarlar iktidara gelemezler. Arzumuz laik 
devlette din kurumu olmaz. Ben Alevi isem, kendi cemevimi kendi cebimden 
finansa ederim, siz de farklı inançtaysanız kendi cemiyetinizi kendiniz idare 
edersiniz. Devlette ne olur? Bakar denetler, gözetler. 
DD: Onun dışında mesela din kültürü dersleri de aynı şekilde bir sorun, bunun 
dışında devletten talep, beklenti olan şeyleri sıralamanız mümkün müdür acaba? 
TK: Bizim esas, çok müzdarip olduğumuz şeylerin başında, bu din derslerinin 
zorunlu olması vardır. Hiçbir laik ülkede, laik devlette din dersi diye bir şey yoktur. 
Keşke şöyle birşey olsa, bu da çok önemli, bunu lütfen yazın, gittiğiniz yerde de 
söyleyin. Yani dinler tarihi olsa, her din öğretilse biz ona saygı duyarız şapka 
çıkarırız. Ama bin yıldır ben mücadele etmişim, Aleviliğimi korumak için ama 
şimdi din dersleri mecbur olmuş, benim çocuğumun genç dimağına Sünniliğin 
Hanefi mezhebini aşılamaya çalışıyorlar.  
DD: Namazlar, dualar... 
TK: Evet. Geçen gün bir okulumuzda demiş, abdestinizi alın yarın gelin camiye 
götüreceğiz. Tabii biz burada müdürü aradık, okula gittik, dedik kardeşim noluyor 
falan. Valiye çıktık, vali ile görüştük. Mücadele ediyoruz ama istiyoruz ki.... 
DD: Örneğin mesela valiye gittik dediniz, size ne şekilde cevap verdiler. 
TK: Çok nazik karşıladılar, vali yardımcısı konuştu, böyle bir şeyin olamayacağına, 
zaten kanunu yok. Sen benim çocuğumu okul dışına çıkaramazsın. Anlayışla 
karşılandı, bir daha böyle bir şeyin olmayacağını, hatta müdür bey de bu öğretmen 
işgüzarlığı falan filan... bizim istediğimiz hakikaten, dinler tarihi okutulsun. Din 
kültürü olsun, ahlak olsun. Biz onların altında neler olduğunu hepsini biliyoruz, 
anlatmaya gerek yok. Dinler tarihi öğretilsin, ahlak bilgisi zaten bizim kültürümüzün 
temeli, hedefi ahlaktır. Ahlaksız bir toplum olur mu? Bütün dinlerin temeli bu. Bu 
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olsun. Bütün inançların temelinde bu yatar. İyi insan olmak, toplumsal düzeni 
sağlamak. Efendim birincisi bu. İkincisi, bizim cemevlerimizi camiye alternatif gibi 
görmesinler. Yani bugün Mersin'de kaç cami var bilmiyorum, belki yüzün 
üzerindedir. Ama bir tane cemevimiz vardır. Ne kimse ile bir derdimiz var. Bakın üç 
yüze yakın Sünni vatandaşımız üye bizim derneğe. Buraya gelen cenazelere biz 
Sünni, Alevi diye bakmayız. Elimizden geleni yaparız. Bizim o tür insanlarımızla, 
arkadaşlarımızla, kardeşlerimizle, yurttaşlarımızla hiçbir problem yaşamayız, 
yaşamadık. Öyle bir şey asla olmaz, yeter ki devlet bizi rahat bıraksın. Yani devletin 
baskısından biz huzursuz oluyoruz. O gün bizim şey geldi, müftümüz geldi, tayini 
çıkmış, kutlu doğum haftası dolayısıyla bizi davete gelmiş sağolsun, kibarca nazikçe 
çayımızı içtik, sohbet ettik, konuştuk ettik.. yani kimse ile bir derdimiz yok. Bizim 
iki şeyde şeyimiz var. Bir, cemevlerimizin, Alevilerin ibadethanesi ya da Alevi 
kültürünün merkezi olarak kabul edilmesi, bunun anayasal güvence altına alınması. 
İkincisi de çocuklarımıza istemediğimiz bir dinin, meshebin öğretilmemesi. 
DD: Bu cemevlerinin kapatılması da zaten, tekke zaviye ve türbelerin kapatılması 
kanununa takıldığını söylüyorlar. Bu konuda bir çözüm öneriniz var mı? Cemevleri 
Alevi halkın ibadet yeri olarak kabul edilsin, merkez olarak kabul edilsin, ancak 
bunun dışında varolan bir kanun var. Çözüm öneriniz nedir? Sonuçta kanunsal bir 
engele takıldığı söyleniyor devlet tarafından. 
TK: Kesinlikle doğru söylenilmiyor. Yani o dönemde tekke ve zaviyeler kanunu 
çıkarılması elzemdi. Bütün Bektaşi tekkeleri, zaviyeleri hepsi kapatıldı. O zaman 
Ulusoy, Atatürk’e teşekkür yazısı göndermiştir. Çünkü Atatürk o dönemde 
ümmetten bir millet yaratıyordu. Din unsuru söz konusu değildi. Biz artık Alevi, 
Sünni falan filan demekten ziyade Türk vatandaşıyız. "Aha da kimliğimiz!" deme 
özgürlüğüne kavuştuk. O bizi çok mutlu etti. Zaten şimdiki mutluluğumuz da odur. 
Yani bana Alevi denmiş, Sunni denmiş çok da umrumda değil. Biz Atatürk’ün özgür 
yurttaşları olarak yaşamak istiyoruz. Tekke ve zaviyeler kanunu neden çıktı? Madem 
bu kadar kanuna düşkün devletimiz, devlet demiyorum ben devlet benim başımın 
tacı, hükümetimiz, hükümetlerimiz madem kanuna bu kadar şeyler, niye şapka 
kanununa muhalefet ediyorlar? Niye türbanla geziyorlar, bilmem kara çarşafla 
geziyorlar? Efendim onların hepsine şey var da, Alevilerin cemevi için mi tekke ve 
zaviyeler kanunu var. Bunlar ikiyüzlülük yapıyorlar. Kesinlike böyle bir şey yoktur. 
Yani 24 saat içinde beş tane kanun çıkaran hükümet, tekke ve zaviyeler kanununu 
mu değiştiremeyecek. Biz inanmıyoruz. Samimiyetlerine inanmıyoruz. Burada bir 
art niyet var. Onunda bilincindeyiz, çokta umurumuzda değil.  
DD: Ben sizin söylediklerinizi gayet net bir şekilde anlayabiliyorum. 
Söylediklerinizi, söylemek istediklerinizi... 
TK: Yani evet bazı şeyleri söyleyemiyorum ama siz anlıyorsunuz... 
DD: Peki örneğin ben orta ikinci sınıftaydım biz buraya taşındığımızda, bir 
arkadaşım vardı çok kısa bir süre sonra ortada hiçbirşey yokken gelip bana, "Didem 
biz Aleviyiz." dedi. "Tamam." dedim. Ve şu anda doktor, gayet görev yapıyor. Ve 
Didem biz Aleviyiz dedi, ben onun ne demek olduğunu bilmediğim için, çünkü daha 
13-14 yaşındaydım, tamam dedim. Akşam geldim "Baba, Alevi ne demek?" dedim. 
Tabii bir şaşırdılar, nereden çıktı bu soru diyerekten. İşte böyle böyle dediler. Farklı 
düşüncelere sahip bir dindir, onlar da inanıyor falan filan gibi bir açıklama yapıldı. 
Ondan sonra ‘o zaman biz neyiz’ durumu ortaya çıktı. Ertesi gün ben sordum, sen 
bana bunu niye söyledin; "Birgün duyarsan şok olma, bana küsme." dedi. Çocuktuk. 
O zaman dedim ki demekki bir ayrımcılık söz konusu. Bunun hala var olduğunu 
söyleyebilir miyiz? Ne kadar iletişim çağında da yaşasak, geçmiş günümüze 
değişiklik veya şu anda hala var olan olumsuzluk, negatif ayrımcılık gibi bir durum 
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söz konusu mudur? 
TK: Şimdi dar çerçevelerde bunun hala böyle olduğunu duyuyoruz, yaşıyoruz da. 
Tabii bizim Türkiye genelinde 120’ye yakın sadece Alevi kültür derneklerimiz var, 
onlarla irtibat halindeyiz. Zaman zaman duyuyoruz ama bu çok düşük seviyededir. 
Yani çok şükür ki biz artık toplumumuzda böyle bir problem yaşamıyoruz. Yani 
girdiğimiz toplumda evet Aleviyim ben diyebiliyorum. Öbür insanlar da benim 
onlara gösterdiğim gibi onlar da bana saygı gösteriyorlar. Ben dediğim zaman yani 
toplum olarak düşünün tabi ki. Böyle bir sıkıntı çok şükür yaşamıyoruz. Fakat bizim 
hükümetlerle problemimiz var. Onlar bu ayrımı yapıyorlar zaman zaman. Bir de dar 
bölgede yaşan insanlarımız arasında zaman zaman böyle şeyler duyuyoruz ama çok 
da önemsemiyoruz. Çünkü artık toplumumuz hakketen bu konuda aydınlandı. 
İletişim çağındayız. Artık insanlarımız dünyanın ne olduğunu biliyorlar. Toplumun 
ne olduğunu biliyorlar. Artık internet girdi evlerimize, televizyonlar girdi en ücra 
dağların başına... yani insanlar toplumu dünyayı tanıyor artık. O dar şeyden çıktık. 
Yani oluyorsa dahi çok önemsizdir, çok alt düzeydedir. 
DD: Çok teşekkür ederim. Sormak istediğim herşeyi sordum. Çok sağolun vakit 
ayırdığınız için. 
TK: Sizler de sağolun 
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